Why Are Artists Poor? Part 2

Is giving more honorable than trading? And if so, why? Why does the gift sphere represent high values and the market low values? The following two sections will discuss a number of the a.s.sumed virtues of the gift sphere.

But .rst I will mention some of the characteristics that make market transactions and gifts similar and different. Both gift giving and market exchange are voluntary and they imply reciprocity; some kind of return is involved. Nevertheless, in market transactions the quid pro quo is more important. Here there's usually a stronger focus on returns and antic.i.p.a-tion of returns and there is generally more certainty about returns. A larger part of returns is covered by a form of contract and can, if neces-sary, be legally monitored. Finally, prices and the willingness to pay play a larger role in market transactions than in the gift sphere where trust and idiosyncrasy play a relatively more important role, and returns come more commonly from third parties.

Unlike the market, money does not rule the gift sphere where there is no transparent pro.t motive. Giving naturally represents a virtue in this sphere. Giving promotes other virtues like sharing, generosity, sel.ess-ness, social justice, personal contact and respect for non-monetary values. These virtues and their inherent values overlap and are interde-pendent.12 They are attractive to the arts. At the same time they are sup-posed to be vulnerable: the market and its inherent system of measure-ment and calculation is thought to endanger these values. Also, the virtue of one sphere is the vice of the other. Therefore, in discussing the virtues of the gift sphere, I shall add critical comments which indirectly refer to market virtues.13 (The comments commence with the word 'however' in Italics.) 1 The virtue of giving be.ts the arts. The act of giving is often cele- brated. When donors give to the arts it is a clear example of a virtue. Sometimes the act of receiving art is also celebrated. Often art itself is seen as a gift; it is a gift from G.o.d or from a supernatural benefactor, and hence the artist is seen as gifted. This is part of the mythology of the arts as noted in table 1 in section 1.8. Next, if art manages to affect the viewer or listener this is also considered a gift. Because a work of art is the emanation of its maker's gift and the audience receives it as a gift, it is a gift and it should be treated as a gift. It cannot be left to the market. Turning a work of art into a commodity can lead to its ulti-mate destruction.14 However, as long as the gift comes from human benefactors, people can question the gift giver's motives. When a donor uses a gift as a way to show off, a virtue turns into a vice. (And when it comes to the notion of a supernatural donor, not everybody agrees that such a donor even exists.) 2Sharing is another virtue of the gift sphere. A gift is usually given by a donor to a recipient implying that the donor no longer has access to this gift. In sharing however, the object is used collectively. People share culture. They share it in different circles including family, neigh-bors, towns, and nations. No payments are involved. This kind of sharing is often automatic; a clear example of this is a shared language as part of a culture. But a sculpture located in a public s.p.a.ce is also shared. When a collector lends a painting to a museum it is a form of sharing. Sharing is praised in the art world. It is often a dogma, that (high) art should be shared by disseminating it so that everyone can enjoy it. However, sharing not only implies inclusion; it also implies exclusion. The sharing of important aspects of art and culture is often limited to certain groups. For instance, the .ne arts are shared and simultane-ously monopolized by certain elites. Generosity to insiders goes together with a de facto exclusion of outsiders.15 With regard to the diffusion of the .ne arts, the modern market is probably more respon-sible for the democratization and emanc.i.p.ation of the .ne arts than the gift sphere.16 3Also related to sharing and giving are the virtues of generosity and self-lessness. Art and artists stand for autonomy, disinterestedness, and even self-sacri.ce. Art benefactors and artists are supposed to be self-less, and only concerned about art. The life of the ideal artist is sup-posed to be a continuous story of giving, giving to art. However, as we shall see in Chapter 4, artists are not that sel.ess; they are focused on the rewards that come with 'serving art' to better them-selves.

4The gift sphere, unlike the market, is also supposed to contribute to social justice. Most charity appeals to principles of social justice. In this context, it is striking how often people in the art world stress that art should be accessible to all and how unfair its inaccessibility due to high prices is. Art is not just some ordinary consumer good; it's sup-posed to be vital for people's development and therefore their chances in life. Therefore a social right to have access to art is often mentioned, which, in turn is a common argument for subsidies. However, the wish to diffuse art often stems from a double standard. When diffusion fails to broaden a particular genre of art, it turns out that art is not for everybody after all and this, in turn, only adds to the prestige of the art consumer.17

'The Market Devalues Art'

5Personal contact can also be considered a virtue of the gift sphere. Per-sonal ident.i.ty matters here and relationships are therefore idiosyn-cratic. In the market, many deals are made regardless of who you are. But donors give to artists not only because of their work, but also because of their personalities, their looks, their age, s.e.x, interests, etc. People care about the person they give to and about their relationship with that person. This fundamental human need is easier catered to in spheres outside the market. Commerce not only devalues the artwork, but also the unique personalities of the donor and artist. However, idiosyncrasies are not absent from the market sphere.18 For instance, in the visual art market idiosyncrasy plays an important role. Many visual art buyers have relationships with particular artists and dealers. In the second ill.u.s.tration, the deal between Alex and collector Mr. O was only successful because of their particular personal rela-tionship, while in the third ill.u.s.tration, the dealer only paid the artist after he showed his grat.i.tude. Secondly, the problem of inclusion and exclusion arises again with regard to idiosyncrasy. Including a group based on personal grounds implies the exclusion of other groups. Thus, idiosyncrasy can imply inequality and even racism. In this respect, the relative lack of personal contact encountered in the market can actually be a virtue instead of a vice. n.o.body checks behavior or clothing or starts an insider conver-sation in the book or cd departments of most large stores (This is cer-tainly the case in branches of a well-known chain of cheap drug stores in the Netherlands, where anybody can buy excellent Bach cds.) On the other hand, in the gift sphere, many personal barriers hamper cul-tural exchanges.

