The Works of George Berkeley Part 14

(M234) Whoever shall cast his eyes on the writings of old or new philosophers, and see the noise is made about formal and objective Being, Will, &c.

(M235) Absurd to argue the existence of G.o.d from his idea. We have no idea of G.o.d. 'Tis impossible(169).

(M236) Cause of much errour & confusion that men knew not what was meant by Reality(170).

(M237) Des Cartes, in Med. 2, says the notion of this particular wax is less clear than that of wax in general; and in the same Med., a little before, he forbears to consider bodies in general, because (says he) these general conceptions are usually confused.

(M238) Des Cartes, in Med. 3, calls himself a thinking substance, and a stone an extended substance; and adds that they both agree in this, that they are substances. And in the next paragraph he calls extension a mode of substance.

(M239) 'Tis commonly said by the philosophers, that if the soul of man were self-existent it would have given itself all possible perfection.

This I do not understand.

(M240) Mem. To excite men to the pleasures of the eye & the ear, which surfeit not, nor bring those evils after them, as others.

(M241) We see no variety or difference betwixt volitions, only between their effects. 'Tis one Will, one Act-distinguished by the effects. This Will, this Act, is the Spirit, i.e. operative principle, soul, &c. No mention of fears and jealousies, nothing like a party.

(M242) Locke in his 4th Book(171), and Des Cartes in Med. 6, use the same argument for the existence of objects, viz. that sometimes we see, feel, &c. against our will.

(M243) While I exist or have any idea, I am eternally, constantly willing; my acquiescing in the present state is willing.

(M244) The existence of any thing imaginable is nothing different from imagination or perception(172). Volition or Will, Wch is not imaginable, regard must not be had to its existence(?) ... First Book.

(M245) There are four sorts of propositions:-"Gold is a metal;" "Gold is yellow;" "Gold is fixt;" "Gold is not a stone"-of which the first, second, and third are only nominal, and have no mental propositions answering them.

(M246) Mem. In vindication of the senses effectually to confute what Des Cartes saith in the last par. of the last Med., viz. that the senses oftener inform him falsely than truely-that sense of pain tells me not my foot is bruised or broken, but I, having frequently observed these two ideas, viz. of that peculiar pain and bruised foot go together, do erroneously take them to be inseparable by a necessity of Nature-as if Nature were anything but the ordinance of the free will of G.o.d(173).

(M247) Des Cartes owns we know not a substance immediately by itself, but by this alone, that it is the subject of several acts. Ans. to 2d objection of Hobbs.

(M248) Hobbs in some degree falls in with Locke, saying thought is to the mind or himself as dancing to the dancer. Object.

(M249) Hobbs in his Object. 3 ridicules those expressions of the scholastiques-"the will wills," &c. So does Locke. I am of another mind(174).

(M250) Des Cartes, in answer to Object. 3 of Hobbs, owns he is distinct from thought as a thing from its modus or manner.

(M251) Opinion that existence was distinct from perception of horrible consequence. It is the foundation of Hobbs's doctrine, &c.

(M252) Malbranch in his ill.u.s.tration(175) differs widely from me. He doubts of the existence of bodies. I doubt not in the least of this.

(M253) I differ from Cartesians in that I make extension, colour, &c. to exist really in bodies independent of our mind(176). All ye carefully and lucidly to be set forth.

(M254) Not to mention the combinations of powers, but to say the things-the effects themselves-do really exist, even wn not actually perceived; but still with relation to perception(177).

The great use of the Indian figures above the Roman shews arithmetic to be about signs, not ideas-or at least not ideas different from the characters themselves(178).

(M255) Reasoning there may be about things or ideas, or about actions; but demonstration can be only verbal. I question, no matter &c.

(M256) Quoth Des Cartes, The idea of G.o.d is not made by me, for I can neither add to nor subtract from it. No more can he add to or take from any other idea, even of his own making.

(M257) The not distinguishing 'twixt Will and ideas is a grand mistake with Hobbs. He takes those things for nothing which are not ideas(179).

(M258) Say you, At this rate all's nothing but idea-mere phantasm. I answer, Everything as real as ever. I hope to call a thing idea makes it not the less real. Truly I should perhaps have stuck to the word thing, and not mentioned the word idea, were it not for a reason, and I think a good one too, which I shall give in the Second Book(180).

(M259) Idea is the object of thought. Yt I think on, whatever it be, I call idea. Thought itself, or thinking, is no idea. 'Tis an act-i.e.

volition, i.e. as contradistinguished to effects-the Will.

(M260) Locke, in B. 4. c. 5, a.s.signs not the right cause why mental propositions are so difficult. It is not because of complex but because of abstract ideas. Ye idea of a horse is as complex as that of fort.i.tude. Yet in saying the "horse is white" I form a mental proposition with ease. But when I say "fort.i.tude is a virtue" I shall find a mental proposition hard, or not at all to be come at.

(M261) Pure intellect I understand not(181).

Locke is in ye right in those things wherein he differs from ye Cartesians, and they cannot but allow of his opinions, if they stick to their own principles or causes of Existence & other abstract ideas.

(M262) The properties of all things are in G.o.d, i.e. there is in the Deity Understanding as well as Will. He is no blind agent, and in truth a blind agent is a contradiction(182).

(M263) I am certain there is a G.o.d, tho' I do not perceive Him-have no intuition of Him. This not difficult if we rightly understand wt is meant by certainty.

(M264) It seems that the Soul, taken for the Will, is immortal, incorruptible.

(M265) Qu. whether perception must of necessity precede volition?

(M266) Error is not in the Understanding, but in the Will. What I understand or perceive, that I understand. There can be no errour in this.

(M267) Mem. To take notice of Locke's woman afraid of a wetting, in the Introd., to shew there may be reasoning about ideas or things.

(M268) Say Des Cartes & Malbranch, G.o.d hath given us strong inclinations to think our ideas proceed from bodies, or that bodies do exist. Pray wt mean they by this? Would they have it that the ideas of imagination are images of, and proceed from, the ideas of sense? This is true, but cannot be their meaning; for they speak of ideas of sense as themselves proceeding from, being like unto-I know not wt(183).

(M269) Cartesius per ideam vult omne id quod habet esse objectivum in intellectu. V. Tract. de Methodo.

(M270) Qu. May there not be an Understanding without a Will?

(M271) Understanding is in some sort an action.

(M272) Silly of Hobbs, &c. to speak of the Will as if it were motion, with which it has no likeness.

(M273) Ideas of Sense are the real things or archetypes. Ideas of imagination, dreams, &c. are copies, images, of these.

(M274) My doctrines rightly understood, all that philosophy of Epicurus, Hobbs, Spinosa, &c., which has been a declared enemy of religion, comes to the ground.

(M275) Hobbs & Spinosa make G.o.d extended. Locke also seems to do the same(184).