The Works of George Berkeley Part 57

_Hyl._ I agree with you. _Material substance_ was no more than an hypothesis; and a false and groundless one too. I will no longer spend my breath in defence of it. But whatever hypothesis you advance, or whatsoever scheme of things you introduce in its stead, I doubt not it will appear every whit as false: let me but be allowed to question you upon it. That is, suffer me to serve you in your own kind, and I warrant it shall conduct you through as many perplexities and contradictions, to the very same state of scepticism that I myself am in at present.

_Phil._ I a.s.sure you, Hylas, I do not pretend to frame any hypothesis at all(850). I am of a vulgar cast, simple enough to believe my senses, and leave things as I find them. To be plain, it is my opinion that the real things are those very things I see, and feel, and perceive(851) by my senses. These I know; and, finding they answer all the necessities and purposes of life, have no reason to be solicitous about any other unknown beings. A piece of sensible bread, for instance, would stay my stomach better than ten thousand times as much of that insensible, unintelligible, real bread you speak of. It is likewise my opinion that colours and other sensible qualities are on the objects. I cannot for my life help thinking that snow is white, and fire hot. You indeed, who by _snow_ and _fire_ mean certain external, unperceived, unperceiving substances, are in the right to deny whiteness or heat to be affections inherent in _them_. But I, who understand by those words the things I see and feel, am obliged to think like other folks. And, as I am no sceptic with regard to the nature of things, so neither am I as to their existence. That a thing should be really perceived by my senses(852), and at the same time not really exist, is to me a plain contradiction; since I cannot prescind or abstract, even in thought, the existence of a sensible thing from its being perceived.

Wood, stones, fire, water, flesh, iron, and the like things, which I name and discourse of, are things that I know. And I should not have known them but that I perceived them by my senses; and things perceived by the senses are immediately perceived; and things immediately perceived are ideas; and ideas cannot exist without the mind; their existence therefore consists in being perceived; when, therefore, they are actually perceived there can be no doubt of their existence. Away then with all that scepticism, all those ridiculous philosophical doubts. What a jest is it for a philosopher to question the existence of sensible things, till he hath it proved to him from the veracity of G.o.d(853); or to pretend our knowledge in this point falls short of intuition or demonstration(854)! I might as well doubt of my own being, as of the being of those things I actually see and feel.

_Hyl._ Not so fast, Philonous: you say you cannot conceive how sensible things should exist without the mind. Do you not?

_Phil._ I do.

_Hyl._ Supposing you were annihilated, cannot you conceive it possible that things perceivable by sense may still exist(855)?

_Phil._ I can; but then it must be in another mind. When I deny sensible things an existence out of the mind, I do not mean my mind in particular, but all minds. Now, it is plain they have an existence exterior to my mind; since I find them by experience to be independent of it(856). There is therefore some other Mind wherein they exist, during the intervals between the times of my perceiving them: as likewise they did before my birth, and would do after my supposed annihilation. And, as the same is true with regard to all other finite created spirits, it necessarily follows there is an _omnipresent eternal Mind_, which knows and comprehends all things, and exhibits them to our view in such a manner, and according to such rules, as He Himself hath ordained, and are by us termed the _laws of nature_(857).

_Hyl._ Answer me, Philonous. Are all our ideas perfectly inert beings? Or have they any agency included in them?

_Phil._ They are altogether pa.s.sive and inert(858).

_Hyl._ And is not G.o.d an agent, a being purely active?

_Phil._ I acknowledge it.

_Hyl._ No idea therefore can be like unto, or represent the nature of G.o.d?

_Phil._ It cannot.

_Hyl._ Since therefore you have no _idea_ of the mind of G.o.d, how can you conceive it possible that things should exist in His mind? Or, if you can conceive the mind of G.o.d, without having an idea of it, why may not I be allowed to conceive the existence of Matter, notwithstanding I have no idea of it?

