Tragic Sense Of Life Part 13

[36] _Todo lo humaniza, y aun lo humana_.

[37] In the translation it is impossible to retain the play upon the verbs _crear_, to create, and _creer_, to believe: _"Porque creer en Dios es en cierto modo crearle, aunque El nos cree antes."_--J.E.C.F.

VIII

FROM G.o.d TO G.o.d

To affirm that the religious sense is a sense of divinity and that it is impossible without some abuse of the ordinary usages of human language to speak of an atheistic religion, is not, I think, to do violence to the truth; although it is clear that everything will depend upon the concept that we form of G.o.d, a concept which in its turn depends upon the concept of divinity.

Our proper procedure, in effect, will be to begin with this sense of divinity, before prefixing to the concept of this quality the definite article and the capital letter and so converting it into "the Divinity"--that is, into G.o.d. For man has not deduced the divine from G.o.d, but rather he has reached G.o.d through the divine.

In the course of these somewhat wandering but at the same time urgent reflections upon the tragic sense of life, I have already alluded to the _timor fecit deos_ of Statius with the object of limiting and correcting it. It is not my intention to trace yet once again the historical processes by which peoples have arrived at the consciousness and concept of a personal G.o.d like the G.o.d of Christianity. And I say peoples and not isolated individuals, for if there is any feeling or concept that is truly collective and social it is the feeling and concept of G.o.d, although the individual subsequently individualizes it. Philosophy may, and in fact does, possess an individual origin; theology is necessarily collective.

Schleiermacher's theory, which attributes the origin, or rather the essence, of the religious sense to the immediate and simple feeling of dependency, appears to be the most profound and exact explanation.

Primitive man, living in society, feels himself to be dependent upon the mysterious forces invisibly environing him; he feels himself to be in social communion, not only with beings like himself, his fellow-men, but with the whole of Nature, animate and inanimate, which simply means, in other words, that he personalizes everything. Not only does he possess a consciousness of the world, but he imagines that the world, like himself, possesses consciousness also. Just as a child talks to his doll or his dog as if it understood what he was saying, so the savage believes that his fetich hears him when he speaks to it, and that the angry storm-cloud is aware of him and deliberately pursues him. For the newly born mind of the primitive natural man has not yet wholly severed itself from the cords which still bind it to the womb of Nature, neither has it clearly marked out the boundary that separates dreaming from waking, imagination from reality.

The divine, therefore, was not originally something objective, but was rather the subjectivity of consciousness projected exteriorly, the personalization of the world. The concept of divinity arose out of the feeling of divinity, and the feeling of divinity is simply the dim and nascent feeling of personality vented upon the outside world. And strictly speaking it is not possible to speak of outside and inside, objective and subjective, when no such distinction was actually felt; indeed it is precisely from this lack of distinction that the feeling and concept of divinity proceed. The clearer our consciousness of the distinction between the objective and the subjective, the more obscure is the feeling of divinity in us.

It has been said, and very justly so it would appear, that h.e.l.lenic paganism was not so much polytheistic as pantheistic. I do not know that the belief in a mult.i.tude of G.o.ds, taking the concept of G.o.d in the sense in which we understand it to-day, has ever really existed in any human mind. And if by pantheism is understood the doctrine, not that everything and each individual thing is G.o.d--a proposition which I find unthinkable--but that everything is divine, then it may be said without any great abuse of language that paganism was pantheistic. Its G.o.ds not only mixed among men but intermixed with them; they begat G.o.ds upon mortal women and upon G.o.ddesses mortal men begat demi-G.o.ds. And if demi-G.o.ds, that is, demi-men, were believed to exist, it was because the divine and the human were viewed as different aspects of the same reality. The divinization of everything was simply its humanization. To say that the sun was a G.o.d was equivalent to saying that it was a man, a human consciousness, more or less, aggrandized and sublimated. And this is true of all beliefs from fetichism to h.e.l.lenic paganism.

The real distinction between G.o.ds and men consisted in the fact that the former were immortal. A G.o.d came to be identical with an immortal man and a man was deified, reputed as a G.o.d, when it was deemed that at his death he had not really died. Of certain heroes it was believed that they were alive in the kingdom of the dead. And this is a point of great importance in estimating the value of the concept of the divine.