6Finally, while the market devalues art, the gift spheremakes a virtue of how it respects the unique and indivisible qualities of art. In the market art has a pricetag. Once art is priced it is compared with other art and other consumer goods. By considering works of art in terms of money, the indivisibility of a unique work of art is necessarily lost. By pricing works of art, their use and usefulness is captured in exact num-bers. Art ceases to be useless and turns into a non-art commodity. Therefore, pricing and money are not neutral. According to the socio-logist, Georg Simmel, money disrupts art.19 The economist, Arjo Klamer, agrees.20 On the other hand, the gift sphere doesn't offer pricetags that measure art in monetary terms and thus devalue it. The gift sphere respects the value of art. However, in contemporary gift-giving, money also plays a role as an intermediary. Therefore, if anything is to blame for art's devaluation it's not so much money but the exchange rates or prices, which are the cornerstone of markets. And, in this respect, the gift sphere is ulti-mately not that different. Exchange rates albeit vaguer ones also operate in the gift sphere.

In this context, I will make a few comments on the devaluation argu-ment. First, devaluation can only be relevant if a depreciation in value and its opposite, an appreciation in value, are viewed as social processes. And thus, because the gift sphere increases the prestige of art, the market concomitantly devalues art.

Next, it should not be forgotten that although most donations and subsidies in the arts lead to lower prices, these artworks are not free. They are still priced and sold in the market. Even though 50% to 85% of all income in cla.s.sical music comes from the gift sphere, virtually one-hundred percent of cla.s.sical music, live concerts, and cds are sold on the open market, albeit for arti.cially low prices. And although live cla.s.sical music has a pricetag, it nevertheless has also has a lot of prestige. There-fore, it seems that the pricing does not necessarily devalues art.21 People in the art world often argue that exact monetary valuations undermine the aesthetic value of art. Some social scientists agree with this view; others disagree.22 I don't disagree because, as I shall show in Chapter 3, any social circ.u.mstance can in.uence an aesthetic experi-ence. Therefore, it would be strange if pricetags didn't in.uence aesthetic value. But within a social process, such in.uence can take a variety of forms, it not only decreases value, it also increases value.

In the everyday world, people measure art and aesthetic value. They do it all the time. Past and present aesthetic experiences are discussed and compared with friends. Opinions change. Even the most unique, sub-lime, moving, or astonishing art experiences only have these qualities in relation to other experiences. Without comparing price, size, length, key, or color there would be no aesthetic experience. There would be no art, sublime or not. Comparing and ordering are such basic activities that there is no a priori reason why they should necessarily devalue art or increase its value. Because any aesthetic experience rests on measure-ments and comparisons, there is no basis for the notion that measure-ment devalues art (thesis 10).

Nevertheless, with the virtues people attribute to the gift sphere it is not that amazing to predict that as long as the arts belong to the gift sphere they will remain highly esteemed.

The Arts Need the High Status of the Gift Sphere As Bourdieu has emphasized however, gifts need to be interpreted as a denial of self-interest in the short run, so that bene.ts can be reaped in the long run.23 Nevertheless, because of the seeming absence of self-interest, giving has a higher status than buying and selling. Long-term support for anti-commercial values does exist in our society. Even with all the pres-ent-day praise of the market, commercial values are always on the defen-sive. They are suspect. Partic.i.p.ating in market activities can easily give someone a bad conscience. The contempt for money and those who openly pursue monetary gain is widely shared and has deep roots. The gift sphere has a lot of status; the values of the gift sphere have more status than the values of the market sphere (thesis 11).

Works of art often symbolize the superiority of the values of the gift sphere and the inferiority of market values. For instance, in theatres all over the world, the commercial aspect continues to be ridiculed and dis-paraged. Scrooge appeals to the imagination. Like earlier audiences, modern audiences continue to laugh at the Pantalone character in a Commedia del Arte play, Shakespeare's Merchant of Venice, Moliere's The Miser, or the greedy right wing h.o.m.os.e.xual in Schlingensief's con-temporary piece, 'Bring Me the Head of Adolf Hitler'. 24 Moreover, even today, people continue to jeer at the cartoon .gure of Disney's Uncle Scrooge (Dagobert Duck). This demonstrates that the contempt for the pursuit of money still is an essential ingredient in our education.

Art apparently has a lot of status. Below are some indications of this.

table 2 signs of the high status of the arts 1 Some artists earn extremely high incomes.

2 The prices of most old and some contemporary art are extremely high.

3 Donations and subsidies form a large part of the income in the arts.

4 Donations and subsidies are seldom questioned.

5 Many people want to become artists in spite of the prospect of low .nancial rewards.

6 Artists and others employed in the arts give large amounts of money to the arts by funneling income from second jobs, allowances, or inheritances into the arts.

