The Vedanta-Sutras with the Commentary by Ramanuja Part 44

But what then is the ent.i.ty referred to in the text 'tato yad uttarataram '? (Svet. Up. III, 10)?--The pa.s.sage immediately preceding (8), 'I know that great person, &c.; a man who knows him pa.s.ses over death,' had declared that the knowledge of Brahman is the only way to immortality; and the clause (9), 'Higher than whom there is nothing else,'

had confirmed this by declaring that Brahman is the Highest and that there is no other thing higher. In agreement herewith we must explain stanza 10 as giving a reason for what had been said, 'Because that which is the highest (uttarataram), viz. the Supreme Person is without form and without suffering, therefore (tatah) those who know him become immortal,' &c. On any other explanation stanza 10 would not be in harmony with stanza 8 where the subject is introduced, and with what is declared in stanza 9.--a.n.a.logously in the text 'He goes to the divine Person who is higher than the highest' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 8) 'the highest'

means the aggregate soul (samasha-purusha), which in a previous pa.s.sage had been said to be 'higher than the high Imperishable' (II, 1, 2); and the 'higher' refers to the Supreme Person, with all his transcendent qualities, who is superior to the aggregate soul.

36. The omnipresence (possessed) by that, (understood) from the declaration of extent.

That omnipresence which is possessed 'by that,' i.e. by Brahman, and which is known 'from declarations of extent,' and so on, i.e. from texts which declare Brahman to be all-pervading, is also known from texts such as 'higher than that there is nothing.' Declarations of extent are e.g.

the following: 'By this Person this whole Universe is filled' (Svet. Up.

III. 9); 'whatever is seen or heard in this world, is pervaded inside and outside by Narayana' (Mahanar. Up.); 'The eternal, pervading, omnipresent, which the Wise consider as the source of all beings' (Mu.

Up. I, 1, 6). The 'and the rest' in the Satra comprises pa.s.sages such as 'Brahman indeed is all this,' 'The Self indeed is all this,' and the like. The conclusion is that the highest Brahman is absolutely supreme.-- Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the Highest.'

37. From thence the reward; on account of possibility.

It has been shown, for the purpose of giving rise to a desire for devout meditation, that the soul in all its states is imperfect, while the Supreme Person to be reached by it is free from imperfections, the owner of blessed qualities and higher than everything else. Being about to investigate the nature of meditation, the Sutrakara now declares that the meditating devotee receives the reward of meditation, i.e. Release, which consists in attaining to the highest Person, from that highest Person only: and that a.n.a.logously the rewards for all works prescribed by the Veda--whether to be enjoyed in this or the next world--come from the highest Person only. The Sutra therefore says generally, 'from thence the reward.'--'Why so?'--'Because that only is possible.'

For it is he only--the all-knowing, all-powerful, supremely generous one-- who being pleased by sacrifices, gifts, offerings, and the like, as well as by pious meditation, is in a position to bestow the different forms of enjoyment in this and the heavenly world, and Release which consists in attaining to a nature like his own. For action which is non- intelligent and transitory is incapable of bringing about a result connected with a future time.

38. And on account of scriptural declaration.

That he bestows all rewards--whether in the form of enjoyment or Release-- Scripture also declares 'This indeed is the great, the unborn Self, the eater of food, the giver of wealth' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 24); and 'For he alone causes delight' (Taitt. Up. II, 7).--Next a prima facie view is stated.

39. For the same reasons Jaimini (thinks it to be) religious action.

For the same reasons, viz. possibility and scriptural declaration, the teacher Jaimini thinks that religious works, viz. sacrifices, gifts, offerings, and meditation, of themselves bring about their rewards. For we observe that in ordinary life actions such as ploughing and the like, and charitable gifts and so on, bring about their own reward, directly or indirectly. And although Vedic works do not bring about their rewards immediately, they may do so mediately, viz. by means of the so-called _apurva_. This follows also from the form of the Vedic injunctions, such as 'He who is desirous of the heavenly world is to sacrifice.' As such injunctions enjoin sacrifices as the means of bringing about the object desired to be realised, viz. the heavenly world and the like, there is no other way left than to a.s.sume that the result (which is seen not to spring directly from the sacrifice) is accomplished by the mediation of the apurva.

