The Vedanta-Sutras with the Commentary by Ramanuja Part 52

In the meditation on prana, according to the Vajasaneyins and the Chandogas, there is a statement as to all food being allowed to him who knows the prana. 'By him there is nothing eaten that is not food' (Bri.

Up. VI, 1, 14; and so on). A doubt here arises whether this permission of all food is valid for him who possesses the knowledge of prana, in all circ.u.mstances, or only in the case of life being in danger.--The Purvapakshin holds the former view, on account of no special conditions being stated in the text.--This the Sutra sets aside 'in the case of danger to life'; for the reason that, as the text shows, the eating of food of all kinds is permitted even for those who know Brahman itself-- the knowledge of which of course is higher than that of prana--only when their life is in danger. The text alluded to is the one telling how Ushasta Kakrayana, who was well versed in the knowledge of Brahman, once, when in great distress, ate unlawful food. We therefore conclude that what the text says as to all food being lawful for him who knows prana, can refer only to occasions when food of any kind must be eaten in order to preserve life.

29. And on account of non-sublation.

The conclusion above arrived at is confirmed by the consideration that thus only those texts are not stultified which enjoin, for those who know Brahman, purity in matters of food with a view to the origination of knowledge of Brahman. Cp.' when the food is pure the mind becomes pure' (Ch. Up. VII, 26, 2).

30. This is said in Smriti also.

That for those as well who know Brahman, as for others, the eating of food of any kind is lawful only in case of extreme need, Smriti also declares, 'He who being in danger of his life eats food from anywhere is stained by sin no more than the lotus leaf by water.'

31. And hence also a scriptural pa.s.sage as to non-proceeding according to liking.

The above conclusion is further confirmed by a scriptural pa.s.sage prohibiting licence of conduct on the part of any one. The text meant is a pa.s.sage in the Samhita of the Kathas, 'Therefore a Brahmawa does not drink spirituous liquor, thinking "may I not be stained by sin."'--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the allowance of all food.'

32. The works of the asramas also, on account of their being enjoined.

It has been said that sacrifices and other works are auxiliary to the knowledge of Brahman. The doubt now arises whether those works are to be performed by him also who merely wishes to fulfil the duties of his asrama, without aiming at final Release, or not. They are not, the Purvapakshin holds, for that things auxiliary to knowledge should stand in subordinate relation to a certain state of life would imply the contradiction of permanent and non-permanent obligation.--Of this view the Sutra disposes, 'The works of the asramas also.' The works belonging to each asrama have to be performed by those also who do not aim at more than to live according to the asrama; for they are specifically enjoined by texts such as as long as life lasts he is to offer the Agnihotra'; this implies a permanent obligation dependent on life. And that the same works are also to be performed as being auxiliary to knowledge appears from the texts enjoining them in that aspect, 'Him they seek to know by the study of the Veda' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22); this the next Sutra declares.

33. And on account of co-operativeness.

These works are to be performed also on account of their being co- operative towards knowledge in so far, namely, as they give rise to the desire of knowledge; and their thus being enjoined for a double purpose does not imply contradiction any more than the double injunctions of the Agnihotra, which one text connects with the life of the sacrificer and another text with his desire to reach the heavenly world.--Nor does this imply a difference of works--this the next Sutra declares.

34. In any case they are the same, on account of twofold inferential signs.

There is no radical difference of works; but in any case, i.e. whether they be viewed as duties inc.u.mbent on the asrama or as auxiliary to knowledge, sacrifices and other works are one and the same. For Scripture, in enjoining them in both these aspects, makes use of the same terms, so that we recognise the same acts, and there is no means of proof to establish difference of works.

35. And Scripture also declares (knowledge) not to be overpowered.

Texts such as 'By works of sacred duty he drives away evil' declare that sacrifices and similar works have the effect of knowledge 'not being overpowered,' i.e. of the origination of knowledge not being obstructed by evil works. Sacrifices and similar works being performed day after day have the effect of purifying the mind, and owing to this, knowledge arises in the mind with ever increasing brightness. This proves that the works are the same in either case.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the being enjoined' (of sacrifices, and so on).

