William of Germany Part 11

Enough perhaps has been said to show that the sending of the telegram had nothing to do with the Emperor's "impulsive" character, and it will only be fair to him to let the notion that it had drop finally out of contemporary history. As an act of State it was in consonance with German policy at the time. That policy, if it did not look to acquiring possession of the Transvaal, may very well have looked to enlisting the sympathies and friendship of the Dutch in South Africa, and finding in them and their country a field for German enterprise and a market for German goods; and there was therefore nothing impulsive, however mistaken the act may have been as a matter of foreign policy, in the German Government's congratulating President Kruger on successful resistance to a private raid.

We have suggested that the telegram was partly due to a certain element of chivalry in the Emperor's character. The Emperor was well acquainted with other forms of government and other social systems besides his own, and though a Hohenzollern could put himself in the position of the chief of the little Boer republic, threatened as he was with annihilation by a mighty and powerful opponent. Moreover, there is always to be remembered the sympathy of view, particularly of religious view, that existed in the two men as regarded their att.i.tude and duties to their respective "folk." The President had appealed to the Emperor for help. The Emperor had had to refuse it, but had wired that he would do all he could "diplomatically." He knew that this was but a poor sort of a.s.sistance, but it was something, and when the Raid occurred he gave the diplomatic a.s.sistance he had promised by sending a telegram of congratulation. In any case--_tempi pa.s.sati_. Foreign policy is not concerned with sympathies or antipathies, and the whole episode should be ignored, or, better still, forgotten.

The Kruger telegram, it turned out, was to usher in a long period of tension between two countries of the same race, singularly alike in their ideals of whatever is sound and praiseworthy in Christian civilization, and almost equally mutual admirers of the fundamental features of each other's national character. Unfortunately, along with these fundamental features of the English and German national characters, the love of money, the _auri sacra fames_, has to be reckoned with, and in the race of nations for wealth and power the fundamental qualities are apt, for a time, to be overborne and cease to act. The rise of the modern German Empire to power and prosperity, and the new world-situation thus created, largely by the Emperor, is at the bottom of Anglo-German tension. As a main contributory cause of both the power and the prosperity, was the creation of the German navy at the period of which we write.

The following is a parable which he who runs may read:--

In a certain town, with a large and heterogeneous population, there was once a "monster" shop. The firm (there were three partners) had been established for hundreds of years, had thrown out several branches, and by hard work, enterprise, and honesty had acquired a leading position in the trade of the town: so much so, indeed, that as time went on it had also come to do the carriage and delivery of goods for most of the smaller shops, though some of these were large houses themselves and the majority of them in a fair way of business. The smaller shops were naturally a little jealous of the "monster," and it was the dream of every owner of them to enlarge his premises and become the proprietor of an equally great emporium as the "monster."

One day, therefore, a little cl.u.s.ter of shops, at some distance from the "monster," suddenly resolved to form a combination, and after settling a dispute with a neighbour in consideration of a sum of money and a fruitful tract of land, issued the prospectus of the new company and began to do business on modern lines.

Almost from the very beginning the new company was a great success: its situation was central; the company inspired its members with enterprise and spirit; it was industrious, energetic, and splendidly organized; and at last it began to cut into the trade of the old-established "monster."

Compet.i.tion might have gone on in the ordinary way had not the new company made a departure in business methods that gradually roused special uneasiness among the members of the "monster" firm. Hitherto the latter had its delivery vans travel all over the town, and so well was this part of its system carried on that the firm acquired all but a monopoly of carrying and delivery. The new company, however, now began to do a little in the same line, whereupon the "monster" took to building a superior type of van much more powerful and imposing, if also much more expensive, than the one previously in use. The new company naturally followed suit, and in a surprisingly short time had built, or had under construction, several vans of an exactly similar kind.

The "monster" saw the new departure of their rivals at first with curiosity, then with contempt, then with anxiety, and finally with suspicion and alarm. At the time of writing the alarm appears to have abated, but a good deal of the suspicion remains. The town is the world, the "monster"

Great Britain, and the rival company the modern German Empire.

