The Writings of Samuel Adams Volume II Part 15

IN the Ma.s.sachusetts-Gazette of the 9th instant, Chronus attempts to prove that "the Parliament's laying duties upon trade, for the express purpose of raising a revenue, is not repugnant to and subversive of our const.i.tution." In defence of this proposition, he proceeds to consider the nation as commercial, and from thence to show the necessity of laws for the regulation of trade. - In the nation he includes Great-Britain and all the Colonies, and infers that these acts for the regulation of trade, "should extend to all the British dominions, to prevent one part of the national body from injuring another." And, says he, "If laws for the regulation of trade are necessary, who so proper to enact them, &c. as the British parliament, or to dispose of the fines & forfeitures arising from the breach of such acts?" And then he tells us, that as a number of preventive officers will hereupon become necessary, the parliament have thought proper to a.s.sign to his Majesty's revenue "the profits arising on the duties of importation for the payment of those officers ". This is Chronus's "method of reasoning ", to prove that because it is necessary that the parliament should enact laws for the regulation of trade, about which there has as yet been no dispute that I know of, and because it is proper that such preventive officers as shall be found needful to carry those laws into execution, should be paid out of the fines and forfeitures arising from the breach of them, Therefore, the parliament hath a right to make laws imposing duties or taxes, for the express purpose of raising a revenue in the colonies without their consent; and that this is not (as is alledg'd by our Patriots ") "repugnant to or subversive of our const.i.tution ".

Every one may easily see how Chronus evades the matter in dispute, and aims at amusing his readers according to his usual manner, by endeavouring, and that without a shadow of argument, to prove one point, instead of another which is quite distinct from it, and which he ought to prove, but cannot. He is indeed sensible that his artifice is seen through; that it will be urged that "he has evaded the chief difficulties," and that "the objection doth not lie against the regulation of trade, but against the imposing duties for the express purpose of raising a revenue." And he is full ready to remove this objection. But how? Why, by asking a question, which he often subst.i.tutes in the room of argument. Are we not, says he, "fellow-subjects with our brethren at home, and consequently bound to bear a part according to our ability, in supporting the honor & dignity of the crown?" It is allow'd that we are the subjects of the same prince with our brethren at home, and are in duty bound, as far as we are able, to support the honor and dignity of our Sovereign, while he affords us his protection.

But does Chronus from thence infer an obligation on us to yield obedience to the acts of the British parliament imposing taxes upon us with the express intention of raising a revenue, to be appropriated for such purposes as that legislative thinks proper, without our consent? 0, says he, "there is good reason for this."

What is the good reason? Why "if we will not consent to do anything ourselves ", "our money will be taken from us without our consent." This is conclusive argument indeed. And then he, as it were, imperceptibly glides into that which has ever appeared to be his favorite topick, however impertinent to the present point, viz, an independent support for the governor. He boldly affirms, what is a notorious untruth, that "we are unwilling to pay his Majesty's subst.i.tute in such a manner as should leave him that freedom and independency which is necessary to his station, and with which he is vested by the const.i.tution:" And therefore the parliament hath a right to enable his Majesty to pay his subst.i.tute, out of a revenue extorted from us against our consent.

If his premises were well grounded, his conclusion would not follow: And the question would still remain, to which Chronus has not attempted to give any rational answer, namely, By what authority doth the parliament these things, and who gave them this authority? Thus we still continue to dispute the authority of the parliament to lay duties and taxes upon us, with the express purpose of raising a revenue, as "repugnant to, and subversive of our const.i.tution;" and for a reason which I dare say Chronus will never get over, namely, because as he himself allows," we are not represented in it." -

