What's Wrong With Eating People? Part 6

'Who's for dinner?' some others asked. Well, I was hungry; and present were bright and beaming people - generous to boot, for no membership fee had been demanded. I was an honorary fellow, they said. Naive little me - little did I realize that my enthusiastic 'yes' to dinner would lead me to the cooking pot, not as guest diner or even guest chef, but - gulp gulp - as guest 'about to be dined upon'. These people were generous sure enough, but generous to a fault, as I was soon to discover. - as guest 'about to be dined upon'. These people were generous sure enough, but generous to a fault, as I was soon to discover.

Serve Man was the club s motto - and it slowly dawned on me what this meant. Yes, cannibalism was alive and well in was the club s motto - and it slowly dawned on me what this meant. Yes, cannibalism was alive and well in London's Pall Mall. It looked as if, while I should soon be dead, I should not be much buried - just stewed, with, I trusted, at least a fine garnish.

We may deal quickly with the scenario sketched, once we have the background question: what's wrong with eating people? After all, I had not consented to their gastronomic intentions and was far from wanting to be cooked; so, that was why eating me was wrong.

Jonathan Swift gave satirical voice to eating babies and the young, to stave off impending starvation. The idea has not been much taken up. True, in extreme cases when, for example, survivors of air crashes would otherwise die, people typically accept that eating those already deceased is morally permissible. Many people, though, would be appalled at the dining habits of our club above, even if members ate only humans recently deceased through natural cause or accident. Yet, many of these appalled people are probably pleased to be blood donors, when alive, and pleased to donate organs on death.

To maintain focus, we cast to one side cases when eating those accidentally or naturally deceased is required because of imminent starvation. Those instances excepted, is something otherwise wrong with the consumption of human remains by humans, even when such cannibalism is voluntarily agreed? After all, many of us enthusiastically eat the flesh of other creatures - fish, fowl, and beasts of the field - and sometimes we savour, sometimes unwittingly, snakes, whales, and crocodiles, even the odd cat, dog, and chimp.Yet only the perverted would defend eating people - it seems.

Whatever is wrong with eating people?

Many creatures - cows, sheep, pigs - would not have existed, but for our husbandry; yet does that give us the right to kill and eat them? Were it to do so, we could return to Swift's proposal and defend farming human babies. The argument is, of course, bad. Just because we created the individuals, we do not possess rights to destroy them - certainly not, if the created possess interests of their own, as arguably animals and babies do. Even a Pica.s.so who creates a great painting, appreciated by millions, may be wrong to destroy his creation.

Many of us, of course, seek to justify the painless killing of non-human animals for food. Maybe a super-species would farm humans, arguing that we humans, a lesser species, suffered little loss, if painlessly killed. That would justify eating people - though not by people. The 'super-species thought' may rightly encourage us not to be so casual in our meat- eating ways.

One man's meat may be another man's person, and there are standard, pragmatic arguments against people-pies, h.o.m.o sapiens bleu, h.o.m.o sapiens bleu, and tinned man or woman. and tinned man or woman.

Were the eating of people to be accepted simply as a pleasurable dish - or maybe not so pleasurable - then, it may be said, we should be devaluing human life in general. Even if such eating were permitted only of those who died naturally or by accident - carrying 'donate for eating' cards - our way of looking at each other could alter for the worse. The looking would be affected by the cooking. After all, some argue that some p.o.r.nography encourages men to view women as flesh, devaluing their personhood. With person cooking accepted, maybe we would regard others as lumps of flesh, commodities, rather than persons. But is this likely? Just because we would be treating corpses in one way, why should we slip into a related att.i.tude to living people?

Respect for persons involves respect for their bodies - and such respect extends to a person's corpse. Having human corpses, hanging in butcher shops, or tinned man or woman available on supermarket shelves, merely to provide dining variety, undermines the respect. It certainly differs from using organs of the deceased to save others' lives.

Consider households that keep a few turkeys - Lucinder, Ludwig, and Ludmilla - with the intention of fattening them for Christmas. When Christmas comes, not many in the family enjoy tucking into Lucinder and the others. The names have helped to make the turkeys honorary members of our human community.