It would require the Emperor himself properly to tell the story of his creation of the modern German navy, and if he has a right to call any part of his people's property his own, he is justified in speaking, as he invariably does, of "my navy." As Prince William, his interest in the subject may have been originally due, as has been seen, to his partly English parentage, his frequent visits to England, and the fact that his physical disability threatened to prevent him taking an active part in the more strenuous duties of the soldier. It is very probable that it was in the region that cradled the British navy the idea of a great German navy was conceived by him. We have seen that the Emperor, as Prince William, showed his enthusiasm in the matter by delivering lectures on it in military circles, though it was not his lot, but that of his brother Henry, to be a.s.signed the navy as a profession. In his Order to the Navy on ascending the throne, he spoke of the "lively and warm interest" that bound him to the navy, shortly afterwards issued directions for a new marine uniform on the English model, and caused the introduction into the Lutheran Church service of a special prayer for the arm. He gave a parliamentary soiree at the New Palace in Potsdam, and before allowing his Conservative and National Liberal guests to sit down to supper, made them listen to a lecture which occupied two hours, giving particular attention, with the aid of maps and plans, to the battle of the Yalu between the fleets of China and j.a.pan. He founded the Technical Shipbuilding Society, and took, and takes, an animated part in its proceedings, suggesting positions for the guns, the disposition of armour, the dimensions of submarines, and a hundred other details. In 1908 he delivered an after-dinner lecture at the "Villa Achilleion" in Corfu on Nelson and the battle of Trafalgar, based on the writings of Captain Mark Kerr of the _Implacable_, at which the situations of the French, English, and Spanish fleets were sketched by the imperial hand. To his admiration for the writings of Captain Mahan his persistence in enlarging the fleet is said largely to be due. He is, of course, a.s.sisted by a host of able experts, among whom Admiral von Tirpitz--the ablest German since Bismarck, many Germans say--is the most distinguished; but as he is his own Foreign Minister and own Commander-in-Chief, he is, in the fullest sense, his own First Lord of the Admiralty.

The Emperor closed one of his naval lectures with an anecdote which the papers reported next day as being received with "stormy amus.e.m.e.nt." It was about the metacentrum, the centre of gravity in ship construction. The Emperor told of his having asked an old sea lieutenant to explain to him the metacentrum. "I received the answer,"

said the Emperor, "that he did not know very exactly himself--it was a secret. 'All I can say is,' the old seaman went on, 'that if the metacentrum was in the topmast, the ship would over-turn.'" The success of a jest, one is told, lies in the ear of the hearer.

Possibly something of the "stormy amus.e.m.e.nt" may have been called forth by the reflection that the imperial metacentrum had on occasion got misplaced.

In addition to the natural and accidental predispositions of the Emperor, certain general considerations, which imposed themselves irresistibly on all men's attention as the century drew to its close, impelled him to more energetic action. A student of the history of other countries as well as his own, and a watchful observer of the tendencies of the time, he felt that the young Empire was incomplete as long as it was without a navy corresponding in size and power to its army, the organization of which had been completed. With its army alone he regarded the Empire as a colossus, no doubt, but a colossus standing on one leg, and was convinced that if the Empire was to be a success it must have a navy at least able to withstand attack by any of his continental neighbours and potential enemies.

On ascending the throne the Emperor was naturally most occupied with the internal situation of his new inheritance, and spent a good deal of his time railing at Social Democracy and the press, explaining the nature of his Heaven-appointed kingship, and rousing his somewhat lethargic people to a sense of their power and possibilities; but he found a moment in 1891 to write under a photograph he gave the retiring Postmaster-General Stephan:

"The world, at the end of the nineteenth century, stands under the star of commerce; commerce breaks down the barriers which separate the peoples and creates new relations between the nations."

Then the idea slumbered in his mind for a few years, while he continued to make his own people restless with criticism, perhaps deserved, of their sluggishness, their pessimism, their party strife, and foreign peoples equally restless with phrases like "_nemo me impune lacessit_"; until the idea came suddenly to utterance in 1897, when, on seeing the figure of Neptune on a monument to the Emperor William, he broke out: "The trident should be in our grip!" From this time, and for the next few years, the growth of the navy may be said to have never long been far from his thoughts. In sending Prince Henry to Kiautschau at the close of 1898 he made the remark that "imperial power means sea power, and sea power and imperial power are dependent on each other." Nine months afterwards at Stettin he used a phrase alone sufficient to keep his name alive in history: "Our future lies on the water!"