7 Art students have more status than other students have.

8 Even young and unsuccessful artists have a special status.

9 People admire and envy artists.

10 The government, royalty, and important corporations all consume art.

11 Works of art are used at funerals, when heads of state visit as well as for many other important ceremonies and functions.

12Members of the social elite, like ministers, heads of ministries and ceos visit important concerts, plays and exhibitions. They con-sume far more art than average people.

13The public consumption of works of art cla.s.sical concerts, modern art exhibits requires that the audience observe a certain kind of silence, speaking in whispers if at all. This solemnity is comparable to that of religious ceremonies.

It might be instructive to apply the above list, which is not exhaustive, to other sectors of production, for instance to that of food production and food producers, science and scientists, or religion and priests. What we discover is that right now in Europe even priests score lower than artists on the esteem scale. (In the us however, many people may well admire successful businessmen like Bill Gates more than well-known artists.) The status of artists is indeed high.25 Even many scientists, despite the relatively high status of their profession, look up to artists, while few artists envy scientists. It is this strange 'inexplicable' level of envy that points to 'something unusual' going on in the arts. (Sometimes people's att.i.tudes towards artists appear two-sided, ambiguous. People pity and mock poor artists, but nevertheless envy them.26) The arts have an exceptionally high status (thesis 12). It is likely that their status can only be this high because the arts are inextricably af.li-ated with the gift sphere, which also has high status. To a lesser degree, the high status of the gift sphere also depends on the high status of the arts. The arts adhere to the values of the gift sphere and reject the values of the economic sphere (thesis 13).

The Economy in the Arts Is Denied and Veiled The value system in the arts is two-faced and asymmetrical. Although in general the market is oriented towards money and pro.t, the arts cannot openly reveal this kind of orientation when they operate in the market. This approach would certainly harm artistic careers and therefore, long-term incomes as well. It speci.cally harms the pro.table af.liation of the arts with the gift sphere, and it is therefore punished by the art world. Thus, pro.t motives are not absent, they are merely veiled, and publicly the economic aspect of art is denied.

Another value system exists in the gift sphere. It emphasizes sel.ess devotion to art and condemns the pursuit of monetary gain. This value system is highly valued and is expressed quite openly. It thus looks as if this value system controls the art world. Nevertheless, many transactions are guided by a normal, but veiled orientation to market values.

Because one value system is veiled, while the other is open, an asym-metrical two-faced value system exists. In this respect, it is noteworthy that it is often commercial to be a-commercial. Expressing anti-market values can add to one's success in the market. Artists, dealers, or editors who exhibit a lack of concern for money may well enhance their market value. This implies that the economic sphere and the gift sphere are related.

The two-faced or plural value system coincides with a dual economy where one economy operates in the market sphere and the other in the gift sphere.27 In both, people increase their welfare by 'serving art', gain-ing recognition, earning money, etc. A dual economy exists in other sec-tors as well.28 But only the arts maintain a one-sided appeal on the values of the gift sphere.29 The way companies sponsor art also re.ects the denial of the economic aspect. Nowadays most sponsorship comes down to a simple market deal: the sale of speci.c advertising rights. But the rituals that belong to the gift sphere are maintained because they are valuable to the partici-pants.30 Market deals take on the appearance of gifts.

It is now possible to answer the questions raised earlier by the ill.u.s.tra-tions at the beginning of this chapter. Why does the dealer want the artist to pretend that when she pays him his cut, she is doing him a favor? It is because by pretending that they are operating in the gift sphere, they can veil their market transaction. Artist and dealer deny the market eco-nomy. In the other ill.u.s.trations, the economy is denied by not including price tags in a commercial gallery, by limiting the talk of money to an absolute minimum and by placing the talk of money in a separate sphere unrelated to art. Most of the other ill.u.s.trations in this book also indi-rectly demonstrate the denial of the economy in the arts.

In order to maintain their high status the arts reject commercial values and deny the economy (thesis 14).

A Dual Economy Requires Special Skills How can artists and intermediaries who deny the economy make a living? Some evidently do. Anti-market behavior can be pro.table. Sometimes, the more anti-commercial artists and intermediaries present themselves, the higher their status and incomes are. Such a-commercial att.i.tudes don't follow from a strategy. Artists behave a-commercially because they are artists. In the course of the history of the artistic profes-sion this type of behavior became part of the artist's 'character'.31 Artists have learned to play 'games' in two spheres. That is how they earn a living.

Any game requires knowledge of the rules and subtleties of the game.32 Although this is often denied, pro.ts can be made or prizes can be won in both market games and non-commercial games. Moreover, all these games have an internal logic. Therefore, as has been noted earlier, economies can be said to exist in- and outside the market.

While operating simultaneously in both the market sphere, and the gift sphere, artists and other people working in the arts have developed skills in the games of both spheres. (Although Alex's colleagues in the second ill.u.s.tration declare that they don't like the money game, they are good at it.) Many present-day artists and others working in the arts have a sense for market games. But they honestly deny this and openly play non-commercial games, most of all the game of being sel.essly devoted to art. They do so by denying the economy and veiling their market activ-ities.33 In this sense they have a split personality.

