Under Four Administrations Part 16

Next he took up a discussion of Panama. Mr. Taft with several others was to leave next day on a mission there to look into the difficulties between the native army and the President of Panama, and some one humorously suggested that he had better go down and take away the weapons from the army and let them muster as much as they wanted to without weapons.

After dinner we adjourned to the President's study on the floor above.

He sat down at his desk and pulled open a drawer as he said: "I want to read to you incomplete drafts of portions of my Message which I should like to have you criticize, as on some of the subjects I have not yet fully made up my mind." The Message was in separate parts, each dealing with an important subject. He took up the part dealing with our foreign relations, in regard to Russia and Roumania, and addressed me, saying he would like me to pay special attention to that as he had consulted me all along concerning the action to be taken. He said our Government had been criticized as interfering with the internal affairs of other nations, and the statement had been repeatedly made that we should not like it if other nations took us to task for our negro lynchings in the South; but he argued that the lynchings were comparatively few, and, though bad enough, were nothing compared to the wholesale murder in cold blood under official sanction and perhaps instigation, as in Kishineff.

"My answer to all these criticisms is this," he said; "only a short time ago I received a remonstrance or pet.i.tion from a society in Great Britain regarding the lynchings in this country. I did not reject it; on the contrary, I answered it most politely and expressed my great regret for these unlawful, unjustifiable acts, with which neither I nor the Government had any sympathy. On the contrary the Government does everything in its power to prevent these outrages and unlawful acts.

And I authorize any one to make use of this information whenever the occasion presents itself."

To the labor question also he wanted me to pay special attention because of my experience with such matters and in the arbitration of labor disputes. He began with the statement that he was in favor of organized capital and organized labor. I asked him whether right at that point I might make a suggestion, which was that he begin with the general subject of capital and labor, because organized labor did not comprise more than fifteen per cent of the wage-earners of the country. This suggestion he accepted.

Roosevelt then expressed himself in favor of the eight-hour law. Messrs.

Moody, Knox, Taft, and myself did not agree with his statement in the form he had it. We explained that there were several bills before Congress on the subject, some of which had pa.s.sed the lower house, but were defeated in the Senate; that it was all right for the Government in its own yards to adopt an eight-hour day, but when it gave out contracts to other shops, while it had a right to say that the work upon that contract should be done by eight-hour days, it had no right to require work on other contracts to be done in eight-hour days. When we had discussed the subject quite thoroughly, it was agreed to omit it from the Message.

Next he took up the trust question. He said Mr. Garfield had several suggestions to offer for making the interstate commerce law effective.

It was generally agreed that the law as originally pa.s.sed fully provided the remedy that was intended, but it had been emasculated by the decisions of the Supreme Court. Messrs. Knox, Taft, and Moody referred to several of these decisions and pointed out that the railroads, under subterfuge of switches and free cars--cars that were furnished by such shippers as the beef trust--got completely around the law. They allowed a mileage charge for the supply of these cars in excess of what should be allowed, and under such cover it amounted to a rebate to those shippers and was a complete circ.u.mvention of the law. Garfield's suggestion was that the interstate commerce corporations be compelled to obtain a license or charter from the National Government to do business.

We thoroughly discussed this, but it was disapproved as being an interference with the legal rights of States, and that therefore no such law could be pa.s.sed by Congress. The President then turned to the legal members of our group and said, "Now here is a great wrong and you lawyers have always got a way of preventing us from reaching a remedy."

Knox created a laugh by replying, "The President wants us as usual to jump over the Supreme Court."

The work on the Message done, Roosevelt said it was his intention to go South and make a few speeches. He would begin at San Antonio and would visit Tuskegee and Sewanee Colleges, for he wanted his views in regard to the South and the negro question fully understood. He read us a draft along the lines of thought he wanted to present, quoting much from Lincoln, which seemed highly to the point. When some one mentioned the curtailing of suffrage so as to have it based upon educational qualifications and property ownership, the President said it would not be wise to agitate that subject, and that herein Booker Washington agreed with him; but, he added, "There is something inherently wrong about a Southern member representing in some instances only a quarter of the number of votes that an Eastern member represents, and having an equal vote with him in Congress."

