The Vedanta-Sutras with the Commentary by Ramanuja Part 36

42. (The soul is) a part, on account of the declarations of difference and otherwise; some also record (that Brahman is of) the nature of slaves, fishermen, and so on.

The Sutras have declared that the individual soul is an agent, and as such dependent on the highest Person. The following question now arises-- Is the individual soul absolutely different from Brahman? or is it nothing else than Brahman itself in so far as under the influence of error? or is it Brahman in so far as determined by a limiting adjunct (upadhi)? or is it a part (amsa) of Brahman?--The doubt on this point is due to the disagreement of the scriptural texts.--But this whole matter has already been decided under Su. II, 1, 22.--True. But as a difficulty presents itself on the ground of the conflicting nature of the texts-- some a.s.serting the difference and some the unity of the individual soul and Brahman--the matter is here more specially decided by its being proved that the soul is a part of Brahman. As long as this decision remains unsettled, the conclusions arrived at under the two Sutras referred to, viz. that the soul is non-different from Brahman and that Brahman is 'additional' to the soul, are without a proper basis.

Let it then first be said that the soul is absolutely different from Brahman, since texts such as 'There are two, the one knowing, the other not knowing, both unborn, the one strong, the other weak' (Svet. Up. I, 9) declare their difference. Texts which maintain the non-difference of a being which is knowing and another which is not knowing, if taken literally, convey a contradiction--as if one were to say, 'Water the ground with fire'!-and must therefore be understood in some secondary metaphorical sense. To hold that the individual soul is a part of Brahman does not explain matters; for by a 'part' we understand that which const.i.tutes part of the extension of something. If, then, the soul occupied part of the extension of Brahman, all its imperfections would belong to Brahman. Nor can the soul be a part of Brahman if we take 'part' to mean a _piece_ (khanda); for Brahman does not admit of being divided into pieces, and moreover, the difficulties connected with the former interpretation would present themselves here also. That something absolutely different from something else should yet be a part of the latter cannot in fact be proved.

Or else let it be said that the soul is Brahman affected by error (bhrama). For this is the teaching of texts such as 'Thou art that'; 'this Self is Brahman.' Those texts, on the other hand, which declare the difference of the two merely restate what is already established by perception and the other means of knowledge, and therefore are shown, by those texts the purport of which it is to teach non-duality not established by other means, to lie--like perception and the other means of knowledge themselves--within the sphere of Nescience.

Or let it be a.s.sumed, in the third place, that the individual soul is Brahman as determined by a beginningless limiting adjunct (upadhi). For it is on this ground that Scripture teaches the Self to be Brahman. And that upadhi must not be said to be a mere erroneous imagination, for on that view the distinction of bondage, release, and so on, would be impossible.

Against all these views the Sutra declares that the soul is a part of Brahman; since there are declarations of difference and also 'otherwise,'

i.e. declarations of unity. To the former cla.s.s belong all those texts which dwell on the distinction of the creator and the creature, the ruler and the ruled, the all-knowing and the ignorant, the independent and the dependent, the pure and the impure, that which is endowed with holy qualities and that which possesses qualities of an opposite kind, the lord and the dependent. To the latter cla.s.s belong such texts as 'Thou art that' and 'this Self is Brahman.' Some persons even record that Brahman is of the nature of slaves, fishermen, and so on. The Atharvanikas, that is to say, have the following text,' Brahman are the slaves. Brahman are these fishers,' and so on; and as Brahman there is said to comprise within itself all individual souls, the pa.s.sage teaches general non-difference of the Self. In order, then, that texts of both these cla.s.ses may be taken in their primary, literal sense, we must admit that the individual soul is a part of Brahman. Nor is it a fact that the declarations of difference refer to matters settled by other means of knowledge, such as perception and so on, and on that account are mere reiterations of something established otherwise (in consequence of which they would have no original proving force of their own, and would be sublated by the texts declaring non-duality). For the fact that the soul is created by Brahman, is ruled by it, const.i.tutes its body, is subordinate to it, abides in it, is preserved by it, is absorbed by it, stands to it in the relation of a meditating devotee, and through its grace attains the different ends of man, viz. religious duty, wealth, pleasure and final release--all this and what is effected thereby, viz.

