Why Are Artists Poor? Part 9

The a.n.a.lysis broadly con.rms Jonathan's view that the government subsidizes the arts because of external pressure, but Jonathan is wrong in a.s.suming that the higher cla.s.ses deliberately pressure the government into subsidizing the arts. Instead, this pressure stems from internalized values that are shared by people in the art world as well as in the various government agencies. These values depend on the mystique of art, the same mystique that forms the essence of arguments that refer to the gen-eral interest.

In practice the rent seeking and general interest explanations overlap. Sometimes the emphasis lies on rent seeking and sometimes on convinc-ing arguments that refer to the general interest. Depending on an individ-ual's personal experience with the arts, one may judge one explanation as more important than the other.

Because I shall present a third explanation in the following chapter, I postpone the a.s.sessment of these two explanations until the end of chap-ter 10. In that chapter I will examine the possibility that art subsidization serves government interests. Instead of being a blind machine or the victim of the art world, governments can be perceived as an effective donor that receives numerous bene.ts from subsidizing the arts. In other words, art may very well serve the interests of a government.

Discussion 1Most cla.s.sical concertgoers have an above-average income. Subsidiza-tion allows some people with more moderate incomes to attend these kinds of concerts. If the aim of subsidization is to a.s.sure that concerts remain accessible for people with lower incomes, where would you draw the line? How many people with lower incomes should be attracted to outweigh the fact that an income advantage is given to people with high incomes?

2 Do you agree that the arts do not need support to maintain a big pondof artists in order to produce some extraordinarily talented artists?3 Can art consumption help people with little cultural capital to increase this very capital?

Chapter10 Art Serves the Government How Symbiotic Is the Relationship between Art and the State?

How the Veiled Purchase of a Mondrian Painting became the Center of Public Debate In 1998 the Dutch National Bank bought a Mondrian painting for 36 million Euros and gave it to the Dutch people. Journalists found out that the pur-chase had been handled behind closed doors using intermediaries and that a special arrangement had been used because the deal had not been entirely legal. The 'gift' from the bank to the Dutch people came from public money; therefore, parliament should have been asked for permission to spend this money on the purchase of the painting. The elected representa-tives of the Dutch people must be able to decide what the Dutch are going to give themselves. The Prime Minister, who had known about the deal all along, admitted that he thought that parliament would have never con-sented to the deal. Therefore, a 'minor' disingenuous procedure and some concealment had been required. The intention of the government and the bank director had only been to do something 'nice' for the country. While the gift was meant to be public, the deal had to remain veiled. When it .nally became public, a row ensued and the public reacted particularly negatively. The people were not happy with the gift because they did not like Mondrian's painting. Alex remembers that he and his friends had mixed feelings about the affair. They liked the painting very much, although they thought that it had cost far too much money. But that wasn't their main issue. Alex's colleague Rosa had the most extreme opinion. 'I like this Mondrian, but I could never accept it as a gift. The president of the bank is a thief; he gives away what is not his to give. He is more than just a petty criminal. This so-called gift comes from a theft worth think of it eighty million guilders. For that money a thousand visual artists could paint murals on public build-ings for the rest of their lives.' This is what Rosa does when she has paid work. Then Peter asked her: "How certain are you that those murals are what the people want?" And Rosa responded, "Of course they'd rather spend their money on bus trips to the Costa Brava, but at least their local board representatives like my murals." Peter was really disgusted by the sneaky maneuvers of this fraternity of regents. At the same time, he was aware of the fact that as a heavily subsi-dized artist he was an accomplice; "It is terrible that we can only make art and have art around us at the expense of others." This is what he hated most of all. Apparently, the whole affair depressed him very much. Alex, like Peter, was not immune to feelings of guilt, but most of all he was angry with the bank director for such a poor and clumsy cover up job. Alex was pretty sure that the hatred of the Mondrian painting was not terribly profound. The hatred for the painting only became acute because it was so closely a.s.sociated with highhanded governors who the people resented. Under normal circ.u.mstances, people would have just shrugged it off, and a few years later they'd probably be proud of this new 'pearl' in their national collection. Moreover, Alex began to understand that the concealment of a gift serves purposes other than just covering up some semi-illegal affairs. He realized that such a prestigious inst.i.tution like the Dutch National Bank could never bequeath a national gift in an atmosphere of extravagant cele-bration with food, drink and entertainment for everybody, nor could it have been the source of an exciting debate in parliament. In order to show their special in.uential positions both the national bank and the Dutch State needed a 'veiled'presentation.

How the Dutch Made a Favorable Impression in Berlin In the summer of 1999, Alex visited his friend Adrian in Berlin where he presently has a studio. Sitting in a cafe and reading the newspaper head-lines, Alex noticed that the Dutch Dance Theatre had given a number of extremely successful performances in Berlin. That evening he heard from Gerhard, Adrian's new boyfriend, that the performances were part of a combined Dutch political and trade mission to the German capital. It included several cultural highlights from the Netherlands. Gerhard does stage lighting and he had been involved in the staging of the performances of the Dutch Dance Theatre. Gerhard said he and his col-leagues were very impressed by the innovative and high level of the danc-ing. The style, although international, still had a Dutch touch to it. They noticed that the artistic director and the large majority of the dancers were not even Dutch. But then listening to them speak, they discovered that everybody in the company spoke Dutch very well. For these German stagehands it was a strange experience to see so many foreigners in this Dutch company because in Germany the members of state-subsidized art companies must be German. Alex noticed that the newspaper critics had also praised the cultural openness of the Dutch. Gerhard certainly loved the inspiring international charisma of the Dutch. He told Alex that he would like to do stage lighting in the Netherlands. And at this time he is in fact doing so at 'Het Muziektheater' in Amsterdam.

Why do governments bestow art on their citizens? Why did the Dutch government present a Mondrian painting to the Dutch public, when they would have preferred another kind of art or a tax deduction instead? And why did the government not convert the painting deal into a major cele-bration? How does the Dutch government use art to impress its German neighbors? Finally, what kind of message is the Dutch government trying to convey?

The explanations for government involvement in the arts presented in the previous chapter are probably lacking. They don't explain the extent of the government's involvement. This chapter approaches the subject from a different angle. It looks at the government as if it has its own interests. Supporting art, one can say, is in the interest of the govern-ment.