In those republics of G.o.ds there was always some predominating G.o.d, some real monarch. It was through the agency of this divine monarchy that primitive peoples were led from monocultism to monotheism. Hence monarchy and monotheism are twin brethren. Zeus, Jupiter, was in process of being converted into an only G.o.d, just as Jahwe originally one G.o.d among many others, came to be converted into an only G.o.d, first the G.o.d of the people of Israel, then the G.o.d of humanity, and finally the G.o.d of the whole universe.

Like monarchy, monotheism had a martial origin. "It is only on the march and in time of war," says Robertson Smith in _The Prophets of Israel_,[38] "that a nomad people feels any urgent need of a central authority, and so it came about that in the first beginnings of national organization, centring in the sanctuary of the ark, Israel was thought of mainly as the host of Jehovah. The very name of Israel is martial, and means 'G.o.d (_El_) fighteth,' and Jehovah in the Old Testament is Iahwe cebaoth--the Jehovah of the armies of Israel. It was on the battlefield that Jehovah's presence was most clearly realized; but in primitive nations the leader in time of war is also the natural judge in time of peace."

G.o.d, the only G.o.d, issued, therefore, from man's sense of divinity as a warlike, monarchical and social G.o.d. He revealed himself to the people as a whole, not to the individual. He was the G.o.d of a people and he jealously exacted that worship should be rendered to him alone. The transition from this monocultism to monotheism was effected largely by the individual action, more philosophical perhaps than theological, of the prophets. It was, in fact, the individual activity of the prophets that individualized the divinity. And above all by making the divinity ethical.

Subsequently reason--that is, philosophy--took possession of this G.o.d who had arisen in the human consciousness as a consequence of the sense of divinity in man, and tended to define him and convert him into an idea. For to define a thing is to idealize it, a process which necessitates the abstraction from it of its incommensurable or irrational element, its vital essence. Thus the G.o.d of feeling, the divinity felt as a unique person and consciousness external to us, although at the same time enveloping and sustaining us, was converted into the idea of G.o.d.

The logical, rational G.o.d, the _ens summum_, the _primum movens_, the Supreme Being of theological philosophy, the G.o.d who is reached by the three famous ways of negation, eminence and causality, _viae negationis, eminentiae, causalitatis_, is nothing but an idea of G.o.d, a dead thing.

The traditional and much debated proofs of his existence are, at bottom, merely a vain attempt to determine his essence; for as Vinet has very well observed, existence is deduced from essence; and to say that G.o.d exists, without saying what G.o.d is and how he is, is equivalent to saying nothing at all.

And this G.o.d, arrived at by the methods of eminence and negation or abstraction of finite qualities, ends by becoming an unthinkable G.o.d, a pure idea, a G.o.d of whom, by the very fact of his ideal excellence, we can say that he is nothing, as indeed he has been defined by Scotus Erigena: _Deus propter excellentiam non inmerito nihil vocatur_. Or in the words of the pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, in his fifth Epistle, "The divine darkness is the inaccessible light in which G.o.d is said to dwell." The anthropomorphic G.o.d, the G.o.d who is felt, in being purified of human, and as such finite, relative and temporal, attributes, evaporates into the G.o.d of deism or of pantheism.

The traditional so-called proofs of the existence of G.o.d all refer to this G.o.d-Idea, to this logical G.o.d, the G.o.d by abstraction, and hence they really prove nothing, or rather, they prove nothing more than the existence of this idea of G.o.d.

In my early youth, when first I began to be puzzled by these eternal problems, I read in a book, the author of which I have no wish to recall,[39] this sentence: "G.o.d is the great X placed over the ultimate barrier of human knowledge; in the measure in which science advances, the barrier recedes." And I wrote in the margin, "On this side of the barrier, everything is explained without Him; on the further side, nothing is explained, either with Him or without Him; G.o.d therefore is superfluous." And so far as concerns the G.o.d-Idea, the G.o.d of the proofs, I continue to be of the same opinion. Laplace is said to have stated that he had not found the hypothesis of G.o.d necessary in order to construct his scheme of the origin of the Universe, and it is very true.

In no way whatever does the idea of G.o.d help us to understand better the existence, the essence and the finality of the Universe.

That there is a Supreme Being, infinite, absolute and eternal, whose existence is unknown to us, and who has created the Universe, is not more conceivable than that the material basis of the Universe itself, its matter, is eternal and infinite and absolute. We do not understand the existence of the world one whit the better by telling ourselves that G.o.d created it. It is a begging of the question, or a merely verbal solution, intended to cover up our ignorance. In strict truth, we deduce the existence of the Creator from the fact that the thing created exists, a process which does not justify rationally His existence. You cannot deduce a necessity from a fact, or else everything were necessary.

