What Germany Thinks Part 17

Another authority quoted to support his point is Professor Hilty (University of Bern, 1889). "A neutral State may not conclude a treaty _in advance_ to protect its own neutrality, because by this means a protectorate relationship would be created."

Frank continues (p. 21): "Hence Belgian neutrality was guaranteed in the interests of the balance of power in Europe, and I have already pointed out that the same idea prevailed when the barrier-systems of 1815 and 1818 were established.

"Considering the matter from this point of view, the falsity of modern Belgium's interpretation at once becomes apparent. According to Belgian official opinion her neutrality obligations only came into force in the event of war, and therefore could not be violated during peace. But this balance of power was to be maintained, above all in time of peace, and might not be disturbed by any peaceful negotiations whatever, especially if these were calculated to manifest themselves in either advantageous or prejudicial form, in the event of war.

"In this category we may place the surrender of territory. No impartial thinker can deny that the cession of Antwerp to England would have been a breach of neutrality on the part of Belgium, even if it had occurred in peace time. The same is true for the granting of occupation rights, and landing places for troops, or for the establishment of a harbour which might serve as a basis for the military or naval operations of another State.

"Moreover, it is unnecessary to exert one's imagination in order to discover 'peaceful negotiations' which are incompatible with permanent neutrality, for history offers us two exceedingly instructive examples.

When a tariff union between France and Belgium was proposed in 1840, England objected because the plan was not in accord with Belgian neutrality. Again in 1868, when the Eastern Railway Company of France sought to obtain railway concessions in Belgium, it was the latter country which refused its consent, and in the subsequent parliamentary debate the step was designated an act of neutrality."

From this extract it is evident that Professor Frank has undermined his own case. Belgian neutrality was intended by the great powers to be the corner-stone of the European balance of power. During the last forty years Germany's carefully meditated increase of armaments on land and sea threatened to dislodge the corner-stone. When the Conference of London declared Belgium to be a permanently neutral country, there was apparent equality of power on each side of the stone. In 1870 the Franco-German war showed that the balance of power was already disturbed at this corner of the European edifice. Still Germany's pledged word was considered sufficient guarantee of the _status quo_.

Since 1870 the potential energy on the German side of the corner-stone has increased in an unprecedented degree, and this huge energy has been consistently converted into concrete military and naval forces. This alteration in the potential _status quo ante_ has been partly the result of natural growth, but in a still greater degree, to Germany's doctrine that it is only might which counts.

Another German professor[138] had defined the position in a sentence: "Germany is a boiler charged to danger-point with potential energy. In such a case is it a sound policy to try to avert the possibility of an explosion by s.c.r.e.w.i.n.g down all its safety-valves?" Recognizing that Belgian neutrality has existed for many years past solely on Germany's good-will, it became the right and urgent duty of the other signatory powers to endeavour to strengthen the corner-stone. Germany absolutely refused to relax in any way the pressure which her "potential energy"

was exercising at this point, therefore it was necessary above all for France and Great Britain to bolster up the threatened corner.

[Footnote 138: Hermann Oncken (Heidelberg), in the _Quarterly Review_, October, 1913. The author of the article charges Great Britain with s.c.r.e.w.i.n.g down the valves, which is a deliberate distortion of the truth.

Britain has always opened her markets free to German goods and admitted the same privileges to her rival--so far as these did not run contrary to established rights--in all parts of the world. With regard to territorial expansion a treaty had been drawn up between the two Powers and was ready to be signed just when war broke out. That treaty would have afforded Germany immense opportunities for expansion, but not at the expense of Europe. Germany, however, desired European expansion, and according to her accepted teaching, the fate of extra-European territories will be decided on the battlefields of Europe.]

The former Power could have achieved this purpose by building a chain of huge fortresses along her Belgian frontier. Why this precautionary measure was never taken is difficult to surmise, but had it been taken, Germany would have ascribed to her neighbour plans of aggression--and declared war.

