The War After the War Part 11

If this lesson of conservation is heeded after the war and becomes a feature of the permanent British life, then the Great Conflict will almost have been worth its dreadful cost in blood and treasure. He who saves now will not have saved in vain.

VI--_The Price of Glory_

When John Jones of the U.S.A. puts his thousand dollars into an English, French, Russian or German bond he becomes part and parcel of the mightiest financial structure ever dedicated to a single purpose. He cannot tell how his funds will be used. They may buy a few hundred sh.e.l.ls, clothe a thousand soldiers, feed a battalion or build a trench.

All he knows is that his mite joins the continuous and colossal stream of expense that makes up the Red Wage of War.

Now if John Jones employs his money in the stock or bond of a railroad, corporation, or public utility enterprise he can find out almost precisely what it does, for it lays down a track, provides new equipment or builds a power house. The investment, in short, represents something that produces more wealth.

War, on the other hand, is a gigantic engine of destruction. Instead of building up, it tears down. It is a monster machine consecrated to waste. The only possible dividend can be peace.

The cost of the European conflict has a deeper interest for us than mere curiosity over staggering statistics. The reason is that we have joined the Paymaster's Corps. In other words, we have backed up our sympathy with cash. We are silent partners in the costliest and deadliest of all businesses.

Up to the present stupendous struggle and with the exception of the Russo-j.a.panese War in which we floated several issues for the little yellow men, we have had no definite economic part in the wars that shook other nations. The losses in money and in men fell on the combatants.

This war, which has shattered so many precedents, has drawn the United States out of its one-time aloofness. To the dignity of World Trader we have added the twin distinction of World Banker. Already we have poured out practically two billions of dollars for securities and credits of the warring countries. To this must be added an even greater sum representing our enormous war exports. The price, therefore, of whatever freedom emerges from these years of bloodshed intimately touches thousands of American pocketbooks in one way or another.

What is the final toll that Battle will take: more important than this, what is the future of the treasure that we have laid on its Consuming Altar?

Before making any a.n.a.lysis of the American stake in the cost of the European War, it is important to find out first just how much money has been expended and what the likelihood of future outlay will be. Like every other phase of the stupendous upheaval this one is both speculative and problematical.

To deal with these European War figures is to flirt with t.i.tanic Numerals. They are more the Playthings of the G.o.ds than matters for mere mortals to juggle with.

Up to the first of January, 1917, the total military expenses of both sides had reached approximately $61,000,000,000. It is only when you reduce this enormous sum to terms that every man and woman can understand that you begin to get some idea of the amazing cost of conflict.

The amount of money expended for direct war purposes alone since August 1, 1914, is equal to three times the par value capitalization of all the American railroads. It represents fifty times the net national debt of the United States: eighteen times the amount of money in actual circulation in this country: and eleven times the total deposits in all our savings banks. With it you could build 146 Panama Ca.n.a.ls or pay for the Napoleonic, Crimean, Russo-j.a.panese, South African and American Civil Wars and still have a surplus of $34,000,000,000 left. Such is the New and High Cost of War!

The price of glory is being constantly advanced. The expenditures for the first year of the war were $17,500,000,000: for the second they had increased to $28,000,000,000: the estimate for the third year, to end August 1, 1917, at the present rate of spending is about $33,000,000,000. This means that by the time the next harvest moon shines (and no man in Europe to-day doubts that it will gleam on carnage), the war will have represented a sacrifice for military purposes alone of $78,500,000,000.

Taking the daily cost of the war you find that England is $25,000,000 poorer for every twenty-four hours that pa.s.s: that France must check out $20,000,000: Russia $16,000,000: Italy $5,000,000. Little Roumania is cutting her war expenditure teeth at the rate of $1,000,000 per diem.

Cross the frontier (for war expense is no respecter of cause or creed), and Germany is "discovered," as they say in play-books, spending $17,500,000 every day: Austria, Turkey and Bulgaria, $11,000,000. Thus between sunrises that break over these warring hosts very nearly $100,000,000 has gone up in smoke, splinters or ruin of some kind, or the upkeep of fighting.

Since England's cost each day is heavier than any of the other countries at war, due to the fact that she is Financial First Aid to most of her Allies and is maintaining a fleet almost equal to all the others combined, let us reduce her enormous daily war bill of $25,000,000 to simpler form. It means that partic.i.p.ation in the greatest of all wars is costing her $1,410,666 an hour, $17,361 a minute and a little over $289 a second. At this rate of waste John D. Rockefeller would be bankrupt in forty days; Andrew Carnegie would be in the bread line in ten. The sum is greater than the entire net public debt of Chicago; it equals the a.s.sessed valuation of all the taxable property in Poughkeepsie, New York.

