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The following point is now taken into consideration. Is Brahman to be meditated upon as something different from the meditating Devotee, or as the Self of the latter?--The Purvapakshin holds the former view. For, he says, the individual soul is something different from Brahman; as has been proved under II, 1, 22; III, 4, 8; I, 1, 15. And Brahman must be meditated upon as it truly is; for if it is meditated upon under an unreal aspect, the attaining to Brahman also will not be real, according to the principle expressed in the text, 'According as a man's thought is in this world, so will he be when he has departed this life' (Ch. Up.
III, 14, 1). This view the Sutra sets aside. Brahman is rather to be meditated upon as being the Self of the meditating Devotee. As the meditating individual soul is the Self of its own body, so the highest Brahman is the Self of the individual soul--this is the proper form of meditation.--Why? Because the great Devotees of olden times acknowledged this to be the true nature of meditation; compare the text 'Then I am indeed thou, holy divinity, and thou art me.'--But how can the Devotees claim that Brahman which is a different being is their 'Ego'?--Because the texts enable them to apprehend this relation as one free from contradiction. 'He who dwelling within the Self is different from the Self, whom the Self does not know, of whom the Self is the body, who rules the Self from within; he is thy Self, the inner ruler, the immortal one'(Bri. Up. III, 7, 3); 'In the True all these beings have their root, they dwell in the True, they rest in the True;--in that all that exists has its Self' (Kh. Up. VI, 8); 'All this indeed is Brahman'
(Kh. Up. III, 14, 1)--all these texts teach that all sentient and non- sentient beings spring from Brahman, are merged in him, breathe through him, are ruled by him, const.i.tute his body; so that he is the Self of all of them. In the same way therefore as, on the basis of the fact that the individual soul occupies with regard to the body the position of a Self, we form such judgments of co-ordination as 'I am a G.o.d--I am a man'; the fact of the individual Self being of the nature of Self justifies us in viewing our own Ego as belonging to the highest Self. On the presupposition of all ideas being finally based on Brahman and hence all words also finally denoting Brahman, the texts therefore make such statements of mutual implication as 'I am thou, O holy divinity, and thou art me.' On this view of the relation of individual soul and highest Self there is no real contradiction between two, apparently contradictory, sets of texts, viz. those on the one hand which negative the view of the soul being different from the highest Self, 'Now if a man meditates upon another divinity, thinking "the divinity is one and I another," he does not know'; 'He is incomplete, let him meditate upon Him as the Self'; 'Everything abandons him who views anything apart from the Self (Bri. Up. I, 4, 10; 7-II, 4, 6); and on the other hand those texts which set forth the view of the soul and the highest Self being different ent.i.ties, 'Thinking of the (individual) Self and the Mover as different'(Svet. Up. I, 6). For our view implies a denial of difference in so far as the individual 'I' is of the nature of the Self; and it implies an acknowledgment of difference in so far as it allows the highest Self to differ from the individual soul in the same way as the latter differs from its body. The clause 'he is incomplete' (in one of the texts quoted above) refers to the fact that Brahman which is different from the soul const.i.tutes the Self of the soul, while the soul const.i.tutes the body of Brahman.--It thus remains a settled conclusion that Brahman is to be meditated upon as const.i.tuting the Self of the meditating Devotee.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'meditation under the aspect of Self.'
4. Not in the symbol; for (the symbol) is not that one (i.e. the Self of the Devotee).
'Let a man meditate on mind as Brahman' (Ch. Up. III, 18, 1); 'He who meditates on name as Brahman' (Ch. Up. VII, 15)--with regard to these and similar meditations on outward symbols (pratika) of Brahman there arises a doubt, viz. whether in them the symbols are to be thought of as of the nature of Self or not. The Purvapakshin holds the former view.
