The Works of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke Volume VIII Part 10

This transaction is of a piece with those that preceded it. On the 6th of July, 1781, Mr. Hastings announced to the board the arrival of a messenger and introduced a requisition from the young Nabob Mobarek ul Dowlah, "that he might be _permitted to dispose of his own stipend, without being made to depend on the will of another_." In favor of this requisition Mr. Hastings urged various arguments:--that the Nabob could no longer be deemed a minor;--that he was twenty-six years of age, and father of many children;--that his understanding was much improved _of late_ by an attention to his education;--that these circ.u.mstances gave him a claim to the uncontrolled exercise of domestic authority; and it might reasonably be supposed that he would pay a greater regard to a just economy in his own family than had been observed by those who were aliens to it. For these reasons Mr. Hastings recommended to the board that Mahomed Reza Khan should be immediately divested of the office of superintendent of the Nabob's household, _and that the Nabob Mobarek ul Dowlah should be intrusted with the exclusive and entire receipts and disburs.e.m.e.nts of his stipend, and the uncontrolled management and regulation of his household_. Thus far your Committee are of opinion, that the conclusion corresponds with the premises; for, supposing the fact to be established or admitted, that the Nabob, in point of age, capacity, and judgment, was qualified to act for himself, it seems reasonable that the management of his domestic affairs should not be withheld from him. On this part of the proceeding your Committee will only observe, that, if it were strictly true that the Nabob's understanding had been much improved _of late_ by an attention to his education, (which seems an extraordinary way of describing the qualifications of a man of six-and-twenty, the father of many children,) the merit of such improvement must be attributed to Mahomed Reza Khan, who was the only person of rank and character connected with him, or who could be supposed to have any influence over him. Mr. Hastings himself reproaches the Nabob with _raising mean men to be his companions_, and tells him plainly, _that some persons, both of bad character and base origin, had found the means of insinuating themselves into his company and constant fellowship_. In such society it is not likely that either the Nabob's morals or his understanding could have been _much improved_; nor could it be deemed prudent to leave him without any check upon his conduct. Mr. Hastings's opinion on this point may be collected from what he did, but by no means from what he said, on the occasion.

The House will naturally expect to find that the Nabob's request was granted, and that the resolution of the board was conformable to the terms of Mr. Hastings's recommendation. Yet the fact is directly the reverse. Mr. Hastings, after advising _that the Nabob should be intrusted with the exclusive and entire receipts and disburs.e.m.e.nts of his stipend_, immediately corrects that advice, _being aware that so sudden and unlimited a disposal of a large revenue might at first encourage a spirit of dissipation in the Nabob_,--and reserves to _himself_ a power of establishing, _with the Nabob's consent_, such a plan for the regulation and equal distribution of the Nabob's expenses _as should be adapted to the dissimilar appearances of preserving his interests and his independence at the same time_. On the same complicated principles the subsequent resolution of the board professes to allow the Nabob the management of his stipend and expenses,--with _an hope_, however, (which, considering the relative situation of the parties, could be nothing less than an injunction,) that he would submit to such a plan _as should be agreed on between him_ and the Governor-General.

The drift of these contradictions is sufficiently apparent. Mahomed Reza Khan was to be divested of his office at all events, and the management of the Nabob's stipend committed to other hands. To accomplish the first, the Nabob is said to be "now arrived at that time of life when a man may be supposed capable, _if ever_, of managing his own concerns."

When this principle has answered the momentary purpose for which it was produced, we find it immediately discarded, and an opposite resolution formed on an opposite principle, viz., that he shall _not_ have the management of his own concerns, _in consideration of his want of experience_.

Mr. Hastings, on his arrival at Moorshedabad, gives Mr. Wheler an account of his interview with the Nabob, and of the Nabob's implicit submission to his advice. The princ.i.p.al, if not the sole, object of the whole operation appears from the result of it. Sir John D'Oyly, a gentleman in whom Mr. Hastings places particular confidence, succeeds to the office of Mahomed Reza Khan, and to the same control over the Nabob's expenses. Into the hands of this gentleman the Nabob's stipend was _to be immediately paid, as every intermediate channel would be an unavoidable cause of delay_; and to _his_ advice the Nabob was required to give the same attention as if it were given by Mr. Hastings himself.

One of the conditions prescribed to the Nabob was, that he should admit no Englishman to his presence without previously consulting Sir John D'Oyly; _and he must forbid any person of that nation to be intruded without his introduction_. On these arrangements it need only be observed, that a measure which sets out with professing to relieve the Nabob from a state of _perpetual pupilage_ concludes with delivering not only his fortune, but his person, to the custody of a particular friend of Mr. Hastings.