It was half after midnight when our little company separated. The President then suggested to Dr. Abbott and me that we meet at 8.15 breakfast, if we did not object to having this meal with him and the children. In the absence of Mrs. Roosevelt, who had gone to New York, the President next morning took the head of the table, and with the coffee urn before him served us each with our coffee, cream, and sugar.

There were Teddy, Ethel, Kermit, Archie, and Quentin, the governess, the tutor, besides Dr. Abbott, his son, and myself. After the meal we strolled in the park back of the White House until 9.30, when the President left for his work-room in the new office building west of the White House.

I did not see Roosevelt again for several months. One day in May I took lunch with him upon his return from Chicago where he had had a conference with the representatives of the labor unions who were carrying on the teamster's strike that paralyzed the commerce of the city. He said he had received through his secretary my memorandum regarding an adjustment of the trouble, and that it was of great a.s.sistance to him in discussing the situation and coming to some equitable arrangement. He was preparing a Message for an extra session of Congress in October, and said he would send me parts of it, especially those referring to immigration and the Far East, for my advice and suggestion.

In 1905, when Roosevelt was busy with negotiations to bring peace between Russia and j.a.pan, I received a letter from him stating that he had endeavored to get these two nations to go to The Hague, but Russia was most reluctant and j.a.pan positively refused; nor would they go to either Paris or Chefoo, but they were both willing to come to Washington. In his own "Autobiography," which I never tire of reading, Roosevelt gives an interesting sketch of his mediation between these two countries which finally brought about the conference and treaty at Portsmouth, New Hampshire.

Count Sergius Witte, head of the Russian mission to Portsmouth, was desirous of meeting some of the representative Jews of our country with a view to seeking what might practicably be done to improve the condition of the Jews in the Russian Empire. While it was said that his wife was a Jewess, his interest in the Jewish question was perhaps primarily to improve the relations between Russia and the United States.

The Russian ma.s.sacres, with the resultant enforced emigration, the public meetings of protest in this country and the press comments, had seriously prejudiced public opinion here against Russia.

The Count therefore invited a committee to confer with him and Baron Rosen at Portsmouth. There were Jacob H. Schiff, Isaac N. Seligman, Adolph Kraus, Adolf Lewisohn, and myself. The Count admitted with much frankness the condition of the Jewish population of Russia, and that it was an injustice. He expressed his purpose to exert his best influence to remedy the just grievances of the oppressed Jews. We a.s.sured him that we asked for no special privileges for our co-religionists, but the same, and no greater, rights for them than were accorded other Russian subjects; that the granting of such rights would relieve Russia of the Jewish question and of the international ill-will to which this question naturally and rightly gave rise. Both the Count and Baron Rosen agreed with us, but argued that it was not practicable to grant such complete emanc.i.p.ation, but that it should come about gradually. We told them, of course, that with that premise we could not and would not agree.

The Count was very much impressed with our presentation of the subject, and our statements were corroborated by his own observations later when he made a visit to the lower East Side of New York where he spoke with a number of the Russian-Jewish immigrants. He said that upon his return to Russia he would at once take up the problem with a view ultimately to secure equal rights for the Jewish subjects, that he realized the necessity for this not only from a humanitarian standpoint, but from the standpoint of Russia's best interests and of her relations with the leading nations of the world, particularly with the United States.

Before going to Portsmouth on Count Witte's invitation, I conferred with Roosevelt. He wanted me in an unofficial capacity to observe carefully the progress of the negotiations and keep him advised. Just at that time it looked as if the conference might break up, and before that stage was actually reached he wanted to be notified, for he would probably have a communication to make to the commissioners. On arriving at Portsmouth I had a confidential talk with Fedor Fedorovich Martens, the great Russian international jurist, who was one of my fellow members at the Hague Tribunal, and with whom I had been in personal touch on several previous occasions. He was legal adviser to the Russian delegation. I apprised him of what I knew to be the desire of the President, and he agreed that if a break became imminent, a communication such as the President would send would be likely to have the right influence, and he would see to it that, should the necessity arise for such a message, Roosevelt should be promptly informed. I advised the President of my understanding with Martens, but fortunately no rupture occurred and the terms of peace were agreed upon.

