Traffic_ Why We Drive The Way We Do Part 17

involved in a fatal crash: See National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, "Alcohol Involvement in Fatal Motor Vehicle Traffic Crashes, 2003," DOT HS 809 822, March 2005.

versus white ones?: S. Newstead and A. D'Elia, "An Investigation into the Relationship Between Vehicle Colour and Crash Risk," Monash University Accident Research Centre, Report 263, 2007.

rental cars: In a conversation, Sheila "Charlie" Klauer noted that in the VTTI's aforementioned 100-car naturalistic study, both younger and older drivers of leased cars were involved in more risky driving events than the owners of private vehicles. "The leased vehicle drivers were involved in just slightly more events than were the private vehicle drivers. It was consistent," she said. "It's kind of a rental car phenomenon, that's what we're hypothesizing. I think we are all a little bit more reckless when we're in a rental car than in our own car." I was unable to find any study in the U.S. that had tackled this question head-on, although the multiplicity of drivers any rental car has and the varieties of exposure would make it difficult to gauge risk. A study in Jordan did report a higher crash rate among rental cars, though this was complicated by the fact that younger drivers (a riskier group to begin with) seemed to be overrepresented among car renters. See Adli H. Al-Balbissi, "Rental Cars Unique Accident Trends," Journal of Transportation Engineering, Journal of Transportation Engineering, vol. 127, no. 2 (MarchApril 2001), pp. 17577. vol. 127, no. 2 (MarchApril 2001), pp. 17577.

(less regard for life?): Guy Stecklov and Joshua R. Goldstein, "Terror Attacks Influence Driving Behavior in Israel," Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, vol. 101, no. 40 (2004), pp. 1455156. vol. 101, no. 40 (2004), pp. 1455156.

than in the front: Evans, Traffic Safety, Traffic Safety, op. cit., p. 56. op. cit., p. 56.

some 28,500 lives: C. Hunter Sheldon, Journal of the American Medical a.s.sociation, Journal of the American Medical a.s.sociation, November 5, 1955. November 5, 1955.

from seat belts: John Adams notes that from 1970 to 1978, in a sample of major Western countries that adopted seat-belt laws during the period, "the group of countries that had not pa.s.sed seat-belt laws experienced a greater decrease [in fatalities] than the group that had pa.s.sed laws." In the United Kingdom, he writes, the drop in fatalities in 1983, the first full year after the belt law was pa.s.sed, was "nothing remotely approaching" the predicted decline of one thousand deaths a year. The only segment of fatalities that dropped dramatically, he notes, was fatalities during the "drink-drive hours" of early Sat.u.r.day and Sunday mornings-in response, he argues, to a stepped-up campaign against drunk driving. The drop in fatalities at other times, he suggests, was no higher than the annual 3 percent decrease already taking place. "No studies have been done to explain why," he writes, "after the seat-belt law came into effect in Britain, seat belts were so extraordinarily selective in saving the lives of those who are over the alcohol limit and driving between 10 at night and 4 in the morning." See John Adams, "Britain's Seat-Belt Law Should Be Repealed," draft of a paper for publication in Significance, Significance, March 2007. March 2007.

colors would make more sense): R. G. Mortimer, "A Decade of Research in Rear Lighting: What Have We Learned?," in Proceedings of the Twenty-first Conference of the American a.s.sociation for Automotive Medicine Proceedings of the Twenty-first Conference of the American a.s.sociation for Automotive Medicine (Morton Grove, Ill.: AAAM, 1977), pp. 10122. (Morton Grove, Ill.: AAAM, 1977), pp. 10122.

improved reaction times: See, for example, J. Crosley and M. J. Allen, "Automobile Brake Light Effectiveness: An Evaluation of High Placement and Accelerator Switching," American Journal of Optometry and Archives of American Academy of Optometry, American Journal of Optometry and Archives of American Academy of Optometry, vol. 43 (1966), pp. 299304. For a good history of brake lights and the various issues involved, see D. W. Moore and K. Rumar, "Historical Development and Current Effectiveness of Rear Lighting Systems," Report No. UMTRI-99-31, 1999, University of Michigan Transportation Research Inst.i.tute, Ann Arbor. vol. 43 (1966), pp. 299304. For a good history of brake lights and the various issues involved, see D. W. Moore and K. Rumar, "Historical Development and Current Effectiveness of Rear Lighting Systems," Report No. UMTRI-99-31, 1999, University of Michigan Transportation Research Inst.i.tute, Ann Arbor.

cut by 50 percent: The trial is described in John Voevodsky, "Evaluation of a Deceleration Warning Light for Reducing Rear-End Automobile Collisions," Journal of Applied Psychology, Journal of Applied Psychology, vol. 59 (1974), pp. 27073. vol. 59 (1974), pp. 27073.

to around 15 percent: Charles Farmer, "Effectiveness Estimates for Center High Mounted Stop Lamps: A Six-Year Study," Accident a.n.a.lysis & Prevention, Accident a.n.a.lysis & Prevention, vol. 28, no. 2 (1996), pp. 20108. vol. 28, no. 2 (1996), pp. 20108.

crashes by 4.3 percent: See Suzanne E. Lee, Walter W. Wierwille, and Sheila G. Klauer, "Enhanced Rear Lighting and Signaling Systems: Literature Review and a.n.a.lyses of Alternative System Concepts," DOT HS 809 425, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, March 2002.

inventors had hoped: Critics of the chimsil have attributed its underwhelming impact in part to the idea that drivers do not necessarily brake when they see brake lights illuminated. The chimsil, this critique goes, offers more information, but more of the same same information. It says nothing, for example, about how quickly a car is decelerating or whether it has, in fact, stopped-a key consideration given the majority of rear-end collisions involving stopped cars. The work of R. G. Mortimer has provided the most thoroughgoing critique of the chimsil. See, for example, R. G. Mortimer, "The High-Mounted Brake Light: The 4% Solution," Society of Automotive Engineers Technical Paper 1999-01-0089, 1999. information. It says nothing, for example, about how quickly a car is decelerating or whether it has, in fact, stopped-a key consideration given the majority of rear-end collisions involving stopped cars. The work of R. G. Mortimer has provided the most thoroughgoing critique of the chimsil. See, for example, R. G. Mortimer, "The High-Mounted Brake Light: The 4% Solution," Society of Automotive Engineers Technical Paper 1999-01-0089, 1999.