For, he says, in form those injunctions do not differ from other injunctions of meditation on Brahman, and Brahman, as we have seen, const.i.tutes the Self of the meditating Devotee.--This view the Sutra sets aside. A pratika cannot be meditated on as being of the nature of Self; for the pratika is not the Self of the meditating Devotee. What, in those meditations, is to be meditated upon is the pratika only, not Brahman: the latter enters into the meditation only as qualifying its aspect. For by a meditation on a pratika we understand a meditation in which something that is not Brahman is viewed under the aspect of Brahman, and as the pratika--the object of meditation--is not the Self of the Devotee it cannot be viewed under that form.--But an objection is raised here also, it is Brahman which is the real object of meditation; for where Brahman _may_ be viewed as the object of meditation, it is inappropriate to a.s.sume as objects non-sentient things of small power such as the mind, and so on. The object of meditation therefore is Brahman viewed under the aspect of mind, and so on.--This objection the next Sutra disposes of.
5. The view of Brahman, on account of superiority.
The view of Brahman may appropriately be superimposed on mind and the like; but not the view of mind, and so on, on Brahman. For Brahman is something superior to mind, and so on; while the latter are inferior to Brahman. To view a superior person, a prince e.g., as a servant would be lowering; while, on the other hand, to view a servant as a prince is exalting.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'symbols.'
6. And the ideas of Aditya and the rest on the member; on account of this being rational.
'He who shines up there let a man meditate on him as the Udgitha' (Ch.
Up. I, 3, 1).--With regard to this and similar meditations connected with subordinate parts of sacrificial performances there arises the doubt whether the idea of Aditya and so on has to be superimposed on the subordinate part of the sacrifice, such as the Udgitha, or vice versa (i.
e. whether Aditya should be meditated upon under the aspect of the Udgitha, or vice versa).--The Purvapakshin holds the former view. For the general principle is that the lower being should be viewed under the aspect of the higher, and the Udgitha and so on, which are parts of the sacrifices through which certain results are effected, are superior to the divinities who do not accomplish any result.--Of this view the Sutra disposes. The ideas of Aditya and so on are to be superimposed on the 'members,' i.e. the Udgitha and so on, which are const.i.tuent members of the sacrifices; because of the G.o.ds only superiority can be established.
For it is only through the propitiation of the G.o.ds that sacrifices are capable of bringing about their results. The Udgitha and the rest therefore are to be viewed under the aspect of Aditya and so on.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the ideas of Aditya and so on.'
7. Sitting; on account of possibility.
It has been shown that that special form of cognitional activity which the Vedanta-texts set forth as the means of accomplishing final Release and which is called meditation (dhyana; upasana) has to be frequently repeated, and is of the nature of continued representation. A question now arises as to the way in which it has to be carried on.--There being no special restrictive rule, the Purvapakshin holds that the Devotee may carry it on either sitting or lying down or standing or walking.--This view the Sutra sets aside. Meditation is to be carried on by the Devotee in a sitting posture, since in that posture only the needful concentration of mind can be reached. Standing and walking demand effort, and lying down is conducive to sleep. The proper posture is sitting on some support, so that no effort may be required for holding the body up.
8. And on account of meditation.
Since, as intimated by the text,'the Self is to be meditated upon,' the mental activity in question is of the nature of meditation, it requires as its necessary condition concentration of mind. For by meditation is understood thought directed upon one object and not disturbed by the ideas of other things.
9. And with reference to immobility.
And it is with reference to their immobility that the earth and other inanimate things--the air, the sky, the waters, the mountains--may be spoken of as thinking, 'the earth thinks (dhyayati) as it were,' and so on. Movelessness hence is characteristic of the intensely meditating person also, and such movelessness is to be realised in the sitting posture only.
10. And Smriti texts say the same.
Smriti texts also declare that he only who sits can meditate, 'Having placed his steady seat upon a pure spot, there seated upon that seat, concentrating his mind he should practise Yoga' (Bha. Gi. VI, 11-12).