_Phil._ As to your first question: I own I have properly no _idea_, either of G.o.d or any other spirit; for these being active, cannot be represented by things perfectly inert, as our ideas are. I do nevertheless know that I, who am a spirit or thinking substance, exist as certainly as I know my ideas exist(859). Farther, I know what I mean by the terms _I_ and _myself_; and I know this immediately or intuitively, though I do not perceive it as I perceive a triangle, a colour, or a sound. The Mind, Spirit, or Soul is that indivisible unextended thing which thinks, acts, and perceives. I say _indivisible_, because unextended; and _unextended_, because extended, figured, moveable things are ideas; and that which perceives ideas, which thinks and wills, is plainly itself no idea, nor like an idea. Ideas are things inactive, and perceived. And Spirits a sort of beings altogether different from them. I do not therefore say my soul is an idea, or like an idea. However, taking the word _idea_ in a large sense, my soul may be said to furnish me with an idea, that is, an image or likeness of G.o.d-though indeed extremely inadequate. For, all the notion I have of G.o.d is obtained by reflecting on my own soul, heightening its powers, and removing its imperfections. I have, therefore, though not an inactive idea, yet in _myself_ some sort of an active thinking image of the Deity. And, though I perceive Him not by sense, yet I have a notion of Him, or know Him by reflexion and reasoning. My own mind and my own ideas I have an immediate knowledge of; and, by the help of these, do mediately apprehend the possibility of the existence of other spirits and ideas(860). Farther, from my own being, and from the dependency I find in myself and my ideas, I do, by an act of reason(861), necessarily infer the existence of a G.o.d, and of all created things in the mind of G.o.d. So much for your first question. For the second: I suppose by this time you can answer it yourself. For you neither perceive Matter(862) objectively, as you do an inactive being or idea; nor know it, as you do yourself, by a reflex act(863); neither do you mediately apprehend it by similitude of the one or the other(864); nor yet collect it by reasoning from that which you know immediately(865). All which makes the case of _Matter_ widely different from that of the _Deity_.

[(866)_Hyl._ You say your own soul supplies you with some sort of an idea or image of G.o.d. But, at the same time, you acknowledge you have, properly speaking, no _idea_ of your own soul. You even affirm that spirits are a sort of beings altogether different from ideas. Consequently that no idea can be like a spirit. We have therefore no idea of any spirit. You admit nevertheless that there is spiritual Substance, although you have no idea of it; while you deny there can be such a thing as material Substance, because you have no notion or idea of it. Is this fair dealing? To act consistently, you must either admit Matter or reject Spirit. What say you to this?

_Phil._ I say, in the first place, that I do not deny the existence of material substance, merely because I have no notion of it, but because the notion of it is inconsistent; or, in other words, because it is repugnant that there should be a notion of it. Many things, for aught I know, may exist, whereof neither I nor any other man hath or can have any idea or notion whatsoever. But then those things must be possible, that is, nothing inconsistent must be included in their definition. I say, secondly, that, although we believe things to exist which we do not perceive, yet we may not believe that any particular thing exists, without some reason for such belief: but I have no reason for believing the existence of Matter. I have no immediate intuition thereof: neither can I immediately from my sensations, ideas, notions, actions, or pa.s.sions, infer an unthinking, unperceiving, inactive Substance-either by probable deduction, or necessary consequence. Whereas the being of my Self, that is, my own soul, mind, or thinking principle, I evidently know by reflexion(867). You will forgive me if I repeat the same things in answer to the same objections. In the very notion or definition of _material Substance_, there is included a manifest repugnance and inconsistency. But this cannot be said of the notion of Spirit. That ideas should exist in what doth not perceive, or be produced by what doth not act, is repugnant.

