War-Time Financial Problems Part 1

War-Time Financial Problems.

by Hartley Withers.

PREFACE

At a time when Finance is of greater importance than ever before, it is hoped that this small volume may be of interest and value to the public, and help the application of war's lessons to the problems that face us in peace.

The contents, with the exception of the last article on "Money or Goods?" (which appeared in the Trade Supplement of the _Times_ for December, 1918), have already been published in _Sperling's Journal_, from September, 1917, to March, 1919; they have been left as they were written, except for a few verbal corrections.

I desire to express my thanks to the Editors of _Sperling's Journal_ and of the _Times_ for their kind permission to reprint the articles.

H. WITHERS.

June, 1919.

WAR-TIME FINANCIAL PROBLEMS

I

THE OUTLOOK FOR CAPITAL

_September_, 1917

The Creation of Capital--The Inducement--War and Capital

One of the questions that are now most keenly agitating the minds of the investing public and of financiers who cater for its wants, and also of employers and organisers of industry who are trying to see their way into after-the-war conditions, is that of the supply of capital. On this subject there are two contradictory theories: one considers that owing to the destruction of capital during the war, capital will be for many years at a famine price; the other, that owing to the exhaustion of all the warring powers, that is, of the greater part of the civilised world, the spirit of enterprise will be almost dead, the demand for capital will be extremely limited, and consequently the supply of it on offer will go begging to find a user.

It seems likely that, as usual, the truth lies somewhere between these two extreme views; but we shall best answer the question if we first get a clear idea of what we mean by capital.

On the subject of the definition of capital, economists differ with all the consistency that they only show in differing. One of the earliest descriptions of capital was given by Turgot, who thought that capital meant "valeurs acc.u.mulees." In this wide sense the word covers all goods which have value, that is, can be exchanged into other goods. From this point of view, the schoolboy who invests sixpence in marbles is a capitalist, because he has bought an a.s.set which is not immediately consumed, but can, later on, if his fancy urges him, be exchanged into white mice or any other object of his desire. On the other hand, the schoolfellow who at the same time spends sixpence on cherries and eats them has put his money into immediate consumption, his a.s.set is digested, and he has no capital in any sense of the word.

Later, the definition was narrowed by John Stuart Mill, for instance, into the sense of wealth set aside to increase production. From this point of view capital practically means the equipment and tools of industry in the widest sense of the word, including agriculture and transport. Lately economists have shown a tendency to go back to the wider application of the word, and an American economist, Dr Anderson, who has just published a book on the Value of Money, goes so far therein as to state that a "dollar is capital." The language of the City generally uses the word in the narrow sense adopted by Mill, and there is very much to be said for this view of the real meaning of capital. Marbles to play with, houses to live in, motor-cars to go joy-riding in--all these are a.s.sets which can be disposed of, and so, in a sense, may be called capital. But the businesslike meaning of the word is the tools and equipment of industry, because it is only by their possession that the wealth of mankind not only increases man's present enjoyment, but enhances his future output of the goods necessary for his existence.

If we take the word in this sense it becomes at once apparent that the theory is exaggerated which maintains that war is destroying capital, so that capital will long be at a famine price. The extent to which war is actually destroying the tools and equipment of industry is quite limited. On the actual battlefield that sort of destruction proceeds apace when factories are sh.e.l.led into shapeless lumps of bricks, and when the surface of the earth, that man's skill had developed into great productive fertility, is torn into craters and covered with rubbish. There is also rapid destruction of a very important part of the equipment of industry owing to the submarine campaign, which is sinking so many fine ships that were meant to carry goods from one country to another. But, apart from this actual destruction on the battlefield and on the sea, the tools and equipment of industry over the greater part of the earth remain untouched. It is true that, owing to the preoccupations of the war, not so much work as usual is being put into the upkeep and repair of our railways, factories and other industrial tools. But at the same time an enormous amount of new machinery is being created for the manufacture of munitions and other stuff needed for the war, and a large part of this new machinery ought to be available as industrial capital when the war is over. Those people who talk so glibly of the enormous destruction of capital by the war are surely making a mistake common to minds which look at economic questions through a financial telescope, mistaking money for capital. They see that an enormous amount of money is being spent on the war, and they jump to the conclusion that this money, if not spent upon the war, would have been put into capital investments and so have increased the tools and equipment of industry.

In fact, a great deal of the money now spent upon the war would have been spent, if there had been no war, not upon increasing the equipment of production, but upon purely frivolous and extravagant consumption. There is no need to dwell on the effect of war in reducing many kinds of expenditure on which hundreds of millions must have gone in peace time, and this restriction of extravagant consumption has to be deducted before we even admit, not that all money spent upon the war is destroyed capital, but even that all the money spent upon the war is destroying what might otherwise have become capital.