40. But the former, Badarayana (thinks), on account of the designation (of deities) as the cause.

The reverend Badarayana maintains the previously declared awarding of rewards by the Supreme Person since the scriptural texts referring to the different sacrifices declare that the deities only, Agni, Vayu, and so on, who are propitiated by the sacrifices--which are nothing else but means to propitiate deities--are the cause of the rewards attached to the sacrifices. Compare texts such as 'Let him who is desirous of prosperity offer a white animal to Vayu. For Vayu is the swiftest G.o.d.

The man thus approaches Vayu with his proper share, and Vayu leads him to prosperity.' And the whole instruction which the texts give, as to the means by which men desirous of certain results are to effect those results, is required on account of the injunctions only, and hence it cannot be doubted that it has reference to the injunctions. The apparatus of means to bring about the results thus being learnt from the text only, no person acquainted with the force of the means of proof will a.s.sent to that apparatus, as stated by the text, being set aside and an apurva about which the text says nothing being fancifully a.s.sumed.

And that the imperative verbal forms of the injunctions denote as the thing to be effected by the effort of the sacrificer, only that which on the basis of the usage of language and grammatical science is recognised as the meaning of the root-element of such words as 'yajeta,' viz. the sacrifice (yaga), which consists in the propitiation of a divine being, and not some additional supersensuous thing such as the apurva, we have already proved above (p. 153 ff.). Texts such as 'Vayu is the swiftest G.o.d' teach that Vayu and other deities are the bestowers of rewards. And that it is fundamentally the highest Self--as const.i.tuting the inner Self of Vayu and other deities--which is pleased by offerings, and bestows rewards for them is declared by texts such as 'Offerings and pious works, all this he bears who is the nave of the Universe. He is Agni and Vayu, he is Sun and Moon' (Mahanar. Up. I, 6, 7). Similarly in the antaryamin-brahmana, 'He who dwells in Vayu, of whom Vayu is the body'; 'He who dwells in Agni,' &c. Smriti expresses itself similarly, 'Whatsoever devotee wishes to worship with faith whatsoever divine form, of him do I make that faith unshakable. Endued with such faith he endeavours to propitiate him and obtains from him his desires--those indeed being ordained by me' (Bha. Gi. VII, 21-22); 'For I am the enjoyer and the Lord of all sacrifices' (IX, 24)--where Lord means him who bestows the reward for the sacrifices. 'To the G.o.ds go the worshippers of the G.o.ds, and those devoted to me go to me' (VII, 23). In ordinary life men, by agriculture and the like, acquire wealth in various forms, and by means of this propitiate their king, either directly or through his officials and servants; and the king thereupon is seen to reward them in a manner corresponding to the measure of their services and presents. The Vedanta-texts, on the other hand, give instruction on a subject which transcends the sphere of all the other means of knowledge, viz. the highest Person who is free from all shadow even of imperfection, and a treasure-house as it were of all exalted qualities in their highest state of perfection; on sacrifices, gifts, oblations, which are helpful towards the propitiation of that Person; on praise, worship, and meditation, which directly propitiate him; and on the rewards which he, thus propitiated, bestows, viz. temporal happiness and final Release.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'reward.'

THIRD PADA.

1. What is understood from all the Vedanta-texts (is one), on account of the non-difference of injunction and the rest.

The Sutras have stated whatever has to be stated to the end of rousing the desire of meditation-concluding with the fact that Brahman bestows rewards. Next the question is introduced whether the vidyas (i.e. the different forms of meditation on Brahman which the Vedanta-texts enjoin) are different or non-different, on the decision of which question it will depend whether the qualities attributed to Brahman in those vidyas are to be comprised in one act of meditation or not.--The first subordinate question arising here is whether one and the same meditation-- as e.g. the vidya of Vaisvanara--which is met with in the text of several sakhas, const.i.tutes one vidya or several.--The vidyas are separate, the Purvapakshin maintains; for the fact that the same matter is, without difference, imparted for a second time, and moreover stands under a different heading--both which circ.u.mstances necessarily attend the text's being met with in different sakhas--proves the difference of the two meditations. It is for this reason only that a restrictive injunction, such as the one conveyed in the text, 'Let a man tell this science of Brahman to those only who have performed the rite of carrying fire on their head' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 10)--which restricts the impaiting of knowledge to the Atharvanikas, to whom that rite is peculiar--has any sense; for if the vidyas were one, then the rite mentioned, which is a part of the vidya, would be valid for the members of other sakhas also, and then the restriction enjoined by the text would have no meaning.-- This view is set aside by the Sutra, 'What is understood from all the Vedanta-texts' is one and the same meditation, 'because there is non- difference of injunction and the rest.' By injunction is meant the injunction of special activities denoted by different verbal roots--such as upasita 'he should meditate,' vidyat 'he should know.' The and the rest' of the Sutra is meant to comprise as additional reasons the circ.u.mstances mentioned in the Purva Mimamsa-sutras (II, 4, 9). Owing to all these circ.u.mstances, non-difference of injunction and the rest, the same vidya is recognised in other sakhas also. In the Chaandogya (V, 12, 2) as well as in the Vajasaneyaka we meet with one and the same injunction (viz. 'He should meditate on Vaisvanara'). The form (character, rupa) of the meditations also is the same, for the form of a cognition solely depends on its object; and the object is in both cases the same, viz. Vaisvanara. The name of the two vidyas also is the same, viz. the knowledge of Vaisvanara. And both vidyas are declared to have the same result, viz. attaining to Brahman. All these reasons establish the ident.i.ty of vidyas even in different sakhas.--The next Sutra refers to the reasons set forth for his view by the Purvapakshin and refutes them.