Great Britain could have restored the balance by creating an army of several millions. Lord Haldane has announced that the late Liberal Government was "afraid" to do this, although the fear of losing office may have been greater than their fear for Germany.

The measures which England did take were merely non-binding conversations with the military authorities of France and Belgium; the making of plans for putting a British garrison of defence on Belgian territory in the event of the latter's neutrality being violated or threatened; and the printing of books describing the means of communication in Belgium.[139]

[Footnote 139: "Belgium, Road and River Reports," prepared by the General Staff, Vol. I., 1912; II., 1913; III. & IV., 1914. Copies of this work have been seized by the Germans in Belgium, and capital is being made of the incident to prove a violation of Belgian neutrality.

If the British General Staff had nothing better to do than to compile guide-books to Belgium for a non-existent British army, it appears merely amusing. But if the late Liberal Government believed that Germany's potential energy could be prevented from breaking through into Belgian territory by a barricade of guide-books--it was a lamentable error of judgment. On the whole we are forced to call it a tragical irony, that the only defences which Belgium possessed against the _furor teutonicus_--excepting the Belgian army--were a "sc.r.a.p of paper" and a barricade of the same material.]

As a result of these measures, Belgium stands charged by Germany with having broken her own neutrality, and German writers are naively asking why Belgium did not give the same confidence to Germany which she gave to England. The German mind knows quite well, that in building strategic railways to the Belgian frontier she betrayed the line of direction which the potential energy was intended to take, when the burst came.

Unofficially Germany has long since proclaimed her intention to invade Belgium; it was an "open secret."

The _denouement_ of August 4th, 1914, when Belgian neutrality was declared a "sc.r.a.p of paper,"[140] was not the inspiration of a moment, nor a decision arrived at under the pressure of necessity, but the result of years of military preparation and planning. It had been carefully arranged that the boiler should pour forth its energy through the Belgian valve.

[Footnote 140: This famous phrase was employed as far back as 1855 by a Belgian Minister in the House of Deputies, Brussels. M. Lebeau in pleading for greater military preparation used these words: "History has shown what becomes of neutralities which were guaranteed, by what may be termed a 'sc.r.a.p of paper.'"]

Or to draw another comparison, it is a modern variety of the wolf and the lamb fable, with this difference: the wolf has first of all swallowed the lamb, and now excuses himself by a.s.serting that the traitorous wretch had muddied the stream.

Belgians were painfully aware of the danger threatening them, and would have made greater efforts to protect themselves, had not their own Social Democrats resisted every military proposal. As the matter stands to-day, however, all the efforts which Belgium did make, are cla.s.sed by Germany as intrigues of the Triple Entente, threatening her (Germany's) existence, and all the horrors which have fallen upon this gallant "neutral" country the German Pecksniff designates "Belgium's Atonement."[141] It is to be feared that sooner or later, unless Germany's military pride and unbounded greed of her neighbour's goods can be checked, German professors will be engaged in the scientific task of proving that the waters of the upper Rhine are unpalatable because the lamb residing in Holland has stirred up mud in the lower reaches of the same river!

[Footnote 141: _Belgien's Subne_, the t.i.tle of a chapter describing the desolation and havoc of war, in a book ent.i.tled "Mit dem Hauptquartier nach Westen," by Heinrich Binder. Berlin, 1915.]

Belgium knew that England and France had no other interest than the maintenance of her neutrality. Belgium saw and felt, where the storm clouds lowered, and probably sought or accepted advice from those Powers who wished to perpetuate both the territorial integrity and neutrality of Belgium. Germany's afterthought on the point is: "It was Belgium's duty to protect her neutrality, and she owed this duty to all States alike in the interests of the balance of power--a conception to which she owes her existence.

"She was bound to treat all the signatory Powers in the same manner, but she failed to do so, in that she permitted one or two of them to gain an insight into her system of defence. By this means she afforded the States admitted to her confidence, certain advantages which they could employ for their own ends at any moment.