But, it is no repugnancy to say that a perceiving thing should be the subject of ideas, or an active thing the cause of them. It is granted we have neither an immediate evidence nor a demonstrative knowledge of the existence of other finite spirits; but it will not thence follow that such spirits are on a foot with material substances: if to suppose the one be inconsistent, and it be not inconsistent to suppose the other; if the one can be inferred by no argument, and there is a probability for the other; if we see signs and effects indicating distinct finite agents like ourselves, and see no sign or symptom whatever that leads to a rational belief of Matter. I say, lastly, that I have a notion of Spirit, though I have not, strictly speaking, an idea of it(868). I do not perceive it as an idea, or by means of an idea, but know it by reflexion.

_Hyl._ Notwithstanding all you have said, to me it seems that, according to your own way of thinking, and in consequence of your own principles, it should follow that _you_ are only a system of floating ideas, without any substance to support them. Words are not to be used without a meaning.

And, as there is no more meaning in _spiritual Substance_ than in _material Substance_, the one is to be exploded as well as the other.

_Phil._ How often must I repeat, that I know or am conscious of my own being; and that I _myself_ am not my ideas, but somewhat else(869), a thinking, active principle that perceives, knows, wills, and operates about ideas. I know that I, one and the same self, perceive both colours and sounds: that a colour cannot perceive a sound, nor a sound a colour: that I am therefore one individual principle, distinct from colour and sound; and, for the same reason, from all other sensible things and inert ideas. But, I am not in like manner conscious either of the existence or essence of Matter(870). On the contrary, I know that nothing inconsistent can exist, and that the existence of Matter implies an inconsistency.

Farther, I know what I mean when I affirm that there is a spiritual substance or support of ideas, that is, that a spirit knows and perceives ideas. But, I do not know what is meant when it is said that an unperceiving substance hath inherent in it and supports either ideas or the archetypes of ideas. There is therefore upon the whole no parity of case between Spirit and Matter.]

_Hyl._ I own myself satisfied in this point. But, do you in earnest think the real existence of sensible things consists in their being actually perceived? If so; how comes it that all mankind distinguish between them?

Ask the first man you meet, and he shall tell you, _to be perceived_ is one thing, and _to exist_ is another.

_Phil._ I am content, Hylas, to appeal to the common sense of the world for the truth of my notion. Ask the gardener why he thinks yonder cherry-tree exists in the garden, and he shall tell you, because he sees and feels it; in a word, because he perceives it by his senses. Ask him why he thinks an orange-tree not to be there, and he shall tell you, because he does not perceive it. What he perceives by sense, that he terms a real being, and saith it _is_ or _exists;_ but, that which is not perceivable, the same, he saith, hath no being.

_Hyl._ Yes, Philonous, I grant the existence of a sensible thing consists in being perceivable, but not in being actually perceived.

_Phil._ And what is perceivable but an idea? And can an idea exist without being actually perceived? These are points long since agreed between us.

_Hyl._ But, be your opinion never so true, yet surely you will not deny it is shocking, and contrary to the common sense of men(871). Ask the fellow whether yonder tree hath an existence out of his mind: what answer think you he would make?

_Phil._ The same that I should myself, to wit, that it doth exist out of his mind. But then to a Christian it cannot surely be shocking to say, the real tree, existing without his mind, is truly known and comprehended by (that is _exists in_) the infinite mind of G.o.d. Probably he may not at first glance be aware of the direct and immediate proof there is of this; inasmuch as the very being of a tree, or any other sensible thing, implies a mind wherein it is. But the point itself he cannot deny. The question between the Materialists and me is not, whether things have a _real_ existence out of the mind of this or that person(872), but, whether they have an _absolute_ existence, distinct from being perceived by G.o.d, and exterior to _all_ minds(873). This indeed some heathens and philosophers have affirmed, but whoever entertains notions of the Deity suitable to the Holy Scriptures will be of another opinion.

_Hyl._ But, according to your notions, what difference is there between real things, and chimeras formed by the imagination, or the visions of a dream-since they are all equally in the mind(874)?