The English const.i.tution, says Baron Montesquieu, has Liberty for its direct object: And the const.i.tution of this province, as our own historian,1 informs us, is an epitome of the British const.i.tution; and it undoubtedly has the same end for its object: Whatever laws therefore are made for our government, either in a manner, or for purposes subversive of Liberty, must be subversive of the end of the const.i.tution, and consequently of the const.i.tution itself. - No free people, as the Pennsylvania Farmer has observed, ever existed, or ever can exist without, to use a common but strong expression, keeping the purse-strings in their hands: But the parliament's laying taxes on the Colonies for the express purpose of raising a revenue, takes the purse strings out of their hands, and consequently it is "repugnant to, and subversive of (the end of) our const.i.tution "-Liberty. Mr. Locke says, that the security of property is the end for which men enter into society; and I believe Chronus will not deny it: Whatever laws therefore are made in any society, tending to render property insecure, must be subversive of the end for which men prefer society to the state of nature; and consequently must be subversive of society itself:

But the parliament in which the Colonies have no voice, taking as much of their money as it pleases, and appropriating it to such purposes as it pleases, even against their consent, and as they think repugnant to their safety, renders all their property precarious, and therefore it is subversive of the end for which men enter into society and repugnant to every free const.i.tution. - Mr. Hooker in his ecclesiastical polity, as quoted by Mr. Locke, affirms that "Laws they are not, which the public approbation hath not made so." This seems to be the language of nature and common sense; for if the public are bound to yield obedience to the laws, to which they cannot give their approbation, they are slaves to those who make such laws and enforce them: But the acts of parliament imposing duties, with the express purpose of raising a revenue in the colonies, have received every mark of the public disapprobation in every colony; and yet they are enforced in all, and in some with the utmost rigour. The British const.i.tution having liberty for its object, is so framed, as that every man who is to be bound by any law about to be made, may be present by his representative in parliament, who may employ the whole force of his objections against it, if he cannot approve of it: If after fair debate, it is approv'd of by the majority of the whole representative body of the nation, the minority, by a rule essential in society, and without which it could not subsist, is bound to submit to it: But the colonies had no voice in parliament when the revenue acts were made; nay, though they had no representatives there, their pet.i.tions were rejected, because they were against duties to be laid on; and they have been called factious, for the objections they made, not only against their being taxed without their consent, which was a sufficient objection, but against the appropriation of the money when rais'd to purposes which as the Farmer has made to appear, will supersede the authority in our respective a.s.semblies, which is most essential to liberty.

Representation and Legislation, as well as taxation, are inseparable, according to the spirit of our const.i.tution; and of all others that are free. Human foresight is incapable of providing against every accident. A small part of the nation may be "at sea, as Chronus tells us, when writs are issued out for the election of members of parliament"; and to admit that they, after their return "should be exempt from any acts of parliament, the members of which were chosen in their absence ", would be attended with greater evil to the community, the safety and welfare of which is the end of all legislation, than the misfortune of their voluntary absence, if it should prove one, could be to them. I say, if it should prove a misfortune to them; for those acts being made by the consent of representatives chosen by all the rest of the nation, it is presum'd they are calculated for the good of the whole, of which they, as a part, must necessarily partake: But the supposed case of these persons is far different from that of the colonists; who are, not by a voluntary choice of their own, but through necessity, not by mere accident, but by means of the local distance of their constant residence, excluded from being present by representation in the British legislature. Chronus allows that by means of their distance, "they are become incapable of exercising their original right of choosing representatives for the British parliament." If so, they cannot without subversion of the end of the British const.i.tution, be bound to obedience, against their own consent, to such laws as are there made; especially such laws as tend to render precarious their property, the security of which is the end of men's entering into society. If they are thus bound, they are slaves and not free men: But slavery must certainly be "repugnant to the const.i.tution" which has liberty for its direct object. If the supreme legislative of Great Britain, cannot consistently with the British const.i.tution or the essential liberty of the colonies, make laws binding upon them, and Chronus for ought I can see, has not attempted to make it rationally appear that it can, it is dangerous for the colonies to admit any of its laws. For however upright some may think the present parliament to be, in intention, they may ruin us through mistake arising from an incurable ignorance of our circ.u.mstances; and though Chronus may be so singular as to judge the present revenue acts of parliament binding upon the colonies, to be salutary, the time may perhaps come, when even he may be convinced, that future ones may be oppressive and tyrannical, not only in their execution, but in the very intention of those that may make them.