And if from the nature of the Universe we pa.s.s to what is called its order, which is supposed to necessitate an Ordainer, we may say that order is what there is, and we do not conceive of any other. This deduction of G.o.d's existence from the order of the Universe implies a transition from the ideal to the real order, an outward projection of our mind, a supposition that the rational explanation of a thing produces the thing itself. Human art, instructed by Nature, possesses a conscious creative faculty, by means of which it apprehends the process of creation, and we proceed to transfer this conscious and artistic creative faculty to the consciousness of an artist-creator, but from what nature he in his turn learnt his art we cannot tell.

The traditional a.n.a.logy of the watch and the watchmaker is inapplicable to a Being absolute, infinite and eternal. It is, moreover, only another way of explaining nothing. For to say that the world is as it is and not otherwise because G.o.d made it so, while at the same time we do not know for what reason He made it so, is to say nothing. And if we knew for what reason G.o.d made it so, then G.o.d is superfluous and the reason itself suffices. If everything were mathematics, if there were no irrational element, we should not have had recourse to this explanatory theory of a Supreme Ordainer, who is nothing but the reason of the irrational, and so merely another cloak for our ignorance. And let us not discuss here that absurd proposition that, if all the type in a printing-press were printed at random, the result could not possibly be the composition of _Don Quixote_. Something would be composed which would be as good as _Don Quixote_ for those who would have to be content with it and would grow in it and would form part of it.

In effect, this traditional supposed proof of G.o.d's existence resolves itself fundamentally into hypostatizing or substantivating the explanation or reason of a phenomenon; it amounts to saying that Mechanics is the cause of movement, Biology of life, Philology of language, Chemistry of bodies, by simply adding the capital letter to the science and converting it into a force distinct from the phenomena from which we derive it and distinct from our mind which effects the derivation. But the G.o.d who is the result of this process, a G.o.d who is nothing but reason hypostatized and projected towards the infinite, cannot possibly be felt as something living and real, nor yet be conceived of save as a mere idea which will die with us.

The question arises, on the other hand, whether a thing the idea of which has been conceived but which has no real existence, does not exist because G.o.d wills that it should not exist, or whether G.o.d does not will it to exist because, in fact, it does not exist; and, with regard to the impossible, whether a thing is impossible because G.o.d wills it so, or whether G.o.d wills it so because, in itself and by the very fact of its own inherent absurdity, it is impossible. G.o.d has to submit to the logical law of contradiction, and He cannot, according to the theologians, cause two and two to make either more or less than four.

Either the law of necessity is above Him or He Himself is the law of necessity. And in the moral order the question arises whether falsehood, or homicide, or adultery, are wrong because He has so decreed it, or whether He has so decreed it because they are wrong. If the former, then G.o.d is a capricious and unreasonable G.o.d, who decrees one law when He might equally well have decreed another, or, if the latter, He obeys an intrinsic nature and essence which exists in things themselves independently of Him--that is to say, independently of His sovereign will; and if this is the case, if He obeys the innate reason of things, this reason, if we could but know it, would suffice us without any further need of G.o.d, and since we do not know it, G.o.d explains nothing.

This reason would be above G.o.d. Neither is it of any avail to say that this reason is G.o.d Himself, the supreme reason of things. A reason of this kind, a necessary reason, is not a personal something. It is will that gives personality. And it is because of this problem of the relations between G.o.d's reason, necessarily necessary, and His will, necessarily free, that the logical and Aristotelian G.o.d will always be a contradictory G.o.d.

The scholastic theologians never succeeded in disentangling themselves from the difficulties in which they found themselves involved when they attempted to reconcile human liberty with divine prescience and with the knowledge that G.o.d possesses of the free and contingent future; and that is strictly the reason why the rational G.o.d is wholly inapplicable to the contingent, for the notion of contingency is fundamentally the same as the notion of irrationality. The rational G.o.d is necessarily necessary in His being and in His working; in every single case He cannot do other than the best, and a number of different things cannot all equally be the best, for among infinite possibilities there is only one that is best accommodated to its end, just as among the infinite number of lines that can be drawn from one point to another, there is only one straight line. And the rational G.o.d, the G.o.d of reason, cannot but follow in each case the straight line, the line that leads most directly to the end proposed, a necessary end, just as the only straight line that leads to it is a necessary line. And thus for the divinity of G.o.d is subst.i.tuted His necessity. And in the necessity of G.o.d, His free will--that is to say, His conscious personality--perishes. The G.o.d of our heart's desire, the G.o.d who shall save our soul from nothingness, must needs be an arbitrary G.o.d.