by someone else: L. Evans and P. Gerrish, "Anti-lock Brakes and Risk of Front and Rear Impact in Two-Vehicle Crashes," someone else: L. Evans and P. Gerrish, "Anti-lock Brakes and Risk of Front and Rear Impact in Two-Vehicle Crashes," Accident a.n.a.lysis & Prevention, Accident a.n.a.lysis & Prevention, vol. 28 (1996), pp. 31523. vol. 28 (1996), pp. 31523.

non-ABS drivers did: Elizabeth Mazzae, Frank S. Barickman, and Garrick J. Forkenbrock, "Driver Crash Avoidance Behavior with ABS in an Intersection Incursion Scenario on Dry Versus Wet Pavement," Society of Automotive Engineers Technical Paper, 1999-01-1288, 1999.

braking the wrong way: A. F. Williams. and J. K. Wells, "Driver Experience with Antilock Brake Systems," Accident a.n.a.lysis & Prevention, Accident a.n.a.lysis & Prevention, vol. 26 (1994), pp. 80711. vol. 26 (1994), pp. 80711.

"close to zero": Charles J. Kahane, "Preliminary Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Antilock Brake Systems for Pa.s.senger Cars," NHTSA Report No. DOT HS 808 206, December 1994.

"has never been explained"): Insurance Inst.i.tute for Highway Safety, Status Report, Status Report, vol. 35, no. 4 (April 15, 2000). vol. 35, no. 4 (April 15, 2000).

guide, it will not: Nick Bunkley, "Electronic Stability Control Could Cut Fatal Highway Crashes by 10,000," New York Times, New York Times, April 6, 2007. One key difference to note with ESC versus ABS is that ESC functions on its own-it does not need to be used "correctly," as in the case of ABS. April 6, 2007. One key difference to note with ESC versus ABS is that ESC functions on its own-it does not need to be used "correctly," as in the case of ABS.

railroad safety improvements: Charles Francis Adams, in his 1879 book Notes on Railroad Accidents, Notes on Railroad Accidents, wrote: "It is a favorite argument with those who oppose the introduction of some of these improvements, or who make excuses for want of them, that their servants are apt to become more careless from the use of them, in consequence of the extra security which they are believed to afford; and it is desirable to consider how much truth there is in this a.s.sertion." As it happens, Adams did not subscribe to this early offset hypothesis: "The risk is proved by experience to be very much greater without them than with them; and, in fact, the negligence and mistakes of servants are found to occur most frequently, and generally with the most serious results, not when the men are over-confident in their appliances or apparatus, but when, in the absence of them, they are habituated to risk in the conduct of the traffic." Interestingly, though, in a pa.s.sage that still applies today, he noted that accidents at grade crossings, then as now, seemed to happen under what would be presumed to be the least likely, or "safest," of conditions: "The full average of accidents of the worst description appear to have occurred under the most ordinary conditions of weather, and usually in the most unantic.i.p.ated way. This is peculiarly true of accidents at highway grade crossings. These commonly occur when the conditions are such as to cause the highway travelers to suppose that, if any danger existed, they could not but be aware of it." From Charles Francis Adams, wrote: "It is a favorite argument with those who oppose the introduction of some of these improvements, or who make excuses for want of them, that their servants are apt to become more careless from the use of them, in consequence of the extra security which they are believed to afford; and it is desirable to consider how much truth there is in this a.s.sertion." As it happens, Adams did not subscribe to this early offset hypothesis: "The risk is proved by experience to be very much greater without them than with them; and, in fact, the negligence and mistakes of servants are found to occur most frequently, and generally with the most serious results, not when the men are over-confident in their appliances or apparatus, but when, in the absence of them, they are habituated to risk in the conduct of the traffic." Interestingly, though, in a pa.s.sage that still applies today, he noted that accidents at grade crossings, then as now, seemed to happen under what would be presumed to be the least likely, or "safest," of conditions: "The full average of accidents of the worst description appear to have occurred under the most ordinary conditions of weather, and usually in the most unantic.i.p.ated way. This is peculiarly true of accidents at highway grade crossings. These commonly occur when the conditions are such as to cause the highway travelers to suppose that, if any danger existed, they could not but be aware of it." From Charles Francis Adams, Notes on Railroad Accidents Notes on Railroad Accidents (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1879). (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1879).

"the highway death rate": Sam Peltzman, "The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation," Journal of Political Economy, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 83, no. 4 (August 1976), pp. 677726. vol. 83, no. 4 (August 1976), pp. 677726.

reason to feel less safe: Decades later, people are still sifting through the data, trying to refute or defend Peltzman's hypothesis. He has been questioned for, among other things, including motorcyclists in his count of nonoccupant fatalities-that is, along with pedestrians and cyclists-as if they were a similar beast. (Annual motorcycle registrations were also growing, it has been argued, and many motorcyclists, in any case, die in single-vehicle crashes, which are presumably not the result of car drivers acting more aggressively.) See, for example, Leon S. Robertson, "A Critical a.n.a.lysis of Peltzman's 'The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation,'" Journal of Economic Issues, Journal of Economic Issues, vol. 2, no. 3 (September 1977), pp. 587600. Others have suggested that people may not have been driving more aggressively but simply vol. 2, no. 3 (September 1977), pp. 587600. Others have suggested that people may not have been driving more aggressively but simply more more-driving more in the newer cars because they felt safer (arguably a form of behavioral adaptation itself). See Robert B. Noland, "Traffic Fatalities and Injuries: Are Reductions the Result of 'Improvements' in Highway Design Standards?," paper submitted to Annual Meeting of the Transportation Research Board, November 10, 2000. A study by a pair of Harvard economists that paid specific attention to how many people were actually using seat belts (again, something that can only be guessed at) found no evidence for a Peltzman effect. The authors did, however, conclude that fatalities had not dropped by nearly as much as government regulators had predicted. See Alma Cohen and Liran Einav, "The Effects of Mandatory Seat Belt Laws on Driving Behavior and Traffic Fatalities," Discussion Paper No. 341, Harvard Law School, November 2001; downloaded on February 12, 2007, from http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/. Peltzman was also criticized for not separating, or "disaggregating," the regulated vehicles from the nonregulated vehicles (to see, for example, if the cars with safety upgrades were overrepresented in fatal pedestrian crashes). This argument was made by Leon Robertson and Barry Pless, "Does Risk Homeostasis Theory Have Implications for Road Safety," British Medical Journal, British Medical Journal, vol. 324 (May 11, 2002), pp. 115152. vol. 324 (May 11, 2002), pp. 115152.

