What Germany Thinks Part 24

To return to the last trial of strength between the two groups of European Powers, it is interesting to note that Professor Oncken denies German partic.i.p.ation in formulating the ultimatum to Serbia, or that Germany was aware of its contents. Germany merely left Austria a free hand in the matter. Oncken endeavours to show that Austria's demands were not excessive, and expresses astonishment that the opposing Powers found them exorbitant. He does not mention the fact that a large section of the German nation held the same opinion on July 25th, 1914.

His comment on Sir Edward Grey's efforts for peace is characteristic: "England claims that she did everything possible to preserve the peace.

It cannot be denied that Grey made a series of mediation proposals. But mere good-will is not everything. It is much more important to weigh their practical importance, and the goal at which they aimed: Whether they were intended to preserve the world's peace under conditions honourable for all parties, or calculated to obtain for the _Entente_ a one-sided diplomatic victory which would have established its future predominance."[199]

[Footnote 199: "Deutschland und der Weltkrieg," p. 544.]

"Grey considered the moment suitable for a mediation proposal. On the evening of July 26th, after obtaining Russia's consent, he proposed to the Governments of France, Germany and Italy that their London amba.s.sadors should meet in London to confer on a peaceful solution of the conflict.

"The proposal was unacceptable to Austria, because it would have been an indirect recognition on her part of Russia's interest in the conflict.

"Only those who had followed the growing intimacy of the mutual obligations between the Entente Powers, and their organization to a 'London Centre' during the summer of 1914, are able to estimate the role--to say nothing of Italy--which Russia's two comrades would have played in the conference. During its course Russia would have continued her military preparations, while Germany would have had to pledge herself not to mobilize.

"Finally, no unprejudiced observer would dare a.s.sert that the man (Sir Edward Grey) who was ready to transform himself at a suitable opportunity into an ally of Russia, would have been an impartial chairman in a conference held under the pressure of a Russian mobilization. The more one thinks about this mediation proposal the more convinced one becomes, that it would at least have worked for a diplomatic victory for the Entente Powers.

"Grey put the whole machinery of the Triple Entente in motion in order to force back Germany and Austria-Hungary along the whole line."[200]

[Footnote 200: Ibid., p. 545 _et seq_.]

An a.n.a.lysis of Professor Oncken's theses gives the following results: First, Britain's efforts to preserve peace are admitted, but he fails to mention any friendly advances to meet them. Secondly, the fundamental principle underlying the Germanic att.i.tude is again exposed, viz., that Russia had no right to intervene in a question affecting the balance of power in the Balkans and in Europe (_vide_, p. 63). Thirdly, a diplomatic struggle was in progress along the whole line, between the two groups of Powers.

In weighing the second point it would be wrong to a.s.sume that the Central Empires were not fully aware of the presence of a far more vital question behind the Austro-Serbian conflict. They knew it from the very beginning and had already expressed threats in St. Petersburg, hoping to achieve the same effect as in the Bosnian crisis. If Austria had been allowed to destroy Serbia's military power the material forces of Europe would have been seriously disturbed; the ineffectiveness of the Triple Entente finally established, and its dissolution the inevitable consequence.

If these considerations are correct then the statement attributed by M.

de L'Escaille (see p. 281) to Sir George Buchanan that Britain would never draw the sword could only have served to strengthen the resolution of the Germanic Powers in enforcing their point Germany above all desired that the balance of power theory should be finally smashed, and it may be safely a.s.sumed that an Austro-Serbian conflict seemed to her a most fitting opportunity to realize her purpose.

The third point suggests two questions. Who provoked the diplomatic conflict, and who would have benefited most by a diplomatic victory? A reply to the first question is superfluous, and the answer to the second is obvious from the preceding line of reasoning. Germany would have reached the goal towards which she had striven for more than a decade--the removal of all diplomatic hindrances to the unlimited a.s.sertion of her will in Europe. It may even be doubted whether the Dual Alliance would have survived the shock.

Another phase of Professor Oncken's work is the open attack on Sir Edward Grey. Only three years ago this statesman was acclaimed in Germany as a man of peace--_the_ man who had prevented the Balkan War from becoming a European conflagration. To-day he is accused by the same nation of being the originator of the world war.

Oncken[201] goes back to the year 1905 and states that Sir Edward Grey initiated only two members of the Cabinet--Mr. Asquith and Lord Haldane--into the details of the agreement with France, and these three gentlemen he refers to as the "inner circle." King Edward, and afterwards Sir Edward Grey in continuing the late King's policy, succeeded in harnessing the _revanche idee_ and the spirit of Russian aggression to the chariot of British Imperialism. All offers of friendship made by this country were insincere. (The professorial pleader does not say so, but he leaves his readers to infer that sincerity is a German monopoly.) Concerning the British Minister's declaration in Parliament that no secret treaty existed with France, Oncken remarks: "The declaration was just as true formally as it was a lie in essentials."