Unlike the previous chapter, this chapter approaches government gifts to the arts from the power end of the gift-duty continuum. The govern-ment is not obliged or forced to support art. Instead like a large corpo-ration the government has the power to support art and does so in order to pro.t from it.

As an artist, I am sticking to my earlier opinion: The government sup-ports art because art is important to society. As a social scientist, I'm increasingly convinced that the government supports art because it needs art.

My thinking on this subject is incomplete. Nevertheless, I like to share what I have.1 Governments Have Interests and Tastes "The government is no judge of the sciences and arts." This saying from the 19-century Dutch politician, Thorbecke, has for a long time in.u-enced Dutch art policy. If one interprets it in the strict sense, it means that the government should never interfere in the arts. In a broader sense, it means that the government is 'allowed' to support the arts, but must leave subsidization choices to the art world.2 The idea that a government could have artistic taste is abhorrent. The autonomy of the arts must be respected at all costs. Government neutrality when it comes to art is par-ticularly important in countries like the us, Britain, and the Netherlands. In Germany and France, for instance, art is more politicized. Neverthe-less, these countries also have many advocates of government neutrality with respect to the arts.

This chapter examines a government's interest in supporting art. It demonstrates that when government intervenes in the arts it necessarily becomes 'a judge of the arts'. Because governments have interests and because not all art serves government interests equally, it is natural for a government to only support certain kinds of art.

My approach to government behavior in this chapter differs from the common economic approach. I am using this rather abstract introduc-tory section to justify my approach. This section may be of more interest to academics than to general readers.

The welfare approach to government expenditure discussed in the previous chapter treats the government as a neutral clearinghouse.3 What the government gathers from its citizens in the form of taxes, it redistributes among these citizens in the form of goods and bene.ts. (When some get more and others less than what they paid in taxes this kind of redistribution is supposed to serve income policy.) The govern-ment itself is neutral; it doesn't necessarily gain or lose from these trans-fers. Because the government has no interests of its own, it can be called sel.ess. When it subsidizes the arts, it sel.essly serves public interest by 'serving art'. This view was treated in the public interest explanation in the previous chapter. (Also in the other explanation in that chapter, the rent seeking explanation, the government was sel.ess; in fact in that explanation, it was seen as a victim of rent seekers.) But the harmonious and highly abstract view of government pursuing public interest cannot explain the large and persistent involvement of governments in the arts. General interest arguments turn out to be pre-dominantly wrong in the case of the arts. The other, the rent seeking explanation, is in a broader sense more convincing. It nevertheless remains dif.cult to comprehend how rent seeking by a badly organized art world could lead to persistent large-scale support, whereas other, better-organized pressure groups actually lost much of their earlier sup-port.

The latter scenario could change, if it is acknowledged that civil ser-vants and politicians can also be rent seekers, as the public choice theory in economics a.s.sumes. Individual politicians could increase their elec-toral base, coalition ministers could minimize con.icts, while civil ser-vants could try to maximize their budgets.4 However, if we really want to explain government behavior in the arts I propose going one step further. I want to look at government interest and the interests of government agencies and not just at the interests of speci.c government employees.

In order to develop a more satisfactory view of government behavior it is important to look at the government from a different angle. Instead of merely redistributing money and goods, it is more fruitful to view the government give and take as two separate functions. These functions are not carried out by some anonymous machine, but by various government agencies that operate on different levels and in many con.gurations. The relationship between taxation and expenditure is often extremely indi-rect.

A government or a state is not a totally independent 'natural' ent.i.ty.5 Nor is it merely the indiscriminate executor of the electorate's desires. In many ways, governments or government agencies are comparable to large .rms where a board of directors but also groups of employees have relative autonomy. They have discretionary s.p.a.ce.6 Under constraints, they pursue their own goals. Constraints come primarily from share-holders, but also from laws, conventions, trade unions and, in the case of a department within a .rm, from higher authorities within the company. Therefore, boards of directors do not indiscriminately carry out share-holders' wishes. In the same way that government agencies do not auto-matically carry out the wishes of citizens or their representatives. Within constraints, established by higher government agencies, among others, they also pursue their own goals.

It's often impossible to distinguish actions that proceed from the use of discretionary s.p.a.ce from those actions that proceed from the impact of constraints set by of.cial goals and other limiting circ.u.mstances. It is equally dif.cult, if not impossible, to determine which actions of individ-ual civil servants and politicians fully utilize discretionary s.p.a.ce. There-fore, it is better to draw the attention to the interests and actions of gov-ernment agencies instead. Such interests vary from government agency to agency. Therefore, governments and government agencies can be said to have lasting ident.i.ties or, metaphorically speaking, personalities. By way of metaphor, a government can be said to 'need' art or to 'prefer' art, as if the government was a living organism.

In this context, it should be noted that the use of 'government interest' often serves as a shortcut. When no detailed information is available on the in.uence of individual persons or groups in and around the govern-ment, a discussion in terms of government interests serves as a second-best solution. However, by speaking in terms of government interests I also emphasize that inst.i.tutions have relative autonomy. The fact that government behavior ultimately rests on the private interests and behav-ior of individual of.cials, voters, delegates, and others does not mean that government actions can be reduced to those private interests and behavior patterns. For instance, the satisfaction civil servants and politi-cians get from supporting art cannot fully explain government support. In the case of inst.i.tutions like a government, the total is more than the sum of the parts. The inst.i.tution maintains a state of relative autonomy. Therefore, the parallel with an organism is more than a metaphor. Within government inst.i.tutions, a modal habitus is reproduced that newcomers tend to adopt. By partic.i.p.ating in the administration, civil servants' and politicians' att.i.tudes change. For instance, if before enter-ing the administration most important bureaucrats and politicians had little respect for the .ne arts, they would quickly learn to respect it.