to be riskier drivers: This point is made explicit in the discussion of the fictional Fred earlier in the chapter, but see, too, P. A. Koushki, S. Y. Ali, and O. AlSaleh, "Road Traffic Violations and Seat Belt Use in Kuwait: Study of Driver Behavior in Motion," Transportation Research Record, Transportation Research Record, vol. 1640 (1998), pp. 1722; see also T. B. Dinh-Zarr, D. A. Sleet, R. A. Shults, S. Zaza, R. W. Elder, J. L. Nichols, R. S. Thompson, and D. M. Sosin, "Reviews of Evidence Regarding Interventions to Increase the Use of Safety Belts," vol. 1640 (1998), pp. 1722; see also T. B. Dinh-Zarr, D. A. Sleet, R. A. Shults, S. Zaza, R. W. Elder, J. L. Nichols, R. S. Thompson, and D. M. Sosin, "Reviews of Evidence Regarding Interventions to Increase the Use of Safety Belts," American Journal of Preventive Medicine, American Journal of Preventive Medicine, vol. 21, no. 4, Supp. 1 (2001), pp. 4865, and D. F. Preusser, A. F. Williams, and A. K. Lund, "The Effect of New York's Seat Belt Use Law on Teenage Drivers," vol. 21, no. 4, Supp. 1 (2001), pp. 4865, and D. F. Preusser, A. F. Williams, and A. K. Lund, "The Effect of New York's Seat Belt Use Law on Teenage Drivers," Accident a.n.a.lysis & Prevention, Accident a.n.a.lysis & Prevention, vol. 19 (1987), pp. 7380. vol. 19 (1987), pp. 7380.

not wearing their belts: Evans, Traffic Safety, Traffic Safety, op. cit., p. 89. op. cit., p. 89.

"frequently get into accidents": Russell S. Sobel and Todd M. Nesbit, "Automobile Safety Regulation and the Incentive to Drive Recklessly: Evidence from NASCAR," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Journal, vol. 74, no. 1 (2007). vol. 74, no. 1 (2007).

suits and helmets: This point is made by Stephen J. Dubner and Steven D. Levitt in "How Many Lives Did Dale Earnhardt Save?" New York Times, New York Times, February 19, 2006. They note that if NASCAR drivers had died at the same rate as American drivers in general in a five-year period, fifteen drivers should have died-instead, none did. This raises the interesting point that Earnhardt's death became something of a spur for greater safety on NASCAR racetracks, where no single death in the general population of drivers seems capable of prompting a similar response. February 19, 2006. They note that if NASCAR drivers had died at the same rate as American drivers in general in a five-year period, fifteen drivers should have died-instead, none did. This raises the interesting point that Earnhardt's death became something of a spur for greater safety on NASCAR racetracks, where no single death in the general population of drivers seems capable of prompting a similar response.

fatalities by some 25 percent: A. J. McLean, B. N. Fildes, C. J. Kloeden, K. H. Digges, R. W. G. Anderson, V. M. Moore, and D. A. Simpson, "Prevention of Head Injuries to Car Occupants: An Investigation of Interior Padding Options," Federal Office of Road Safety, Report CR 160, NHMRC Road Accident Research Unit, University of Adelaide and Monash University Accident Research Centre.

seat belts and air bags: Sam Peltzman, "Regulation and the Natural Progress of Opulence," lecture presented at the American Enterprise Inst.i.tute, September 8, 2004, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Washington, D.C.

Simpson has suggested: Joe Simpson, writing about "super-share ice screws" and other technological innovations, notes that "one would have thought these welcome developments would have made the sport considerably safer. Unfortunately climbers now throw themselves onto ice climbs that would have been unheard-of only a decade ago." He then draws a comparison to his car, a "rust bucket of a Mini" that "left you with no illusions as to what a small cube of twisted metal it could instantly become if you hit anything." As a result, he writes, "I drove with a modic.u.m of caution." From The Beckoning Silence The Beckoning Silence (Seattle: Mountaineers Books, 2006), p. 105. (Seattle: Mountaineers Books, 2006), p. 105.

for more "safety": The Mount McKinley information comes from a fascinating study by R. Clark and Dwight R. Lee, "Too Safe to Be Safe: Some Implications of Short- and Long-Run Rescue Laffer Curves," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Journal, vol. 23, no. 2 (Spring 1997), pp. 12737. It is true that many more people were climbing the mountain by the century's end, but it is also true that many more climbers were needing to be rescued. In 1976 alone, the study notes, there were thirty-three rescues, one out of every eighteen climbs-almost as many as the total number prior to 1970. vol. 23, no. 2 (Spring 1997), pp. 12737. It is true that many more people were climbing the mountain by the century's end, but it is also true that many more climbers were needing to be rescued. In 1976 alone, the study notes, there were thirty-three rescues, one out of every eighteen climbs-almost as many as the total number prior to 1970.

no-pull fatality: Vic Napier, Donald Self, and Carolyn Findlay, "Risk Homeostasis: A Case Study of the Adoption of a Safety Innovation on the Level of Perceived Risk," paper submitted to the American Society of Business and Behavioral Sciences meeting, Las Vegas, February 22, 2007.

our willingness for risk: O. Adebisi and G. N. Sama, "Influence of Stopped Delay on Driver Gap Acceptance Behavior," Journal of Transportation Engineering, Journal of Transportation Engineering, vol. 3, no. 115 (1989), pp. 30515. vol. 3, no. 115 (1989), pp. 30515.

fatal crashes goes down: down: Daniel Eisenberg and Kenneth E. Warner, "Effects of Snowfalls on Motor Vehicle Collisions, Injuries, and Fatalities," Daniel Eisenberg and Kenneth E. Warner, "Effects of Snowfalls on Motor Vehicle Collisions, Injuries, and Fatalities," American Journal of Public Health, American Journal of Public Health, vol. 95, no. 1 (January 2005), pp. 12024. vol. 95, no. 1 (January 2005), pp. 12024.