2. If it be said (that the vidyas are not one) on account of difference, we deny this, since even in one (vidya there may be repet.i.tion).

If it be said that there is no oneness of vidya, because the fact of the same matter being stated again without difference, and being met with in a different chapter, proves the object of injunction to be different; we reply that even in one and the same vidya some matter may be repeated without any change, and under a new heading (in a different chapter); if, namely, there is difference of cognising subjects. Where the cognising person is one only, repet.i.tion of the same matter under a new heading can only be explained as meaning difference of object enjoined, and hence separation of the two vidyas. But where the cognising persons are different (and this of course is eminently so in the case of different sakhas), the double statement of one and the same matter explains itself as subserving the cognition of those different persons, and hence does not imply difference of matter enjoined.--The next Sutra refutes the argument founded on a rite enjoined in the Mundaka.

3. For (the sirovrata) concerns the mode of the study of the Veda; also on account of (that rite) being a heading in the samakara; and the restriction is like that of the libations.

What the text says as to a restriction connected with the 'vow of the head,' does not intimate a difference of vidyas. For that vow does not form part of the vidya. The restriction refers only to a peculiarity of the _study_ of the Veda on the part of the Atharvanikas, being meant to establish that they should possess that special qualification which the rite produces; but it does not affect the vidya itself. This is proved by the subsequent clause, 'a man who has not performed that rite may not _read_ the text,' which directly connects the rite with the studying of the text. And it is further proved by the fact that in the book of the Atharvanikas, called 'samakara,' that rite is referred to as a rite connected with the Veda (not with the special vidya set forth in the Mundaka), viz. in the pa.s.sage, 'this is explained already by the Veda- observance' (which extends the details of the sirovrata, there called veda-vrata, to other observances). By the _knowledge of Brahman_ (referred to in the Mundaka-text 'let a man tell this science of Brahman to those only,' &c.), we have therefore to understand knowledge of the Veda in general. And that restriction is 'like that of the libations'--i. e. it is a.n.a.logous to the restriction under which the sava-libations, beginning with the Saptasurya-libation, and terminating with the Sataudana-libation, are offered in the one fire which is used by the followers of the Atharvan, and not in the ordinary three fires.

4. Scripture also declares this.

Scripture also shows that (identical) meditation is what all the Vedanta- texts intimate. The Chandogya (VIII, 1, 1 ff.) declares that that which is within the small s.p.a.ce in the heart is to be enquired into, and then in reply to the question what the thing to be enquired into is, says that it is the highest Self possessing the eight attributes, freedom from all evil and the rest, which is to be meditated upon within the heart. And then the Taittiriya-text, referring to this declaration in the Chandogya, says, 'Therein is a small s.p.a.ce, free from all grief; what is within that is to be meditated upon' (Mahanar. Up. X, 23), and thus likewise enjoins meditation on the highest Self possessing the eight qualities. And this is possible only if, owing to unity of vidya, the qualities mentioned in the first text are included also in the meditation enjoined in the second text.--Having thus established the unity of meditations, the Sutras proceed to state the practical effect of such unity.

5. (Meditation) thus being equal, there is combination (of gunas); on account of non-difference of purport in the case of what subserves injunction.