Chronus says, that "he has all along taken it for granted, that the kingdom and the colonies are one dominion." If so he must allow the colonies to take it for granted that they have an equal share with the inhabitants of Britain in the rights belonging to this one dominion, and particularly in the cardinal right of being represented in the supreme legislature. But that right, he says, they are "incapable of exercising," by reason of their distance.

We all agree in this, and it is not their fault? Why then should they not have the right of legislating for themselves, as well as that other part of this one dominion? Why truly, we have "a right of choosing an a.s.sembly, which with the concurrence of his Majesty's Governor, hath a power of enacting local statutes, establishing taxes, &c. - Yet still in subordination to the general laws of the empire, reserving the full right of supremacy & dominion, which are in themselves unalienable." If I understand his meaning in this dark expression, it is this, we have a right of choosing an a.s.sembly, but this a.s.sembly is controulable in all its acts, by another a.s.sembly which we have no right to choose, and which has this right of controul in itself unalienable. But the question still recurs, How came this right to be in the British parliament? Chronus says that "admitting that we are all one dominion, there is, and must be, a supreme, irresistible, absolute, uncontrouled authority, in which must reside the power of making and establishing laws," "and all others must conform to it, and be govern'd by it". But if we are all one dominion; or if I understand him, the members of one state, tho' so remotely situated, the kingdom from the Colonies, as that we cannot all partake of the rights of the supreme Legislature, why may not this "irresistible, absolute, uncontrouled," and controuling "authority, in which the jura summi imperii, or the rights of the government reside", be established in America, or in Ireland, as well as in Britain. Is there any thing in nature, or has Ireland or America consented that the part of this one dominion called Britain shall be thus distinguished? Or are we to infer her authority from her power? But it must be, and Chronus gives us no other reason for it than his bare affirmation, that "the King, Lords and Commons of Great-Britain form the supreme Legislature of the British dominions". And he adds, "to say that each of the Colonies had within itself a supreme independent Legislature, and that nevertheless the kingdom and the Colonies are all one dominion, is a solecism:" Let him then view the Kingdom and the Colonies in another light, and see whether there will be a solecism in considering them as more dominions than one, or separate states.

It is certainly more concordant with the great law of nature and reason, which the most powerful nation may not violate and cannot alter, to suppose that the Colonies are separate independent and free, than to suppose that they must be one with Great-Britain and slaves. And slaves they must be, notwithstanding all which Chronus has said to the contrary, if Great Britain may make all laws whatsoever binding upon them, especially laws to take from them what portions of their property she pleases, without and against their consent.

I shall make further remarks upon Chronus, when I shall be at leisure.

CANDIDUS.

1 Mr. Hutchinson.

ARTICLE SIGNED "CANDIDUS."

[Boston Gazette, January 27, 1772; a complete draft of this article is in the Samuel Adams Papers, Lenox Library.]

Messieurs EDES & GILL,

I have observed from Baron Montesquieu, that the British const.i.tution has liberty for its direct object and that the const.i.tution of this province, according to Mr. Hutchinson, is an epitome of the British const.i.tution: That the right of representation in the body that legislates, is essential to the British const.i.tution, without which there cannot be liberty; and Chronus himself acknowledges, that the Americans are "incapable of exercising this right": Let him draw what conclusion he pleases.

All I insist upon is, that the conclusion cannot be just, that "the parliament's laying duties upon trade with the express purpose of raising a revenue, is not repugnant to or subversive of our const.i.tution." This doctrine, tho' long exploded by the best writers on both sides of the atlantic, he now urges; and he is reduced to this necessity, in order to justify or give coloring to his frequent bold a.s.sertions, that "no one has attempted even to infringe our liberties," and to his ungenerous reflections upon those who declare themselves of a different mind, as "pretended patriots," "overzealous," "intemperate politicians," "men of no property," who "expect to find their account" in perpetually keeping up the ball of contention. But after all that Chronus and his a.s.sociates have said, or can say, the people of America have just "grounds still to complain" that their rights are violated.