(In this respect, I depart from the methodological individualism of tra-ditional economics and the public choice theory and I side instead with the sociological approach such as the .guration theory of Elias and the habitus-.eld theory of Bourdieu.7 Because the total is more than the sum of its parts, it also follows that government interests cannot be equated to the sum of internal pressures applied by bureaucrats and politicians who favor the arts. Therefore, the present approach differs from an approach that only examines magisterial rent seeking, as is the common practice in public choice theory.8) In this context, I shall not only speak of government interest, but also of government taste, as if government was a being with certain tastes in art. This is a shortcut for complicated phrases like 'the government enables certain experts to develop tastes that become expressed in gov-ernment subsidies and purchases.' At the same time, it's more than just a shortcut; I emphasize the relative autonomy of the government in its pref-erence for art.

Art Appears to be Less Serviceable than it was during Monarchical Times

Extensive patronage by the courts, the church, and other patrons pre-ceded modern state patronage. It seems that in their relation to the arts, modern governments are the successors of the church and the monarchy. Thus, it would be strange if the interests that modern governments have in supporting the arts bore no relation to the interests of the patrons of earlier periods.

In stylized fashion, a Patron and a Maecenas can be said to have been interested in art in three respects. Firstly, they enjoyed the immediate bene.ts that followed from their private consumption of art. Paintings hung on the castle walls and music was performed for exclusive circles. Secondly, they enjoyed the indirect bene.ts of the internal display to sub-ordinates, which led to increased respect, obedience, solidarity, etc. Thirdly, they enjoyed the indirect bene.ts of external display to competi-tors in the form of the preservation or improvement of their position in social s.p.a.ce. These three dimensions of art utilization depend on one another. Solidarity, respect, worship, awe, or fear of others are just as related to art utilization as enjoyment of the art product itself might be.

One use cannot be separated from the other, as we made clear in chapter 3.

The Patron and Maecenas of old did not hide the fact that art repre-sented an attractive consumption good. The possibility of display was an auxiliary attraction.9 By conspicuously consuming art products, rich consumers openly fabricated an external effect that gave them returns in the form of more respect.10 Respect was a reciprocal effect: onlookers responded to the magni.cence and splendor of their art.11 It 'changed' them; in general inspiring respect and awe for the Patron or Maecenas. Not only subordinates or 'friends' were impressed, but also enemies. In the past, the rich used art to mark their position on the social ladder in order to preserve or improve that position.

In my view, the present use and support of art by modern governments can still be a.n.a.lyzed from the perspective of the interests governments have in private consumption and display. Many would argue that this is impossible because modern governments are purportedly disinterested, and also because art is increasingly considered as useless to large donors like governments.

It is true that, unlike modern governments, the Patron and Maecenas of old openly consumed art. They did not perceive their dealings with art as gift giving. Because they were interested in art, these 'benefactors' made deals with artists in which many rights and obligations were speci-.ed. Although viewed from the outside, these same deals sometimes looked like gifts the Maecenas basically commissioned artworks, while the Patron employed artists.12 Even churches were 'consumers' of art rather than donors. Unlike the common people, they could afford the conspicuous consumption of this 'luxury'.

Modern governments on the other hand are donors rather than con-sumers. They often spend more money on subsidies than on purchases. And because modern governments are supposed to be disinterested, they prefer to present themselves as donors and not as consumers of art.13 Nevertheless, I shall show that governments have numerous interests in the arts. First of all, governments seek display. And at present conspicu-ous gifts serve the need to display better than conspicuous consumption does.

It is also true that the arts have changed. Art has lost some of its tradi-tional uses; for instance, art is no longer used as propaganda. Modern advertising strategies are more effective in conveying speci.c messages. Nevertheless, display through art has not disappeared, but its nature has changed. The messages of most current art are almost always general. This is particularly obvious in the visual arts.

More than 200 years ago visual art was attractive to the Maecenas because of the artistic symbols that painters employed. People could easily comprehend the meanings of the artworks and could respond to them. (In this respect, it resembles the way modern people 'read' adver-tis.e.m.e.nts.) Therefore, in the compet.i.tive struggle between churches, kingdoms, aristocrats, and the af.uent, the arts were often used for a direct and speci.c purpose. Speci.c messages, not easily misunderstood, indoctrinated subordinates to submit to their superiors, be it pope, king, local aristocrat, priest or magistrate. Or they were enlisted in the strug-gles that would a.s.sure their superiors' place on the social ladder. Observ-ing the various scenes depicted in paintings that presently hang on the walls of our museums, one can see that patrons made extensive use of art's capacity to propagate concrete messages in the political strife of the time.

Current art does not tell buyers and observers what to do or believe, at least not in a blatant way. The messages modern art conveys are general, not speci.c. When the cia sponsored American abstract painting during the Cold War, it wasn't trying to convey a concrete message, like 'shake off the chains of communist oppression'. The message was extremely oblique and general, more like, 'Look at these paintings and you will see freedom in America'.14 The cia evidently believed that modern art could still be used for non-artistic purposes. Right or wrong as they may have been in this case, it is unlikely that art has lost all of this instrumentality.

It is generally only in retrospect that the instrumentality or lack of instrumentality of art can be determined. Impressionist painting for instance, which for a long time stood for a totally disinterested 'l'art pour l'art', can in retrospect, be viewed as having had a message that served the needs of a new clientele. It effectively marked the newly gained independence and prosperity of those urbanites who could afford to take trips to the countryside. It is this countryside as seen through the eyes of the urban visitor that the Impressionists depicted. By displaying these kinds of paintings, consumers were able to distinguish themselves and develop a new ident.i.ty.

I still believe that the arts are instrumental. They are used for display and marking someone's position among others in social s.p.a.ce. The same applies to towns, regions, and countries. The main difference is that the messages are less literal and more general than before. American abstract painting did not depict liberty; it is liberty. The fact that this kind of vague message is short-lived, just as short-lived as most concrete mes-sages, suggests that art can still be used in an instrumental way. (Today, American abstract painting would probably not be used to symbolize American liberty.) European Governments Carried on the Former Patronage Art has changed and so has its patronage. The new patronage is one of democratic governments and private individuals and to a much smaller degree, of private corporations and private foundations. Most of all modern governments have replaced the courts, churches, n.o.bility, aris-tocracy and regents of previous generations. (In the us, government involvement since the Second World War has its origins elsewhere.15 Nev-ertheless, as I suggest in the Appendix to Chapter 10, the explanation of government involvement in the us does not have to be all that different.) Three interdependent developments commingle in the transition from old to new patronage. First, the old donors became less relevant in soci-ety. Secondly, the arts became more independent or autonomous; the arts were less prepared to serve as conveyors of concrete messages plus they became less .t to convey these concrete messages. Thirdly, the new donors, most of all governments, increasingly needed art to convey their general messages.