Work out this immense daily outlay from still another angle and these striking facts develop: the war is costing at the rate of 29 cents a day for every inhabitant of the United Kingdom: 31 cents for every individual in France: 22 cents for every person in the Kaiser's domain, and 6 cents for each human unit in the Russian Empire.

Yet this well-nigh overwhelming rush of figures only accounts for the actual cost of hostilities. By this I mean arms and armament, food and military supplies, the construction, maintenance and renewal of fleets, the cost of transport and the pay of soldiers and sailors.

To the vast sum already recorded must be added the loss registered by the destruction of cities, towns and villages, the sinking of ships, the wiping out of factories, warehouses, bridges, roads and railways.

Then, too, you must allow for the almost incalculable productive loss due to the killing and maiming of millions of men: the shrinkage of agricultural yields and the more or less general dislocation of the machinery of output. All these factors pile up a total, the calculation of which would almost cause a compound fracture of the brain. Sufficient to say it puts a terrific human and financial tax on coming generations and we in America will feel its effects when the world begins to readjust itself to the altered social and economic conditions which will come with peace.

Of course the inevitable question arises: Who is paying the Scarlet Piper? In seeking the answer you encounter for the first time America's intimate and all-important part in the costly drama now being unfolded to the tune of billions. She sits in the armoured box-office with the Treasurers of the embattled nations.

At the outset of the war all the belligerent countries believed that they could finance their needs without seeking neutral aid. Less than a year was enough to dispel this delusion. Although England and France immediately voted immense credits they were not long in finding out that they must back up their unprecedented mobilisation of resources with outside help. They came to us.

When the great Anglo-French loan of $500,000,000 was first discussed as a possible American financial feat, people over here began to wonder why Great Britain and France, whose combined wealth exceeds that of all the other nations at war, should want overseas a.s.sistance. Since the reason for this loan as well as the disposition of proceeds are practically the same as that of most of the other Allied issues in this country in which thousands of our investors have partic.i.p.ated, it is well worth explaining because it also carries with it a lesson in international barter. Here it is:

Before the war our foreign trade was growing fast. England and France, in particular, were good customers for our wheat and other foodstuffs, iron and cotton manufactures, oil and automobiles. In exchange we imported the product of many European factories.

Business relations between nations are not settled like transactions between individuals and firms, that is, with checks or cash. They are settled by balances. England's imports from the United States, for example, are paid by her exports to us. Usually exports and imports so nearly balance that the difference is paid by gold or with the temporary use of bank credit. Therefore it is not a question of actual money but of exchange and this foreign exchange is a commodity whose value fluctuates with supply and demand.

Along came the war. Millions of artisans in France and England were withdrawn from lathe and loom to fight in the battle line. What workers remained at their posts had to produce war supplies. Yet civilian and soldier needed food, clothing and arms. The demand for our products increased and the United States suddenly became the work-shop and the granary of the world.

The Allies, in control of the seas, became our princ.i.p.al foreign customers. American exports soared: those of France and England declined correspondingly. A huge balance of trade--the biggest in our history--swung to our favour.

This balance of trade had to be settled, but on an abnormal basis. What was ordinarily a comparatively trivial matter of a few millions suddenly became an item of many millions and it was all owed on one side. The demand for exchange on New York greatly exceeded the supply and the inevitable dislocation happened. England and France had to pay a drastic premium on the American dollar. The English pound, normally rated $4.86, dropped to $4.50; the franc, ordinarily worth 19.29 cents, fell to 16.94 cents. This shrinkage in values was not due to any impairment of the resource or wealth of the Allies but because the machinery of international payment works automatically and unsentimentally.

Here was a crisis that without aid from us might have eventually cost us dear. Rather than submit to the terrific drain on the exchange value of the pound and franc, England and France could have set about emulating the example of Germany and become self-sufficient. It was not a month's work or even a year's work, but ultimately it would have made these countries more independent of the United States after the war is over.

Of course England and France could have met the situation by shipping gold. Each had a large reserve but the United States had all the gold it wanted, and still has. Besides, in such an emergency gold is an inert and unproductive commodity.

Again, the Allies might have "dumped" their American securities representing an investment of over three billions of dollars, which would have upset the American stock market and sent prices down. Either one of these performances would have done us no good.