There seems to be a system of "tyranny and oppression" already begun. It is therefore the duty of every honest man, to alarm his fellow-citizens and countrymen, and awaken in them the utmost vigilance and circ.u.mspection. Jealousy, especially at such a time, is a political virtue: Nay, I will say, it is a moral virtue; for we are under all obligations to do what in us lies to save our country." Tyrants alone, says the great Vatel, will treat as seditious, those brave and resolute citizens, who exhort the people to preserve themselves from oppression, in vindication of their rights and privileges: A good prince, says he, will commend such virtuous patriots" and will "mistrust the selfish suggestions of a minister, who represents to him as rebels, all those citizens who do not hold out their hands to chains, who refuse lamely to suffer the strokes of arbitrary power."

I cannot help observing how artfully Chronus expresses his position, that the "parliament's laying duties upon trade with the express purpose of raising a revenue, is not repugnant to our const.i.tution." It has not been made a question, that I know of, whether the parliament hath a right to make laws for the regulation of the trade of the colonies. Power she undoubtedly has to enforce her acts of trade: And the strongest maritime power caeteris paribus, will always make the most advantageous treaties, and give laws of trade to other nations, for whom there can be no pretence to the right of legislation. The matter however should be considered equitably, if it should ever be considered at all: If the trade of the Colonies is protected by the British navy, there may possibly be from thence inferr'd a just right in the parliament of Great Britain to restrain them from carrying on their trade to the injury of the trade of Great Britain. But this being granted, it is very different from the right to make laws in all cases whatever binding upon the Colonies, and especially for laying duties upon trade for the express purpose of raising a revenue. In the one case it may be the wisdom of the Colonies, under present circ.u.mstances to acquiesce in reasonable restrictions, rather than lose their whole trade by means of the depredations of a foreign power: In the other, it is a duty they owe themselves and their posterity, by no means to acquiesce; because it involves them in a state of perfect slavery. I say perfect slavery: For, as political liberty in its perfection consists in the people's consenting by themselves or their representatives, to all laws which they are bound to obey, so perfect political slavery consists in their being bound to obey any laws for taxing them, to which they cannot consent. If a people can be deprived of their property by another person or nation, it is evident that such a people cannot be free. Whether it be by a nation or a monarch, is not material: The masters indeed are different, but the government is equally despotic; and tho' the despotism may be mild, from principles of policy, it is not the less a despotism.

Chronus talks of Magna Charta as though it were of no greater consequence than an act of parliament for the establishment of a corporation of b.u.t.tonmakers. Whatever low ideas he may entertain of that Great Charter, and such ideas he must entertain of it to support the cause he hath espous'd, it is affirm'd by Lord c.o.ke, to be declaratory of the princ.i.p.al grounds of the fundamental laws and liberties of England. "It is called Charta Libertatum Regni, the Charter of the Liberties of the kingdom, upon great reason, says that sage of the law, because liberos facit, it makes and preserves the people free." Those therefore who would make the people slaves, would fain have them look upon this charter, in a light of indifference, which so often affirms sua jura, suas libertates, their own rights, their own liberties: But if it be declaratory of the princ.i.p.al grounds of the fundamental laws and liberties of England, it cannot be altered in any of its essential parts, without altering the const.i.tution. Whatever Chronus may have adopted from Mr. Hume, Vatel tells us plainly and without hesitation, that "the supreme legislative cannot change the const.i.tution," "that their authority does not extend so far," & "that they ought to consider the fundamental laws as sacred, if the nation has not, in very express terms, given them power to change them." And he gives a reason for it solid and weighty; for, says he, "the const.i.tution of the state ought to be fixed." Mr.