At the same time that the former masters of the arts became less important within the existing social order, the arts gradually became less serviceable to the former masters. In the nineteenth century, Bohemian artists entered the scene. Gradually artistic autonomy became an ideal not only of artists but also of the art world and of general society. There-fore, it was not so unusual for a Dutch minister to tell parliament that 'the government is no judge of the arts'. It is a statement that could never have been made by a king or bishop.

It is possible that the obsession with artistic autonomy has delayed the transition to the new patronage. In a number of countries, there appears to have been reluctance on both sides to resume patronage. It is hard to calculate, but it is likely that in these countries the level of overall support of the arts showed a relative downhill slide in the second half of the nine-teenth and the .rst half of the twentieth centuries. This was more likely the case in a country like the Netherlands than in, for instance, France, where the authorities maintained a high level of involvement.16 Never-theless, government support increased rapidly after the Second World War in all Western countries, including the us. In the Netherlands, it rose from a very low level to that of a per capita rate equal to that of generous countries like Germany and France.17 That the restoration of a substantial patronage system was not begun earlier is probably due to the fact that both the art world and govern-ments were not ready for it. The art world remained reluctant. After art gained more autonomy it had to develop a new and stable habitus before it could once again deal with large donors, who could very well be wolves in sheep clothing. Political parties were also reluctant to partic.i.p.ate. They didn't want modern government to follow in the footsteps of the old royal system by creating a new type of of.cial or state art.

After the Second World War, this reluctance did not altogether disap-pear, but it became less signi.cant. Gradually the growing advantages of government support started to outweigh the disadvantages. On the one hand, the situation in the .ne arts appeared to be degenerating. Art world expenses, most p.r.o.nounce in the performing arts, were rising quickly and the relative incomes of artists were declining. Unemployment among artists was on the increase. There was a sense of urgency; a.s.sistance was called for.

On the other hand, the bene.ts of involvement in the arts for govern-ments had also increased. Compet.i.tion with other nations was increas-ingly based not only on military and economic might, but on cultural in.uence as well. Moreover, culture was increasingly being seen as essen-tial for creating solidarity and coherence among the citizenry. The arts could perhaps play a signi.cant role in all this. The government needed general messages from unimpeachable sources. As far as artistic mes-sages could be interpreted as expressions of government in.uence, this had to come in the form of sublimated power. Therefore, the government did not overtly promote its a.s.sistance to the arts. Governments often supported the arts in a surrept.i.tious way. And this be.tted the arts.

Despite an initial reluctance by both sides, art and government were willing to play their newfound roles. After the Second World War, gov-ernment expenditures on the arts began to rise quickly. In the Nether-lands, government expenditure on the arts, per capita, corrected for in.ation, more than tripled from 1950 to 1980. (After 1980 the amount stabilized.) It's impossible to ascertain whether the primary initiative for the new patronage came from governments or from the art world. Gov-ernment needs were probably the single most decisive factor.18 Govern-ments needed art for veiled display both internally for their own people, and externally for other nations.

Governments need display their power. As we noted in chapter 8, in 'times of peace' power only exists as a display of power symbols. These symbols keep others informed about the power of their 'superior' or 'compet.i.tor' and ultimately make them respect those in power. Modern governments are extremely powerful. Because they manage enormous amounts of collective riches and have a monopoly on the authority to levy taxes and use violence, the power of the state is seen as unrivaled. Today's governments with all their wealth and power are the heirs appar-ent to kingdoms of earlier times.19 Like the monarchies of old, they dis-play sublimated power through art and direct it at their own citizens or at compet.i.tors like other nations (or regions or towns). I will .rst exam-ine internal display.

Veiled Display Serves Social Coherence In 1999, as mentioned earlier, the publicly owned Dutch National Bank spent 36 million Euros on a Mondrian painting. Never before had so much public money been spent on a single painting. As described above, the painting was given to the Dutch people, which meant that it was handed over to 'Het Mauritshuis' museum in The Hague. For the bank, the gift represented a ceremony to mark the eventual transition to the Euro.

Given the celebration and the enormous size of the gift, one would have expected the transfer to occasion a grand celebration to be attended to by ministers, amba.s.sadors, and local magistrates and perhaps marked by a huge .reworks display for the rest of the nation. No such thing hap-pened, however. The queen unveiled the painting in the presence of a small gathering of mostly art world people. If there were any speeches, they were not broadcasted on radio or television. The unveiling went almost unnoticed in the news. Why wasn't this opportunity utilized for a grand display of cultural values? One would have expected as much.

It was never the intention of those concerned to draw much attention to this gift. As noted in the ill.u.s.tration, the way the painting was pur-chased had already received more attention than had been intended. This may have contributed to the extreme modesty of the ceremony, but the ceremony probably would have been sober anyway. Currently in the Netherlands, a sober display be.ts the government's cultural efforts. Display is possible and perhaps even necessary, but it must be kept to a minimum, especially with respect to the general public.

Veiled display seems to be a contradiction in terms, but it is not. Veiled display is not overpowering, but nevertheless leaves its traces. In an open display the extravaganza of single buildings, arches, sculptures, paint-ings, and performances makes audiences gaze in wonder. In a veiled dis-play it is usually not a single item but the combination of many somewhat prestigious 'events' that together 'impress' people. These events need a minimum of openness otherwise they might go unnoticed. In impressive and yet veiled display everybody undergoes the artistic experience and responds accordingly. Moreover, what is displayed in a veiled manner is usually not so much immediate power, but sublimated power. The Dutch government's possession of works of art like a Mondrian painting repre-sents unlike military hardware a form of sublimated power. This was also noted in chapter 8. Veiled display be.ts the sublimation of power.