We de-humanize people, block out respect, reducing their status to mere bundles of flesh, by addressing them, even when face to face, simply by numbers - as done in concentration camps. De-humanization dangers are even present when, for example, patients are known simply as the 'appendix' or 'hernia'.Yet, there are cases and cases. Cases vary, depending on context, intentions, and perceptions. People sometimes may rightly be treated as just bodies. Stelarc, an artist, has engaged in street suspension, piercing his body with hooks, hanging his body over New York City. Was he degrading himself? It is not clear that he was; he remained a voluntary agent in that use of his body as apparently artistic object.

We have pictured human corpses dangling in butcher shops; and such scenes would deeply offend. Yet have we really shown anything to be morally wrong with people wishing to be eaten after their natural death - and those wishes being respected, given suitable regulation and discretion? We have a natural repugnance at the idea, but is there anything immoral?

Respect may be shown in diverse ways. Consider a society where people may choose how their lives and remains should end. Just as today we respect people's wishes whether to be cremated or buried - and even accept that a few mothers after birth cook the placentas - so, in that society, a choice could be made to be eaten. Perhaps a highly significant and ritualistic dining ceremony exists, with only the deceased's loved ones present. Perhaps the ritual is symbolic of ultimate or eternal bonding, of 'connecting' with the deceased. In such a society, people would feel their lives ended badly if the appropriate ceremonies failed to take place. The dining may be a.s.sociated with a sense of religious oneness or of the flesh metaphorically sustaining the living. Some could see the eating more as worthy sacrificing to the G.o.ds. Others may regard life as a work of art, requiring the right ending, just as do novels and music.

Such rituals, with the justifications offered, would today generate laughter or disgust; they would not be taken in the right spirit. It does not follow, though, that there is anything morally wrong in the proposed society. Let us hasten to add: this is not a slide into moral relativism. It is not a slide at all, for, in justifying the dining practices, we deploy values readily recognized across cultures: respecting people's wishes, connecting with others, manifesting love. It does, though, remind us that respecting people can take different forms.

Eating people could be a significant practice in a highly moral world. E. M. Forster's injunction 'only connect' - empathizing, bonding, valuing other people's wishes - may now come to mind. It may come to mind with the addition of a more literal rendering than intended. People who, in the circ.u.mstances just outlined, value eating people and being eaten are indeed valuing Forster's injunction.

Logic/Language

20.

HOW TO GAIN WHATEVER YOU WANT.

An eminent British philosopher gave a lecture in the United States about fifty years ago. The lecturer was J. L. Austin - John Langshaw Austin - a master of the nuance, and grammatical felicity and infelicity in the English language, a philosopher whose writings consisted of finer and finer linguistic distinctions. In his lecture, Austin made the point that an interesting fact about the English language is that a double negation makes a positive - if he did not not not take the money, then it looks as if he did take the money. Yet a double positive, 'yes' added to 'yes', does not make a negative. Immediately from the audience came forth the sceptical mutter, 'Yeah, yeah.' take the money, then it looks as if he did take the money. Yet a double positive, 'yes' added to 'yes', does not make a negative. Immediately from the audience came forth the sceptical mutter, 'Yeah, yeah.'

With the above background, consider the following two puzzles, seemingly of impeccable reasoning. Allow me to orientate one in which you lose; the other in which you win.You could, of course, always be the winning partic.i.p.ant - or the loser.

Here is a 'lose everything' puzzle. A woman, sitting at a bar, offers you the following deal, wanting to know if you are happy with its conditions.

Accept this offer of a holiday in Venice - you can take someone with you - and all you have to do is pay me 10; everything else is free. There are no strings about the holiday: return first-cla.s.s tickets, first-cla.s.s hotel, and so on. Here is one further condition. If what I say next is true, then I keep the 10 and you have the holiday at no further cost; if what I say next is false, then you must accept the 10 back, but still have the holiday free.

How can you lose? There are no snags about the holiday.You would like to go to Venice, see the art - and so forth. Either way, you are surely bound to have the splendid Venetian break. At worst, it costs you a mere 10. And you may even have the 10 returned. Rational man that you are, you eagerly accept. She takes the 10, with a coy smile; and then says: Either I shall return the 10 or you will pay me 1 million.