Hume, as quoted by Chronus, says, the only rule of government is the established practice of the age, upon maxims universally a.s.sented to. If then any deviation is made from the maxims upon which the established practice of the age is founded, it must be by universal a.s.sent. "The fundamental laws," says Vatel, "are excepted from their (legislators) commission," "nothing leads us to think that the nation was willing to submit the const.i.tution itself to their pleasure." "They derive their authority from the const.i.tution, how then can they change it without destroying the foundation of their own authority?" If then according to Lord c.o.ke, Magna Charta is declaratory of the princ.i.p.al grounds of the fundamental laws and liberties of the people, and Vatel is right in his opinion, that the supreme legislative cannot change the const.i.tution, I think it follows, whether Lord c.o.ke has expressly a.s.serted it or not, that an act of parliament made against Magna Charta in violation of its essential parts, is void. - "By the fundamental laws of England, says Vatel, the two houses of parliament in concert with the King, exercise the legislative power: But if the two houses should resolve to suppress themselves, and to invest the King with the full and absolute government, certainly the nation would not suffer it, "although it was done by a solemn act of parliament. But such doctrine is directly the reverse of that which Chronus holds; which amounts to this, that if the two houses should give up to the King, any, the most essential rights of the people declared in Magna Charta, the nation has not a power either de jura or de facto to prevent it. I may hereafter quote for his serious perusal, the reasoning of the immortal Locke upon this important subject, and am, in the mean time,

Your's, CANDIDUS.

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF Ma.s.sACHUSETTS TO THE GOVERNOR, APRIL 10, 1772.

[Ma.s.sachusetts State Papers, pp. 315, 316; a draft, is in the Samuel Adams Papers, Lenox Library.]

May it please your Excellency.

The House of Representatives have duly considered your speech1 to both Houses, at the opening of this session. Your Excellency is pleased to acquaint us, that, "if we had desired you to carry the Court to Boston, because it is the most convenient place; and the prerogative of the Crown to instruct the Governor to convene the Court at such place as his Majesty may think proper, had not been denied; you should have obtained leave to meet us in Boston, at this time; but that you shall not be at liberty to do so, whilst this denial is persisted in."

We have maturely considered this point; and are still firmly in opinion, that such instruction is repugnant to the royal charter, wherein the Governor is vested with the full power of adjournment, proroguing and dissolving the General a.s.sembly, as he shall judge necessary. Nothing in the charter, appears to us to afford the least grounds to conclude, that a right is reserved to his Majesty of controling the Governor, in thus exercising this full power.

Nor indeed does it seem reasonable that there should for, it being impossible that any one, at the distance of three thousand miles, should be able to foresee the most convenient time or place of holding the a.s.sembly, it is necessary that such discretionary power should be lodged with the Governor, who is, by Charter, constantly to reside within the Province.

We are still earnestly desirous of the removal of this a.s.sembly to the Court House, in Boston; and we are sorry that your Excellency's determination thereon, depends upon our disavowing these principles; because we cannot do it consistently with the duty we owe our const.i.tuents. We are constrained to be explicit at this time; for if we should be silent, after your Excellency has recommended it to us, as a necessary preliminary, to desist from saying any thing upon this head, while we request your Excellency for a removal of the a.s.sembly, for reasons of convenience only, it might be construed as tacitly conceding to a doctrine injurious to the const.i.tution, and in effect, as rescinding our own record, of which we still deliberately approve.

The power of adjourning and proroguing the General a.s.sembly, is a power in trust, to be exercised for the good of the province; this House have a right to judge for themselves, whether it was thus exercised. We cannot avoid taking this occasion, freely to declare to your Excellency, that the holding of the a.s.sembly in this place, without any good reason which we can conceive of, under the many and great inconveniences which this, and former Houses, have so fully set forth to your Excellency, is, in our opinion, an undue exercise of power; and a very great grievance, which we still hope will soon be fully redressed.

Your Excellency may be a.s.sured, that this House will, with all convenient despatch, take into our most serious consideration, that part of your speech which concerns the establishment of a part.i.tion line between this province and the province of New York; and that we will, with great candor, contribute every thing in our power, to accomplish the same equitable terms.

The other parts of your Excellency's speech, have had the proper attention of the House; and we are determined, during the remainder of the session, which must be short, to consult his Majesty's real service - the true interest of the province.

1 The original message of Governor Hutchinson of April 8, 1772, is among the Samuel Adams Papers, Lenox Library, and on it is endorsed, in the handwriting of Adams, the fourth paragraph of the following reply.

2 Ma.s.sachusetts State Papers, pp. 313-315.

ARTICLE SIGNED "VINDEX."

[Boston Gazette, April 20, 1772.]