Whereas the patrons of old used art in openly majestic ways, in most western countries pompous art presentations are no longer appropriate contributions to national solidarity. Instead of paying respect to the authorities, people would tend to laugh at them. Moreover, nowadays, veiled display keeps art more exclusive than open display. In the past, magni.cent castles with barred entrances inspired awe. People today are more aware of the existence of high culture, they are impressed and maybe even proud of it; in theory they might even come to view it, but usually the way it's presented puts them off.

The degree to which governments veil their cultural displays varies over time and varies according to country and artistic endeavor. Amaz-ing new architecture, extravagant operas, and museums of modern art with their cathedral-like exteriors and their collections of precious modern art, are relatively conspicuous manifestations of cultural power. Their presence is displayed both to citizens and foreign visitors alike. France is probably best known for its open display of cultural power (as well as for the personal interest their presidents take in displaying art with a certain grandeur). In the Netherlands on the other hand, cultural power is primarily displayed in a subdued and subtle way. The sober ident.i.ty of the Dutch government requires a veiled form of display. (Nev-ertheless displays can vary. More now than in earlier times, the Muziek-theater, the Concertgebouw as well as other important art inst.i.tutions are inscribed as so-called '.gureheads' of Dutch culture. The use of the term '.gurehead' reveals the element of display involved.) The degree of transparency or veiling involved in the display of power through artistic means also depends on the way government is organ-ized. Lies the emphasis on relatively centralized bodies and is their little room for private initiative or is government largely decentralized and do private organizations have relatively much power? The last situation fairly accurately describes the us. As we shall see, government display in the us through artistic means is not only more subdued but also less important than in Europe.20 Compared to France, the Dutch government also leaves a relatively large amount of s.p.a.ce to local and private organi-zations.21 No modern government, however, today still displays cultural power as openly as the kings and emperors of old used to. The art world would be against this type of display and the general population would not be impressed. People were certainly not impressed in the former com-munist countries, where ostentatious architecture and social realist paintings with precise messages preached the virtues of the administra-tion.

Whereas in the past, internal display served to propagate a sense of awe or fear for authority to a.s.sure obedience of the citizenry, it currently serves to promote a common feeling of cultural ident.i.ty and consensus with national inst.i.tutions. It serves the notion of social coherence. Edu-cation through art also contributes to social coherence. (In this respect, education through art is part of the promotion of social coherence, even though they are often presented as separate aims of art policy.22 For instance, immigrants can only begin their compact with state inst.i.tu-tions after they have learned about its customs and traditions.) Only a few decades ago cultural education was still openly employed to contribute to national cultural ident.i.ty and social coherence. For instance, many governments were prepared to spend large amounts of tax money on public broadcasting. Broadcasting was not used for propa-ganda purposes as was the case in the communist bloc, but it served public educational purposes and the promotion of social coherence in a direct and transparent fashion. National radio and television stations have lost much of their signi.cance and can no longer count on large sums of public money.23 A complacent and continuous display of a coun-try's cultural merits no longer serves social coherence.

Nowadays, a subtle and veiled display is generally thought to serve the nation better. The nation remains, however, the binding force par excel-lence. The oneness and solidarity that hold a community together rests on a cultural ident.i.ty that differs from the cultural ident.i.ties of other nations. In this respect, nations do compete.

The Cultural Superiority of the Nation Needs Display Looking back it's easy to see that wealthy and powerful inst.i.tutions, like churches and kingdoms, competed with one another. The history books are .lled with tales of domination, war, victories, and defeats through the centuries. People nowadays tend to think that the compet.i.tion between nations (and regions as well as towns) has largely disappeared and that their world is paci.ed. There still is compet.i.tion but it occurs through trade. This form of compet.i.tion seems to concern businessmen, not nations (or regions or towns). People tend to consider commercial triumphs and defeats as extremely relative and temporal: one year this company or country wins, next year another. Trade seems to be a gentle-man's game, never to be confused with warfare. Appearances, however, are deceiving. The outcome of the commercial compet.i.tion between towns, regions and above all nations can be as extreme as in the case of warfare. Not just businessmen, but successive generations prosper from commercials victories or suffer from defeats. For long periods of time, this type of compet.i.tive struggle can determine a population's prosperity and poverty, cultural liberty and cultural dependence.

A country can considerably increase its trade rewards, if it is able to determine (some of) the rules of international trade. International pres-tige, including cultural prestige, adds to this capacity. Moreover, inter-national prestige represents a reward in itself. This reward is especially augmented when a country has the capacity to set (some of) the rules of international culture as well. Economic and cultural success abroad clearly depend on one another, as the much-envied international success of the us demonstrates. Cultural ident.i.ty is both source and product of cultural superiority. In this respect, a nation's ident.i.ty differs from that of another nation. It is distinct and more or less authentic. (It should be noted that because cultural prestige is rewarding in itself, art is not neces-sarily subordinate to the economy in the present approach, as it was in the argument of section 9.7 where the government must subsidize art because art contributes to the economic welfare of a nation.24) International cultural prestige, as with trade, is necessarily based on a comparison, in this case between different cultural capabilities and iden-t.i.ties.25 When the outcome of the comparison is favorable, prestige increases. Which means that there is a confrontation, either directly or indirectly, with other nations. This confrontation is largely an automatic process and takes place in the market, among other places. American cul-tural products like .lms, television programs and pop music, do well in markets all over the world and thus contribute to America's cultural prestige. Most governments, however, are not satis.ed with the results produced by these natural exchanges and thus deliberately display the high standard and superiority of their own culture to the rest of the world.

Countries like Germany and France maintain an expensive network of cultural emba.s.sies 'Das Goethe Inst.i.tut' and 'Maison Descartes' in many cities around the world. These emba.s.sies produce exhibitions, readings by authors, musical performances, etc. This kind of permanent cultural presence is too expensive for most other countries. Moreover, ad hoc bilateral exchanges are currently not only cheaper but probably also more effective.26 Many countries also take examples of their performing or visual art abroad on political junkets, trade missions, and cultural exchanges. And when foreign missions visit another country, the hosts will certainly offer their guests a variety of cultural happenings. They are not just mat-ters of hospitality or ceremony. They are occasions to attract as much publicity for one's own culture in the other country as possible. (The reviews of these cultural events in the foreign press are monitored and discussed at length in the national newspapers. In this way, these encoun-ters also offer internal evaluations of the strengths and weaknesses of the national culture.) Because of modern communication technologies people know more about other cultures than they once did. Therefore, the organized cul-tural activities abroad are above all reminders and catalysts. Periodically extra attention is drawn to the cultural production of the visiting coun-try. The existence of a rich culture is merely suggested. Although culture that is taken abroad on missions sometimes helps to open new markets for one's own cultural productions such as books, cds or performances, it primarily serves to strengthen and, if necessary, correct one's own cul-tural ident.i.ty.