_Phil._ The ideas formed by the imagination are faint and indistinct; they have, besides, an entire dependence on the will. But the ideas perceived by sense, that is, real things, are more vivid and clear; and, being imprinted on the mind by a spirit distinct from us, have not the like dependence on our will. There is therefore no danger of confounding these with the foregoing: and there is as little of confounding them with the visions of a dream, which are dim, irregular, and confused. And, though they should happen to be never so lively and natural, yet, by their not being connected, and of apiece with the preceding and subsequent transactions of our lives, they might easily be distinguished from realities. In short, by whatever method you distinguish _things_ from _chimeras_ on your scheme, the same, it is evident, will hold also upon mine. For, it must be, I presume, by some perceived difference; and I am not for depriving you of any one thing that you perceive.

_Hyl._ But still, Philonous, you hold, there is nothing in the world but spirits and ideas. And this, you must needs acknowledge, sounds very oddly.

_Phil._ I own the word _idea_, not being commonly used for _thing_, sounds something out of the way. My reason for using it was, because a necessary relation to the mind is understood to be implied by that term; and it is now commonly used by philosophers to denote the immediate objects of the understanding. But, however oddly the proposition may sound in words, yet it includes nothing so very strange or shocking in its sense; which in effect amounts to no more than this, to wit, that there are only things perceiving, and things perceived; or that every unthinking being is necessarily, and from the very nature of its existence, perceived by some mind; if not by a finite created mind, yet certainly by the infinite mind of G.o.d, in whom 'we live, and move, and have our being.' Is this as strange as to say, the sensible qualities are not on the objects: or that we cannot be sure of the existence of things, or know anything of their real natures-though we both see and feel them, and perceive them by all our senses?

_Hyl._ And, in consequence of this, must we not think there are no such things as physical or corporeal causes; but that a Spirit is the immediate cause of all the phenomena in nature? Can there be anything more extravagant than this?

_Phil._ Yes, it is infinitely more extravagant to say-a thing which is inert operates on the mind, and which is unperceiving is the cause of our perceptions, [(875)without any regard either to consistency, or the old known axiom, _Nothing can give to another that which it hath not itself_].

Besides, that which to you, I know not for what reason, seems so extravagant is no more than the Holy Scriptures a.s.sert in a hundred places. In them G.o.d is represented as the sole and immediate Author of all those effects which some heathens and philosophers are wont to ascribe to Nature, Matter, Fate, or the like unthinking principle. This is so much the constant language of Scripture that it were needless to confirm it by citations.

_Hyl._ You are not aware, Philonous, that, in making G.o.d the immediate Author of all the motions in nature, you make Him the Author of murder, sacrilege, adultery, and the like heinous sins.

_Phil._ In answer to that, I observe, first, that the imputation of guilt is the same, whether a person commits an action with or without an instrument. In case therefore you suppose G.o.d to act by the mediation of an instrument, or occasion, called _Matter_, you as truly make Him the author of sin as I, who think Him the immediate agent in all those operations vulgarly ascribed to Nature. I farther observe that sin or moral turpitude doth not consist in the outward physical action or motion, but in the internal deviation of the will from the laws of reason and religion. This is plain, in that the killing an enemy in a battle, or putting a criminal legally to death, is not thought sinful; though the outward act be the very same with that in the case of murder. Since, therefore, sin doth not consist in the physical action, the making G.o.d an immediate cause of all such actions is not making Him the Author of sin.

Lastly, I have nowhere said that G.o.d is the only agent who produces all the motions in bodies. It is true I have denied there are any other agents besides spirits; but this is very consistent with allowing to thinking rational beings, in the production of motions, the use of limited powers, ultimately indeed derived from G.o.d, but immediately under the direction of their own wills, which is sufficient to ent.i.tle them to all the guilt of their actions(876).

_Hyl._ But the denying Matter, Philonous, or corporeal Substance; there is the point. You can never persuade me that this is not repugnant to the universal sense of mankind. Were our dispute to be determined by most voices, I am confident you would give up the point, without gathering the votes.