Marcel Duchamp, Andy Warhol, and Jeff Koons are possible exam-ples of artists who contradict the denial of the economy. These artists knew the rules of the various games inside and out. Duchamp challenged the rules by showing the relative value of artistic objects. Meanwhile Warhol and Koons openly displayed their interest in money and market values.34 (Maybe this is a case of desiring 'to kill the very thing you love'?) These artists are exponents of a trend that lasts to the present day. Again and again artists provoke the existing order of denying the econ-omy. Their behavior is shocking, but at the same time the art world loves it. By being ironic about what lies at the core of the arts, the art world playfully consolidates the denial of the economy. De facto the repressive tolerance of the art world renders the artists who were involved harmless.

Another example demonstrates that games used to deny the economy can take different forms that demand different skills. A colleague of mine, Olav Velthuis, has questioned gallery owners about their pricing policies.35 Given the denial of the economy, you would expect the people he interviewed to feel uneasy and reluctant to talk about their own calcu-lations and strategies. Velthuis found that gallery owners in the 'lower' art circles showed more uneasiness and were more reluctant to answer his questions about prices than those in the higher or contemporary art sectors. The 'low' art group of gallery owners apologized more often about the fact that 'after all they had to run a business' as if this were a sin. And between responses they made all sorts of remarks to demon-strate their una.s.sailable love of art. I asked Velthuis if he therefore believed that the denial of the economy is less strong in high art circles. He did not think so. He prefers to describe their tactics as a 'double denial'. The game is more re.ned in these circles. The 'low' art gallery owners, in their search for recognition, felt obliged to stick to the rules, whereas the avant-garde gallery owners applied the rules naturally and knew when they could deviate from them. In the presence of my col-league they could playfully joke about money and prices and thus display the true aristocratic traits that the newcomers lack.36 Evidently, in spite of their denial of market values and their split per-sonalities, artists and other people working in the art operate comfort-ably in both the gift sphere and the market sphere without losing their sanity.

Conclusion

Why can't the presence of money and commerce in the arts bear the light of day? In the commercial gallery in the earlier ill.u.s.tration, the paintings had no price tags. Sacha Tanja who bought drawings from Alex for her bank did not directly ask about their prices, and collector Mr. O kept the bargaining and conversational aspects of art strictly separate. Finally, the example of the gallery owner is the most extraordinary. Why indeed did the owner only want to pay Alex his cut in the context of the charade where they both pretended that payment was a gift not an obligation? The answer lies in the necessary denial of the economy in the arts.

Even though artists and art lovers tend to disapprove of the monetary connection in art, this connection is nevertheless undeniably present. Although donations and subsidies are more important than they are in other sectors, approximately half of the art world's income derives from the market. Evidently the arts seem to operate successfully in both the market and gift spheres. (The latter includes subsidies.) Nevertheless, the values of the gift sphere come .rst. The virtues of the gift sphere are attractive. The high status accorded the gift sphere enhances the status of the arts. Several phenomena con.rm the high status of art and artists.

The a.s.sociation of the arts with non-commercial values has grown in importance over the last one hundred years. The economy is denied. Art products are sold in the market, but often in a veiled manner. Art and artists are highly esteemed. This kind of status could never have existed if the arts had embraced commerce instead. It is commercial to be non-commercial.

It can be argued that the denial of the economy in the arts has pa.s.sed its zenith.37 For instance, among performing art companies there is less resistance to commercial att.i.tudes than there was twenty years ago. Other signs (to be discussed later) point in the same direction. Neverthe-less, even if the denial has pa.s.sed its zenith, it is still strong and it is likely to continue to in.uence the economy of the arts for at least another .fty years.

Finally, even if readers agree that money and markets are indispensa-ble to the arts, they can still maintain that money is a necessary evil in the arts. 'After all, aesthetic value has nothing to do with market value.' Therefore the next chapter examines the relationship between aesthetic and market values.

Discussion

1Gallery owners in the 'low' arts were said to be relatively orthodox in their denial of the economy. They feel the need to be more Catholic than the pope. Or is there a better, more down to earth explanation? One could maintain that they are secretive about their price policies because they are more closely related to normal commerce and there-fore they are more aware of compet.i.tion than high art galleries. They hide their price-policies, not because they deny the economy, but because of compet.i.tion. How can one tell the difference?

2Is the contempt for money in society and in the arts becoming less important? For instance, art administrators in the performing arts appear to deny the economy less than they did twenty years ago. Does this change in behavior re.ect a trend that contradicts this chapter's .ndings?

Chapter 3

Economic Value Versus Aesthetic Value

Is There Any Financial Reward for Quality?