perfect risk "temperature": Robertson and Pless, "Does Risk Homeostasis Theory Have Implications for Road Safety," op. cit.

the lookout for cars: For a Palo Alto report, see Alan Wachtel and Diana Lewiston, "Risk Factors for Bicycle-Motor Vehicle Collisions at Intersections," ITE Journal, ITE Journal, September 1994. See also L. Aultmann-Hall and M. F. Adams. "Sidewalk Bicycling Safety Issues," September 1994. See also L. Aultmann-Hall and M. F. Adams. "Sidewalk Bicycling Safety Issues," Transportation Research Record, Transportation Research Record, no. 1636, 1998, pp. 7176. For a fascinating and in-depth discussion of bicycle risk and safety issues, see Jeffrey A. Hiles, "Listening to Bike Lanes," September 1996; retrieved on November 14, 2006, at no. 1636, 1998, pp. 7176. For a fascinating and in-depth discussion of bicycle risk and safety issues, see Jeffrey A. Hiles, "Listening to Bike Lanes," September 1996; retrieved on November 14, 2006, at http://www.wright.edu/~jeffrey.hiles/essays/listening/contents.htm.

than those without them): See, for example, La.s.se Fridstrom, "The Safety Effect of Studded Tyres in Norwegian Cities," Nordic Road and Transport Research, Nordic Road and Transport Research, no. 1 (2001), as well as Veli-Pekka Kallberg, H. Kanner, T. Makinen, and M. Roine, "Estimation of Effects of Reduced Salting and Decreased Use of Studded Tires on Road Accidents in Winter," no. 1 (2001), as well as Veli-Pekka Kallberg, H. Kanner, T. Makinen, and M. Roine, "Estimation of Effects of Reduced Salting and Decreased Use of Studded Tires on Road Accidents in Winter," Transportation Research Record, Transportation Research Record, vol. 1533 (1995). vol. 1533 (1995).

drivers of larger cars: Paul Wasielewski and Leonard Evans, "Do Drivers of Small Cars Take Less Risk in Everyday Driving?," Risk a.n.a.lysis, Risk a.n.a.lysis, vol. 5, no. 1 (1985), pp. 2532. vol. 5, no. 1 (1985), pp. 2532.

higher speeds and more lanes: D. Walton and J. A. Thomas, "Naturalistic Observations of Driver Hand Positions," Transportation Research Part F: Traffic Psychology and Behavior, Transportation Research Part F: Traffic Psychology and Behavior, vol. 8 (2005), pp. 22938. vol. 8 (2005), pp. 22938.

lower feelings of risk: D. Walton and A. Thomas, "Measuring Perceived Risk: Self-reported and Actual Hand Positions of SUV and Car Drivers," Transportation Research Part F: Traffic Psychology and Behaviour, Transportation Research Part F: Traffic Psychology and Behaviour, vol. 10, issue 3 (May 2007). vol. 10, issue 3 (May 2007).

talking on a cell phone: Lesley Walker, Jonathan Williams, and Konrad Jamrozik, "Unsafe Driving Behaviour and Four Wheel Drive Vehicles: Observational Study," British Medical Journal, British Medical Journal, vol. 333, issue 17558 (July 8, 2006), p. 71. vol. 333, issue 17558 (July 8, 2006), p. 71.

"car in front": Sten Fossser and Peter Christensen, "Car Age and the Risk of Accidents," TOI Report 386, Inst.i.tute of Transport Economics, Norway, 1998.

more than old cars: This was suggested to me in a conversation with Kim Hazelbaker, senior vice president of the Insurance Inst.i.tute for Highway Safety, May 19, 2007.

drive it more often: When I asked Leonard Evans, one of the leading authorities on traffic safety in the United States, what kind of car he drove, his answer made an impression on me. "In terms of a certain mind-set I drive a very unsafe car," he said. "It's about the least expensive, lightest car that my former employer manufactured: the Pontiac Sunfire." It is well over a decade old.

and killed in war: Shaoni Bhattacharya, "Global Suicide Toll Exceeds War and Murder," killed in war: Shaoni Bhattacharya, "Global Suicide Toll Exceeds War and Murder," New Scientist, New Scientist, September 8, 2004. September 8, 2004.

struck by lightning: John Mueller, "A False Sense of Insecurity," Regulation, Regulation, vol. 27, no. 3 (Fall 2004), pp. 4246. vol. 27, no. 3 (Fall 2004), pp. 4246.

stricter cell phone laws): Frank McKenna, a professor of psychology at the University of Reading, points out that people have commonly resisted previous traffic and other health safety measures, ranging from wearing seat belts to restricting workplace smoking, on the grounds that they impinge upon "freedoms." There is also, in public policy, a tendency to avoid legislating behaviors that do not violate John Stuart Mill's "harm principle"-that is, this thinking maintains that laws should be pa.s.sed only to "prevent harm to others," not for the "physical or moral" good of any individual. As McKenna argues, even though drunk driving and not wearing seat belts were once considered legitimate behavior, the social costs of these behaviors, as with workplace smoking, were eventually recognized. This raises the question, however, of why speeding, which can cause "harm to others," is so widely tolerated. It may be that, as has been argued in this book, people are often simply not aware of their speed, or of the potential risks they are a.s.suming in driving at a high speed. This may help contribute to a perceived lack of "legitimacy" on the part of authorities in trying to mount stricter enforcement campaigns. Police are faced with a well-known quandary: Be too lenient in enforcing strict speed limits, and drivers' speeds will creep up; be too strict, and "they risk strain on public acceptability." McKenna concludes that the current public acceptance of regularly driving above speed limits may at some point look as retrograde as workplace smoking: "It is noted that the perceived legitimacy of action can change considerably over time and interventions that would not be perceived as legitimate at one point in time may be considered uncontroversial at a later point in time." See Frank P. McKenna, "The Perceived Legitimacy of Intervention: A Key Feature for Road Safety," AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety, 2007.