36. Also in the case of those outside, as this is seen.

It has been declared that the members of the four asramas have a claim to the knowledge of Brahman, and that the duties connected with each asrarna promote knowledge. A doubt now arises whether those men also who, on account of poverty and so on, stand outside the asramas are qualified for the knowledge of Brahman, or rtot.--They are not, the Purvapakshin holds, since such knowledge is to be attained in a way dependent on the special duties of each asrama; while those who do not belong to an asrama are not concerned with asrama duties.--This view the Sutra rejects. Those also who do not stand within any asrama are qualified for knowledge, 'because that is seen,' i.e. because the texts declare that men such as Raikva, Bhishma, Samvarta and others who did not belong to asrama were well grounded in the knowledge of Brahman. It can by no means be maintained that it is asrama duties only that promote knowledge; for the text 'by gifts, by penance, by fasting, and so on' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22) distinctly declares that charity also and other practices, which are not confined to the asramas, are helpful towards knowledge. In the same way as in the case of those bound to chast.i.ty--who, as the texts show, may possess the knowledge of Brahman--knowledge is promoted by practices other than the Agnihotra and the like, so--it is concluded--in the case of those also who do not belong to any abrama knowledge may be promoted by certain practices not exclusively connected with any asrama, such as prayer, fasting, charity, propitiation of the divinity, and so on.

37. Smriti also states this.

Smriti also declares that men not belonging to an asrama grow in knowledge through prayer and the like. 'Through prayer also a Brahmana may become perfect. May he perform other works or not, one who befriends all creatures is called a Brahmana' (Manu Smri. II, 17).

38. And there is the promotion (of knowledge) through special acts (of duty).

The above conclusion is founded not only on Reasoning and Smriti; but Scripture even directly states that knowledge is benefited by practices not exclusively prescribed for the asramas, 'By penance, abstinence, faith, and knowledge he is to seek the Self (Pr. Up. I, 10).

39. But better than that is the other also on account of an inferential mark.

Better than to be outside the asramas is the condition of standing within an asrama. The latter state may be due to misfortune; but he who can should be within an asrama, which state is the more holy and beneficial one. This follows from inference only, i.e. Smriti; for Smriti says, 'A Brahmana is to remain outside the asramas not even for one day.' For one who has pa.s.sed beyond the stage of Brahmakarya, or whose wife has died, the impossibility to procure a wife const.i.tutes the misfortune (which prevents him from belonging to an asrama).--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'widowers.'

40. But of him who has become that there is no becoming not that, according to Jaimini also, on account of (Scripture) restraining from the absence of the forms of that.

The doubt here arises whether those also who have fallen from the state of life of a Naishthika, Vaikhanasa or Parivrajaka are qualified for the knowledge of Brahman or not.--They are so, since in their case, no less than in that of widowers and the like, the growth of knowledge may be a.s.sisted by charity and other practices not confined to asramas.--This prima facie view the Sutra sets aside. 'He who has become that,' i.e. he who has entered on the condition of a Naishthika or the like 'cannot become not that,' i.e. may not live in a non-asrama condition; since scriptural texts restrain men who once have entered the Naishthika, &c., state 'from the absence of the forms of that,' i.e. from the discontinuance of the special duties of their asrama. Compare texts such as 'He is to go into the forest, and is not to return from thence'; 'Having renounced the world he is not to return.' And hence persons who have lapsed from their asrama are not qualified for meditation on Brahman. This view of his the Sutrakara strengthens by a reference to the opinion of Jaimini.--But cannot a Naishthika who, through some sin, has lapsed from his duties and position, make up for his transgression by some expiatory act and thus again become fit for meditation on Brahman?--To this point the next Sutra refers.

41. Nor the (expiatory performance) described in the chapter treating of qualification; that being impossible on account of the Smriti referring to such lapse.

Those expiatory performances which are described in the chapter treating of qualification (Pu. Mi. Su. VI) are not possible in the case of him who has lapsed from the condition of a Naishthika; since such expiations do not apply to him, as is shown by a Smriti text referring to such lapse, viz. 'He who having once entered on the duties of a Naishthika lapses from them, for such a slayer of the Self I do not see any expiatory work by which he might become clean.' The expiatory ceremony referred to in the Purva Mimamsa therefore applies to the case of other Brahmakarins only.

42. A minor one, thus some; (and hence they hold) the existence (of expiation), as in the case of eating. This has been explained.