_Phil._ I wish both our opinions were fairly stated and submitted to the judgment of men who had plain common sense, without the prejudices of a learned education. Let me be represented as one who trusts his senses, who thinks he knows the things he sees and feels, and entertains no doubts of their existence; and you fairly set forth with all your doubts, your paradoxes, and your scepticism about you, and I shall willingly acquiesce in the determination of any indifferent person. That there is no substance wherein ideas can exist beside spirit is to me evident. And that the objects immediately perceived are ideas, is on all hands agreed(877). And that sensible qualities are objects immediately perceived no one can deny.

It is therefore evident there can be no _substratum_ of those qualities but spirit; _in_ which they exist, not by way of mode or property, but as a thing perceived in that which perceives it(878). I deny therefore that there is any unthinking _substratum_ of the objects of sense, and _in that acceptation_ that there is any material substance. But if by _material substance_ is meant only _sensible body_-that which is seen and felt (and the unphilosophical part of the world, I dare say, mean no more)-then I am more certain of matter's existence than you or any other philosopher pretend to be. If there be anything which makes the generality of mankind averse from the notions I espouse: it is a misapprehension that I deny the reality of sensible things. But, as it is you who are guilty of that, and not I, it follows that in truth their aversion is against your notions and not mine. I do therefore a.s.sert that I am as certain as of my own being, that there are bodies or corporeal substances (meaning the things I perceive by my senses); and that, granting this, the bulk of mankind will take no thought about, nor think themselves at all concerned in the fate of those unknown natures, and philosophical quiddities, which some men are so fond of.

_Hyl._ What say you to this? Since, according to you, men judge of the reality of things by their senses, how can a man be mistaken in thinking the moon a plain lucid surface, about a foot in diameter; or a square tower, seen at a distance, round; or an oar, with one end in the water, crooked?

_Phil._ He is not mistaken with regard to the ideas he actually perceives, but in the inferences he makes from his present perceptions. Thus, in the case of the oar, what he immediately perceives by sight is certainly crooked; and so far he is in the right. But if he thence conclude that upon taking the oar out of the water he shall perceive the same crookedness; or that it would affect his touch as crooked things are wont to do: in that he is mistaken. In like manner, if he shall conclude from what he perceives in one station, that, in case he advances towards the moon or tower, he should still be affected with the like ideas, he is mistaken. But his mistake lies not in what he perceives immediately, and at present, (it being a manifest contradiction to suppose he should err in respect of that) but in the wrong judgment he makes concerning the ideas he apprehends to be connected with those immediately perceived: or, concerning the ideas that, from what he perceives at present, he imagines would be perceived in other circ.u.mstances. The case is the same with regard to the Copernican system. We do not here perceive any motion of the earth: but it were erroneous thence to conclude, that, in case we were placed at as great a distance from that as we are now from the other planets, we should not then perceive its motion(879).

_Hyl._ I understand you; and must needs own you say things plausible enough. But, give me leave to put you in mind of one thing. Pray, Philonous, were you not formerly as positive that Matter existed, as you are now that it does not?

_Phil._ I was. But here lies the difference. Before, my positiveness was founded, without examination, upon prejudice; but now, after inquiry, upon evidence.

_Hyl._ After all, it seems our dispute is rather about words than things.

We agree in the thing, but differ in the name. That we are affected with ideas _from without_ is evident; and it is no less evident that there must be (I will not say archetypes, but) Powers without the mind(880), corresponding to those ideas. And, as these Powers cannot subsist by themselves, there is some subject of them necessarily to be admitted; which I call _Matter_, and you call _Spirit_. This is all the difference.

_Phil._ Pray, Hylas, is that powerful Being, or subject of powers, extended?

_Hyl._ It hath not extension; but it hath the power to raise in you the idea of extension,

_Phil._ It is therefore itself unextended?

_Hyl._ I grant it.

_Phil._ Is it not also active?