It appears that national cultural ident.i.ties have become important again. In Europe, uni.cation has led to fears of h.o.m.ogenization with the disappearance of national currencies and laws. Meanwhile, all over the world consumer products have become more and more the same. Pre-sent-day consumer goods are international rather than national in origin. Culture however, allows a country to maintain a distinct charac-ter, a cultural ident.i.ty of its own. And art, with its emphasis on authen-ticity rather than h.o.m.ogeneity, offers the most important long-term con-tribution to a unique national cultural ident.i.ty.27 Sports are also outstanding cultural products and they certainly con-tribute to national prestige. But countries usually excel in one sport or another for brief periods of time and thus the relative advantage tends to be temporal. Moreover, sports products are international products and involve relatively little local cultural ident.i.ty. Art products on the other hand, have long histories of being closely a.s.sociated with the cultural ident.i.ty of a particular country.

Because it is impossible to give a detailed description of the cultural ident.i.ty of any one country, the concept of cultural ident.i.ty could almost be perceived as an empty concept. It is not impossible however, to approach a cultural ident.i.ty in more indirect ways. For instance, one can observe the kind of ident.i.ty a government tries to promote in neighbor-ing countries and how this ident.i.ty somehow crystallizes in the media. Dutch culture in the context of a combined political and trade mission to Berlin described in the above ill.u.s.tration serves as an example.

The Dutch government took a selection of art products to Berlin. The selection emphasized aspects of Dutch cultural ident.i.ty that might impress the neighbors. Although the Netherlands is a small country, the art chosen was not nationalistic or folkloristic. Among the highlights of Dutch culture were the Dutch Dance Theatre performances under the direction of the Czech-born Jiri Kylian, which made a strong impression in the German press. Several newspapers remarked that the dance pieces were modern, international, and Dutch at the same time. The Dutch managed to combine a national and an international ident.i.ty. What the papers found most striking was the cultural openness of the Dutch; the fact that almost all dancers including the director were not Dutch by birth added to this impression. On top of all that, the director and most of the dancers spoke Dutch well; they apparently felt at home in the Netherlands. (As noted earlier, in Germany only German dancers can dance in state-subsidized dance companies.) The 'typical' Dutch values exhibited were the values of individual freedom, tolerance, diversity, and cultural relativism. These values are rooted in the striving for democracy, equality, and the sharing and diffu-sion of culture. Such liberal values be.t a small country that depends on free trade. By emphasizing them abroad, they are presented as relative attributes of the Dutch ident.i.ty. The implicit message is that 'the Nether-lands is not just another small country; the Dutch have a special place in social s.p.a.ce and their cultural values can serve as an example for others; they deserve to be exported. For instance, other European countries with immigrant problems or strife between various social groups can pro.t from these Dutch values.'

This does not mean that the Dutch only emphasize the modern aspects of their cultural ident.i.ty. On other occasions, the Dutch do not hesitate to show off the solidity and seriousness of their cultural ident.i.ty as it established itself over centuries. 'The Dutch are serious and honorable trading partners. If they are open to the world and to new things, they know what they are doing.' In this setting, the paintings of Rembrandt and Vermeer might be shown to foreign guests. Attention will likely also be drawn to old Dutch architecture the monumental as well as the everyday. This contributes to the Dutch quality of trustworthiness. Even Van Gogh appears to augment the seriousness and sincerity of the Dutch ident.i.ty. In this respect, the aforementioned Muziektheater, Concertge-bouw, Rijksmuseum and the Van Gogh Museum serve as .gureheads of Dutch culture for foreigners.28 The present argument also applies to compet.i.tiveness at more local levels. Ident.i.ties at local levels tend to differ more subtly, but they are just as important. The compet.i.tion between towns is often very visible. Cul-tural festivals, among other events, play an important role in their rivalry.29 And in a country like the Netherlands with three major cities close to one another, the distribution between the three cities of the major art inst.i.tutions, which are predominantly .nanced by the central government, is a continuous source of rivalry.

Government Taste Serves Display Why did the Dutch National Bank with government permission choose a painting by Mondrian and not a painting by, say, Karel Appel? The Mondrian painting was not what one would call the people's choice, and even many members of parliament would not have consented had they been asked. The answer lies in the interest the government has in dis-play. With respect to its own citizenry, this kind of display serves, despite some initial resistance, education and in due course social coherence. Moreover, the presence of the painting in the Mauritshuis in The Hague is bound to impress foreigners and to recon.rm Dutch cultural ident.i.ty. In this context, the sobriety of Mondrian was preferred to the expres-sionism of Van Gogh, for instance. The choice was made and it con.rms the notion that governments have a taste.

A particular government's taste with respect to art is revealed in the aesthetic choices it actually makes. Central or local governments subsi-dize and buy art, but not all art. They select art. For instance, the con-tents of the government's 'shopping basket' of subsidized and purchased art differs from the contents of the basket of art purchased by the average private individual. The contents of these baskets differ simply because selections differ. Therefore, by de.nition the government has a taste that differs from the taste of others. The same way the taste of local govern-ment differs from the taste of the national government. These differences are not accidental. Differences in taste are rooted in government inter-ests.

When a government travels with certain artworks on missions abroad it also makes a selection. Certain artworks are selected because they serve the interests of the government better than other artworks. When it subsidizes the arts domestically, the same applies. A government cannot remain neutral.30 If governments had to remain neutral and if 'the gov-ernment is no judge of the arts', this ultimately implies that governments can never subsidize art. The continuous attempts to let governments sub-sidize neutrally are basically a form of self-deception.31 Governments seem to be neutral because they often leave the actual choice up to independent experts. Nevertheless, almost all governments basically decide on the size of the total art budget and on its distribution over the various art forms. Only the distribution within an art form is sometimes left to experts. Moreover, these experts are never totally inde-pendent of government scrutiny. Experts, for instance, decide what art is so-called 'quality art', but as was made clear in chapter 3, quality and aesthetics are not independent variables. It depends on cultural power or cultural in.uence.