drive rather than fly: "Consequences for Road Traffic Fatalities of the Reduction in Flying Following September 11, 2001," Michael Sivak and Michael Flannagan, Transportation Research Part F: Traffic Psychology and Behavior, Transportation Research Part F: Traffic Psychology and Behavior, vol. 7, nos. 45 (JulySeptember 2004), pp. 30105. vol. 7, nos. 45 (JulySeptember 2004), pp. 30105.

a.s.signed to counterterrorism: Carl Ingram, "CHP May Get to Hire 270 Officers," Los Angeles Times, Los Angeles Times, June 2, 2004, p. B1. In the article, one police officer points out that Timothy McVeigh was caught on a "routine traffic stop." Eerily enough, Mohammed Atta, the ringleader of the September 11 partic.i.p.ants, was ticketed once for speeding and once for driving without a license; the license he finally got was suspended when he failed to appear in court. June 2, 2004, p. B1. In the article, one police officer points out that Timothy McVeigh was caught on a "routine traffic stop." Eerily enough, Mohammed Atta, the ringleader of the September 11 partic.i.p.ants, was ticketed once for speeding and once for driving without a license; the license he finally got was suspended when he failed to appear in court.

raising speed limits: Elihu D. Richter, Lee S. Friedman, Tamar Berman, and Avraham Rivkind, "Death and Injury from Motor Vehicle Crashes: A Tale of Two Countries," American Journal of Preventative Medicine, American Journal of Preventative Medicine, vol. 29, no. 5 (2005), pp. 44050. The authors implicate several other differences, including the steep rise in ownership of SUVs and other light trucks in the United States in the 1990s, as well as higher rates of driving under the influence of alcohol. vol. 29, no. 5 (2005), pp. 44050. The authors implicate several other differences, including the steep rise in ownership of SUVs and other light trucks in the United States in the 1990s, as well as higher rates of driving under the influence of alcohol.

would have been killed: This point was raised in a letter by Leonard Evans in response to the previous article. American Journal of Preventative Medicine, American Journal of Preventative Medicine, vol. 30, no. 6 (2006), p. 532. vol. 30, no. 6 (2006), p. 532.

"psychophysical numbing": D. Fetherstonhaugh, P. Slovic, S. Johnson, and J. Friedrich, "Insensitivity to the Value of Human Life: A Study of Psychophysical Numbing," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, vol. 14, no. 3 (1997), pp. 282300. vol. 14, no. 3 (1997), pp. 282300.

of a terrible disease: Karen E. Jenni and George Lowenstein, "Explaining the 'Identifiable Victim Effect,'" Journal of Risk Uncertainty, Journal of Risk Uncertainty, vol. 14 (1997), pp. 23537. vol. 14 (1997), pp. 23537.

only one one more child: Paul Slovic, "If I Look at the Ma.s.s I Will Never Act: Psychic Numbing and Genocide," more child: Paul Slovic, "If I Look at the Ma.s.s I Will Never Act: Psychic Numbing and Genocide," Judgement and Decision Making, Judgement and Decision Making, vol. 2, no. 2 (April 2007), pp. 117. vol. 2, no. 2 (April 2007), pp. 117.

all who died: One exception to this is found at streetsblog.org, which has tracked fatalities and crashes in the New York metropolitan area.

"dread" and "novelty": B. Fischhoff, P. Slovic, S. Lichtenstein, S. Read, and B. Combs, "How Safe Is Safe Enough? A Psychometric Study of Att.i.tudes Towards Technological Risks and Benefits," Policy Sciences, Policy Sciences, vol. 9 (1978), pp. 12752. vol. 9 (1978), pp. 12752.

(like nuclear power): In New York City, an undercurrent of public opinion says that bicycles are "dangerous." Neighborhoods have fought against the addition of bike lanes for this very reason. Yet one could count the number of people killed by bicycles in New York City each year on one hand, with a few fingers left over, while many times that number of people are killed or severely injured by cars. When I met with Ryan Russo, an engineer with the New York City Department of Transportation, I could not help but hear the echo of several of the reasons why we misperceive risk. "It's silent and it's rare," he told me, when I asked about New Yorkers' antipathy toward cyclists. "As opposed to cars, which make noise and are prevalent. You don't see it because it's smaller, you don't hear it approach because it's silent, and you don't expect it because it's not prevalent." A close call with a cyclist, no matter how less dangerous statistically, stands out as the greater risk than a close call with a car, even though-or in fact precisely because because-pedestrians are constantly having near-hazardous encounters with turning cars in crosswalks.

seem to be misperceived: A cla.s.sic case, pointed out by Leonard Evans, is the specter of "vehicle recalls." Every month or so, the news announces that some particular model of car has a potential defect. These recalls haunt us, raising our hackles with a constant stream of exploding tires and potentially faulty brakes. The c.u.mulative result of this, Evans suggested, is that we may come to feel that the greatest threat to a driver's safety is the improper functioning of his or her vehicle. "They will say on the news there are 'no injuries reported,'" Evans said. We may feel relieved; the system works. "But the previous night there might have been a thousand people injured in crashes. And we're told it's the recall recall that is important." that is important."

those killed by lightning): An a.n.a.lysis by AAA found 10,037 incidents of "violent and aggressive driving" between January 1, 1990, and August 31, 1996, that led to the deaths of 218 people. An estimated 37 percent of those cases involved a firearm. Cited by David K. Willis of AAA in Road Rage: Causes and Dangers of Aggressive Driving; Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Surface Interpretation of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Road Rage: Causes and Dangers of Aggressive Driving; Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Surface Interpretation of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, 105th Congress, 1st Session, 1997. As Michael Fumento has pointed out, in the same time span that these 218 "aggressive driving" deaths were registered, some 290,000 people were killed on the road. See Fumento, "'Road Rage' vs. Reality," 105th Congress, 1st Session, 1997. As Michael Fumento has pointed out, in the same time span that these 218 "aggressive driving" deaths were registered, some 290,000 people were killed on the road. See Fumento, "'Road Rage' vs. Reality," Atlantic Monthly, Atlantic Monthly, August 1998. August 1998.