Not because He thinks can G.o.d be G.o.d, but because He works, because He creates; He is not a contemplative but an active G.o.d. A G.o.d-Reason, a theoretical or contemplative G.o.d, such as is this G.o.d of theological rationalism, is a G.o.d that is diluted in His own contemplation. With this G.o.d corresponds, as we shall see, the beatific vision, understood as the supreme expression of human felicity. A quietist G.o.d, in short, as reason, by its very essence, is quietist.

There remains the other famous proof of G.o.d's existence, that of the supposed unanimous consent in a belief in Him among all peoples. But this proof is not strictly rational, neither is it an argument in favour of the rational G.o.d who explains the Universe, but of the G.o.d of the heart, who makes us live. We should be justified in calling it a rational proof only on the supposition that we believed that reason was identical with a more or less unanimous agreement among all peoples, that it corresponded with the verdict of a universal suffrage, only on the supposition that we held that _vox populi_, which is said to be _vox Dei_, was actually the voice of reason.

Such was, indeed, the belief of Lamennais, that tragic and ardent spirit, who affirmed that life and truth were essentially one and the same thing--would that they were!--and that reason was one, universal, everlasting and holy (_Essai sur l'indifference_, partie iv., chap, viii.). He invoked the _aut omnibus credendum est aut nemini_ of Lactantius--we must believe all or none--and the saying of Herac.l.i.tus that every individual opinion is fallible, and that of Aristotle that the strongest proof consists in the general agreement of mankind, and above all that of Pliny (_Paneg. Trajani_, lxii.), to the effect that one man cannot deceive all men or be deceived by all--_nemo omnes, neminem omnes fefellerunt_. Would that it were so! And so he concludes with the dictum of Cicero (_De natura deorum_, lib. iii., cap. ii., 5 and 6), that we must believe the tradition of our ancestors even though they fail to render us a reason--_maioribus autem nostris, etiam nulla ratione reddita credere_.

Let us suppose that this belief of the ancients in the divine interpenetration of the whole of Nature is universal and constant, and that it is, as Aristotle calls it, an ancestral dogma (_patrios doxa_) (_Metaphysica_, lib. vii., cap. vii.); this would prove only that there is a motive impelling peoples and individuals--that is to say, all or almost all or a majority of them--to believe in a G.o.d. But may it not be that there are illusions and fallacies rooted in human nature itself? Do not all peoples begin by believing that the sun turns round the earth?

And do we not all naturally incline to believe that which satisfies our desires? Shall we say with Hermann[40] that, "if there is a G.o.d, He has not left us without some indication of Himself, and if is His will that we should find Him."

A pious desire, no doubt, but we cannot strictly call it a reason, unless we apply to it the Augustinian sentence, but which again is not a reason, "Since thou seekest Me, it must be that thou hast found Me,"

believing that G.o.d is the cause of our seeking Him.

This famous argument from the supposed unanimity of mankind's belief in G.o.d, the argument which with a sure instinct was seized upon by the ancients, is in its essence identical with the so-called moral proof which Kant employed in his _Critique of Practical Reason_, transposing its application from mankind collectively to the individual, the proof which he derives from our conscience, or rather from our feeling of divinity. It is not a proof strictly or specifically rational, but vital; it cannot be applied to the logical G.o.d, the _ens summum_, the essentially simple and abstract Being, the immobile and impa.s.sible prime mover, the G.o.d-Reason, in a word, but to the biotic G.o.d, to the Being essentially complex and concrete, to the suffering G.o.d who suffers and desires in us and with us, to the Father of Christ who is only to be approached through Man, through His Son (John xiv. 6), and whose revelation is historical, or if you like, anecdotical, but not philosophical or categorical.

The unanimous consent of mankind (let us suppose the unanimity) or, in other words, this universal longing of all human souls who have arrived at the consciousness of their humanity, which desires to be the end and meaning of the Universe, this longing, which is nothing but that very essence of the soul which consists in its effort to persist eternally and without a break in the continuity of consciousness, leads us to the human, anthropomorphic G.o.d, the projection of our consciousness to the Consciousness of the Universe; it leads us to the G.o.d who confers human meaning and finality upon the Universe and who is not the _ens summum_, the _primum movens_, nor the Creator of the Universe, nor merely the Idea-G.o.d. It leads us to the living, subjective G.o.d, for He is simply subjectivity objectified or personality universalized--He is more than a mere idea, and He is will rather than reason. G.o.d is Love--that is, Will. Reason, the Word, derives from Him, but He, the Father, is, above all, Will.