When a government supports cla.s.sical music, for instance, it rein-forces the cultural in.uence of experts who might favor cla.s.sical music and so the 'quality' of cla.s.sical music remains high. Thus it would be wrong to say that a government gives money to cla.s.sical music instead of to pop music because cla.s.sical music has more 'quality' than pop music. It is more appropriate to say that currently, cla.s.sical music better serves government interests than pop music.32 (If subsidization rested on 'qual-ity', then the 'quality' of pop music must have suddenly experienced a rise in the last decade because in that period some European countries have actually begun to subsidize pop music, be it in dribs and drabs. Nev-ertheless, critics do not agree with this sudden rise over the past decade. It is more plausible that the piecemeal subsidization of pop music increasingly serves government interests.) In subsidizing the arts, governments are not neutral. Government has a taste (thesis 96). In this respect it must be noted that government involvement in the arts is not only revealed in its purchases and subsidies, but also in what it promotes and pays attention to. For instance, in many countries literature does not receive direct subsidies. But at home, the government still manages to bestow it with distinction by offering presti-gious of.cial awards. And meanwhile, when abroad, it a.s.sists in promot-ing literature as a manifestation of its culture by subsidizing translations into foreign languages and by subsidizing the costs of publishers display-ing the publications of national authors at foreign book fairs.

Can government interests adequately explain its current selections of art? At .rst glance it's dif.cult to comprehend how, for instance, the large investment in cla.s.sical music can serve the objectives of social coherence. Nevertheless, in order to close ranks, people need only be impressed; they do not necessarily need to partic.i.p.ate in (high) art. In this respect, cultural symbols of superior, remote but not altogether inac-cessible cultural power often serve a government well. In a case like this, only a mere hint of meaning may actually reach the general public. (Common people a.s.sume that privileged insiders fully understand the deeper hidden meanings of the art displayed, while they themselves only have a vague notion of it.) This implies that governments have a prefer-ence for art, which is neither altogether accessible nor extremely inacces-sible (thesis 97).

For instance, on the basis of this a.n.a.lysis, one would expect that if (some of) the subsidized avant-garde visual art had continued to develop into esoteric and inaccessible areas, it would have served the government less well, and the government would have gradually lost interest in it. In a different situation government could just as easily lose interest if, for instance, ever more television contests cheapen mainstream subsidized cla.s.sical music, till it totally loses all its mystique.

Because prestige is an important return from the display of art, it is almost always in the interest of the government to select high and sacred art and to ignore less prestigious art. This explains why some art forms dominate government subsidies. In this respect, opera and cla.s.sical music .nish .rst, followed by the other traditional performing arts. They remain the current big winners. Next comes avant-garde visual art. In terms of attention, literature also does well.

Broadly speaking, governments do not care whether the art they sub-sidize is cla.s.sic, traditional, or contemporary as long as it has high status. Governments prefer prestigious art (thesis 98). Because of differences in status, governments prefer cla.s.sical music to contemporary cla.s.sical, jazz, or pop music; and they prefer contemporary and old visual art to traditional visual art.33 Governments do not only select high-status art. They also produce this status. As noted earlier, the very fact that governments select certain artworks over others adds to the prestige of the selected art. By display-ing art, governments enhance the prestige of their selection or prevent its decline. In this way, governments have some control over the production of (prestigious) art.

Regarding their behavior governments basically prefer prestigious art. However, this does not exclude experiments. For instance, the French as well as the English (London Arts) have started to subsidize exponents of hip-hop culture, break dancing, rap, comics, etc. and the Dutch support various forms of so-called transgressive art. The budgets are extremely small compared with funds that are given to more established varieties of culture. But as a way of receiving government attention, it cannot be ignored. Through these new endeavors governments in.uence the cul-tural ident.i.ty of a country (or region or town) and they stimulate feelings of oneness and solidarity. (In due time such art may even become presti-gious. In the future it may turn out that by their present subsidization these governments contributed to the consecration of these new art forms.) Governments are Willing to Support the Arts What is the relation between the rent seeking explanation of government involvement in the arts, presented in the previous chapter, and the gov-ernment-interest explanation presented here? Both depart from inter-ests, but the .rst stresses pressure put on the government because of the interests of groups outside government, while the second emphasizes government power and government interest. Although these approaches sit at opposite ends of the gift-duty continuum, they could nevertheless complement one another. Mutual interests could be involved.

After the Second World War, the arts not only knocked on govern-ment's door and later on business's door, but government and business also pursued the arts. Art needed government to relieve its bad .nancial situation. This dreadful situation was due to a large supply of artists and little growth in productivity in the arts. The government, however, needed the arts to enable it to deploy subtle cultural strategies in its rivalry with other countries as well as to promote national coherence among the people, as mentioned earlier.

Given the fact that the arts needed support and that governments appeared to be willing to offer that support, one would have expected considerable rent seeking from the art world. But according to the a.n.a.ly-sis in Chapter 9, the art world never became organized enough to enable it to put effective pressure on the government. No substantial organized rent seeking developed.

The arts did not effectively organize because this goes against the basic notion of artistic freedom. And, because they were afraid of losing their newfound autonomy, they resisted overbearing government involvement. In the us, the mistrust of government involvement remains particularly strong. The fear of business involvement in the arts has been less p.r.o.nounced in the us. In Europe, it was the opposite. Because in Europe the fear of business arose .rst, the arts consented instead to gov-ernment involvement. Only several decades later would business become an acceptable partner in the arts and vice versa.

The absence of highly organized rent seeking can also be explained by the fact that there was little need for it. Even without rent seeking the annual art budget rose year after year. In other sectors with considerable organized rent seeking support was less persistent. The att.i.tude of gov-ernments towards pressure groups, like automobile and homeowners, gradually turned around in the seventies and subsidies were reduced con-siderably in the decades that followed. Subsidies for the arts represent a notable exception.