The instructions given to the Nabob contain other pa.s.sages that merit attention. In one place Mr. Hastings tells him, "You have offered to give up the sum of four lacs of rupees to be allowed the free use of the remainder; but this we have refused." In another he says, that, "_as many matters will occur which cannot be so easily explained by letter as by conversation_, I desire that you will on such occasions give your orders to Sir John D'Oyly respecting such points as you may desire to have imparted to _me_." The offer alluded to in the first pa.s.sage does not appear in the Nabob's letters, therefore must have been in conversation, and declined by Mr. Hastings without consulting his colleague. A refusal of it might have been proper; but it supposes a degree of incapacity in the Nabob not to be reconciled to the principles on which Mahomed Reza Khan was removed from the management of his affairs. Of the matters alluded to in the second, and which, it is said, _could not be so easily explained by letters as in conversation_, no explanation is given. Your Committee will therefore leave them, as Mr.

Hastings has done, to the opinion of the House.

As soon as the Nabob's requisition was communicated to the board, it was moved and resolved that Mahomed Reza Khan should be divested of his office; and the House have seen in what manner it was disposed of. The Nabob had stated various complaints against him:--that he had dismissed the old established servants of the Nizamut, and filled their places with his own dependants;--that he had _regularly received_ the stipend of the Nizamut from the Company, yet had kept the Nabob involved in debt and distress, and exposed to the clamors of his creditors, and sometimes even in want of a dinner. All these complaints were recorded at large in the proceedings of the Council; but it does not appear that they were ever communicated to Mahomed Reza Khan, or that he was ever called upon, in any shape, to answer them. This circ.u.mstance inclines your Committee to believe that all of these charges were groundless,--especially as it appears on the face of the proceedings, that the chief of them were not well founded. Mr. Hastings, in his letter to Mr. Wheler, urges the absolute necessity of the monthly payment of the Nabob's stipend _being regularly made_, and says, that, to relieve the Nabob's present wants, he had directed the Resident to raise an immediate supply on the credit of the Company, to be repaid from the first receipts. From hence your Committee conclude that the monthly payments had _not_ been regularly made, and that whatever distresses the Nabob might have suffered must have been owing to the Governor-General and Council, not to Mahomed Reza Khan, who, for aught that appears to the contrary, paid away the stipend as fast as he received it. Had it been otherwise, that is, if Mahomed Reza Khan had reserved a balance of the Nabob's money in his hands, he should, and undoubtedly he would, have been called upon to pay it in; and then there would have been no necessity for raising an immediate supply by other means.

The transaction, on the whole, speaks very sufficiently for itself. It is a gross instance of repeated disobedience to repeated orders; and it is rendered particularly offensive to the authority of the Court of Directors by the frivolous and contradictory reasons a.s.signed for it.

But whether the Nabob's requisition was reasonable or not, the Governor-General and Council were precluded by a special instruction from complying with it. The Directors, in their letter of the 14th of February, 1779, declare, that a resolution of Council, (taken by Mr.

Francis and Mr. Wheler, in the absence of Mr. Barwell,) viz., "that the Nabob's letter should be referred to _them_ for _their_ decision, and that no resolution should be taken in Bengal on his requisitions without their special orders and instructions," was very proper. They prudently reserved to themselves the right of deciding on such questions; but they reserved it to no purpose. In England the authority is purely formal. In Bengal the power is positive and real. When they clash, their opposition serves only to degrade the authority that ought to predominate, and to exalt the power that ought to be dependent.

Since the closing of the above Report, many material papers have arrived from India, and have been laid before your Committee. That which they think it most immediately necessary to annex to the Appendix to this Report is the resolution of the Council-General to allow to the members of the Board of Trade resident in Calcutta a charge of five per cent on the sale in England of the investment formed upon their second plan, namely, that plan which had been communicated to Lord Macartney. The investment on this plan is stated to be raised from 800,000_l._ to 1,000,000_l._ sterling.

It is on all accounts a very memorable transaction, and tends to bring on a heavy burden, operating in the nature of a tax laid by their own authority on the goods of their masters in England. If such a compensation to the Board of Trade was necessary on account of their engagement to take no further (that is to say, no unlawful) emolument, it implies that the practice of making such unlawful emolument had formerly existed; and your Committee think it very extraordinary that the first notice the Company had received of such a practice should be in taxing them for a compensation for a partial abolition of it, secured on the parole of honor of those very persons who are supposed to have been guilty of this unjustifiable conduct. Your Committee consider this engagement, if kept, as only a partial abolition of the implied corrupt practice: because no part of the compensation is given to the members of the Board of Trade who reside at the several factories, though their means of abuse are without all comparison greater; and if the corruption was supposed so extensive as to be bought off at that price where the means were fewer, the House will judge how far the tax has purchased off the evil.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] See the Secret Committee's Reports on the Mahratta War.