At Hamburg, in 1899, he laid emphasis on the changes in the world which justify a naval policy one can see now was almost inevitable.

"A strong German fleet," he said, "is a thing of which we stand in bitter need." And he continued:

"In Hamburg especially one can understand how necessary is a powerful protection for German interests abroad. If we look around us we see how greatly the aspect of the world has altered in recent years. Old-world empires pa.s.s away and new ones begin to arise. Nations suddenly appear before the peoples and compete with them, nations of whom a little before the ordinary man had been hardly aware. Products which bring about radical changes in the domain of international relations, as well as in the political economy of the people, and which in old times took hundreds of years to ripen, come to maturity in a few months. The result is that the tasks of our German Empire and people have grown to enormous proportions and demand of me and my Government unusual and great efforts, which can then only be crowned with success when, united and decided, without respect to party, Germans stand behind us. Our people, moreover, must resolve to make some sacrifice. Above all they must put aside their endeavour to seek the excellent through the ever more-sharply contrasted party factions. They must cease to put party above the welfare of the whole. They must put a curb on their ancient and inherited weakness--to subject everything to the most unlicensed criticism; and they must stop at the point where their most vital interests become concerned. For it is precisely these political sins which revenge themselves so deeply on our sea interests and our fleet. Had the strengthening of the fleet not been refused me during the past eight years of my Government, notwithstanding all appeals and warnings--and not without contumely and abuse for my person--how differently could we not have promoted our growing trade and our interests beyond the sea!"

Perhaps; but perhaps, too, it was as well for the peace of the world that Germany had no great war fleet during those eight years of troubled international relations, and that the gentle and adjusting hand of Providence, not the mailed fist of the Emperor, was guiding the destinies of nations.

Previous to the opening of the reign a German navy can hardly be said to have existed. Yet it should not be forgotten that Germany also has maritime traditions of no small interest, if of no great importance, to the world. The Great Elector, the ancestor of the Emperor who ruled Brandenburg from 1640 to 1688, was fully conscious of the profit his people might acquire by sea commerce, and the little navy of high-sea frigates which he built stood manfully, and often successfully, up to the more powerful navies of Sweden and Spain. This fleet was known, too, far away from Brandenburg, for the records tell how the Pope and the Maltese Knights and Louis XIV willingly admitted it to their harbours.

But there was lacking what until lately has always hemmed German progress--money; and the commercially-minded Dutch, a people themselves with many German characteristics, kept the Germans from the sea. Then came Frederick the Great, who ruled from 1740 to 1786, and those Germans who are fond of claiming Shakespeare for their own will also tell you that the plan drawn up by Frederick for Pitt's seven years' struggle with France--that plan so unfortunately imitated afterwards by the Emperor in his correspondence with Queen Victoria during the Boer War--was the foundation-stone of British naval supremacy! Frederick, too, saw the advantage of possessing a fleet, but he had his hands full with France and Russia, and reluctantly had to decline the offer of the French naval hero, Labourdonnais, to build him a battle-fleet. At this period, and in the Great Elector's time, Emden was the Plymouth of Prussia. When Frederick died, there followed that time of which Germans themselves are ashamed--the hole-and-corner time, the time when the parochial spirit was abroad and no German burgher saw beyond the village church and the village pump; the Biedermeier time (that comic figure of the German _Punch_), the time of genuine German philistinism, when the people were lapped in an idyllic repose and were content, as many are to-day, with the smallest and simplest pleasures.