Market Success Demonstrates Low Quality, But not if the Artist's own Work is Successful When Alex goes to the local pub with his artist friends, a recurrent theme in their conversations is the question of whether the prices of artworks re.ect their artistic quality. The other day the work of a colleague who has recently become successful in the market was being discussed. They scolded him for accepting such high prices for such dreadful paintings. (This particular colleague frequents a different bar.) They are angry at the stupid art world, which buys all this c.r.a.p literally and .guratively. They question the existing order, in what it does to sales and reputations, but mostly regarding its criti-cal judgment. Alex and his colleagues can be expected to think this way. Within their group, they have developed a speci.c notion about aesthetics. As artists, it is essential to them to offer, through artistic means, critical commentaries on society, including the market. Because people cannot be expected to purchase painful commentary, society should furnish a sanctuary for art outside the realm of the market. For them this is the raison d'etre for subsi-dies. Thus, it's fairly obvious that their notions about aesthetics means that art with a low market value has a high aesthetic value and vice versa. Later on, that evening something strange happens. Alex's colleagues ask him whether he has sold anything during his present exhibition. They con-gratulate Alex when he tells them he has sold several drawings. They say he deserves it. One colleague says she thinks Alex's work has improved a lot over the past two years. Alex suddenly realizes that they often berate the market when it favors artists who are not their friends, and conversely, if one of their own suddenly tastes success, they tend to attach almost too much signi.cance to it. The market suddenly goes from being something coincidental to something righteous. And so they have to justify its right-eousness by concluding that Alex has worked hard and that his work has improved. But Alex wonders: maybe his work did not improve at all. Is it possible that his colleagues look at his work afresh because it is selling and that they suddenly see qualities they did not see before?

Deciding on the Value of One's Work Adrian, a former student and Alex's good friend, has become successful, in the market as well as in the eyes of the critics. Since Adrian is now well known, sometimes at exhibitions people tell Alex that they like his work, but that it is too much like Adrian's work as if Alex is trying to copy Adrian's work. Alex .nds this hard to swallow. After all, he is twenty-.ve years older then Adrian. When they .rst met, Alex already had his own style, all before Adrian had even entered art school. Adrian's work hangs on his wall and Alex's work hangs in Adrian's house. Due to a common interest and because of some mutual in.uence, their work is related. But if one in.u-enced the other at all, Alex must have in.uenced Adrian, not the other way around. Whenever somebody close to him, like Adrian, becomes successful, Alex feels the need to suddenly reevaluate his own work. The market value of Adrian's work has increased a great deal to the point where it now has a much higher market value than Alex's work. Thus, it's only natural that Alex questions the aesthetic value of his and Adrian's work. Does increased market value mean that the quality of Adrian's work is also that much higher than his own? Somewhat to his relief, Alex realizes that it's not just the work that matters. External factors also play a role. Adrian's youthfulness and good looks certainly make a difference in the art world. Plus Adrian's artis-tic form and temperament seem to suit the spirit of the times. Therefore, Alex tries to formulate all the possible external factors that might in.uence public opinion, but also his own a.s.sessments of his own and his friend's work. This way he hopes that his work will no longer be inferior. Even though the market and critics prefer his friend's work, when it really comes down to it, his own work is just as good. But Alex remains uncertain. He tells himself that the market and the critics can't be totally wrong, and so Adrian's work must have qualities his own does not. Moreover, Alex .nds the notion that he could be just fooling him-self by bucking the opinions of both the market and the critics unbearable. In the end, he has decided that his friend's work is better. Adrian is a d.a.m.n good painter.

Art That Ends Up on the Garbage Dump Alex and his colleagues are serious about their art materials and tech-niques. Because of the paint, paper, and canvas and the techniques they employ, their works might well last a thousand years. They seriously ponder the possibility that their art might live forever. Which means that if their art is valuable now, it will continue to be valuable in the future. And if it is not valu-able now, it is bound to become so in the future. Two decades ago, Alex met an art historian, So.a, whom rudely opened his eyes when she told him that the overwhelming majority of artworks end up in a garbage dump. This might happen in part during an artist's lifetime and in part shortly after his or her death. Within .fty years of an artist's death, some ninety percent of his or her ma.n.u.scripts, scores, compositions, and paintings have disappeared into the rubbish bin. These are averages of course. A rather small selection of artists still has its work intact but for the vast majority, their work has all but vanished. She also noted that of all the paintings that hung on walls in the Netherlands during the Golden Age, less than one percent have survived to the present day.1 Alex was shocked. It was not so much the perception of his art that was threatened, but of art itself. Deep down Alex had always cherished the holi-ness of art and its enduring value. He thought that this value stemmed from an intrinsic quality of art that other products lack. And because an intrinsic quality doesn't just disappear over time, Alex a.s.sumed that valuable art now would still be valuable in a thousand years. In the following years, Alex gradually came to terms with the temporality of his art and of the art he loved and admired. To his own amazement, Alex felt an enormous sense of relief. He no longer had to work for posterity. Instead, he could produce drawings for people, alive now, some of whom are his personal friends. These people evidently have some use for his drawings. But it's very likely that in half a century his drawings will be lost. Who cares? He'll be dead by then anyway. Since this revelation, Alex has found it easier to take responsibility for his art. Having a responsibility for the rest of eternity was always a bit too much responsibility. And so like a loaf of bread, most art works get used up. And Alex now thinks this is the way it should be.

Does aesthetic value diminish? Is that why so many works of art end up in a garbage dump? And why do artists remain so ambiguous about market value? One minute, artists are scolding the market because it has nothing to do with quality and the next their appreciation of Alex's work is determined by its success in the market. And so when Alex's friend Adrian becomes successful on the market, Alex .rst tries to play it down by questioning market value, but in the end he comes to the conclusion that his friend's work is simply better.