If, then, it is true that the war is not making a very terribly substantial inroad upon the ma.s.s of existing capital, how is it going to affect the supply of capital in the future? To answer this question we have to see how capital is created. The answer to this question is very simple, very obvious, and very dull. Capital can only be created by saving.

Saving is such an entirely unpopular virtue that it seems at first sight a disastrous conclusion to arrive at, that if we want to increase the supply of capital it can only be done by stimulating this unattractive habit; and there is a further question to be asked--whether it will be necessary or desirable to have a great increase in the supply of capital. As was pointed out above, one theory of after-war needs maintains that the world will be so exhausted by this great struggle that it will have no enterprise and no energy left, and that capital will go begging. If this be so, we need not trouble to inquire as to whether the supply of capital can be made plentiful. But I venture to think that this view is very probably wrong, though it is very dangerous to prophesy concerning the purely psychological question of the state of mind in which the citizens of the warring Powers will end the war. It is, however, at least probable that the prices which are then likely to rule will stimulate enterprise all over the world; that every one will see that there is a great work to be done in getting industry back on to a peace basis, and a great profit to be made by those who do this work most successfully, and that the demand for capital is likely, for some years at least, to clamour for all that can be produced.

To go back, then, to the statement that only by saving can capital be created. The man who saves, instead of spending money on his own enjoyment, hands it over to some company or Government to be spent on some industrial or national purpose. When it is put into industry it builds a factory or a ship or a railway or a ca.n.a.l, or clears a wilderness for cultivation, or does one of the innumerable other things which are necessary for the production and transport of the goods which mankind enjoys. And it is only by this process of handing over buying power, instead of using it for our own amus.e.m.e.nt and enjoyment, to others who will use it for furthering production that the tools and equipment of industry can be multiplied.

Something can be done by banks and financiers in supplying credit in the form of advances and acceptances; but this method is only like oiling the wheel of industry, the real driving power of which has to be saved capital. Creating credits simply means that a certain amount of buying power is manufactured and handed over to those to whom the credit is given. It does not set free any labour or goods to be put into industry. That is only done by the man who abstains from consumption and saves money by restraining his desire to spend it on himself, and puts it at the disposal of industry. The man who saves money, who has always. .h.i.therto been rather despised by his companions and resented by a certain cla.s.s of social reformer and many other uneducated people as a capitalist bloodsucker, is thus, in fact, the person who leaves the world richer than he found it, having put his money, the product of his own work, into increasing the world's output, instead of spending it on such forms of enjoyment as heavy lunches and cinema shows.

The man who does this beneficent work, increasing mankind's output of goods, and providing employment as long as the factory or railway that he helps to build is running, is induced to do so, as a rule, by the purely selfish motive of providing for his old age or for those who come after him by earning the rate of interest that is paid to him for his capital. What is this rate of interest going to be, and how much effect does it have upon the creation of capital?

Some people argue that a low rate of interest makes people save more because it is necessary for them to save more in order to acquire independence. Others maintain that a high rate of interest induces people to save because they can see the direct advantage of doing so.

Both these arguments are probably true in some cases. But, as a rule, people who have the instinct of saving will save, within certain limits, whatever the rate of interest may be. When the rate of interest is low they will certainly not reduce their saving because each hundred pounds that they put away brings them in comparatively little, and when the rate of interest is high the attraction of the high rate will also deter them from diminishing the amount that they put aside. Moreover, we have to consider, not only the money payment involved by the rate of interest, but its buying power in goods. In 1896 trustee securities could only be bought to return a yield of 2-1/2 per cent. for the buyer; now the investor can get 5-1/4 per cent. and more from the British Government. And yet the power that this 5-1/4 gives him over the goods and services that he wants for his comfort Is probably not greater, and very likely rather less, than the power which he got in 1896 from his 2-1/2 per cent. One of the few facts which seem to stand out clearly from a study of the movement of the prices of securities, and consequently of the rate of interest to be derived from them, is that the rate of interest is high when the price of commodities is high, and vice versa. So that the answer to the question: What is the rate of interest likely to be after the war?

may be given, in Quaker fashion, by another question: What will happen to the index number of the prices of commodities? It seems fairly probable that both these questions may be answered, very tentatively and diffidently, by the expression of a hope that after a time, when peace conditions have settled down and all the merchant ships of the world have been restored to their peaceful occupations, the general level of the price of commodities will be materially lower than it is now, though probably considerably higher than it was before the war.