than pistol-packing drivers: Traces of the sleeping pill Ambien, not taken as prescribed, have been showing up in the bloodstreams of drivers involved in crashes. See Stephanie Saul, "Some Sleeping Pill Users Range Far Beyond Bed," New York Times, New York Times, March 8, 2006. But many other drugs of the kind that typically warn users not to "operate heavy machinery" while taking them also show up in the bodies of drivers (who apparently forget that cars are heavy machinery); for example, dextromethorphan, a synthetic a.n.a.logue of codeine that appears frequently in over-the-counter medicines. See Amy Cochems, Patrick Harding, and Laura Liddicoat, "Dextromethorphan in Wisconsin Drivers," March 8, 2006. But many other drugs of the kind that typically warn users not to "operate heavy machinery" while taking them also show up in the bodies of drivers (who apparently forget that cars are heavy machinery); for example, dextromethorphan, a synthetic a.n.a.logue of codeine that appears frequently in over-the-counter medicines. See Amy Cochems, Patrick Harding, and Laura Liddicoat, "Dextromethorphan in Wisconsin Drivers," Journal of a.n.a.lytical Toxicology, Journal of a.n.a.lytical Toxicology, vol. 31, no. 4 (May 2007), pp. 22732. vol. 31, no. 4 (May 2007), pp. 22732.

if they pick the numbers: This phenomenon was described by psychologist Ellen Langer, who called it the "illusion of control." See E. J. Langer, "The Illusion of Control," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, vol. 32, no. 2 (1975), pp. 31128. vol. 32, no. 2 (1975), pp. 31128.

real dangers cars present: Consider, for example, the fact that, in the United States at least, hardly any children walk to school anymore-the figure has dropped from 48 percent in 1969 to under 15 percent in 2001. One perceived reason is "stranger danger." But abductions, by strangers or family members, the U.S. Department of Justice has noted, make up only 2 percent of violent crimes against juveniles. Riding in the family car, and not "stranger danger," is the greatest risk to people aged four to thirty-seven in the United States (and many other places). The car is actually a risk before it even leaves the driveway. In 2007, more than two hundred children were killed in the United States in "nontraffic fatalities," a grim category that includes everything from "backover" incidents (typically in "safe" SUVs) to the hyperthermia of children unintentionally left in cars. For abduction statistics, see D. Finklehor and R. Ormrod, "Kidnapping of Juveniles: Patterns from NIBRS," Juvenile Justice Bulletin, Juvenile Justice Bulletin, June 2000. Children's walk-to-school rates come from Reid Ewing, Christopher V. Forinash, and William Schroeer, "Neighborhood Schools and Sidewalk Connections: What Are the Impacts on Travel Mode Choice and Vehicle Emissions?," June 2000. Children's walk-to-school rates come from Reid Ewing, Christopher V. Forinash, and William Schroeer, "Neighborhood Schools and Sidewalk Connections: What Are the Impacts on Travel Mode Choice and Vehicle Emissions?," TR News, TR News, vol. 237 (MarchApril 2005). School bus fatality risks are taken from Ann M. Dellinger and Laurie Beck, "How Risky Is the Commute to School," vol. 237 (MarchApril 2005). School bus fatality risks are taken from Ann M. Dellinger and Laurie Beck, "How Risky Is the Commute to School," TR News, TR News, vol. 237 (MarchApril 2005). vol. 237 (MarchApril 2005).

more dangerous it is: This information comes from a study by William Lucy, a University of Virginia professor of urban planning. His findings are based on two key mortality indices: chance of being killed by a stranger and risk of being killed in traffic. See Lucy, "Mortality Risk a.s.sociated with Leaving Home: Recognizing the Relevance of the Built Environment," American Journal of Public Health, American Journal of Public Health, vol. 93, no. 9 (September 2003), pp. 156469. vol. 93, no. 9 (September 2003), pp. 156469.

(roughly 22 miles per hour): In 2006, there were 14 traffic fatalities recorded in Bermuda, though that number was set to rise to 20 in 2007. See Tim Smith, "Call for Greater Police Presence to Tackle Road Deaths 'Epidemic,'" Royal Gazette, Royal Gazette, November 24, 2007. This is actually quite a high number for a country with a population of some 66,000 (not including the many tourists who visit). Typically, however, 80 percent of these fatalities involve the riders or pa.s.sengers of motorbikes, and a high percentage of those involve tourists who are either unfamiliar with the roads (or the bikes) or presumably have been drinking. Tourists in Bermuda are estimated to be almost six times at risk for being injured on a motorbike than are local residents. See M. Carey, M. Aitken, "Motorbike Injuries in Bermuda: A Risk for Tourists," November 24, 2007. This is actually quite a high number for a country with a population of some 66,000 (not including the many tourists who visit). Typically, however, 80 percent of these fatalities involve the riders or pa.s.sengers of motorbikes, and a high percentage of those involve tourists who are either unfamiliar with the roads (or the bikes) or presumably have been drinking. Tourists in Bermuda are estimated to be almost six times at risk for being injured on a motorbike than are local residents. See M. Carey, M. Aitken, "Motorbike Injuries in Bermuda: A Risk for Tourists," Annals of Emergency Medicine, Annals of Emergency Medicine, vol. 28, Issue 4, pp. 42429. Other studies have shown tourists to be overrepresented in car crashes. See C. Sanford, "Urban Medicine: Threats to Health of Travelers to Developing World Cities," vol. 28, Issue 4, pp. 42429. Other studies have shown tourists to be overrepresented in car crashes. See C. Sanford, "Urban Medicine: Threats to Health of Travelers to Developing World Cities," Journal of Travel Medicine, Journal of Travel Medicine, vol. 11, no. 5 (2004), pp. 31327. John Adams brought up the Bermuda example in his book vol. 11, no. 5 (2004), pp. 31327. John Adams brought up the Bermuda example in his book Risk and Freedom: The Record of Road Safety Risk and Freedom: The Record of Road Safety (Cardiff: Transport Publishing Projects, 1985), p. 2. He quotes, in turn, Herman Kahn, (Cardiff: Transport Publishing Projects, 1985), p. 2. He quotes, in turn, Herman Kahn, The Next 200 Years The Next 200 Years (New York: William Morrow, 1976), p. 168. (New York: William Morrow, 1976), p. 168.

cars and cyclists: Based on a conversation with city manager Judie Zimomra and police department records specialist Bob Conklin. Zimomra noted that there were traffic fatalities in the 1990s, but subsequent enforcement and engineering efforts have proven successful. The lesson: Speed is important, but hardly the only issue.

lowers crash risks: C. N. Kloeden, A. J. McClean, and G. Glonek, "Rea.n.a.lysis of Travelling Speed and Risk of Crash Involvement in Adelaide, South Australia," Australian Transport Safety Bureau Report CR 207, April 2002.