Before we examine what has gone wrong, here is a 'win everything' similar puzzle. Find someone - say, Melissa - with some valuable item that you crave. Maybe you want her fine yacht.You ask her: Q1. Will you give the same answer, 'yes' or 'no', to this question as to the next?

Melissa hesitates. She has no idea what you are going to ask, so it would be foolish to commit either way.You rea.s.sure her, saying that you are happy for her to decide which way to answer after after you have asked the second question; but would she merely agree that she will answer truthfully 'yes' or 'no'. If she still hesitates, slip her some fivers to agree - after all, it is easy money: she is free to answer either 'yes' or 'no'. She agrees.You now ask her: you have asked the second question; but would she merely agree that she will answer truthfully 'yes' or 'no'. If she still hesitates, slip her some fivers to agree - after all, it is easy money: she is free to answer either 'yes' or 'no'. She agrees.You now ask her: Q2.Will you give me your yacht?

She may immediately answer 'no'; but can she give that answer truthfully? After all, how is she going to answer that first question now? Logic can indeed puzzle us.

How have you lost a million, yet gained a yacht?

We tackle the 'yacht' tale first. Melissa has agreed to answer the first question 'yes' or 'no'. If she answers 'yes', that commits her to the same answer, 'yes', to the question about giving you the yacht. 'Yes' to the same the same keeps us with 'yes'. If she answers 'no' to the first question, that commits her to not answering the same to the yacht question, hence also making a 'yes'. 'No' to keeps us with 'yes'. If she answers 'no' to the first question, that commits her to not answering the same to the yacht question, hence also making a 'yes'. 'No' to the same the same switches us to 'yes'. The offer, of 'yes' or 'no' answers, appeared to be leaving her with alternatives, but it did not. 'No' repeated is 'no' to 'no', that is 'yes'. 'Yes' repeated - 'yes' to 'yes' - also delivers 'yes'. Of course, maybe saying 'yeah, yeah' sceptically as a response could leave us baffled as to whether it is a 'yes' or a 'no' - but that was not an option. switches us to 'yes'. The offer, of 'yes' or 'no' answers, appeared to be leaving her with alternatives, but it did not. 'No' repeated is 'no' to 'no', that is 'yes'. 'Yes' repeated - 'yes' to 'yes' - also delivers 'yes'. Of course, maybe saying 'yeah, yeah' sceptically as a response could leave us baffled as to whether it is a 'yes' or a 'no' - but that was not an option.

How about the 1 million puzzle? She says, 'Either I shall return the 10 or you will pay me 1 million.' Suppose what she says is false: for it to be false, just considering what she says, she must not return the 10. But conditions are that she does return the 10, if it is false; hence, there is a contradiction, whether or not you pay the 1 million. So, what she says cannot be false. Therefore, what she says must be true. But if it is true, then that must be because either she returns the 10 or you pay her the 1 million. It cannot be because she returns the 10; the conditions state that she keeps the 10, if what she says is true in her statement. Hence it can only be true because you pay her the 1 million. So, you are 1 million down. Once again, conditions have been rigged to ensure a 'yes', an affirmative, a 'true', to what is wanted.

Lurking in many paradoxes are presuppositions deserving challenge. A dangerous presupposition is that having to answer 'yes' or 'no', or 'true' or 'false', is a fair request. In a cla.s.sic case, the police ask the suspect, 'Have you stopped beating your wife? Yes or no.' Answering 'yes' implies that you indeed used to, although you are now reformed. Answering 'no' implies that you did - and tells us that, bad character that you are, you continue to beat her. The suspect was afforded no opportunity to challenge the presupposition.

He was not first asked, 'Did you beat your wife?' Then, only if he answered 'yes' should he have been asked, 'Do you still?'

G.o.d/Existence

21.

'I AM THE GREATEST' or or 'THERE AIN'T NO SANITY CLAUS' 'THERE AIN'T NO SANITY CLAUS'

G: I am the greatest.

I: The greatest what?

G: The greatest being.

I: Ah, you mean G.o.d. G.o.d.