If this be so, then it is fairly safe to expect that the rate of interest, as expressed in money, will follow the movement of prices of goods. But it must be remembered that by rate of interest I mean the pure rate of interest, that is to say, the rate earned on perpetual fixed-charge securities of the highest cla.s.s. It may be that, owing to the very large amount of gilt-edged securities created in the course of the war by the various warring Governments, the rate of profit to be earned by the man who takes the risks of industry from dividends on ordinary shares and stocks will have to be made relatively more attractive than it was before the war.

If, then, capital can only be created by saving, how far will the war have helped towards its more plentiful production?

Here, again, we are faced with a psychological question which can only be answered by those who are bold enough to forecast the state of mind in which the majority of people will find themselves when the war is over. If there is a great reaction, and everybody's one desire is to throw this nightmare of war off their chests and go back to the times as they were before it happened, then all that the war has taught us about the production of capital will have been wasted. But I rather doubt whether this will be so. Saving merely means the diversion of a certain proportion of the output of industry into the further equipment of industry. The war has taught us lessons which, if we use them aright, will help us to increase enormously the output of industry. So that if these lessons are used aright, and industry does not waste its time in squabbles over the sharing of its product, its output may be so great that a comparatively smaller amount of saving in relation to the total output may produce a larger amount of capital than was made available in days before the war. There is a further point, that the war has taught a great many people who never saved at all to save a good deal. It was estimated before the war that we in this country were saving about four hundred millions a year. This figure was necessarily a guess, and must be taken for what it is worth. There can be no doubt that the amount of real saving now in progress, voluntary, owing to the patriotic effort of people who think they ought to restrict their own consumption so that the needs of our fighters may be provided, and enforced through the action of the Government in taking taxes and inflating the currency, is very much greater than it was before the war; probably at least twice as much when all allowance has been made for depreciation of the currency.

Some people think that this saving lesson will have been learned, will have become a habit, will continue and will grow. If so, if people save a larger proportion of their income than they did before, and if the total output of goods is increased, as it easily may be, it becomes at once evident that there is a possibility of a freer supply of capital for industry than has ever been seen. But in looking at this hopeful and optimistic picture, we must never forget that it can only be painted by those who are prepared to leave out of the canvas all the danger of industrial strife and dislocation, and all the danger of reaction to the old habits of luxurious spending which are so strong a possibility in the other direction. The war has shown us how we can, if we like, increase production, reduce consumption, and so have a larger margin than ever before to be put into providing capital for industry. Whether we really have learned these lessons and will apply them remains to be seen.

There is also a possibility that some people may recognise that saving money and applying it to the re-equipment of the world for peace industry is a patriotically praiseworthy object not less than saving in time of war for the equipment of the Army. It may be that the benefit conferred by those who save, in increasing the output of mankind, will be more generally recognised, and that the supply of capital may, when the war is over, be increased on patriotic grounds, or on grounds even wider than mere patriotism--a desire to help a great stride forward in the material welfare of mankind.

Capital is a very tender plant, and it will be very easy, if mistakes are made, to frighten those who see the benefits of acc.u.mulation for themselves and others. Labour troubles and industrial unrest are extremely likely to have the effect of destroying capital by preventing it coming into existence. If we remember that capital can only be created by being saved, it becomes evident that if those who save are threatened with too deep an inroad into their reward for so doing, on the part of labour, they will hesitate to save; and if the action of labour has this effect, labour will be sawing off the bough on which it sits. For it is new capital that sets new industry going, and it is only by a continual supply of new industry that a continual demand for fresh labour can be maintained.

There is also at present much mischievous talk about a great tax on capital for the purpose of redeeming, or hastening the redemption of, war debt. It is clear at once that it is not possible to tax capital if we remember that capital consists of the tools and equipment of industry, or even, in the wider sense of the word, of acc.u.mulated a.s.sets which have not been consumed. Unless the Government is prepared to take payment in factory chimneys, railway sleepers, houses and fields, or the securities and mortgages that are claims on their product, it is not possible to tax capital. The only thing that the Government can tax is the output, that is to say, the annual income of the people. In other words, a tax on capital is simply a form of income tax a.s.sessed, not according to a man's income, but according to the a.s.sets of which he is possessed. The effect of such a tax would be that he who has spent everything that he has earned on his own enjoyment would go scot free in the matter of the capital tax, and would be rewarded for his improvidence by being asked to make no sacrifice; while his thrifty brother who, out of a smaller income, has set aside a certain proportion during the last twenty or thirty years, would have to hand over a portion of his current income a.s.sessed upon the value of the a.s.sets into which he has put his savings.

Incidentally, it may be remarked that it would take years to make this necessary valuation, and that it would probably be done in a very inequitable manner by untrained and incompetent officials. But the important point is this, that if the Government shows a tendency to take the possession of a.s.sets as a basis for taxation it will be directly encouraging those who spend their whole income in riotous living and frivolous amus.e.m.e.nt, and discouraging those who help to increase mankind's output by adding to the capital available.