Adams calls "hypermobility": See John Adams, "Hypermobility: Too Much of a Good Thing?," Royal Society for the Arts Lecture, November 21, 2001. Retrieved at http://www.geog.ucl.ac.uk/~jadams/publish.htm.

roughly half the crashes: See Cherian Varghese and Umesh Shankar, "Restraint Use Patterns Among Fatally Injured Pa.s.senger Vehicle Occupants," DOT HS 810 595, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, May 2006.

slow level of 35 miles per hour: From a report prepared by Michael Paine, based on data taken from the U.S. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration from 1993 to 1997; retrieved from http://users.tpg.au/users/mpaine/speed/html.

(among other things): An observational study of a random sample of drivers in New York City found that those talking on a hands-free device were more likely to engage in other distracting activities (e.g., smoking, eating, grooming) than those speaking on a handheld cell phone. As the researchers observed, the drivers "may be trading one automobile-related risk for another." See "Driving Distractions in New York City," Hunter College, November 2007.

Epilogue: Driving Lessons to pa.s.s the front: For an excellent discussion of the physics of oversteering and understeering, as well as driving in general, see Barry Parker, The Isaac Newton School of Driving: Physics and Your Car The Isaac Newton School of Driving: Physics and Your Car (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003). (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003).

to maintain our course?: W. O. Readinger, A. Chatziastros, D. W. Cunningham, J. E. Cutting, and H. H. Bulthoff, "Gaze-Direction Effects on Drivers' Abilities to Steer a Straight Course," TWK Beitrage zur 4. Tubinger Wahrnehmungskonferenz, TWK Beitrage zur 4. Tubinger Wahrnehmungskonferenz, ed. H. H. Bulthoff, K. R. Gegenfurtner, H. A. Mallot, R. Ulrich. Knirsch, Kirchentellinsfurt, 149 (2001). Available at ed. H. H. Bulthoff, K. R. Gegenfurtner, H. A. Mallot, R. Ulrich. Knirsch, Kirchentellinsfurt, 149 (2001). Available at http://www.kyb.mpg.de/publication.htm?publ=67.

"doing so at all": See W. O. Readinger, A. Chatziastros, D. W. Cunningham, H. H. Bulthoff, and J. E. Cutting, "Gaze-Eccentricity Effects on Road Position and Steering," Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, vol. 8, no. 4 (2002), pp. 24758. vol. 8, no. 4 (2002), pp. 24758.

"might be your English teacher": Actually, the traditional model of high school driver's ed-usually cla.s.sroom instruction plus on-road time-has been largely discredited. The reasons have less to do with the worth or validity of learning the rules of the road than with the fact that such programs, rather than helping to produce safer drivers, just seem to put more unsafe drivers on the road at a younger age. A number of studies have come to this conclusion, but see, in particular, J. Vernick, G. Li, S. Ogaitis, E. MacKenzie, S. Baker, and A. Gielen, "Effects of High School Driver Education on Motor Vehicle Crashes, Violations, and Licensure," American Journal of Preventive Medicine, American Journal of Preventive Medicine, vol. 16, no. 1 (1999), pp. 4046; M. F. Smith, "Research Agenda for an Improved Novice Driver Education Program: Report to Congress, May 31, 1994," DOT HS 808 161, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, retrieved from vol. 16, no. 1 (1999), pp. 4046; M. F. Smith, "Research Agenda for an Improved Novice Driver Education Program: Report to Congress, May 31, 1994," DOT HS 808 161, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, retrieved from www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/injury/research/pub/drive-ed.pdf; and I. Roberts and L. Kwan, "School Based Driver Education for the Prevention of Traffic Crashes," Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews, Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews, no. 2 (2006). no. 2 (2006).

skills needed to drive: Thanks to Leonard Evans for this reference.

stock-car drivers: A. F. Williams and B. O'Neill, "On-the-Road Driving Records of Licensed Race Drivers," Accident a.n.a.lysis & Prevention, Accident a.n.a.lysis & Prevention, vol. 6 (1974), pp. 26370. vol. 6 (1974), pp. 26370.

"not going fast enough": Thanks to Leonard Evans for Andretti Quote.

to go next: Vision researchers studied the eye and head movements of Formula 3 racer Tomas Scheckter as he drove on the Mallory Park circuit in Leceistershire, England. They suggested that Scheckter, because he had learned the layout of the track, actually moved his head in the direction in which he wanted to go before he adjusted his steering. See Michael F. Land and Benjamin W. Tatler, "Steering with the Head: The Visual Strategy of a Racing Driver," Current Biology, Current Biology, vol. 11 (2001), pp. 121520. vol. 11 (2001), pp. 121520.

to avoid a crash: For an excellent summary of the research, see Lisa D. Adams, "Review of the Literature on Obstacle Avoidance Maneuvers: Braking Versus steering," Report No. UMTRI-94-19, University of Michigan Transportation Research Inst.i.tute, Ann Arbor, August 1994.

the only thing to do: Jeffrey Muttart raises the idea of "operant conditioning" in "Factors That Influence Drivers' Response Choice Decisions in Video Recorded Crashes," Society of Automotive Engineers Journal, Society of Automotive Engineers Journal, 2005. 2005.

to their full power: See Rodger J. Koppa and Gordon G. Hayes, "Driver Inputs During Emergency or Extreme Vehicle Maneuvers," Human Factors, Human Factors, vol. 18, no. 4 (1976), pp. 36170. vol. 18, no. 4 (1976), pp. 36170.

the obstacle is moving: D. Fleury, F. Fernandez, C. Lepesant, and D. Lechner, "a.n.a.lyse typologique des manoeuvres d'urgence en intersection," Rapport de recherche INRETS, Rapport de recherche INRETS, no. 62 (1988), quoted in Lisa D. Adams, 1994. no. 62 (1988), quoted in Lisa D. Adams, 1994.