This spirit continued until the early quarter of the nineteenth century, when Professor Frederick List roused the attention of his countrymen, and notably that of Bismarck, to the necessity of an independent national existence and a national economic policy. In 1836 a committee recommended naval coast protection, but it was not until 1848, when Denmark blockaded the German coast, that anything was done to provide for it. In that year the National a.s.sembly of delegates from various German Diets, which met at Frankfort, voted for the marine a million sterling to be levied on the German States, but only one-half of the money could be collected. Still, three steam frigates, one large and six small steam corvettes, and two sailing corvettes were got together, but in 1852, owing to the poverty of the States, two of the ships were sold to Prussia for 60,000 and the rest disposed of by auction at less than a fourth of their value. The officers and men were disbanded with a year's pay.

To this humiliating state of things Bismarck refers in his "Gedanken und Erinnerungen." "The German fleet," he writes,

"and Kiel harbour as a foundation for its inst.i.tution, were from 1848 on one of the most burning thoughts at whose fire German aspirations for unity were accustomed to warm themselves and to concentrate. Meanwhile, however, the hatred of my parliamentary opponents was stronger than the interest for a German fleet, and it seemed to me that the Progressive party at that time preferred to see the newly-acquired rights of Prussia to Kiel, and the prospect of a maritime future founded on its possession, rather in the hands of the auctioneer, Hannibal Fischer, than in those of a Bismarck Ministry."

From this on naval development in Prussia was slow; there was no interest for a marine either among the governing cla.s.ses or the people; but it was not wholly neglected, for Wilhelmshaven was acquired from the Duchy of Oldenburg, a small fleet was sent to the Orient with a view to obtaining commercial treaties and concessions, and a sum of 320,000 was devoted annually to naval requirements.

During the Danish War of 1864 a fleet of three screw corvettes, two paddle steamers, and a few gunboats was considered sufficient to protect the coasts and make a blockade impossible.

From 1885 onwards there had been several Navy Proposals, but it was in that of 1889, a year after the Emperor's accession, that the beginning of Germany's naval policy is to be found. In that Proposal it was announced that the Government intended to depart from the previous principles of naval policy which had "become antiquated owing to the progress of science and the character of future naval warfare, as also owing to the extension of Germany's oversea relations." Up to this time German maritime needs had invariably been postponed to military requirements. The necessity for a fleet was indeed recognized, but only for purposes of coast defence and the prevention of a blockade of the ports on the North Sea and Baltic. To this end no large fleet was considered needful, particularly as the war with France had demonstrated the futility of coast attack. During that war two small fleets were sent from Cherbourg to blockade the North Sea and Baltic coasts, but the admirals in charge found the task "impossible" and returned to France after a few single engagements with divided honours had occurred. At that time the German people felt entirely secure on the score of invasion. The numerous espionage incidents of more recent times prove that this feeling of security has entirely pa.s.sed away, and all countries are now armed as though they were to be invaded to-morrow.

Emperor William I did something, though not much, for the German navy.

Moltke was interested in it and proposed an armoured cruiser fleet, but he was thinking chiefly of coast defence. Roon also took up the matter and laid a Navy Bill before the Diet in 1865, but it was rejected because, in Virchow's words, the Diet thought "the Const.i.tution more important than the development of the army and navy." The war of 1866 showed the necessity of a fleet, and this time the Diet accepted Roon's proposals. Still, however, the object was coast defence; and when Emperor William I died the navy was relatively of no consideration. In the ten years between 1881 and 1891 only one armoured cruiser, the _Oldenburg_, was launched. With the accession of the Emperor, however, began a new, and for the Emperor and the Empire--why not candidly admit it?--a glorious chapter in German naval history.

An incident during the reign which really touched German national pride, and was one of the reasons which caused the Emperor to accelerate the building of a powerful fleet, was the eviction, if the term is not too strong, of the German admiral, Diedrich, by the Americans from the harbour of Manila in the course of the Spanish-American War. Admiral Dewey was in command of a blockading fleet at Manila. The ships of various nationalities, and among them some German warships, were in the harbour. Various causes of irritation arose between the Germans and Americans. There was talk of Spain's being desirous of selling the Philippines to Germany, and the impression got abroad in America that the Germans were inclined to behave as if they were already the new masters of the islands. The German warships kept going in and out of the harbour of Millesares, a village close to Manila, in connexion with the exchange of time-expired men, using search-lights, the American admiral thought, in an unnecessary way, and doing other acts which he considered might give information to blockade-running vessels.