"There can be no doubt whatever," Ritschl says (_Rechtfertigung und Versohnung_, iii., chap. v.), "that a very imperfect view was taken of G.o.d's spiritual personality in the older theology, when the functions of knowing and willing alone were employed to ill.u.s.trate it. Religious thought plainly ascribes to G.o.d affections of feeling as well. The older theology, however, laboured under the impression that feeling and emotion were characteristic only of limited and created personality; it transformed, _e.g._, the religious idea of the Divine blessedness into eternal self-knowledge, and that of the Divine wrath into a fixed purpose to punish sin." Yes, this logical G.o.d, arrived at by the _via negationis_, was a G.o.d who, strictly speaking, neither loved nor hated, because He neither enjoyed nor suffered, an inhuman G.o.d, and His justice was a rational or mathematical justice--that is, an injustice.

The attributes of the living G.o.d, of the Father of Christ, must be deduced from His historical revelation in the Gospel and in the conscience of every Christian believer, and not from metaphysical reasonings which lead only to the Nothing-G.o.d of Scotus Erigena, to the rational or pantheistic G.o.d, to the atheist G.o.d--in short, to the de-personalized Divinity.

Not by the way of reason, but only by the way of love and of suffering, do we come to the living G.o.d, the human G.o.d. Reason rather separates us from Him. We cannot first know Him in order that afterwards we may love Him; we must begin by loving Him, longing for Him, hungering after Him, before knowing Him. The knowledge of G.o.d proceeds from the love of G.o.d, and this knowledge has little or nothing of the rational in it. For G.o.d is indefinable. To seek to define Him is to seek to confine Him within the limits of our mind--that is to say, to kill Him. In so far as we attempt to define Him, there rises up before us--Nothingness.

The idea of G.o.d, formulated by a theodicy that claims to be rational, is simply an hypothesis, like the hypotheses of ether, for example.

Ether is, in effect, a merely hypothetical ent.i.ty, valuable only in so far as it explains that which by means of it we endeavour to explain--light, electricity or universal gravitation--and only in so far as these facts cannot be explained in any other way. In like manner the idea of G.o.d is also an hypothesis, valuable only in so far as it enables us to explain that which by means of if we endeavour to explain--the essence and existence of the Universe--and only so long as these cannot be explained in any other way. And since in reality we explain the Universe neither better nor worse with this idea than without it, the idea of G.o.d, the supreme _pet.i.tio principii_, is valueless.

But if ether is nothing but an hypothesis explanatory of light, air, on the other hand, is a thing that is directly felt; and even though it did not enable us to explain the phenomenon of sound, we should nevertheless always be directly aware of it, and, above all, of the lack of it in moments of suffocation or air-hunger. And in the same way G.o.d Himself, not the idea of G.o.d, may become a reality that is immediately felt; and even though the idea of Him does not enable us to explain either the existence or the essence of the Universe, we have at times the direct feeling of G.o.d, above all in moments of spiritual suffocation. And this feeling--mark it well, for all that is tragic in it and the whole tragic sense of life is founded upon this--this feeling is a feeling of hunger for G.o.d, of the lack of G.o.d. To believe in G.o.d is, in the first instance, as we shall see, to wish that there may be a G.o.d, to be unable to live without Him.

So long as I pilgrimaged through the fields of reason in search of G.o.d, I could not find Him, for I was not deluded by the idea of G.o.d, neither could I take an idea for G.o.d, and it was then, as I wandered among the wastes of rationalism, that I told myself that we ought to seek no other consolation than the truth, meaning thereby reason, and yet for all that I was not comforted. But as I sank deeper and deeper into rational scepticism on the one hand and into heart's despair on the other, the hunger for G.o.d awoke within me, and the suffocation of spirit made me feel the want of G.o.d, and with the want of Him, His reality. And I wished that there might be a G.o.d, that G.o.d might exist. And G.o.d does not exist, but rather super-exists, and He is sustaining our existence, existing us _(existiendonos)_.