In his "Autobiography" Roosevelt says, with regard to these Portsmouth negotiations: "I had certainly tried my best to be the friend not only of the j.a.panese people but of the Russian people, and I believe that what I did was for the best interests of both and of the world at large." He refers with characteristic generosity to the help given him at St. Petersburg by our amba.s.sador, George von Lengerke Meyer, who "rendered literally invaluable aid by insisting upon himself seeing the Czar at critical periods of the transaction, when it was no longer possible for me to act successfully through the representatives of the Czar, who were often at cross-purposes with one another."

And when the Portsmouth Conference was over, the President further took a deep interest in bringing about amelioration of the condition of the Jews in Russia. When Count Witte came to New York, Roosevelt wrote him the following letter, of which he sent me a copy:

OYSTER BAY, N.Y.

_September 10, 1905_

MY DEAR MR. WITTE:

... In furtherance of our conversation of last evening I beg you to consider the question of granting pa.s.sports to reputable American citizens of Jewish faith. I feel that if this could be done it would remove the last cause of irritation between the two nations whose historic friendship for one another I wish to do my best to maintain. You could always refuse to give a pa.s.sport to any American citizen, Jew or Gentile, unless you were thoroughly satisfied that no detriment would come to Russia in granting it.

But if your Government could only see its way clear to allowing reputable American citizens of Jewish faith, as to whose intentions they are satisfied, to come to Russia, just as you do reputable American Christians, I feel it would be from every standpoint most fortunate.

Again a.s.suring you of my high regard, and renewing my congratulations to you and to your country upon the peace that has been obtained, believe me,

Sincerely yours THEODORE ROOSEVELT

Early in 1906, when the Algeciras Conference regarding Morocco was in session, and the press reported that it was likely to break up without an agreement on account of Germany's att.i.tude, Carl Schurz, knowing of my close relationship with Roosevelt, wrote to me that the President could probably prevail upon the Powers concerned to refer the question to the Hague Tribunal. This letter I forwarded to Roosevelt; but although he was ever ready to vitalize the machinery of the Hague Tribunal, advice coming from Mr. Schurz at this time was not regarded with favor, possibly because of their previous differences. In his reply to me, however, the President showed what a clear and prophetic insight he had into Germany's att.i.tude and purposes:

Modern Germany is alert, aggressive, military and industrial. It thinks it is a match for England and France combined in war, and would probably be less reluctant to fight both those powers together than they would be together to fight it. It despises the Hague Conference and the whole Hague idea. It respects the United States only in so far as it believes that our navy is efficient and that if sufficiently wronged or insulted we would fight. Now I like and respect Germany, but I am not blind to the fact that Germany does not reciprocate the feeling. I want us to do everything we can to stay on good terms with Germany, but I would be a fool if I were blind to the fact that Germany will not stay in with us if we betray weakness. As for this particular case, when I see you next I shall tell you all that I have done and you will see that I have been using my very best efforts for peace.

In all my relations with Roosevelt, even before I became a member of his Cabinet, I was more and more convinced that no consideration of political self-interest or partisan advantage ever entered his mind in determining his att.i.tude or action in upholding the right or dethroning a wrong. He resented nothing more than when some politician or inconsiderate person made an appeal to him for action on the plea that it would be good politics. He was visioned, but not visionary; and withal highly practical, in that he understood the workings and tendencies of human forces. Just as he would read a book by absorbing a page at a glance, so he would instinctively appraise his fellow men; their qualities would impress him just as a brilliant paragraph in a book would arrest his instant attention.

Roosevelt would not make an idle gesture or even imply a threat which he did not purpose to carry into action. He was more abused by those whom he designated as "the interests," and better understood and trusted by the ma.s.ses, than any President in our history with the exception of Lincoln. So it is always with real leaders, who seek to guide rather than pander to public opinion. The latter course appeals to weak though well-intentioned public men; the former requires not only clear vision but high courage, and these qualities Roosevelt possessed to an extraordinary degree.

CHAPTER VIII

INDUSTRIAL DIPLOMACY

Trade unions and federated unions--Formation of the National Civic Federation--Notable industrial disputes are settled--Andrew Carnegie dines with fighting labor leaders--Marcus Hanna, general of industry--My chairmanship of the Board of Railway Labor Arbitration--Our findings and recommendations--My chairmanship of the New York Public Service Commission--Military necessities impinge upon industrial relations--The President's Industrial Conference of 1919-20.