In accordance with custom, the Germans, had at first supplied themselves with permits from the American admiral for crossing the blockade lines, but as time went on the German ships began to cross the line without them. Admiral Dewey thereupon issued an order that permits must be obtained. The German admiral sent his flag-lieutenant to Admiral Dewey to protest, on the ground that warships are exempt from blockade regulations. The American admiral's reply was to bring his fist down on his cabin table and say,

"Tell Admiral Diedrich, with my compliments, that he must obtain permits, and that if a German ship breaks the blockade lines without one it spells war, for I shall fire on the first vessel that attempts it."

The flag officer went back with the message, and Admiral Diedrich took his ships, which were greatly inferior in number to those of the Americans, out of the harbour.

The German navy, in contrast to the army, is a purely imperial inst.i.tution--an inst.i.tution, according to the Const.i.tution, "entirely under the chief command of the Kaiser," consequently in no respect administered or controlled by the federated kingdoms and states. One speaks of the "royal" army, but of the "imperial" navy. The Emperor is officially described as the navy's "Chef," superintends its organization and disposition, with his brother Prince Henry as Inspector-General, and appoints its officials and officers. He exercises his functions through the Marine Cabinet, a creation of his own, which serves as a connecting link between the Emperor and the Admiralty.

The legislative stages of the growth of the German navy have so far been five in number. The first Navy Law pa.s.sed the Reichstag on third reading, on March 28, 1898, 212 members voting for it and 139 against, in a Parliament of 397 members. It provided for the building of a fleet of seventeen battleships within a certain time, and fixed the age of the ships at twenty-five years. The new ships were divided into ships-of-the-line (a new designation), large armoured cruisers, and small armoured cruisers. This fleet, however, was not large enough to have any influence on sea politics or seaborne trade, and the occurrences of the Spanish-American War, just now begun and finished, determined the Emperor to make further proposals. A great agitation for the navy was started throughout the Empire, and on January 25, 1900, Admiral Tirpitz laid the second Navy Bill (a "Novelle," as it is called) before the Reichstag.

The new measure demanded a doubling of the fleet. The first fleet was intended chiefly with a view to coast defence, while the new fleet was to a.s.sure "the economic development of Germany, especially of its world-commerce." If the first Navy Bill had excited surprise and uneasiness in England, the sensations roused by the second may be imagined, not altogether because of the increase of German naval power, but of the power that would result when the new German navy was combined with the navies of Germany's allies of the Triplice. The third Navy Bill was a consequence of the Russo-j.a.panese War and of the lesson taught by the sea-fight of Tsuschima. It was laid before the Reichstag on November 28, 1905, for "a stronger representation of the Empire abroad." Its main object was to increase by almost one-half the size of the battleships, thus following the lead of England, which had decided on the new and famous "Dreadnought" cla.s.s of vessel, remarkable for its five revolving armoured turrets (instead of two previously) and the number of its heavy guns. Hitherto English warships had had an average tonnage of about 14,000 tons: the tonnage of the original "Dreadnought" was 18,300 tons. Notwithstanding the enormous nature of the financial demand (47,600,000 within eleven years) the Reichstag pa.s.sed the Bill on May 19, 1905. A torpedo fleet of 144 boats, in 24 divisions, was additionally provided for in this Bill.

The fourth Navy Bill was brought in in 1908, with the diminution of the age of the German battleship from twenty-five to twenty years as its princ.i.p.al aim. As a result the number of new ships to be built by 1912 was raised from six to twelve. The fifth and last Navy Bill was pa.s.sed last year, 1912, creating a third active squadron as reserve, made up of existing vessels and three new battleships. The German navy now consists of 41 battleships of the line, 12 large armoured cruisers, and 30 small armoured cruisers, the cruisers being for purposes of reconnaissance; the foreign-service fleet of 8 large and 10 small armoured cruisers; and an active reserve fleet of 16 battleships, 4 large and 12 small armoured cruisers.