The meditation in all Vedanta-texts thus being the same, the qualities mentioned in one text are to be combined with those mentioned in another; 'on account of non-difference of purport in the case of what subserves injunction.' We find that in connexion with certain injunctions of meditation--such as the meditation on Vaisvanara, or the small ether within the heart--the text of some individual Vedanta-book mentions certain secondary matters (qualities, guna) which subserve that meditation; and as these gunas are connected with the meditation they are to be comprised in it, so that they may accomplish their aim, i.e.

of subserving the meditation. For the same reason therefore we have to enclose in the meditation gunas mentioned in other Vedanta-texts; for being also connected with the meditation they subserve it in the same way.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'what is intimated by all Vedanta-texts.

6. If it be said that there is difference on account of the text; we say no; on account of non-difference.

So far it has been shown that the non-difference of injunction, and so on, establishes the unity of meditations, and that owing to the latter the special features of meditation enjoined in different texts have to be combined. Next, an enquiry is entered upon whether in the case of certain particular meditations there actually exists, or not, that non- difference of injunction which is the cause of meditations being recognised as identical. A meditation on the Udgitha is enjoined in the text of the Chandogas, as well as in that of the Vajasaneyins (Ch. Up. I, 2; Bri. Up. I, 3); and the question arises whether the two are to be viewed as one meditation or not. The Purvapakshin maintains the former alternative. For, he says, there is no difference of injunction, and so on, since both texts enjoin as the object of meditation the Udgitha viewed under the form of Prana; since there is the same reward promised in both places, viz. mastering of one's enemies; since the form of meditation is the same, the Udgitha being in both cases viewed under the form of Prana; since the injunction is the same, being conveyed in both cases by the same verbal root (vid, to know); and since both meditations have the same technical name, viz. udgitha-vidya. The Sutra states this view in the form of the refutation of an objection raised by the advocate of the final view. We do not admit, the objector says, the unity maintained by you, since the texts clearly show a difference of form. The text of the Vajasaneyins represents as the object of meditation that which is the agent in the act of singing out the Udgitha; while the text of the Chandogas enjoins meditation on what is the object of the action of singing out (i. e. the Udgitha itself). This discrepancy establishes difference in the character of the meditation, and as this implies difference of the object enjoined, the mere non- difference of injunction, and so on, is of no force, and hence the two meditations are separate ones.--This objection the Purvapakshin impugns, 'on account of non-difference.' For both texts, at the outset, declare that the Udgitha is the means to bring about the conquest of enemies (Let us overcome the Asuras at the sacrifices by means of the Udgitha'

(Bri. Up.); 'The G.o.ds took the Udgitha, thinking they would with that overcome the Asuras'--Ch. Up.). In order therefore not to stultify this common beginning, we must a.s.sume that in the clause 'For them that breath sang out' (Bri. Up.), the Udgitha, which really is the object of the action of singing, is spoken of as the agent. Otherwise the term udgitha in the introductory pa.s.sage ('by means of the Udgitha') would have to be taken as by implication denoting the agent (while directly it indicates the instrument).--Hence there is oneness of the two vidyas.-- Of this view the next Sutra disposes.

7. Or not, on account of difference of subject-matter; as in the case of the attribute of being higher than the high, and so on.

There is no unity of the two vidyas, since the subject-matter of the two differs. For the tale in the Chandogya-text, which begins 'when the Devas and the Asuras struggled together,' connects itself with the pranava (the syllable Om) which is introduced as the object of meditation in Chand. I, 1, 1, 'Let a man meditate on the syllable Om as the Udgitha'; and the clause forming part of the tale,'they meditated on that chief breath as Udgitha.' therefore refers to a meditation on the pranava which is a part only of the Udgitha. In the text of the Vaja- saneyins; on the other hand, there is nothing to correspond to the introductory pa.s.sage which in the Chandogya-text determines the subject- matter, and the text clearly states that the meditation refers to the whole Udgitha (not only the pranava). And this difference of leading subject-matter implies difference of matter enjoined, and this again difference of the character of meditation, and hence there is no unity of vidyas. Thus the object of meditation for the Chandogas is the pranava viewed under the form of Prana; while for the Vajasaneyins it is the Udgatri (who sings the Udgitha), imaginatively identified with Prana.

Nor does there arise, on this latter account, a contradiction between the later and the earlier part of the story of the Vajasaneyins. For as a meditation on the Udgatri necessarily extends to the Udgitha, which is the object of the activity of singing, the latter also helps to bring about the result, viz. the mastering of enemies.--There is thus no unity of vidya, although there may be non-difference of injunction, and so on.-- 'As in the case of the attribute of being higher than the high,' &c. In one and the same sakha there are two meditations, in each of which the highest Self is enjoined to be viewed under the form of the pranava (Ch.