"By allowing certain of the great Powers to see her cards, Belgium was not supporting the European balance, but seriously disturbing it. Even Belgium's Legation Secretary in Berlin had warned his Government concerning the political dangers arising out of intimacy with England.

By revealing her system of defence to England, Belgium destroyed its intrinsic value and still more--she violated her international obligations."[142]

[Footnote 142: Professor Frank's work, pp. 29-30.]

Considering that the British army at that time was small, that Britain had no idea of annexing Belgian territory, one naturally wonders how the value of Belgium's defence system had been depreciated by conversations with British officers. In effect, Germany maintains that Belgium should have behaved as a nonent.i.ty, which is contrary to all reason.

The Berlin Government has always treated her small neighbour as a sovereign State, equal in quality, though not in power, to any State in the world. If Germany recognized Belgium's sovereignty, why should not England do the same, and, above all, why had Belgium no right to think of her self-preservation, when she knew the danger on her eastern frontier grew more menacing month by month?

Frank concludes his dissertation with his opinion of England and quotes Thucydides, V., 105, as the best applicable characterization of the British with which he is acquainted. "Among themselves, indeed, and out of respect for their traditional const.i.tution, they prove to be quite decent. As regards their treatment of foreigners, a great deal might be said, yet we will try to express it in brief. Among all whom we know they are the most brazen in declaring what is good to be agreeable, and what is profitable to be just."

The very offence which Germany accuses England of having premeditated, she committed herself many years before. When France seemed to threaten Belgium's existence, King Leopold I. concluded a secret treaty[143] with the king of Prussia, whereby the latter was empowered to enter Belgium and occupy fortresses in case of France becoming dangerous. The French danger pa.s.sed away, and its place was taken by a more awful menace--the pressure of German potential energy; and when Belgium in turn opened her heart (this is the unproved accusation which Germany makes to-day--Author) to England, then she has violated her neutrality and undermined the balance of power.[144] There is even a suspicion that Leopold II. renewed this treaty with Germany in 1890, in spite of the fact that the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Prince de Chimay, in an official speech denied its existence.

[Footnote 143: Germans love anything which is "secret."

"Geheimniskramerei" ("affectation of mysteriousness and secrecy") is a national and individual characteristic of the German people.--Author.]

[Footnote 144: Karl Hampe: "Belgiens Vergangenheit und Gegenwart"

("Belgium Past and Present"), p. 49.]

Professor Schoenborn's essay on Belgian neutrality is the least satisfactory exposition of the three professorial effusions; it is no credit to a man of learning, and is merely the work of an incapable partisan trying to make a bad cause into a good one. Schoenborn commences[145] with the customary German tactics by stating that Bethmann-Hollweg's "sc.r.a.p-of-paper" speech, and von Jagow's (German Secretary of State) explanations to the Belgian representative in Berlin on August 3rd, 1914, are of no importance in deciding the justice of Germany's violation of her pledged word. One is led to inquire, When is a German utterance--whether given in the Reichstag by the Chancellor or on paper in the form of a treaty--final and binding?

[Footnote 145: "Deutschland und der Weltkrieg" ("Germany and the World War"), pp. 566-8.]

Subterfuges, insinuations, distortions, even brazen falsehoods, are scattered throughout German war literature, thicker "than Autumnal leaves in Vallombrosa's brook." It is to be feared that just as Germans have lied for a century to prove that the English were annihilated at the battle of Waterloo, and for over forty years to show that Bismarck was not a forger, so they will lie for centuries to come in order to prove that the invasion of Belgium was not what Bethmann-Hollweg called it, a "breach of international law."