Although I do not always behave accordingly, as an artist it is my con-viction that the quality of my artwork is not related to my success or lack of success in the market. I don't think that artists who earn more neces-sarily make better art. In my view artists who earn much money can still make bad art. If there is any relationship at all, I would have to agree with my colleagues who insist that success and low artistic quality go hand-in-hand. Although I actually earn a substantial portion of my income through the market, as an artist I am convinced that aesthetic value is independent of market value.

But as an economist, I disagree with this. As an economist I believe that quality in general corresponds with success in the market. I'm sure that artists and art lovers alike will accuse me for being cynical. They would do well to paraphrase Oscar Wilde: "Here is this economist who knows the price of everything and the value of nothing". Be that as it may; I think I have a point. Otherwise, Alex and his colleagues would not be so ambivalent when it comes to market value.

In this chapter, my aims are limited. I don't intend to present a compre-hensive study of how prices and aesthetic judgments in the arts evolve.2 Nor do I contrast cultural values with economic values as Throsby does.3 I merely want to demonstrate that aesthetic value, de.ned in a limited sense, and economic value are systematically related.

Aesthetic Value and Market Value Differ in De.nition Before embarking on a discussion of the relationship between aesthetic and economic value, the meanings of these terms should be clari.ed. As with the term 'art', I prefer to de.ne aesthetic value more obliquely. So-called experts de.ne aesthetic value. Aesthetic value is what experts call aesthetic value. The experts include artists, critics, mediators, and con-sumers with authority in the art world. They comprise the acknowledged leading experts of the art world. Similar to our earlier de.nition of art, not everyone wields the same amount of authority in the establishment of aesthetic value: the in.uence of some experts is larger than that of others. Aesthetic value resembles a weighed average. But unlike market values, aesthetic values differ only in an ordinal sense. For instance, some experts might .nd that painting A has more aesthetic value than that of painting B, but they cannot tell how much more.

This sociological approach to aesthetic value which places the power of evaluation in the hands of experts can offer a special perspective to the questions raised in the ill.u.s.trations above. But it should be borne in mind that it also circ.u.mvents numerous issues and problems regarding the value of artworks that are of interest in other settings.4 The economic value of a work of art is its value in terms of money. (Here as in 'economic sphere', and later in 'economic capital' and 'eco-nomic power', 'economic' is used in a monetary sense.) Most of the time 'economic value' is synonymous with 'market value', i.e., the amount of money involved in the selling and buying of artworks. Because economic value is measured in terms of money, it is possible to make precise com-parisons. For instance, the market value of painting A is 1.8times as high as that of painting B.

Although price is often thought to represent market value, this corre-lation is only appropriate in the case of unique works of art. In all other cases, like the sale of books, cds and seats at a performance, only rev-enues from sales can represent market value. These revenues are deter-mined by multiplying price by quant.i.ty.5 For instance, cds by My Morn-ing Jacket are the same price as Spice Girls cds, and yet the market value of a Spice Girls cd is much higher, because sales of Spice Girls cds are much higher. (In this speci.c case, quant.i.ty is a fair determinant of market value, but to be safe, it is always better to multiply price and quant.i.ty.) 'In the Market there is no Reward for Quality'

There is no reward for good art in the market. And it's not just artists and art lovers who go around saying this. The notion that artistic quality does not 'pay' permeates every level of society. The cleaning woman and the lawyer alike may express as their opinion that true art does not pay and that artists must suffer. This is common wisdom that is deeply rooted in our society. As an artist, I also adhere to this view.

As an economist however, I oppose the notion that there is no relation-ship or even a negative one between quality and market value. I believe that market value and aesthetic value generally correspond. 'In the market, artists are justly rewarded for the quality of their artworks.' These two opinions are basically as different as day and night. I begin by putting them in some perspective.

First, I look at the artist's argument, which also includes most art lovers: market value does not re.ect quality. The relationship can, in fact, be negative. High aesthetic value can actually be linked to low market value and vice versa. Three different interpretations of this prem-ise are possible. 1 Aesthetic value and economic value belong to independent spheres.

Values deviate randomly and are only coincidentally similar. There is no relation whatsoever between these two values. 2 Aesthetic value and economic value belong to non-reciprocal spheres.

Aesthetic value is independent, while market value depends, to vary ing degrees, on aesthetic value. Buyers listen to experts but not vice versa. A positive but one-way relationship exists in which aesthetic value remains an autonomous uncontaminated factor. 3 Aesthetic value and economic value belong to hostile spheres. An inverse relationship exists. Market value reduces aesthetic value. The implicit message is that market value is dangerous for art; thus it must not interfere with aesthetic value. Because aesthetic value is not natu-rally autonomous, autonomy should be the goal of those you care about art.6 My description of the market and the gift sphere in the previous chapter implies the presence of hostile spheres not unlike interpretation number three. In commerce everything is measured in monetary term, which tends to degrade art; it lowers a particular artwork's aesthetic value. And so evidence of commerce must be swept under the mat. Meanwhile, art lovers consider aesthetic value the essence of art. If art is sublime or sacred, it's because of its aesthetic value. And thus, artists and art lovers feel the need to safeguard the notion of aesthetic value from contamina-tion by market value.