11. Where concentration of mind (is possible), there; on account of there being no difference.
As the texts do not say anything as to special places and times, the only requisite of such places and times is that they should favour concentration of mind. This agrees with the declaration 'Let a man apply himself to meditation in a level and clean place, &c., favourable to the mind' (Svet. Up. II, 10).--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the sitting one.'
12. Up to death; for there also it is seen.
The question now arises whether the meditation described which is the means of final Release is to be accomplished within one day, or to be continued day after day, until death.--The view that it is accomplished within one day, as this will satisfy the scriptural injunction, is disposed of by the Sutra. Meditation is to be continued until death. For Scripture declares that meditation has to take place 'there,' i.e. in the whole period from the first effort after meditation up to death, 'Acting thus as long as life lasts he reaches the world of Brahman.'-- Here terminates the adhikarana of 'up to death.'
13. On the attainment of this, there result the non-clinging and the destruction of later and earlier sins; this being declared.
Having, so far, elucidated the nature of meditation, the Sutras now begin to consider the result of meditation. Scripture declares that on the knowledge of Brahman being attained a man's later and earlier sins do not cling to him but pa.s.s away. 'As water does not cling to a lotus leaf, so no evil deed clings to him who knows this' (Ch. Up. IV, 14, 3); 'Having known that he is not sullied by any evil deed' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 23); 'As the fibres of the Ishika reed when thrown into the fire are burnt, thus all his sins are burnt' (Ch. Up. V, 24, 3); 'All his works perish when He has been beheld who is high and low' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8).-- The doubt here arises whether this non-clinging and destruction of all sins is possible as the result of mere meditation, or not.--It is not possible, the Purvapakshin maintains; for Scripture declares, 'no work the fruits of which have not been completely enjoyed perishes even in millions of aeons.' What the texts, quoted above, say as to the non- clinging and destruction of works occurs in sections complementary to pa.s.sages inculcating knowledge as the means of final Release, and may therefore be understood as somehow meant to eulogize knowledge. Nor can it be said that knowledge is enjoined as an expiation of sins, so that the destruction of sins could be conceived as resulting from such expiation; for knowledge--as we see from texts such as 'He who knows Brahman reaches the Highest,' 'He knows Brahman and he becomes Brahman'-- is enjoined as a means to reach Brahman. The texts as to the non- clinging and destruction of sins therefore can only be viewed as arthavada pa.s.sages supplementary to the texts enjoining knowledge of Brahman.--This view the Sutra sets aside. When a man reaches knowledge, the non-clinging and destruction of all sins may be effected through the power of knowledge. For Scripture declares the power of knowledge to be such that 'to him who knows this, no evil deed clings,' and so on. Nor is this in conflict with the text stating that no work not fully enjoyed perishes; for this latter text aims at confirming the power of works to produce their results; while the texts under discussion have for their aim to declare that knowledge when once sprung up possesses the power of destroying the capability of previously committed sins to produce their own evil results and the power of obstructing that capability on the part of future evil actions. The two sets of texts thus refer to different matters, and hence are not mutually contradictory. There is in fact no more contradiction between them than there is between the power of fire to produce heat and the power of water to subdue such heat. By knowledge effecting the non-clinging of sin we have to understand its obstructing the origination of the power, on the part of sin, to cause that disastrous disposition on the part of man which consists in unfitness for religious works; for sins committed tend to render man unfit for religious works and inclined to commit further sinful actions of the same kind. By knowledge effecting the destruction of sin, on the other hand, we understand its destroying that power of sin after it has once originated. That power consists, fundamentally, in displeasure on the part of the Lord. Knowledge of the Lord, which, owing to the supreme dearness of its object is itself supremely dear, possesses the characteristic power of propitiating the Lord--the object of knowledge-- and thus destroys the displeasure of the Lord due to the previous commission of sins on the part of the knowing Devotee; and at the same time obstructs the origination of further displeasure on the Lord's part, which otherwise would be caused by sins committed subsequently to the origination of such knowledge. What Scripture says about sin not clinging to him who knows can however be understood only with regard to such sins as spring from thoughtlessness; for texts such as 'he who has not turned away from evil conduct' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 24) teach that meditation, becoming more perfect day after day, cannot be accomplished without the Devotee having previously broken himself off from all evil conduct.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the reaching of that.'