Like his _confreres_, Herr Schoenborn admits that Germany was pledged to respect the neutrality of Belgium, but the said neutrality was non-existent, which appears somewhat paradoxical. Yet this is not the least logical part of his case. "The pa.s.sage of German troops through Belgium was indispensable in the interests of the preservation of the German Empire. A successful resistance to the annihilation-plans which our enemies had wrought for our downfall seemed possible only by this means. The Government regretted that, by so doing, we should commit a formal infringement of the rights of a third State (Belgium), and promised to make all possible compensation for the transgression.

"The judicial point of view which influenced the decision of the German Government is perhaps, best ill.u.s.trated by a parallel taken from the ordinary laws of the country: A forester (game-keeper) is attacked by a poacher, and in that same moment perceives a second poacher bearing a gun at full-c.o.c.k, creeping into a strange house in order to obtain a better shot at the forester. Just as he is about to enter the house the forester breaks the door open and thus forestalls him--in order to surprise and overcome him. The forester is justified in taking this step, but must make good all damage resulting to the householder."[146]

[Footnote 146: Ibid., p. 575.]

The instance holds good in the land of _Kultur_, where law and order affords so little protection to a civilian and his property; but in countries where laws are based upon culture the author believes that the forester would receive condign punishment for breaking into another man's house, no matter under what pretext. Unconsciously the learned professor is humorous when he compares Germany to a gamekeeper and Russia and France to poachers; but he is nave to a degree of stupidity, when he makes France carry a weapon fully prepared to shoot the forester.

We will consult another German authority to show that France's weapons were not at full-c.o.c.k.

"During the last ten years France has given special attention to the fortresses on the German frontier. But those facing Belgium have been so carelessly equipped that we see clearly to what a degree she relied upon her neighbour. The forts are in the same condition as they were twenty or thirty years ago. As some of these fortifications were built fifty years ago, various points on the frontier are strategically, absolutely useless.

"A typical example of this, is Fort les Ayvelles, which is intended to protect the bridges and Meuse crossings south of Mezieres-Charleville; the fort was levelled to the ground by 300 shots from our 21-centimetre howitzers. It was built in 1878 and armed with forty cannon; of these the princ.i.p.al weapons consisted of two batteries each containing six 9-centimetre cannon, which, however, were cast in the years 1878-1880, and in the best case could only carry 4,000 yards. Then there were some 12-centimetre bronze pieces cast in 1884, and a few five-barrelled revolver cannon.

"Besides these there were old howitzers from the year 1842; muzzle-loaders with the characteristic pyramids of cannon ball by the side, such as are often used in Germany at village festivals or to fire a salute. The fort itself was a perfect picture of the obsolete and out-of-date. Apart from the crude, primitive equipment, the organization must have been faulty indeed.

"On the road leading up to the fort we saw some tree-branches which had been hurriedly placed as obstacles, and higher up wire entanglements had been commenced at the last moment. At least one battery was useless, for the field of fire was cut off by high trees, and at the last minute the garrison had tried to place the guns in a better position.

"Our artillery which fired from a north-westerly position displayed a precision of aim which is rare. One battery had had nearly every gun put out of action by clean hits. In several cases we saw the barrel of the gun yards away from its carriage, and only a heap of wheels, earth, stones, etc., marked the place where it had stood.

"Another proof of the excellent work done by the artillery, was the fact that hardly a sh.e.l.l had struck the earth in the 500 yards from the battery to the fort. After the former had been disposed of, the artillery fire was concentrated on the fort, which was reduced to a heap of rubbish. The stonework and the high walls--yards thick--had tumbled to pieces like a child's box of bricks.

"A garrison of 900 men had been placed in this useless cage, and they had fled almost at the first shot. Instead of putting these men in trenches, their superiors had put them at this 'lost post' and allowed them to suffer the moral effects of a complete, inevitable defeat.

"Near the fort I saw the grave of its commander, the unfortunate man who had witnessed the hopeless struggle. He lived to see his men save their lives in wild flight--and then ended his own."[147]

[Footnote 147: Heinrich Binder: "Mit dem Hauptquartier nach Westen," pp.