Finally, it may be added that the shyness of the saver will be greatly diminished if he can feel that there is a trustworthy machinery of company promotion, so that he can rely on any savings that he puts into industry having at least a fair chance of yielding him a fair reward. This subject is too vast to enter into at present, but it is one to which those who are responsible for the management of our financial affairs cannot give too much attention. Every time the real investor is swindled out of his money there is more than a chance that he will look upon all forms of saving as a folly to be left to the credulous. It is easy to say that it was his own fault, that he ought to have been more careful, or consulted a better broker; but he will, with equal ease, retort that If honest financiers knew their business better, they would have long ago made things easier for the ignorant investor to know whether he was putting his money into genuine enterprise or throwing it down a sink.

Like all other divagations on the subject of what may happen in the future, this attempt to forecast has necessarily consisted of "dim glimpses into the obvious," as the undergraduate said of Jowett's sermon. All that we can be sure of is this: that if the great opportunities that will lie open to mankind at the end of the war are rightly used, if we use its lessons to increase our production, restrict our frivolous consumption, and put a larger proportion of our larger production into stimulating production still further, there ought to be a great increase in the amount of capital available to supply the great increase which may be expected in the amount of capital demanded. The fact that the chief nations of the world will have enormous debts on which to pay interest is not one that need necessarily terrify us from this point of view. The arranging and imposition of the taxation necessary for meeting the interest on these debts will involve very serious political and social questions; but the payment of this interest need not necessarily diminish production, and it may probably help in checking consumption. It will not impair the total wealth of the world as a whole; it will merely affect its distribution. And since it will mean that a considerable part of the world's output will, for this reason, be handed over to the holders of the various Government debts, who, _ex hypothesi_, will be people who have saved money in the past, it is at least possible that they may devote a considerable amount of the spin so received to further saving or increasing the supply of capital available.

II

LONDON'S FINANCIAL POSITION

_October_, 1917

London after the War--A German View--The Rocks Ahead--Our Relative Position secure--Faulty Finance--The Strength we have shown--The Nature and Limits of American Compet.i.tion--No other likely Rivals.

Will the prestige of the London money market be maintained when the war is over? This is a question of enormous importance, not only to every one who works in and about the City, but to all who are interested in the maintenance and increase of England's wealth. Like all other questions about what is going to happen some day, the answer to it will depend to a very great extent on what happens between the present moment and the return of peace. To arrive at an answer we have first to consider on what London's financial prestige has been based in the past, and on this subject we are able to cite in evidence the opinion of an enemy. Our own views about the reasons which gave us financial eminence may well be coloured by national and patriotic prejudice, but when we take the opinion of a German we may be pretty sure that it is not warped by any predisposition in favour of English character and achievement.

A little book published this year by Messrs. Macmillan and Co., ent.i.tled "England's Financial Supremacy," contains a translation of a series of articles from the _Frankfurter Zeitung_, and from this witness we are able to get some information which may be valuable, and is certainly interesting.

The basis of England's financial supremacy is recapitulated as follows by this devil's advocate:--

"The influence of history, a mighty empire, a cosmopolitan Stock Exchange, intimate business connections throughout the whole world, cheap money, a free gold market, steady exchanges, an almost unlimited market for capital and an excellent credit system, an elastic system of company legislation, a model Insurance organisation and the help of Germans, these are the factors that have created England's financial supremacy. Perhaps we have omitted one other factor, the errors and omissions of other nations."

Coming closer to detail, our critic says, with regard to the international nature of the business done on the London Stock Exchange:--

"In recent years London had almost lost its place as the busiest stock market in the world. New York, as a rule, Berlin on many occasions, could show more dealings than London. But there was no denying the international character of its business. This was due to England's position of company promoter and money lender to the world; to the way in which new capital was issued there; to its Stock Exchange rules, so independent of legislative and Treasury interference; to the international character of its Stock Exchange members, and to the cosmopolitan character of its clients,"

On the subject of our Insurance business and the fair-mindedness and quickness of settlement with which it was conducted, we can cite the same witness as follows:--

"Insurance, again, represented by the well-known organisation of Lloyds, which in form is something between a stock exchange and a co-operative partnership, is nowhere more elastic and adaptable than in London. It must be said, to the credit of Lloyds, that anyone asking to be insured there was never hindered by bureaucratic restrictions, and always found his wishes met to the furthest possible extent. The agencies of Lloyds abroad are also so arranged that both the insured and the insurer can have their claims settled quickly and equitably."