[Footnote 201: The authorities (?) most frequently cited by Professor Oncken in making out his case are Messrs. Morel, Macdonald, Hardie, G.

B. Shaw and the _Labour Leader_.--Author.]

Following the development of events after the conference proposal had been dropped, Oncken writes: "Meanwhile the Russian Government endeavoured to persuade England's leading statesman that the opinion prevailed in Germany and Austria, that England would remain neutral in every case, in consequence of this delusion the Central Powers were obdurate. England could only dispel the danger of war by destroying this false conception, _i.e._, openly joining Russia and France.

"It is noteworthy how quickly Grey a.s.similated this train of thought.

Disregarding the suggestions of the British Amba.s.sador in St.

Petersburg, he did nothing to exercise a moderating influence upon Russia and thereby further the success of the conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg. On the other hand, he proceeded to take steps which probably in his opinion, were calculated to damp the supposed desire for war on the part of Germany. Practically, the result of all his actions was to exercise one-sided pressure upon Germany and Austria and simultaneously, through unmistakable declarations concerning England's eventual att.i.tude, to encourage Paris and St. Petersburg to energetic measures.

"But all hopes for peace were destroyed at a single blow by Russia. On the evening of July 30th after the conversations with Austria-Hungary had been resumed, Sasonow increased his demands--and in truth with England's co-operation--to such a degree that their acceptance would have meant the complete submission of the Dual Monarchy.

"And as if this were insufficient, a few hours later, before a reply had been received and while negotiations were proceeding in Vienna, Russia suddenly broke off the communications with a momentous decision (mobilization). The certainty which she had gained from the moves of English diplomacy, that in case of war she was sure of France's support and with it England's, turned the scale--against peace.

"That this calculation was decisive for Russia's change of front is confirmed by a witness whose impartiality even our opponents will admit."[202]

[Footnote 202: "Deutschland und der Weltkrieg," pp. 553-4.]

Professor Oncken then supports his argument with quotations from a letter written by the Belgian Legation Secretary in St. Petersburg to his Government. The letter was doubtless stolen while in transit by the Berlin postal authorities. Monsieur B. de l'Escaille wrote the letter on July 30th, despatched it by courier to Berlin, where it was posted on the following day. The outside envelope was addressed to Madame Costermans, 107 Rue Froissard, Bruxelles; inside was a letter addressed to M. Darignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs. German writers state that no letters were forwarded to foreign countries after martial law was proclaimed on July 31st (a statement which is untrue), thus it fell into their hands.

Overwhelming importance is attached to this doc.u.ment by German war writers. The more important pa.s.sages of the despatch run as follows: "The last two days have pa.s.sed in the expectation of events which are bound to follow[203] upon Austria-Hungary's declaration of war against Serbia. The most contradictory reports were in circulation, without any possibility of confirming their truth or falsity.

[Footnote 203: Thus the impartial witness whom Germans quote to prove their innocence definitely states that Russia had no other course left open to her by Austria's actions.--Author.]

"One thing is, however, indisputable, viz., that Germany has done everything possible both here and in Vienna[204] to find a means of avoiding a general conflict, but has only been met with the determination of the Vienna cabinet, on the one hand, not to yield a single step, and on the other hand Russian distrust of Vienna's declaration that they merely intend a punitive expedition against Serbia.

[Footnote 204: How could M. de l'Escaille know what had pa.s.sed in Vienna?--Author.]

"One must really believe that everybody wants war, and is only anxious to postpone the declaration in order to gain time. At first England gave out, that she would not allow herself to be drawn into a conflict. Sir George Buchanan said that definitely. But to-day they are firmly convinced in St. Petersburg, indeed they have received an a.s.surance, that England will stand by France. This support is of extraordinary importance, and has contributed not a little to the war-party gaining the upper hand.

"In the cabinet sitting held yesterday, there were differences of opinion, and the mobilization order was postponed. This morning at four o'clock mobilization was ordered.

"The Russian army feels itself strong, and is full of enthusiasm. The reorganization of the navy is still so incomplete that it would be out of the count in case of war. For that reason England's a.s.surance of help was of the greatest consequence."[205]

[Footnote 205: "Kriegs-Depeschen, 1914" ("German War-Telegrams, 1914").

Berlin, 1914; p. 96 _et seq_.]

If Professor Oncken is correct in stating that Sir Edward Grey's measures were calculated to exercise a pressure on Germany and Austria, then he merely confirms what this country has. .h.i.therto believed--Sir Edward Grey acted rightly. Where else should he have exerted pressure except in the quarter from whence a provocative, insolent challenge had proceeded?

With regard to the a.s.sertion that Russia--stiffened by England--took a "momentous decision" on the evening of July 30th, Professor Oncken is guilty of distortion. The decision to mobilize had been taken earlier, and as M. de l'Escaille wrote, was made public at four o'clock on the morning of July 30th.