Messieurs EDES & GILL,

Philanthrop Jun. in Draper's paper of the 9th current tells us, that "For four or five years together n.o.body could appear in print unless he was a favourer of what is call'd Liberty," and therefore concludes, "Falshood has been imposed on the credulous readers of News-papers, and has spread through the country for truth, because no one would contradict it." What fort.i.tude must a man be possess'd of that can offer two such sentences to the eye of the public in a paper which for that s.p.a.ce has contained nothing else in the political way? Again, why have we a mark of distinction in the signature? Was Philanthrop senior a liberty writer? Was the True Patriot a liberty writer? Were all the scribblers in Mein's Chronicle friends or favourers of what is called liberty? Blush!

reformer blush at imposition of so gross a kind!

But what are the falshoods these credulous people have been led to believe? Why it seems that men from Lancaster and elsewhere, have been insinuating that we laboured under grievances in commerce, legislation, and execution of the wholesome laws of the land, when no such thing has been seen, felt, heard or understood among us; and one Lancaster man in particular, has been furnished with all his prejudices from the letters of Junius America.n.u.s, a despicable creature (as we say) who has certainly blackened some men and measures in both Englands, in such manner as defies time itself to bleach their characters. And till the officious Philanthrop engaged, every one judged the friends, at least, of those respectable men, would avoid the provocation of fresh caustics to such rankled ulcers; but luxuriant flesh forever interrupts the efficacy of the most healing plaisters, and must be removed as fast as it puts forth. Indeed gentlemen, I myself who live in Boston, the centre of American politicks, have suspected we had some grievances to complain of before either Junius Anglica.n.u.s or America.n.u.s ever published a letter on the subject to my knowledge: I thought the stamp-act a grievance, I think the extension of the vice-admiralty courts a grievance, I think the captious and unprecedented treatment of our legislature a grievance; and above all, I think the alteration of our free and mutually dependent const.i.tution, into a dependent ministerial despotism a grievance so great, so ignominious and intolerable, that in case I did not hope things would in some measure regain their ancient situation, without more blood shed and murder than has already been committed, I could freely wish at the risk of my all to have a fair chance of offering to the manes of my slaughtered countrymen a libation of the blood of the ruthless traitors who conspired their destruction. It is here I confess my fingers would fall with weight, let those of Dr. Y -g, Mr. -x, or even Mr. A -s, fall how or where they pleased.

VINDEX.

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF Ma.s.sACHUSETTS TO THE GOVERNOR.

JULY 14, 1772.1

[Ma.s.sachusetts State Papers, pp. 330, 331 ; extracts are printed in W. V. Wells, Life of Samuel Adams, vol. i., p. 482, with the statement that such extracts were copied from an original draft in the autograph of Adams.2]

May it please your Excellency,

In answer to your message of yesterday, this House beg leave to observe, that they are not unapprized that the Province House is out of repair, and that expense might be saved, by making such repairs as are necessary, as soon as may be. But, that building was procured for the residence of a Governor, whose sole support was to be provided for by the grants and acts of the General a.s.sembly, according to the tenor of the charter: and, it is the opinion of this House, that it never was expected by any a.s.sembly of this province, that it would be appropriated for the residence of any Governor, for whose support, adequate provision should be made in another way. Upon this consideration, we cannot think it our duty to make any repairs, at this time.

Your Excellency may be a.s.sured, that this House is far from being influenced by any personal disrespect. Should the time come, which we hope for, when your Excellency shall think yourself at liberty to accept of your whole support from this province, according to ancient and invariable usage, we doubt not, but you will then find the Representatives of this people ready to provide for your Excellency a house, not barely tenantable, but elegant. In the mean time, as your Excellency receives from his Majesty a certain and adequate support, we cannot have the least apprehensions that you will be so far guided by your own inclination, as that you will make any town in the province the place of your residence, but where it shall be most conducive to his Majesty's service, and the good and welfare of the people.

1 On this date the Governor prorogued the General Court to meet again September 30. The next session actually commenced January 6, 1773.

2 Wells also attributes to Adams the message of the house of May 29, 1772; Life of Samuel Adams, vol. I., p. 477; Ma.s.sachusetts State Papers, p. 321.