Like sailors everywhere, the German sailor is a frank and hearty type of his race, and welcome wherever he goes. The German naval officer is usually of middle-cla.s.s extraction, while a slightly larger proportion of the officers of the army is taken from the _n.o.blesse_. He is a fine, frank, and manly fellow as a rule, and, like the Emperor, perfectly willing to admit that his navy is closely modelled on that of Great Britain. Moreover, in addition to a thorough knowledge of his profession, he is able, in two cases out of three, to converse with useful fluency in English, French, and in some cases Italian as well.

The navy, like the army, is recruited by conscription, but active service is for three years, as in the German cavalry and artillery, while only two years in the German infantry. Naturally young men of an adventurous turn of mind frequently elect for the navy, as they hope thereby to see something of the world. At the end of their third year of service they may go back to civil life as reservists or may "capitulate," that is, continue in active service for another year, and renew their "capitulation" thenceforward from year to year. The ordinary sailor receives (since 1912) the equivalent of 14s. 6d. in cash monthly and 9s. for clothing, but when at sea additional pay of 6s. a month. The result of the system of conscription is that about 40 per cent. of the fleet's crews consist of what may be called seasoned sailors, the remainder being three-year conscripts. The officer cla.s.s is recruited from young men who have pa.s.sed a certain school standard examination and enter the navy as cadets. The one-year-volunteer system (_Einjahriger Dienst_) only partially obtains in the navy, for purposes, namely, of coast defence and other services on land. After two years the cadet becomes a midshipman, and with five or six other middies serves for a year or so on board ship, when he becomes a sub-lieutenant and is promoted by seniority to full lieutenant, captain-lieutenant (the English naval lieutenant with eight years' service), corvette-captain (the English naval commander, with three stripes), frigate-captain (corresponding in rank to a lieutenant-colonel in the English army), and finally captain-at-sea (with four stripes), when he may get command of a battleship. To reach this great object of the German naval officer's ambition takes on an average twenty-four years, or about the same period as in the British navy.

The upper ranks, in ascending order, are contre-admiral (the English rear-admiral), vice-admiral, admiral, grand-admiral (English Admiral of the Fleet). There are only four grand-admirals in Germany, namely, the Emperor (as "Chef" of the navy), his brother Prince Henry (as inspector-general), retired Admiral von Koester (president of the Navy League), and Admiral von Tirpitz (Secretary of Admiralty and the only "active" grand-admiral). King George V of England is an admiral of the German navy, as the Emperor is an admiral of the British navy.

Salutes are a matter of international agreement. They are: 33 guns (simultaneously from all ships) for the Emperor and foreign monarchs, 21 for the Crown Prince of Germany or of a foreign country, 19 for a grand-admiral or an amba.s.sador, 17 for an admiral, the Secretary of Admiralty or inspector-general, 15 for a vice-admiral, 13 for contre-admiral, and so descending. 101 guns are fired on the Emperor's birthday or on the birth of an imperial prince. 66 guns is the salute when a German monarch ascends the imperial throne, and 101 when a German Emperor dies.

The yearly salaries of German naval officers are as follows: Admiral, 1,294 (of which 699 is "pay"), vice-admiral, 897 (677 "pay"), contre-admiral, 772 (677 "pay"), captain-at-sea, 520 (438 "pay"), corvette-captain, 396 (280 "pay"), full lieutenant, 174 (120 "pay"), and so on downwards. Jews are not allowed to become officers of the navy, thus following the practice in the army. There is no law to prevent Jews becoming officers in either army or navy, but, as a matter of tradition or prejudice, no regimental or naval commander is willing to accept an Israelite among his officers.

It is time, however, to return to the personal doings of the Emperor.

He is responsible for Germany's foreign policy, and his duties in connexion with it and with the navy must often have suggested to him the desirability of seeing with his own eyes something of the Orient, the new battlefield of the world's diplomacy, and possibly a new Eldorado for European merchants and engineers. His journey to the East, now undertaken, was, however, chiefly a religious one, though it had also something of a chivalric character, since much of every German's imagination is concerned with the Crusades, the Order of Knight Templars, and similar historical or legendary incidents and personalities in the early stages of the struggle between the Christian and the Saracen. The birthplace of Christ has special interest for a Hohenzollern who holds his kingship by divine grace, and in the Emperor's case because his father had made the journey to Jerusalem thirty years before. The Emperor, lastly, cannot but have been glad to escape, if only for a time, such hara.s.sing concerns as party politics, scribbling journalists, long-winded ministerial harangues, and Social Democrats.

