The Works of George Berkeley Part 55

_Hyl._ I do not pretend to have any notion of it.

_Phil._ And what reason have you to think this unknown, this inconceivable Somewhat doth exist? Is it that you imagine G.o.d cannot act as well without it; or that you find by experience the use of some such thing, when you form ideas in your own mind?

_Hyl._ You are always teasing me for reasons of my belief. Pray what reasons have you not to believe it?

_Phil._ It is to me a sufficient reason not to believe the existence of anything, if I see no reason for believing it. But, not to insist on reasons for believing, you will not so much as let me know _what it is_ you would have me believe; since you say you have no manner of notion of it. After all, let me entreat you to consider whether it be like a philosopher, or even like a man of common sense, to pretend to believe you know not what, and you know not why.

_Hyl._ Hold, Philonous. When I tell you Matter is an _instrument_, I do not mean altogether nothing. It is true I know not the particular kind of instrument; but, however, I have some notion of _instrument in general_, which I apply to it.

_Phil._ But what if it should prove that there is something, even in the most general notion of _instrument_, as taken in a distinct sense from _cause_, which makes the use of it inconsistent with the Divine attributes?

_Hyl._ Make that appear and I shall give up the point.

_Phil._ What mean you by the general nature or notion of _instrument_?

_Hyl._ That which is common to all particular instruments composeth the general notion.

_Phil._ Is it not common to all instruments, that they are applied to the doing those things only which cannot be performed by the mere act of our wills? Thus, for instance, I never use an instrument to move my finger, because it is done by a volition. But I should use one if I were to remove part of a rock, or tear up a tree by the roots. Are you of the same mind?

Or, can you shew any example where an instrument is made use of in producing an effect _immediately_ depending on the will of the agent?

_Hyl._ I own I cannot.

_Phil._ How therefore can you suppose that an All-perfect Spirit, on whose Will all things have an absolute and immediate dependence, should need an instrument in his operations, or, not needing it, make use of it? Thus it seems to me that you are obliged to own the use of a lifeless inactive instrument to be incompatible with the infinite perfection of G.o.d; that is, by your own confession, to give up the point.

_Hyl._ It doth not readily occur what I can answer you.

_Phil._ But, methinks you should be ready to own the truth, when it has been fairly proved to you. We indeed, who are beings of finite powers, are forced to make use of instruments. And the use of an instrument sheweth the agent to be limited by rules of another's prescription, and that he cannot obtain his end but in such a way, and by such conditions. Whence it seems a clear consequence, that the supreme unlimited Agent useth no tool or instrument at all. The will of an Omnipotent Spirit is no sooner exerted than executed, without the application of means; which, if they are employed by inferior agents, it is not upon account of any real efficacy that is in them, or necessary apt.i.tude to produce any effect, but merely in compliance with the laws of nature, or those conditions prescribed to them by the First Cause, who is Himself above all limitation or prescription whatsoever(840).

_Hyl._ I will no longer maintain that Matter is an instrument. However, I would not be understood to give up its existence neither; since, notwithstanding what hath been said, it may still be an _occasion_(841).

_Phil._ How many shapes is your Matter to take? Or, how often must it be proved not to exist, before you are content to part with it? But, to say no more of this (though by all the laws of disputation I may justly blame you for so frequently changing the signification of the princ.i.p.al term)-I would fain know what you mean by affirming that matter is an occasion, having already denied it to be a cause. And, when you have shewn in what sense you understand _occasion_, pray, in the next place, be pleased to shew me what reason induceth you to believe there is such an occasion of our ideas?

_Hyl._ As to the first point: by _occasion_ I mean an inactive unthinking being, at the presence whereof G.o.d excites ideas in our minds.

_Phil._ And what may be the nature of that inactive unthinking being?

_Hyl._ I know nothing of its nature.

_Phil._ Proceed then to the second point, and a.s.sign some reason why we should allow an existence to this inactive, unthinking, unknown thing.

_Hyl._ When we see ideas produced in our minds, after an orderly and constant manner, it is natural to think they have some fixed and regular occasions, at the presence of which they are excited.

_Phil._ You acknowledge then G.o.d alone to be the cause of our ideas, and that He causes them at the presence of those occasions.

_Hyl._ That is my opinion.

_Phil._ Those things which you say are present to G.o.d, without doubt He perceives.

_Hyl._ Certainly; otherwise they could not be to Him an occasion of acting.

_Phil._ Not to insist now on your making sense of this hypothesis, or answering all the puzzling questions and difficulties it is liable to: I only ask whether the order and regularity observable in the series of our ideas, or the course of nature, be not sufficiently accounted for by the wisdom and power of G.o.d; and whether it doth not derogate from those attributes, to suppose He is influenced, directed, or put in mind, when and what He is to act, by an unthinking substance? And, lastly, whether, in case I granted all you contend for, it would make anything to your purpose; it not being easy to conceive how the external or absolute existence of an unthinking substance, distinct from its being perceived, can be inferred from my allowing that there are certain things perceived by the mind of G.o.d, which are to Him the occasion of producing ideas in us?