the distinction of the soul and Brahman, does not fall within the cognisance of perception and the other means of proof, and hence is not established by something else. It is therefore not true that the texts declaring the creation of the world, and so on, are mere reiterations of differences established by other means of authoritative knowledge, and hence have for their purport to teach things that are false.--[Nor will it do to say that the texts declaring duality teach what indeed is not established by other means of knowledge but is erroneous.] 'Brahman conceives the thought of differentiating itself, forms the resolution of becoming many, and accordingly creates the ether and the other elements, enters into them as individual soul, evolves all the different forms and names, takes upon himself all the pleasures and pains which spring from experiencing the infinite mult.i.tude of objects thus const.i.tuted, abides within and inwardly rules all beings, recognises itself in its jiva- condition to be one with the universal causal Brahman, and finally accomplishes its release from the samsara and the body of sacred doctrine by which this release is effected'--all this the Veda indeed declares, but its real purport is that all this is only true of a Brahman under the influence of an illusion, and therefore is unreal!-- while at the same time Brahman is defined as that the essential nature of which is absolutely pure intelligence! Truly, if such were the purport of the Veda, what more would the Veda be than the idle talk of a person out of his mind!

Nor finally is there any good in the theory of the soul being Brahman in so far as determined by a limiting adjunct. For this view also is in conflict with the texts which distinguish Brahman as the ruling and the soul as the ruled principle, and so on. One and the same Devadatta does not become double as it were--a ruler on the one hand and a ruled subject on the other--because he is determined by the house in which he is, or by something else.

In order to be able to account for the twofold designations of the soul, we must therefore admit that the soul is a _part_ of Brahman.

43. And on account of the mantra.

'One part (quarter) of it are all beings, three feet (quarters) of it are the Immortal in heaven' (Ch. Up. III, 12, 6)--on account of this mantra also the soul must be held to be a part of Brahman. For the word 'foot' denotes a part. As the individual souls are many the mantra uses the plural form 'all beings.' In the Sutra (42) the word 'part' is in the singular, with a view to denote the whole cla.s.s. For the same reason in II, 3, 18 also the word 'atman' is in the singular. For that the individual Selfs are different from the Lord, and are many and eternal, is declared by texts such as 'He who, eternal and intelligent, fulfils the desires of many who likewise are eternal and intelligent' (Ka. Up.

II, 5, 13). Since thus the plurality of the eternal individual Selfs rests on good authority, those who have an insight into the true nature of Selfs will discern without difficulty different characteristics distinguishing the individual Selfs, although all Selfs are alike in so far as having intelligence for their essential nature. Moreover the Sutra II, 3, 48 directly states the plurality of the individual Selfs.

44. Moreover it is so stated in Smriti.

Smriti moreover declares the individual soul to be a part of the highest Person, 'An eternal part of myself becomes the individual soul (jiva) in the world of life' (Bha. Gi. XV, 7). For this reason also the soul must be held to be a part of Brahman.

But if the soul is a part of Brahman, all the imperfections of the soul are Brahman's also! To this objection the next Sutra replies.

45. But as in the case of light and so on. Not so is the highest.

The 'but' discards the objection. 'Like light and so on.' The individual soul is a part of the highest Self; as the light issuing from a luminous thing such as fire or the sun is a part of that body; or as the generic characteristics of a cow or horse, and the white or black colour of things so coloured, are attributes and hence parts of the things in which those attributes inhere; or as the body is a part of an embodied being. For by a part we understand that which const.i.tutes one place (desa) of some thing, and hence a distinguishing attribute (viseshna) is a part of the thing distinguished by that attribute. Hence those a.n.a.lysing a thing of that kind discriminate between the _distinguishing_ clement or part of it, and the _distinguished_ element or part. Now although the distinguishing attribute and the thing distinguished thereby stand to each other in the relation of part and whole, yet we observe them to differ in essential character. Hence there is no contradiction between the individual and the highest Self--the former of which is a viseshana of the latter--standing to each other in the relation of part and whole, and their being at the same time of essentially different nature. This the Sutra declares 'not so is the highest,' i.e. the highest Self is not of the same nature as the individual soul. For as the luminous body is of a nature different from that of its light, thus the highest Self differs from the individual soul which is a part of it. It is this difference of character--due to the individual soul being the distinguishing clement and the highest Self being the substance distinguished thereby--to which all those texts refer which declare difference. Those texts, on the other hand, which declare non-difference are based on the circ.u.mstance that attributes which are incapable of separate existence are ultimately bound to the substance which they distinguish, and hence are fundamentally valid.