to the point where we do nothing: Michael A. Dilich, Dror Kopernik, and John M. Goebelbecker, "Evaluating Driver Response to a Sudden Emergency: Issues of Expectancy, Emotional Arousal, and Uncertainty," Safety Brief, Safety Brief, vol. 20, no. 4 (June 2002). A frequent occurrence in driving simulator studies that seek to evaluate how drivers respond to unexpected obstacles or hazards is that a small number of subjects often have "no response." A French study, for example, in which drivers on a test track had to react to an inflatable "dummy car," found that 4 percent of subjects did nothing, simply "freezing." See Christian Collett, Claire Pet.i.t, Alain Priez, and Andre Dittmar, "Stroop Color-Word Test, Arousal, Electrodermal Activity and Performance in a Critical Driving Situation," vol. 20, no. 4 (June 2002). A frequent occurrence in driving simulator studies that seek to evaluate how drivers respond to unexpected obstacles or hazards is that a small number of subjects often have "no response." A French study, for example, in which drivers on a test track had to react to an inflatable "dummy car," found that 4 percent of subjects did nothing, simply "freezing." See Christian Collett, Claire Pet.i.t, Alain Priez, and Andre Dittmar, "Stroop Color-Word Test, Arousal, Electrodermal Activity and Performance in a Critical Driving Situation," Biological Psychology, Biological Psychology, vol. 69 (2005), pp. 195203. vol. 69 (2005), pp. 195203.

car was going to do: D. Lechner and G. Maleterre, "Emergency Maneuver Experimentation Using a Driving Simulator," Society of Automotive Engineers Technical Paper No. 910016, 1991; referenced in Dilich, Kopernik and Goebelbecker, op. cit.

"living room on wheels": Micheline Maynard, "At Chrysler, Home Depot Still Lingers," New York Times, New York Times, October 30, 2007. October 30, 2007.

warnings he or she might disregard: See, for example, M. P. Manser, N. J. Ward, N. Kuge, and E. R. Boer, "Influence of a Driver Support System on Situation Awareness and Information Processing in Response to Lead Vehicle Braking," Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Forty-eighth Annual Meeting Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Forty-eighth Annual Meeting (New Orleans, Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, 2004), pp. 235963, and "Crash Warning System Interfaces," DOT HS 810 697, January 2007. (New Orleans, Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, 2004), pp. 235963, and "Crash Warning System Interfaces," DOT HS 810 697, January 2007.

be able to react accordingly: This is one of the problems that plague automation. Barry Kantowitz at the University of Michigan notes that automation "works fine up to a certain point, and then it fails utterly and completely." He uses the example of a plane crash in which the autopilot, in attempting to correct for an imbalance in fuel, tipped the plane to the point where the autopilot couldn't control it any longer. "So essentially it did the equivalent of ringing a bell and telling the pilot, 'Okay, you take over now,'" he says. "You have a pilot who's unaware there's a problem. He's 'out of the loop.' He has to very quickly figure out what the h.e.l.l happened." But when people fail, they have what he calls a "graceful degradation. They fail slowly instead of abruptly. They can cope with it a little better." Design theorist Donald Norman gives a driving example in his book The Design of Future Things: The Design of Future Things: A friend was driving with adaptive cruise control. This is the device that measures the distance away in time, in speed, of the vehicle in front, and keeps the car automatically at a safe distance. But, Norman notes, his friend suddenly moved to exit the freeway, forgetting the ACC was on. The car, thinking it suddenly had clear road ahead, chose to accelerate at the very moment it should have been decelerating. Automation is supposed to relieve the driver of having to pay attention, but in this case, if the driver hadn't been paying attention there would have likely been a severe crash. Norman argues that while full automation would be safer than human manual driving, the "difficulty lies in the transition towards full automation, when different vehicles will have different capabilities, when only some things will be automated, and when even the automation that is installed will be limited in capability." See Donald Norman, A friend was driving with adaptive cruise control. This is the device that measures the distance away in time, in speed, of the vehicle in front, and keeps the car automatically at a safe distance. But, Norman notes, his friend suddenly moved to exit the freeway, forgetting the ACC was on. The car, thinking it suddenly had clear road ahead, chose to accelerate at the very moment it should have been decelerating. Automation is supposed to relieve the driver of having to pay attention, but in this case, if the driver hadn't been paying attention there would have likely been a severe crash. Norman argues that while full automation would be safer than human manual driving, the "difficulty lies in the transition towards full automation, when different vehicles will have different capabilities, when only some things will be automated, and when even the automation that is installed will be limited in capability." See Donald Norman, The Design of Future Things The Design of Future Things (New York: Basic Books, 2007), p. 116. (New York: Basic Books, 2007), p. 116.

memory playing tricks): A group of psychologists at the University of Nottingham showed subjects a series of eight-second film clips of "dangerous" and "safer" situations that had been digitally manipulated to play at a range of faster or slower speeds (but always for eight seconds). Subjects were more likely to have judged the "dangerous" films as having been sped up. "If real dangerous events are remembered as if time slowed down," the authors write, "this will create an expectation that videos of such events should run slowly.... Becausethe actual speed of the video does not slow down, viewers will judge films of dangerous events as having been sped up." See Peter Chapman, Georgina c.o.x, and Clara Kirwan, "Distortion of Drivers' Speed and Time Estimates in Dangerous Situations," in Behavioral Research in Road Safety Behavioral Research in Road Safety (London: Transport for London, 2005), pp. 16474. (London: Transport for London, 2005), pp. 16474.

A Note About the Author

Tom Vanderbilt writes on design, technology, science, and culture, among other subjects, for many publications, including Wired, Slate, Wired, Slate, the the London Review of Books, Gourmet, London Review of Books, Gourmet, the the Wall Street Journal, Artforum, Travel & Leisure, Rolling Stone, Wall Street Journal, Artforum, Travel & Leisure, Rolling Stone, the the New York Times Magazine, Cabinet, Metropolis, New York Times Magazine, Cabinet, Metropolis, and and Popular Science. Popular Science. He is contributing editor to the award-winning design magazines He is contributing editor to the award-winning design magazines I.D. I.D. and and Print, Print, and contributing writer for the popular blog Design Observer. He lives in Brooklyn with his wife and drives a 2001 Volvo V40. and contributing writer for the popular blog Design Observer. He lives in Brooklyn with his wife and drives a 2001 Volvo V40.

ALSO BY TOM VANDERBILT.

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