Whether Russia had increased her demands ("peremptorily sharpened" are Oncken's words) the reader can judge for himself by comparing the two texts.

I II "If Austria, recognizing "If Austria agrees to that the Austro-Serbian stay the advance of her question has troops on Serbian territory, a.s.sumed the character and if, recognizing of a European question, that the Austro-Serbian declares herself ready to dispute has a.s.sumed the eliminate from her ultimatum character of a question the points which of European interest, she infringe the sovereign admits that the Great rights of Serbia, Russia Powers shall examine engages to stop her the satisfaction which military preparations." Serbia might give to (Russian Orange Book, the Austro--Hungarian No. 60.) Government without affecting her sovereign rights and independence, Russia undertakes to maintain her waiting att.i.tude." (French Yellow Book, No. 113.)

Oncken, in making this comparison, comments: "It is most remarkable that the original formula chosen by Sasonow had been peremptorily sharpened (_einschneidend verscharft_) on July 31st at the request of the British Amba.s.sador. This interference by England in the formulation of the proposal must arouse the gravest doubt regarding the peaceful tendencies of England's policy. Sasonow had every reason to thank Grey 'for the firm, amicable tone which he has employed in his pourparlers with Germany and Austria.'"[206]

[Footnote 206: "Deutschland und der Weltkrieg," p. 553. Oncken's quotation in the last lines taken from the Russian Orange Book, No. 69.]

Sir Edward Grey had proposed five days earlier (July 26th) that all military measures should cease pending a settlement. Hence the introduction of this clause is not a new demand. Moreover, in the meantime Russia and Germany--in spite of the latter's denial--had commenced to mobilize; Austria had mobilized and commenced hostilities against Serbia. Thus there were far more urgent reasons to include the cessation of military measures on July 31st than before. Lastly, it was the only acceptable pledge of Austrian sincerity which Russia could accept. Whether the formula would have met with Austria's approval cannot be determined, for Austria was saved from what Oncken terms "complete submission" by Germany's ultimatum to Russia, despatched on the same day, July 31st.

It is impossible to get rid of the suspicion that Germany thought Austria might accept the proposal; in any case, Germany deliberately shattered the last chance of a settlement by her demand that Russia should demobilize.

If Germany outwardly worked for peace in St. Petersburg, as M. de l'Escaille states, it would be quite in harmony with the methods of German diplomacy. But, as the same gentleman testifies: "Austria would not yield a step"--the conclusion must be drawn that Germany had ordered her to stand firm. Austria did not yield a single inch, and so it is a matter of indifference as to the sincerity or otherwise of Germany's peace endeavours.

Oncken further mentions Britain's refusal to remain neutral in return for a promise that French territory should not be annexed, but he omits the question of French colonies. His a.n.a.lysis of the Belgian question deserves quotation: "Grey was seeking an excuse for war, and he found one in the question of Belgian neutrality. It was just such a reason as he required in order to carry away the Cabinet, Parliament and public opinion. And since then that reason has been much discussed, accompanied by appeals to international law and humanity, by England's and the world's Press.

"But there is more than one irrefutable proof at hand, to show that this reason for war, was merely a veil covering the real ones. Antic.i.p.ating Grey's intentions, before the German Government had finally declared themselves on the subject,[207] Prince Lichnowsky put the question to Sir Edward Grey on August 1st, as to whether England would remain neutral if Germany undertook to respect the neutrality of Belgium.

[Footnote 207: Britain had asked Germany a day or two before, whether she would respect Belgium's neutrality.--Author.]

"Grey, however, refused to give the pledge with which he could--if he was really concerned about Belgium--have spared that unhappy land its terrible fate. But by these means the trump card of Belgian neutrality had been taken from our opponent's hand in advance. Yet Grey actually considered it permissible to conceal this offer from the British Cabinet. Yes, he dared even more.

"After the matter had been mentioned by Ramsay Macdonald in the _Labour Leader_, Keir Hardie asked a question in the House of Commons on August 27th, as to whether Lichnowsky's proposal had been submitted to the Cabinet, and why the same had not been made the basis of peaceful negotiations with Germany. Grey made a weak attempt to discriminate between official proposals made by a government, and a private question asked by an amba.s.sador.

"When the inconvenient questioner asked for further information, he was cried down. The Oxford theologian Conybeare gained the impression from this Parliamentary incident: 'That all Sir Edward Grey's answers to Mr.

Keir Hardie's questions are examples of _suppressio veri_ and _suggestio falsi_.' His later revocation of this judgment does not alter its value as objective evidence.

"After Grey's refusal, Prince Lichnowsky pressed him to formulate England's conditions for her neutrality. At the same time the Amba.s.sador increased his offer of July 29th by proposing to guarantee the integrity of France and her colonies in return for England's neutrality. Grey suppressed this proposal too before the Cabinet, as any negotiation on this basis would have thwarted his pre-conceived plans. Only an immovable determination for war can explain this behaviour.