That in declarations such as 'Thou art that' and 'this Self is Brahman,'

the words _thou_ and _Self_, no less than the words _that_ and _Brahman_, denote Brahman in so far as having the individual souls for its body, and that thus the two sets of words denote fundamentally one and the same thing, has been explained previously.

46. And Smriti texts declare this.

That the world and Brahman stand to each other in the relation of part and whole, the former being like the light and the latter like the luminous body, or the former being like the power and the latter like that in which the power inheres, or the former being like the body and the latter like the soul; this Parasara also and other Smriti writers declare, 'As the light of a fire which abides in one place only spreads all around, thus this whole world is the power (sakti) of the highest Brahman.' The 'and' in the Sutra implies that scriptural texts also ('of whom the Self is the body' and others) declare that the individual Self is a part of Brahman in so far as it is its body.

But if all individual souls are equal in so far as being alike parts of Brahman, alike actuated by Brahman, and alike knowing subjects, what is the reason that, as Scripture teaches, some of them are allowed to read the Veda and act according to its injunctions, while others are excluded therefrom; and again that some are to see, feel, and so on, while others are excluded from these privileges?--This question is answered by the next Sutra.

47. Permission and exclusion (result) from connexion with a body; as in the case of light and so on.

Although all souls are essentially of the same nature in so far as they are parts of Brahman, knowing subjects and so on, the permissions and exclusions referred to are possible for the reason that each individual soul is joined to some particular body, pure or impure, whether of a Brahmana or Kshattriya or Vaisya or Sudra, and so on. 'As in the case of fire and so on.' All fire is of the same kind, and yet one willingly fetches fire from the house of a Brahmana, while one shuns fire from a place where dead bodies are burnt. And from a Brahmana one accepts food without any objection, while one refuses food from a low person.

48. And on account of non-connectedness there is no confusion.

Although the souls, as being parts of Brahman and so on, are of essentially the same character, they are actually separate, for each of them is of atomic size and resides in a separate body. For this reason there is no confusion or mixing up of the individual spheres of enjoyment and experience. The Sutrakara introduces this reference to an advantage of his own view of things, in order to intimate that the views of the soul being Brahman deluded or else Brahman affected by a limiting adjunct are on their part incapable of explaining how it is that the experiences of the individual Self and the highest Self, and of the several individual Selfs, are not mixed up.

But may not, on the view of the soul being Brahman deluded, the distinction of the several spheres of experience be explained by means of the difference of the limiting adjuncts presented by Nescience?--This the next Sutra negatives.

49. And it is a mere apparent argument.

The argumentation by which it is sought to prove that that being whose nature is const.i.tuted by absolutely uniform light, i.e. intelligence, is differentiated by limiting adjuncts which presuppose an obscuration of that essential nature, is a mere apparent (fallacious) one. For, as we have shown before, obscuration of the light of that which is nothing but light means destruction of that light.--If we accept as the reading of the Sutra 'abhasah' (in plural) the meaning is that the various reasons set forth by the adherents of that doctrine are all of them fallacious.

The 'and' of the Sutra is meant to point out that that doctrine, moreover, is in conflict with texts such as 'thinking himself to be different from the Mover'(Svet. Up. I, 6); 'there are two unborn ones, one a ruler, the other not a ruler' (I, 9); 'of those two one eats the sweet fruit' (V, 6); and others. For even if difference is due to upadhis which are the figment of Nescience, there is no escaping the conclusion that the spheres of experience must be mixed up, since the theory admits that the thing itself with which all the limiting adjuncts connect themselves is one only.

But this cannot be urged against the theory of the individual soul being Brahman in so far as determined by real limiting adjuncts; for on that view we may explain the difference of spheres of experience as due to the beginningless adrishtas which are the cause of the difference of the limiting adjuncts!--To this the next Sutra replies.

50. On account of the non-determination of the adrishtas.

As the adrishtas also which are the causes of the series of upadhis have for their substrate Brahman itself, there is no reason for their definite allotment (to definite individual souls), and hence again there is no definite separation of the spheres of experience. For the limiting adjuncts as well as the adrishtas cannot by their connexion with Brahman split up Brahman itself which is essentially one.

51. And it is thus also in the case of purposes and so on.

For the same reason there can be no definite restriction in the case of purposes and so on which are the causes of the, different adrishtas. (For they also cannot introduce plurality into Brahman that is fundamentally one.)