14. Of the other also there is thus non-clinging; but at death.
It has been said that, owing to knowledge, earlier and subsequent sins do not cling and are destroyed. The same holds good also with regard to the other, i.e. to good works--they also, owing to knowledge, do not cling and are destroyed; for there is the same antagonism between knowledge and the fruit of those works, and Scripture moreover expressly declares this. Thus we read, 'Day and night do not pa.s.s that bank-- neither good nor evil deeds. All sins turn back from it' (Ch. Up. VIII, 4, 1); 'He shakes off his good and evil deeds' (Kau. Up. I, 4). In the former of these texts good works are expressly designated as 'sin'
because their fruits also are something not desirable for him who aims at Release; there is some reason for doing this because after all good works are enjoined by Scripture and their fruits are desired by men, and they hence might be thought not to be opposed to knowledge.--But even to him who possesses the knowledge of Brahman, the fruits of good deeds-- such as seasonable rain, good crops, &c.--are desirable because they enable him to perform his meditations in due form; how then can it be said that knowledge is antagonistic to them and destroys them?--Of this point the Sutra disposes by means of the clause 'but on death.' Good works which produce results favourable to knowledge and meditation perish only on the death of the body (not during the lifetime of the Devotee).--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the other.'
15. But only those former works the effects of which have not yet begun; on account of that being the term.
A new doubt arises here, viz. whether all previous good and evil works are destroyed by the origination of knowledge, or only those the effects of which have not yet begun to operate.--All works alike, the Purvapakshin says; for the texts-as e.g. 'all sins are burned'--declare the fruits of knowledge to be the same in all cases; and the fact of the body continuing to exist subsequently to the rise of knowledge may be accounted for by the force of an impulse once imparted, just as in the case of the revolution of a potter's wheel.--This view the Sutra sets aside. Only those previous works perish the effects of which have not yet begun to operate; for the text 'For him there is delay as long as he is not delivered from the body' (Ch. Up. VI, 14, 2) expressly states when the delay of the body's death will come to an end (the body meanwhile continuing to exist through the influence of the anarabdhakarya works). There is no proof for the existence of an impetus accounting for the continuance of the body's life, other than the Lord's pleasure or displeasure caused by--good or evil deeds.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the works the operation of which has not yet begun.'
16. But the Agnihotra and the rest, (because they tend) to that effect only; this being seen.
It might here be said that special works inc.u.mbent on the several asramas, as e. g. the Agnihotra, need not be undertaken by those who are not desirous of their results, since these works also fall under the category of good works the result of which does not 'cling.'--This view the Sutra sets aside. Such works as the Agnihotra must be performed, since there is no possibility of their results not clinging; for him who knows, those works have knowledge for their exclusive effect. This we learn from Scripture itself: 'Him Brahmanas seek to know by the study of the Veda, by sacrifices, gifts, austerities, and fasting.' This pa.s.sage shows that works such as the Agnihotra give rise to knowledge, and as knowledge in order to grow and become more perfect has to be practised day after day until death, the special duties of the asrama also, which a.s.sist the rise of knowledge, have daily to be performed. Otherwise, those duties being omitted, the mind would lose its clearness and knowledge would not arise.--But if good works such as the Agnihotra only serve the purpose of giving rise to knowledge, and if good works previous to the rise of knowledge perish, according to the texts 'Having dwelt there till their works are consumed' (Ch. Up. V, 10, 5) and 'having obtained the end of his deeds' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 6), to what then applies the text 'His sons enter upon his inheritance, his friends upon his good works'?--This point is taken up by the next Sutra.