The journey of the Emperor and Empress to Palestine occupied about a month from the middle of October, 1898, to the middle of the following November, and while it was one of the most delightful and picturesque experiences of the Emperor, it entailed some unforeseen and not altogether agreeable consequences. It was very much criticized in Germany as an exhibition of a theatrical kind, of the "decorative in policy," as Bismarck used to say, who saw no utility in decoration, and evidently did not agree with Shakspeare that the "world is still deceived by ornament." It was objected that the Emperor should have stayed at home to look after imperial business, that such a journey must excite suspicion in England and France--in the former because England is an Oriental power, and in the latter because France is supposed to claim special protective rights over Christianity in the East.

The Englishman who reads what German writers say about the journey gets the impression that the criticism was an expression of jealousy--jealousy, as we know from Bismarck and Prince Bulow, being a national German failing. Every German ardently desires to see Italy and the Orient, but until of late years few Germans had the means of gratifying the wish. In one point, however, the critics were right.

The Emperor, when in Damascus, after saying that he felt "deeply moved at standing on the spot where one of the most knightly sovereigns of all times, the great Sultan Saladin, stood," went on to say that Sultan Abdul "and the three hundred million Mohammedans who, scattered over the earth, venerated him as their Caliph, might be a.s.sured that at all times the German Emperor would be their friend." It was a harmless and vague remark enough, one would think, but political writers in all countries have made great capital out of it ever since whenever Germany's Oriental policy is discussed. At the risk of repet.i.tion it may be said that that policy is, in the East as elsewhere, a purely economic one. The Emperor's mistake perhaps chiefly lay in raising hopes in Turkish minds which were very unlikely to be realized.

The Emperor's allusion to Saladin as the most knightly sovereign of all times was a bad blunder. He was doubtless carried away by a combination, in his probably at this time somewhat excited imagination, of the chivalrous figures of the crusading times with thoughts of the German Knight Templars and other soldierly characters.

Saladin was a brave man physically, and fond of imperial magnificence, as is only natural and necessary for an Oriental potentate to be; and a good deal of Eastern legend grew up about him on that account.

Legend was enough for the Emperor in his then romantic mood. He forgot, or did not know, that Saladin, from the point of view of a modern and in reality far more knightly age, was a sanguinary and fanatic ruffian, who showed no mercy to his Christian prisoners--killed, in fact, one of them, Rainald de Chatillon, with his own hand, sacked Jerusalem, turned the Temple of Solomon into a mosque, after having it "disinfected" with rose-water, and killed Pope Urban III, who died, the chronicles tell, of sorrow at the news.

The journey was, as has been said, a delightful and picturesque experience for the Emperor and the Empress. They pa.s.sed through Venice with its marble palaces, sailed over the sapphire waters of the Adriatic, and were received with great demonstrations of welcome by the Sultan in Constantinople. When they were leaving, the Sultan gave the Emperor a gigantic carpet, and the Emperor gave the Sultan a gold walking-stick, an exact imitation of the stick Frederick the Great used to lean on, and sometimes, very likely, apply to the backs of his trusty but stupid lieges.

Before disposing of the events of this period of the Emperor's life mention may be made of two or three occurrences which must have been a source of political interest or social entertainment to him. From among them we select the Dreyfus case and the historic scene arranged for the painter, Adolf Menzel, in Sans Souci.

The Dreyfus case, though its investigation brought to light no fact implicating the German authorities, naturally aroused interest throughout Germany. The interest was felt equally in the army, notwithstanding that it contains no Jewish officer, and among the civil population. In France, it will be remembered, the case acquired its importance from the charge, made by the anti-Semite Drumont and his journal _La Libre Parole_, that the Jews were exploiting the Government and the country. There is an anti-Semite party in Germany, founded by the Court preacher Stoecker in 1878, but possibly owing to the prudence and good citizenship of the Jews in Germany, it has gained little weight or momentum since.