When our industries were small, a strong human tie bound together employer and worker. Following the expansion which began after the Civil War, our industries resolved themselves into vast organizations and corporations, and the relations between employer and worker became more and more impersonal. The workers first organized into trade unions, which presently expanded into federated unions similar to those which a generation before had begun to be formed in Great Britain.

The rapid growth of our industries and the impersonal relations between employer and employed made it apparent that social justice required that reciprocal rights be recognized in order to bring about a better understanding of a relationship which had already become increasingly strained and often embittered, resulting in serious strikes and lock-outs. One of the first organizations to meet this need was formed in Chicago in 1894, following the Pullman strike. It was called the Civic Federation of Chicago and was under the leadership of a number of prominent men of that city, directed by Ralph M. Easley.

Six years later the scope of this organization was enlarged, and in the name of the National Civic Federation a conference was called in Chicago, in December, 1900, and the debate centered round the proposition that in American industries voluntary conciliation was preferable to compulsory arbitration. At that conference a committee was selected whose duty it was to collect information at home and abroad regarding measures of arbitration, and to advise with employers and workmen in this country whenever and wherever possible.

In the following December, 1901, the National Civic Federation held a conference in New York in the rooms of the New York Board of Trade and Transportation. I was then president of that Board and was asked to preside at the conference. After adjourning the sessions, we organized the industrial department of the Federation, with a committee of twelve men representing the public, twelve men representing employers, and twelve men representing wage-earners. These three groups were headed, respectively, by Grover Cleveland, Marcus A. Hanna, and Samuel Gompers.

All of their colleagues were men of national distinction and were recognized leaders in their fields. From this larger committee of thirty-six, an executive committee of five was selected, whose members were as follows: Marcus A. Hanna, chairman; Samuel Gompers, first vice-president; I, second vice-president; Charles A. Moore, treasurer; and Ralph M. Easley, secretary.

The scope and plan of the industrial department was to promote industrial peace in whatever way might seem best. We planned for a large meeting in May, when two public sessions were to be held, one at Cooper Union and one in the rooms of the New York Chamber of Commerce. We issued a statement of our plan and scope and inaugurated a broad educational campaign.

Meanwhile our department proved itself most practical. It actively helped settle several disputes, notably the Albany street-car strike, the disagreement between the National Metal Trades a.s.sociation and the International a.s.sociation of Machinists, and the United States steel strike. And it was instrumental in averting the threatened anthracite coal strike.

The identical ideal that I held up in my opening address at the meeting in January, 1901, I should hold up to-day: namely, that industrial peace, to be permanent, cannot rest upon force, but must rest upon justice, and in essential industries especially, upon a high sense of responsibility to the public by both employer and employed. In no other country are conditions, by nature and by principles of government, better adapted to the equitable adjustment of the reciprocal rights, duties, and privileges of labor and capital than in our own, because we are a democratic people with no fixed cla.s.s distinctions to separate us.

The laborer of to-day may be the capitalist of to-morrow, and vice versa. Capital and labor are interdependent, not opponents; and it is on the basis of that dependency that adjustments in the relationship between them must be made. This ideal is, happily, more widely recognized to-day than it was when the National Civic Federation was organized.

I gave considerable attention to the work of the Federation for a number of years. As the offices were in New York and the president and first vice-president were both resident in other cities, the direction of the organization between conferences largely fell upon me as second vice-president, with the important a.s.sistance of the secretary, Mr.

Easley.

The Federation afforded a neutral forum where, under the chairmanship of one of its officers, the disputants could discuss their grievances and arrive at an understanding. Many times the growing bitterness between them was checked and a strike or lock-out averted. The fact was often borne in upon me how many of these industrial disputes grew out of misunderstandings which were cleared away when men a.s.sembled around a table and frankly discussed their differences.

To further the work and interests of the Federation I brought together in social relationship, at several dinners at my home, the representatives of all three groups; namely, the public, the wage-earner, and the employer. One day Andrew Carnegie expressed the desire to meet the labor leaders who had instigated the strike in the Carnegie works which resulted in the Homestead riots. Accordingly I arranged a dinner, to which I invited a number of the men of the labor wing of the Federation, as well as some others of the committee, together with Messrs. Wighe and Schaeffer, of Pittsburgh, officers of the Amalgamated Union, who had led the Homestead strike.