G.o.d, who is Love, the Father of Love, is the son of love in us. There are men of a facile and external habit of mind, slaves of reason, that reason which externalizes us, who think it a shrewd comment to say that so far from G.o.d having made man in His image and likeness, it is rather man who has made his G.o.ds or his G.o.d in his own image and likeness,[41]

and so superficial are they that they do not pause to consider that if the second of these propositions be true, as in fact it is, it is owing to the fact that the first is not less true. G.o.d and man, in effect, mutually create one another; G.o.d creates or reveals Himself in man and man creates himself in G.o.d. G.o.d is His own maker, _Deus ipse se facit_, said Lactantius (_Divinarum Inst.i.tutionum_, ii., 8), and we may say that He is making Himself continually both in man and by man. And if each of us, impelled by his love, by his hunger for divinity, creates for himself an image of G.o.d according to his own desire, and if according to His desire G.o.d creates Himself for each of us, then there is a collective, social, human G.o.d, the resultant of all the human imaginations that imagine Him. For G.o.d is and reveals Himself in collectivity. And G.o.d is the richest and most personal of human conceptions.

The Master of divinity has bidden us be perfect as our Father who is in heaven is perfect (Matt. v. 48), and in the sphere of thought and feeling our perfection consists in the zeal with which we endeavour to equate our imagination with the total imagination of the humanity of which in G.o.d we form a part.

The logical theory of the opposition between the extension and the comprehension of a concept, the one increasing in the ratio in which the other diminishes, is well known. The concept that is most extensive and at the same time least comprehensive is that of being or of thing, which embraces everything that exists and possesses no other distinguishing quality than that of being; while the concept that is most comprehensive and least extensive is that of the Universe, which is only applicable to itself and comprehends all existing qualities. And the logical or rational G.o.d, the G.o.d obtained by way of negation, the absolute ent.i.ty, merges, like reality itself, into nothingness; for, as Hegel pointed out, pure being and pure nothingness are identical. And the G.o.d of the heart, the G.o.d who is felt, the G.o.d of living men, is the Universe itself conceived as personality, is the consciousness of the Universe. A G.o.d universal and personal, altogether different from the individual G.o.d of a rigid metaphysical monotheism.

I must advert here once again to my view of the opposition that exists between individuality and personality, notwithstanding the fact that the one demands the other. Individuality is, if I may so express it, the continent or thing which contains, personality the content or thing contained, or I might say that my personality is in a certain sense my comprehension, that which I comprehend or embrace within myself--which is in a certain way the whole Universe--and that my individuality is my extension; the one my infinite, the other my finite. A hundred jars of hard earthenware are strongly individualized, but it is possible for them to be all equally empty or all equally full of the same h.o.m.ogeneous liquid, whereas two bladders of so delicate a membrane as to admit of the action of osmosis and exosmosis may be strongly differentiated and contain liquids of a very mixed composition. And thus a man, in so far as he is an individual, may be very sharply detached from others, a sort of spiritual crustacean, and yet be very poor in differentiating content. And further, it is true on the other hand that the more personality a man has and the greater his interior richness and the more he is a society within himself, the less brusquely he is divided from his fellows. In the same way the rigid G.o.d of deism, of Aristotelian monotheism, the _ens summum_, is a being in whom individuality, or rather simplicity, stifles personality. Definition kills him, for to define is to impose boundaries, it is to limit, and it is impossible to define the absolutely indefinable. This G.o.d lacks interior richness; he is not a society in himself. And this the vital revelation obviated by the belief in the Trinity, which makes G.o.d a society and even a family in himself and no longer a pure individual. The G.o.d of faith is personal; He is a person because He includes three persons, for personality is not sensible of itself in isolation. An isolated person ceases to be a person, for whom should he love? And if he does not love, he is not a person. Nor can a simple being love himself without his love expanding him into a compound being.

It was because G.o.d was felt as a Father that the belief in the Trinity arose. For a G.o.d-Father cannot be a single, that is, a solitary, G.o.d. A father is always the father of a family. And the fact that G.o.d was felt as a father acted as a continual incentive to conceive Him not merely anthropomorphically--that is to say, as a man, _anthropos_--but andromorphically, as a male, _aner_. In the popular Christian imagination, in effect, G.o.d the Father is conceived of as a male. And the reason is that man, _h.o.m.o_, _anthropos_, as we know him, is necessarily either a male, _vir_, _aner_, or a female, _mulier_, _gyne_. And to these may be added the child, who is neuter. And hence in order to satisfy imaginatively this necessity of feeling G.o.d as a perfect man--that is, as a family--arose the cult of the G.o.d-Mother, the Virgin Mary, and the cult of the Child Jesus.