_Hyl._ I am perfectly at a loss what to think, this notion of _occasion_ seeming now altogether as groundless as the rest.

_Phil._ Do you not at length perceive that in all these different acceptations of _Matter_, you have been only supposing you know not what, for no manner of reason, and to no kind of use?

_Hyl._ I freely own myself less fond of my notions since they have been so accurately examined. But still, methinks, I have some confused perception that there is such a thing as _Matter_.

_Phil._ Either you perceive the being of Matter immediately or mediately.

If immediately, pray inform me by which of the senses you perceive it. If mediately, let me know by what reasoning it is inferred from those things which you perceive immediately. So much for the perception. Then for the Matter itself, I ask whether it is object, _substratum_, cause, instrument, or occasion? You have already pleaded for each of these, shifting your notions, and making Matter to appear sometimes in one shape, then in another. And what you have offered hath been disapproved and rejected by yourself. If you have anything new to advance I would gladly hear it.

_Hyl._ I think I have already offered all I had to say on those heads. I am at a loss what more to urge.

_Phil._ And yet you are loath to part with your old prejudice. But, to make you quit it more easily, I desire that, beside what has been hitherto suggested, you will farther consider whether, upon supposition that Matter exists, you can possibly conceive how you should be affected by it. Or, supposing it did not exist, whether it be not evident you might for all that be affected with the same ideas you now are, and consequently have the very same reasons to believe its existence that you now can have(842).

_Hyl._ I acknowledge it is possible we might perceive all things just as we do now, though there was no Matter in the world; neither can I conceive, if there be Matter, how it should produce any idea in our minds.

And, I do farther grant you have entirely satisfied me that it is impossible there should be such a thing as Matter in any of the foregoing acceptations. But still I cannot help supposing that there is _Matter_ in some sense or other. _What that is_ I do not indeed pretend to determine.

_Phil._ I do not expect you should define exactly the nature of that unknown being. Only be pleased to tell me whether it is a Substance; and if so, whether you can suppose a Substance without accidents; or, in case you suppose it to have accidents or qualities, I desire you will let me know what those qualities are, at least what is meant by Matter's supporting them?

_Hyl._ We have already argued on those points. I have no more to say to them. But, to prevent any farther questions, let me tell you I at present understand by _Matter_ neither substance nor accident, thinking nor extended being, neither cause, instrument, nor occasion, but Something entirely unknown, distinct from all these(843).

_Phil._ It seems then you include in your present notion of Matter nothing but the general abstract idea of _ent.i.ty_.

_Hyl._ Nothing else; save only that I superadd to this general idea the negation of all those particular things, qualities, or ideas, that I perceive, imagine, or in anywise apprehend.

_Phil._ Pray where do you suppose this unknown Matter to exist?

_Hyl._ Oh Philonous! now you think you have entangled me; for, if I say it exists in place, then you will infer that it exists in the mind, since it is agreed that place or extension exists only in the mind. But I am not ashamed to own my ignorance. I know not where it exists; only I am sure it exists not in place. There is a negative answer for you. And you must expect no other to all the questions you put for the future about Matter.

_Phil._ Since you will not tell me where it exists, be pleased to inform me after what manner you suppose it to exist, or what you mean by its _existence_?

_Hyl._ It neither thinks nor acts, neither perceives nor is perceived.

_Phil._ But what is there positive in your abstracted notion of its existence?

_Hyl._ Upon a nice observation, I do not find I have any positive notion or meaning at all. I tell you again, I am not ashamed to own my ignorance.

I know not what is meant by its _existence_, or how it exists.

_Phil._ Continue, good Hylas, to act the same ingenuous part, and tell me sincerely whether you can frame a distinct idea of Ent.i.ty in general, prescinded from and exclusive of all thinking and corporeal beings(844), all particular things whatsoever.

_Hyl._ Hold, let me think a little--I profess, Philonous, I do not find that I can. At first glance, methought I had some dilute and airy notion of Pure Ent.i.ty in abstract; but, upon closer attention, it hath quite vanished out of sight. The more I think on it, the more am I confirmed in my prudent resolution of giving none but negative answers, and not pretending to the least degree of any positive knowledge or conception of Matter, its _where_, its _how_, its _ent.i.ty_, or anything belonging to it.

_Phil._ When, therefore, you speak of the existence of Matter, you have not any notion in your mind?

_Hyl._ None at all.

_Phil._ Pray tell me if the case stands not thus:-At first, from a belief of material substance, you would have it that the immediate objects existed without the mind; then that they are archetypes; then causes; next instruments; then occasions: lastly, _something in general_, which being interpreted proves _nothing_. So Matter comes to nothing. What think you, Hylas, is not this a fair summary of your whole proceeding?