G: That's right - or Allah Allah or or Yahweh. Yahweh. Names don't hurt me, whatever people say. I am, after all, the greatest - the greatest being than which nothing greater can be conceived, dreamt of, imagined. Names don't hurt me, whatever people say. I am, after all, the greatest - the greatest being than which nothing greater can be conceived, dreamt of, imagined.

I: So I hear, but you don't exist.

G:You're talking to me.

I: I talk to myself.

G: That's true - and even true now. Being the greatest being I have no need for chat. This is a dialogue with yourself; yet, if you reason correctly, you'll realize that I must exist - and not just in your mind, imagination or dreams.

I: How come?

G: Look, you agree that my existence is not straightaway ruled out.You can make sense of my existing.

I: I'm not sure, once I start thinking about it. But let's suppose that I can - that there can be a being that is all powerful, all knowing, even all perfect, that created the universe. However, that said, there's simply no evidence for you, O greatest conceivable one.

G: That's true. Despite what many believe, I left no signs in the world. Don't focus on the universe. Don't even focus on your self. Focus on the very thought of me.

I: Okay, I have the idea of the greatest conceivable being - I think.

G: Indeed, that being than which nothing greater can be conceived - excellent. Now, suppose that I do not exist.

I: I don't need to suppose.You don't.

G: Let's pretend that is true. Then, were I to exist, it seems that I should be greater than the greatest conceivable being, according to your idea of the greatest conceivable being.

I: Ah, a contradiction.

G: Well, only a contradiction if your idea is really of a being that both lacks existence and is the greatest conceivable being - for such a non-existent being could not be the greatest conceivable being. How could such a being be the greatest, with such a glaringly obvious defect as non-existence? Perhaps you now grasp that I exist.

Must G.o.d, Allah, Yahweh, the greatest conceivable being, exist?

Our little dialogue is a version of the ontological argument put forward by the eleventh-century St Anselm of Canterbury. Such ontological arguments, in one form or another, have received considerable support, yet also considerable rejection - and recently, mainly rejection. Major philosophers have lined up - some for; some against. Descartes for; Hume against. Leibniz for; Kant against.

One challenge is: how can any reflections, based solely on the meanings of words, on which ideas we possess, lead to conclusions about reality? We have ideas of unicorns, mermaids, and Santa Claus, yet we need to search the world to establish whether such items exist.

Should we be impressed by that challenge? After all, from a.n.a.lysing our ideas, we conclude that certain things can not not exist in reality. Once we grasp the nature of squares and circles, we conclude that there are no square circles. Furthermore, once we understand the number series, we can conclude that a prime number exist in reality. Once we grasp the nature of squares and circles, we conclude that there are no square circles. Furthermore, once we understand the number series, we can conclude that a prime number must must exist between seventeen and twenty-three. Of course, these examples are distinctive: they concern abstract ent.i.ties, ent.i.ties that we, in any case, cannot experience through the senses or gain evidence for via scientific investigations. We may, though, also show, by reasoning alone, that certain hypothesized everyday empirical ent.i.ties cannot exist - for example, a creature that at the same time is both capable and incapable of flight. exist between seventeen and twenty-three. Of course, these examples are distinctive: they concern abstract ent.i.ties, ent.i.ties that we, in any case, cannot experience through the senses or gain evidence for via scientific investigations. We may, though, also show, by reasoning alone, that certain hypothesized everyday empirical ent.i.ties cannot exist - for example, a creature that at the same time is both capable and incapable of flight.

Some suggest that ontological arguments muddle the idea of X with X. Our idea of an elephant is of a creature with a trunk, but the idea does not itself sport a trunk. The arguments' seeming force, the suggestion runs, rests upon a threatened contradiction, resulting from such a muddle. We see this, when we present a key stage in some of the arguments.

If we suppose that the greatest conceivable being fails to exist, then, were he to exist, he would be greater than the greatest conceivable being - but that is a contradiction.

The mistake here lies in treating our idea of the greatest conceivable being as itself a contender for such greatness. Yes, were the greatest conceivable being to exist, he would be greater than our idea - indeed, greater than any ideas - existing in our minds, but it does not follow that he would be greater than what our idea is an idea of - for our idea simply is of the greatest conceivable being. So, there would be no contradiction.