It was important, therefore, for the benefit of all interest involved, that the Allies establish a credit in the United States that would enable them to buy freely and remove the costly handicap on American exchange. In a word, instead of having to pay their bills through an intricate mechanism that rose and fell with the tides of trade and put a premium on trading with us, a medium was needed that would restore the whole economic trade balance. It was as essential to us as to our customers.

Hence the Anglo-French Five Hundred Million Dollar Loan was floated and Uncle Sam became a war banker. This loan, however, was nothing more or less than the setting up of a credit of half a billion dollars for England and France in the United States. To put it in another way, it is just as if the two Allies had deposited this sum in an American bank and then drew checks against it for goods and raw materials made or mined in America. In a word, we lent to ourselves.

Put out at a time when money was scarce, the loan would have been unpatriotic and uneconomic. But our banks were filled with idle cash: everywhere capital sought safe and profitable employment. Now you begin to see why these allied loans are really good business in more ways than one.

What is our financial stake in the cost of the war: what does it yield: how is it safeguarded?

Clearly to understand this whole situation you must know just how these foreign bonds are put out. There are two kinds. One is the internal loan issued in the money of the country whose name it bears. This means that if it is a French bond it is in terms of francs: if English it calls for payment in pounds sterling: if Russian, in roubles: if German, in marks. An external loan, on the other hand, is issued in the money of the country in which it is floated. The Anglo-French loan is an example of this kind because both princ.i.p.al and interest are to be paid in United States gold coin. These internal and external loans may be direct obligations of the issuing governments or may be secured by collateral.

There is still a third medium for the employment of American money in the war. Technically it is known as bank credit. Through this agency, foreign firms make deposits of money or collateral in the national banks of their respective countries and purchase goods in America through credits thus established for them in a group of New York banks or trust companies. The acceptances for the goods thus bought become negotiable doc.u.ments and are bought and sold by inst.i.tutions and investors at a discount.

This evidence of debt is not the kind of foreign investment suitable for the man or woman with savings to employ because it is more or less a banking transaction. These credits usually net about 6 per cent.

With the exception of a comparatively small amount of German and Austrian Bonds bought in the main by natives of these two countries for purely sentimental and patriotic reasons, the entire bulk of European loans placed in America is for the Allied countries, princ.i.p.ally England and France who are our heaviest customers in trade.

The largest foreign loan brought out here so far is the Anglo-French 5 per cent External Loan which was negotiated through J. P. Morgan & Company--Fiscal Agents for the Allies over here--by the Commission headed by Lord Reading and Sir Edward Holden. It is the Joint and Several Obligation of the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and the French Republic, is dated October 15, 1915, and is due five years after that date. It ranks first amongst the foreign war obligations of these countries.

This was the first big credit arranged by England or France in the United States and the proceeds were used, in the manner that I have already described, for the purchase of American goods and to stabilize the foreign exchange. These bonds which have had a very wide sale in America were brought out at 98 and interest and at the time of issue represented an investment that paid nearly 5 per cent.

These bonds, I might add, are convertible at the option of the holder on any date not later than April 15, 1920, or provided that notice is given not later than this date, par for par, into 15-25 Year Joint and Several 4 per cent bonds of the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and the French Republic. Such 4 per cent bonds, payable, princ.i.p.al and interest, in United States gold coin, in New York City, and free from deduction for any present or future British or French taxes, will mature October 15, 1940, but will be redeemable, at par and accrued interest, in whole or in part, on any interest date not earlier than October 15, 1930, upon three months' notice.

The equity behind these bonds is the good name, wealth and taxing power of the issuing countries. The interest on this loan equals only one-fifth of one per cent of the total estimated income of the British people in 1914. It is slightly more than one-third of one per cent of the French Republic in 1914.

Between this loan and the next large borrowing by England or France in the United States occurred an event of significance to the American investor interested in the securities of foreign nations. The Anglo-French loan, as you know, was simply the promise to pay of two great countries whose Government Bonds at home represented the last word in unshakable security.

But when England and France stepped up to our money counters again, Uncle Sam put sentiment aside and became a p.a.w.n broker. "I think you are all right," he said, "but you are in a war that may last a very long time and I must have collateral."

To English pride this was a terrific jolt. I happened to be in England at the time and I recall the astonishment of no less a distinguished individual than the Chancellor of the British Exchequer. It was unbelievable that any nation could demand greater security than the good name of the Empire. "If the elder J. P. Morgan were alive this would never have happened," said the London bankers. They knew that the Grizzled Old Lion of American Finance always held that character was the best collateral. In the war emergency, however, many American bankers thought to the contrary and the net result was that with all external loans thereafter England and France have been forced to dig into their strong boxes and do what any individual does when he borrows money--put up a good margin of security.