Governments also seem to think there is a negative relationship between aesthetic and market value. For instance, in efforts to promote 'quality' in the arts, many governments tend to subsidize young artists who have not yet succeeded in the market. So, in the eyes of many govern-ments, low market value can correspond with high aesthetic value. In fact, the very existence of government subsidies in the arts presumes an overall negative relationship between aesthetic value and economic value.7 I now turn from the artist's opinion to the opposing argument, that of the economist: market value corresponds with aesthetic value in the arts. The economist, William Grampp, defends this position most fervently. "In saying that economic and aesthetic values are consistent, I mean that if outside the market painting A is said to be superior to painting B then on the market the price of A will be higher than B."8 Formulated in a dif-ferent manner it begins to sound less pleasant: If the price of A is higher than that of B, then A is superior. I shall refer to this a.s.sumed (ordinal) correspondence as the thesis of correspondence between aesthetic and economic value or simply, Grampp's thesis. 9 Grampp does not say so, but a clear implication of his thesis is that, if one artist earns more than another, the .rst is the better artist. For instance, if Lucian Freud earns more than Jeff Koons, his work must be artistically superior. It is an implication most art-lovers will strongly repudiate. (Grampp refers to unique paintings and can therefore use price instead of market value. Because the a.n.a.lysis in this chapter also refers to multiples, like graphics, books, and cds, I use market value to represent economic value.) Grampp's discussions of the correspondence between the two values certainly does not imply a one-way in.uence, i.e., that market value is determined by aesthetic value. They depend on one another. In his view, aesthetic value cannot be an independent value as it also depends on eco-nomic variables such as relative scarcity. For instance, Grampp suggests that if Rembrandt had produced even fewer self-portraits both their market and aesthetic value would be even higher than they already are.10 In the context of our purposes, the thesis of correspondence offers a fruitful starting point for our a.n.a.lysis of economic and aesthetic value. The thesis is clear and precise, however in princ.i.p.al, it can be refuted.11 The thesis of correspondence is part of a broader and more relevant thesis. Economists like Grampp and Tyler Cowen claim that free markets and commerce in the arts more often promote quality or aesthetic value than harm it. 12 But because this kind of thesis is harder to a.s.sess, it is not dealt with in this chapter.

To repeat, the economist defends the position that market perform-ance and quality in the arts largely correspond. 13 Thus, on average, artists get what they deserve. If they suffer, it's because the quality of their work is low. On the other hand, the art world defends the position that quality in the arts exists irrespective of market performance. Artists may suffer because they lack market income while they are indeed making great art.

Before attempting to a.s.sess these positions, I will brie.y discuss the question of whether market value and aesthetic value are social values.

Values are Shared Social variables are essential in this book's approach to the economy of the arts. Nevertheless, the term 'social' does not really exist in the tradi-tional economic approach. This approach is based on individual prefer-ences. Although individual preferences do get funneled into the market, thus in.uencing market value, it is not considered a social process. Market value then, is the automatic outcome of the interactions of numerous independent individuals who cannot alone in.uence the out-come. Therefore, market value is not a social value, but an objective value.

Modern economists, however, are well aware that preferences are not given and independent; preferences are interdependent.14 Nevertheless, in their view standard economic theory offers a useful 'approach', not necessarily a realistic view of the world. At the same time, most econo-mists do not disagree with the thesis that market value is a social value.

It should be acknowledged however, that individuals are the building blocks of economic theory. Economists adhere to so-called methodological individualism.15 If social values in fact exist, they stem from individ-ual values or preferences. Sociologists, on the other hand, base their approach on social values, which they believe are not the sum total of individual values. Social values maintain a relative autonomy.16 As long as we take social values seriously, there is no need to take sides in this complex controversy.17 In the context of this book, an a.n.a.lysis of value concepts is not neces-sary and would ultimately be confusing.18 The distinction between .rst order and higher order values (or meta-values) as noted by social scien-tists as well as economists cannot be ignored however.19 Taste and con-sequent shopping behavior rest on .rst-order values. Take Mr. Williams; he has a higher order value because he wants to be regarded as 'a man of his time'. Thus, he prefers .ction by young authors, which represents a .rst-order value. This implies that higher-order values and .rst order values are contingent or interdependent, but not in a deterministic way. Contradictions between .rst and higher order values are not uncom-mon. Mr. Smith, for instance, buys Tom Jones cds and goes to see p.o.r.no-graphic .lms, but at the same time, he is ashamed of this kind of con-sumption. Evidently, his conscience tells him that he should prefer other kinds of music and .lms. In his conscience, he has internalized higher values that are more important to him than his daily values.

Without the possibility of individuals maintaining contradictory values, the cultural inferiority and consequent asymmetry in judgment described in Chapter 1 could not have existed. For instance, in practice people with lower levels of education buy different art than people with higher levels of education; their .rst order values differ. Nevertheless, when the .rst are asked to order low and high art their higher order values correspond in a general sense with the elite ordering. Therefore in their case, .rst and higher order values must contradict.

Social values that are primarily shared within a speci.c group result in a group att.i.tude. Artists and economists, for instance, have different att.i.tudes. To a lesser degree, the same applies to different groups of artists, such as composers and ch.o.r.eographers. The typical elements of these att.i.tudes are commonly knowledge. So, it should not be too amaz-ing to learn that the controversies between the artist in me and the econo-mist in me presented in each chapter's introduction are largely pre-dictable.