In most countries, government arts expenditures per capita, corrected for in.ation, has risen steadily since the Second World War until around 1980. Since 1980, art expenditures in most European countries have more or less stabilized.34 (In some countries, like England, there was actually a slight reduction in spending in the eighties that was corrected again in the nineties.) Contrary to the popular notion in the art world that government is withdrawing from the arts, there has been no net reduction in spending per capita and there are no real signs of a substantial decline in expenditures in the near future. Therefore, given its differ-ence from other sectors it is unlikely that arts expenditures are just some response to organized external pressure; it's far more likely that govern-ment interests are involved.

Nevertheless, both explanations enhance one another because as we noted in the previous chapter, external pressure is internalized by gov-ernment of.cials. But it's also because a new type of 'mediator' has emerged who harmonizes the sector's interests and the administration's interests, as we will see in the next section.

An Arts Experts Regime Harmonizes Government and Art World Interests

Since the Second World War, many professionals gradually found employment in inst.i.tutions that integrate European governments with the arts. They form an imaginary semi-political body or an 'experts regime' in the arts, as Abram de Swaan has called similar professional 'regimes' in education and health care.35 Some of these professionals are employed within government agencies, but seem above all committed to the arts. Others work in subsidized art inst.i.tutions. Still others work in the many inst.i.tutions that operate in that domain located between gov-ernment and art and are primarily government funded.36 Similar kinds of professional or experts regimes emerged earlier in the health care, social security, and education sectors. Although the back-ground of the arts experts regime differs, it shares certain characteristics with the other three.37 One common characteristic is that in all four sec-tors, the interests of many people in the sector run largely parallel with the interests of government agencies. For instance, art's high status serves both the government and the art sector employees. The profes-sional regime in the arts takes care of shared interests. Presently a profes-sional regime in the arts looks after and harmonizes the interests of the government with those of the art world (thesis 99).

The experts regime also harmonizesinternal interests. Neither the arts nor the government can be treated as a monolithic ent.i.ty. They consist of many parts, whose interests do not always coincide. And so the regime not only tries to harmonize the interests of the government and the art world, but also of the various governmental departments as well as of parts of the art world.

Because not all of the interests can be reconciled, the regime a.s.sists the arts in setting boundaries. In the arts, however, such boundaries cannot be based on regulations or diplomas. For reasons that will become clearer in the next chapter, this kind of control can only be informal. Instead of deciding on people based on their diplomas, a complicated system of informal barriers exists that calls for many gatekeepers. The professional regime supplies most of these gatekeepers. They are organ-ized by the regime and they often, either directly or indirectly, receive facilities and payment from the government.

With the help of a professional regime in the arts, the government has gradually become a co-producer of art.38 By indirectly controlling circles of recognition in the arts, it helps co-produce the de.nition of art. This is in the government's interest as it can thus a.s.sure that the art it subsidizes and consumes is de.ned as the best examples of available art.

At the same time, however, standards of artistic quality are increas-ingly determined in an international context. Therefore, part of the arts experts regime is in the process of becoming internationally oriented. This applies, for instance, to important avant-garde inst.i.tutions that exhibit and produce international contemporary visual art. Examples are White Columns in New York, The Serpentine Gallery in London, Witte de With in Rotterdam and The Appel in Amsterdam. Although local and national governments .nance these inst.i.tutions, their directors are part of the board of directors of similar inst.i.tutions in other countries and vice versa. This way a professional regime acquires an international dimension. On the one hand, it is able to synchronize local interests to international developments. On the other hand, it can show national highlights, not as folklore, but as national innovations within an ongo-ing international development.

Given the activities of the professional regime the notion of govern-ment artistic taste has to be put in perspective. Government taste is not an independent variable that of.cials can supply at will. By supervising the dialogue between the art world and the government, the regime has an important stake in government taste. This is how the government and the arts depend on one another. Because of the impact of this profes-sional regime in the arts, the relationship has become a complicated knot that's not easily untangled.

It turns out that the government and the cultural sector are engaged in a symbiotic relationship. Art serves the government and the government serves art. The giving of gifts to the arts by a powerful government who seeks display and the extraction of duties from a government who sub-mits to pressure merge into new rituals. On the gift-duty spectrum, power has met duty.

Conclusion Why did the publicly owned Dutch National Bank in cooperation with the Dutch government purchase a Mondrian painting to give to the Dutch people, while the latter did not really want this painting? This chapter has emphasized government interests. In the case of the Mon-drian painting, the government wanted to impress people and not neces-sarily please them. Moreover, by adding an important piece to the Dutch national collection other countries can now be impressed as well.

At home, art is promoted because it is thought to contribute to educa-tion and consequently to social coherence. In its relation with other nations (or regions or towns) art plays a role in the rivalry. That is why the Dutch government chose to have The Dutch Dance Theatre and other exponents of Dutch art accompany its combined state and trade mission to Berlin. Towns, regions, and nations compete with one another. They no longer advance their standing through warfare. Instead, they compete through trade and cultural exchanges. Cultural ident.i.ties play an impor-tant role in this.

Although art is still useful for governments, it no longer conveys con-crete messages as it once did in the monarchical past. The newly gained artistic autonomy of the arts no longer tolerates this. Governments also prefer art to a.s.sist them in a veiled display of power. Therefore, the pur-chase of the Mondrian could never have been the occasion for a grand celebration. Nevertheless, art with considerable status is generally most useful for governments. It explains why cla.s.sical music receives much more money than pop music, for instance.

Gradually since the Second World War a professional regime in the arts emerged which synchronizes government and art world interests. This shows that last chapter's rent seeking explanation supplements the government-interest explanation of this chapter. The third explanation, the general-interest explanation that was treated in the previous chapter, also contributes to the overall explanation of art subsidies and of the large gift sphere in the arts; arguments that are largely false but neverthe-less convincing add to subsidization.

I am inclined to attach the most value to this chapter's government-interest explanation, but this does not imply that the other two explana-tions are unimportant. Moreover, the three explanations are related because they all depend on a common determinant: the mystique of art. However, before I return to the mystique of art in the concluding chapter, I will