Our G.o.dly dialogue, though, does not appear to involve the alleged muddle. G.o.d's argument is that if we reflect on what we mean by 'the greatest conceivable being', we should see that it involves existence. To take matters further, here comes Santa Claus.

I: But Santa Claus, you don't exist.

SC: You're right, given your understanding of 'Santa Claus'. But consider, instead, a Santa Claus with maximal generosity, most perfect white beard, best possible 'ho, ho' - and so on.

I: I'm trying.

SC: Call him, 'the greatest conceivable Santa Claus'.Then, were he not to exist, we should be able to conceive of a greater Santa Claus, namely one that exists, and so*

I: Go on, tell me - 'and so therefore the greatest conceivable Santa Claus exists.'

SC: By Santa, you've got it!

I: But then the greatest of numerous, numerous things exist - the greatest cat, dog, and pigeon; the greatest Zilli's ice cream.

SC: The universe - 'tis great indeed.

I: So great that, if such reasoning works, there exists not merely the greatest good G.o.d, but also the greatest evil Devil.

What is meant by 'greatest? Sometimes it is understood as perfection, sometimes as maximal independent reality. Whatever the version, it includes existence and excludes features lacking in greatness. So, the greatest conceivable Santa Claus involves a contradiction because, being Santa Claus, however great, he must still be finite, limited, in many ways - for example, he must fit regular chimneys and deliver presents to human beings. For similar reasons, we need not judge that the greatest being has perfect eyesight, Estonian language skills, and tango-dancing ability. However, in the spirit of ontological arguments, could we not argue that we at least have the idea of a great Santa Claus, great in that he possesses the feature of existing? So, were such a Claus not to exist, then we should have landed ourselves with a contradiction.

Here is one way of trying to expose the error in such arguing: Were you to describe the woman of your dreams to a dating agency, you would be unimpressed if the agency suggested someone who satisfied the descriptions you gave - the predicates listed - yet who was fictional. 'Oh, but you didn't specify that she should exist,' would not quell your 'money back' demand.Yet, had you added 'and exists' in your initial requirement, that would not have been another feature, but simply that the agency produce a woman as described by the descriptions, the predicates, first listed.

With the dating agency example in mind, let us return to G.o.d. From the idea of the greatest conceivable being, we may infer that such a being has features of being all powerful and so on. But to infer 'and exists' is simply to say that there is a being that has those features. Whether there exists such a being depends on whether any item in the world satisfies the given descriptions or predicates. And how could we find that out, save by investigating the world? This line of thinking is grounded in the slogan, 'Existence is not a predicate.'

When we investigate the world, we encounter items that only happen to exist. This book, that tree, the sun, and the moon might not have existed - well, so it seems. And it is difficult to see how putting together a set of descriptions or predicates could establish that there is a thing that merely happens to exist. Yet, as said earlier, we do conclude, by reasoning alone, that round squares cannot exist and the number nineteen must exist. These examples, though, concern necessary necessary existence, what existence, what must must be so. Perhaps the idea of the greatest conceivable being points to something that necessarily exists - to something that has an existence akin to abstract mathematical ent.i.ties. We may now, of course, wonder whether we do really possess a coherent idea of the greatest being involving necessary existence. be so. Perhaps the idea of the greatest conceivable being points to something that necessarily exists - to something that has an existence akin to abstract mathematical ent.i.ties. We may now, of course, wonder whether we do really possess a coherent idea of the greatest being involving necessary existence.

The greatest number cannot exist. Mention a number and greater ones can always be mentioned. Perhaps the idea of the greatest conceivable being - the greatest power, the greatest love - is as incoherent as the idea of the greatest number. Further, even if we can make sense of such a being and are led to think that there must must be one, it would seem to be an abstract ent.i.ty, akin to the mathematical. be one, it would seem to be an abstract ent.i.ty, akin to the mathematical.

Abstract ent.i.ties lack causal powers. They cannot create, love, and judge; so, the greatest conceivable being, G.o.d or Allah or Yahweh, understood in that way would lack divine features as traditionally listed. And, for that matter, even if some silver tongues could persuade us that the greatest Santa Claus and greatest ice cream necessarily necessarily exist, such a Santa exist, such a Santa

Ethics/Humanity