There is No Such Thing as a Pure Work of Art Are art lovers correct in saying that aesthetic value is independent of values such as market value and other social values? If the various spheres are indeed independent or non-reciprocal, then there is either no relation between aesthetic and market value, or market value adapts itself to aesthetic value, but not vice versa.

The way aesthetic value has been de.ned here makes it a social value by de.nition: individual experts who necessarily listen to one another, collectively determine aesthetic value. Nevertheless, for many experts aesthetic value is an altogether independent value that is hidden in the artwork.

Let us take a closer look at expert behavior. I mention four cases in which market value is in.uenced by social circ.u.mstances, in two of which aesthetic value is also effected. 1 The instant that new techniques of measuring characteristics unseen by the human eye revealed that a painting by Rembrandt was made by one of his students or that a Pica.s.so lithography was a fake, the prices of these works tumbled as does their aesthetic value in the eyes of experts.

2When any of the Marilyn Monroe portraits by Warhol goes up for sale, it consistently fetches higher prices than his other portraits. Moreover, within Warhol's oeuvre, the Monroe portraits received a lot of attention from experts who wrote more positive reviews about them than about the others.

3Until recently, companies, but also foundations and government-insti-tutions, bought relatively many large and colorful abstract expression-ist paintings to use as decoration in halls or behind desks. Because of this demand the market value of this type of painting was higher than it would otherwise have been. Experts however, will fervently declare that the aesthetic value of these paintings was not in.uenced by the use these inst.i.tutions made of the paintings.

4Copies of an etching are exactly alike, but they differ in their prove-nance, i.e., the doc.u.mentation of their ownership history: one etching has been part of a royal collection since it was created, while the other has not. And so, the .rst sells at a higher price than the latter. But for experts this difference does not matter.20 In all four examples, social factors have in.uenced market value. In the .rst two, they have also in.uenced the experts' aesthetic opinion.21 (In the third experts deny any in.uence. If we were to look from the perspec-tive of the tenth .oor however, we could probably prove that also in the third example the experts were in.uenced by the omnipresence of those eye-catching abstract expressionist paintings, but were evidently unaware of it.) In any case, the .rst two examples tell us that even experts admit that their aesthetic judgment is sometimes in.uenced by social cir-c.u.mstances.

The examples are instructive because they show that experts draw a line.Inthiscase,thelineisdrawnbetweenthesecondandthethirdexam-ple. Rules and conventions among experts govern what enters into the determinationofaestheticvalue.Theexistenceoftheserulesandconven-tionsmeans that aesthetic value is in practice a social construction.

These remarks have not even touched upon the possibility that art might have intrinsic aesthetic value independent of expert decree. Can art be intrinsically valuable? People clearly desire this idea of intrinsic value. Many art lovers, and I'm no exception, are looking for pure works of art. They want to believe in a naive or virginal approach to listening, reading and looking, as if the book, tone or painting is the .rst one. They believe that only in this mode can they remain truly receptive to art. The belief that art is sacred only feeds the notion of a primeval aesthetic expe-rience comparable to that of a unique religious experience. But people are never completely open nor do they live in a void. Their social values and relation to art, determines which elements in an artwork are read, heard, or seen.

If a Van Eyck painting were left behind for an indigenous tribe in New Guinea, the tribe would probably treat it like any other panel. Because the members of the tribe have a different social setting, they won't see anything extraordinary on the canvas. The only value it might have is as a shingle to .x a roof or as .rewood.

In one of the above ill.u.s.trations, Alex tries to compare his work with that of his successful friend, Adrian. His friend's work has a higher market value and experts pay more attention to it. Alex however, believes (or hopes) that when the social impact is removed, his work will be con-sidered no worse than Adrian's. He prefers to compare the 'intrinsic' values of 'pure' artworks. But it's impossible to eliminate all social values and begin with a blank slate. In practice, Alex only discounts those values that he personally doesn't want interfering with the art-work's 'intrinsic' value, such as their age difference. But a more agree-able value, such as the h.o.m.oerotic content of their work, continues to a.s.sert its in.uence on his judgment of 'intrinsic' value.

Barbara Smith has pointed out, that by subtracting all social values one is left with no value at all. She writes, "When all such utilities, inter-ests, and particular sources of value have been subtracted, nothing remains. Or, to put this in other terms: the 'essential' value of a work of art consists of everything from which it is usually distinguished."22 Therefore, the division between aesthetic and non-aesthetic values nec-essarily depends on social judgment.

Aesthetic judgments vary according to time and to the social group involved. It thus follows that, contrary to the claim of many art lovers and artists, art has no intrinsic value (thesis 15). Aesthetic value is not an independent value, but a social value (thesis 16). This conclusion clears the path for the discussion of the main question of this chapter: how are aesthetic and market value related? Is there a negative relationship as many artists and art lovers believe, or is it positive as the economist believes?

Buyers In.uence Market Value and Experts Aesthetic Value Who determines aesthetic value and market value? In discussing the con-troversy regarding the relationship between aesthetic and market values, it might be helpful to try to answer this question .rst.