[2] Vide Secret Committee Reports.

[3] Vide Select Committee Reports, 1781

[4] The sale, to the amount of about one hundred thousand pounds annually, of the export from Great Britain ought to be deducted from this million.

[5] Estimate of the Sale Amount and Net Proceeds in England of the Cargoes to be sent from Bengal, agreeable to the Plan received by Letter dated the 8th April, 1782.

This calculation supposes the eighty lac investments will be equal to the tonnage of five ships.

[B] 2. To custom 320,000 |[A] 1. By sale amount of [C] 3. " freight 200,000 | piece-goods and [D] 4. " 5 per cent duty on | raw silk 1,300,000 1,300,000 65,000 | Discount 61/2 per [E] 5. " 2 do. warehouse | cent allowed the room do. 26,000 | buyers 84,500 7 do. commission | on 604,500 42,315 | ---------- | 653,315 | [F] 6. " Balance 562,185 | ---------- | ---------- 1,215,500 | 1,215,500

[A] 1. The sale amount is computed on an average of the sales of the two last years' imports.

[B] 2. The custom is computed on an average of what was paid on piece-goods and raw silk of said imports, adding additional imposts.

[C] 3. The ships going out of this season, (1782,) by which the above investment is expected to be sent home, are taken up at 47_l._ 5_s._ per ton, for the homeward cargo; this charge amounts to 35,815_l._ each ship; the additional wages to the men, which the Company pay, and a very small charge for demurrage, will increase the freight, &c., to 40,000_l._ per ship, agreeable to above estimate.

[D] 4. The duty of five per cent is charged by the Company on the gross sale amount of all private trade licensed to be brought from India: the amount of this duty is the only benefit the Company are likely to receive from the subscription investment.

[E] 5. This charge is likewise made on private trade goods, and is little, if anything, more than the real expense the Company are at on account of the same; therefore no benefit will probably arise to the Company from it on the sale of the said investment.

[F] 6. This is the sum which will probably be realized in England, and is only equal to 1_s._ 6_d._ per rupee, on the eighty lacs subscribed.

[6] Vide Mr. Francis's plan in Appendix, No. 14, to the Select Committee's Sixth Report.

[7] The whole sum has not been actually raised; but the deficiency is not very considerable.

[8] Fourth Report, page 106.

[9] Par. 36. Vide Fourth Report from Com. of Secrecy in 1773, Appendix, No. 45.

[10] Vide Sel. Letter to Bengal, 17 May, 1766, Par. 36, in Fourth Report from Com. of Secrecy, in 1773, Appendix, No. 45.

[11] Ibid. Par. 37.

[12] Vide Committee's Fifth Report, page 21, and Appendix to that Report, No. 12.

[13] 1st and 5th April, 1779.

ELEVENTH REPORT

OF THE

SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

ON

THE AFFAIRS OF INDIA.

WITH EXTRACTS FROM THE APPENDIX.

November 18, 1783.

ELEVENTH REPORT

From the SELECT COMMITTEE appointed to take into consideration the state of the administration of justice in the provinces of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa, and to report the same, as it shall appear to them, to the House, with their observations thereupon; and who were instructed to consider how the British possessions in the East Indies may be held and governed with the greatest security and advantage to this country, and by what means the happiness of the native inhabitants may be best protected.

Your Committee, in the course of their inquiry into the obedience yielded by the Company's Servants to the orders of the Court of Directors, (the authority of which orders had been strengthened by the Regulating Act of 1773,) could not overlook one of the most essential objects of that act and of those orders, namely, _the taking of gifts and presents_. These pretended free gifts from the natives to the Company's servants in power had never been authorized by law; they are contrary to the covenants formerly entered into by the President and Council, they are strictly forbidden by the act of Parliament, and forbidden upon grounds of the most substantial policy.

Before the Regulating Act of 1773, the allowances made by the Company to the Presidents of Bengal were abundantly sufficient to guaranty them against anything like a necessity for giving into that pernicious practice. The act of Parliament which appointed a Governor-General in the place of a President, as it was extremely particular in enforcing the prohibition of those presents, so it was equally careful in making an ample provision for supporting the dignity of the office, in order to remove all excuse for a corrupt increase of its emoluments.