The Vedanta-Sutras with the Commentary by Ramanuja Part 22

9. But she begins with light; for thus some read in their text.

The 'but' has a.s.sertory force. 'Light' in the Sutra means Brahman, in accordance with the meaning of the term as known from texts such as 'On him the G.o.ds meditate, the light of lights' (Bri. Up. X, 4, 16); 'That light which shines beyond heaven' (Ch. Up. III, 13, 7). 'She begins with light' thus means 'she has Brahman for her cause.'--'For thus some read in their text,' i.e. because the members of one Sakha, viz the Taittiriyas read in their text that this 'aja' has Brahman for her cause.

The Mahanarayana-Upanishad (of the Taittiriyas) at first refers to Brahman abiding in the hollow of the heart as the object of meditation.

'Smaller than the small, greater than the great, the Self placed in the hollow of this creature'; next declares that all the worlds and Brahma and the other G.o.ds originated from that Self; and then says that there sprung from it also this aja which is the cause of all 'The one aja (goat), red, white and black, which gives birth to numerous offspring of the same shape, one aja (he-goat) loves and lies by her; another one forsakes her after having enjoyed her.' The subject-matter of the entire section evidently is to give instruction as to the whole aggregate of things other than Brahman originating from Brahman and thus having its Self in it; hence we conclude that also the aja which gives birth to manifold creatures like her, and is enjoyed by the soul controlled by karman, while she is abandoned by the soul possessing true knowledge is, no less than vital airs, seas, mountains, &c., a creature of Brahman, and hence has its Self in Brahman. We then apply to the interpretation of the Svetasvatara-text the meaning of the a.n.a.logous Mahanarayana-text, as determined by the complementary pa.s.sages, and thus arrive at the conclusion that the aja in the former text also is a being having its Self in Brahman. That this is so, moreover, appears from the Svetasvatara itself. For in the early part of that Upanishad, we have after the introductory question, 'Is Brahman the cause?' the pa.s.sage 'The sages devoted to meditation and concentration have seen the person whose Self is the divinity, hidden in its own qualities' (I, 1, 3); which evidently refers to the aja as being of the nature of a power of the highest Brahman. And as further on also (viz. in the pa.s.sages 'From that the Mayin creates all this, and in this the other is bound up through Maya'; 'Know then Prakriti to be Maya and the Great Lord the ruler of Maya'; and 'he who rules every place of birth,' V, 9-11) the very same being is referred to, there remains not even a shadow of proof for the a.s.sertion that the mantra under discussion refers to an independent Prakriti as a.s.sumed by the Sankhyas.

But a further objection is raised, if the Prakriti denoted by aja begins with, i.e. is caused by Brahman, how can it be called aja, i.e. the non- produced one; or, if it is non-produced, how can it be originated by Brahman? To this the next Sutra replies.

10. And on account of the teaching of formation (i.e. creation) there is no contradiction; as in the case of the honey.

The 'and' expresses disposal of a doubt that had arisen. There is no contradiction between the Prakriti being aja and originating from light.

On account of instruction being given about the formation (kalpana), i.e.

creation of the world. This interpretation of 'kalpana' is in agreement with the use of the verb klip in the text, 'as formerly the creator made (akalpayat) sun and moon.'

In our text the sloka 'from that the Lord of Maya creates all this'

gives instruction about the creation of the world. From that, i.e. from matter in its subtle causal state when it is not yet divided, the Lord of all creates the entire Universe. From this statement about creation we understand that Prakriti exists in a twofold state according as it is either cause or effect. During a pralaya it unites itself with Brahman and abides in its subtle state, without any distinction of names and forms; it then is called the 'Unevolved,' and by other similar names. At the time of creation, on the other hand, there reveal themselves in Prakriti Goodness and the other gunas, it divides itself according to names and forms, and then is called the 'Evolved,' and so on, and, transforming itself into fire, water, and earth, it appears as red, white, and black. In its causal condition it is aja, i.e. unborn, in its effected condition it is 'caused by light, i.e. Brahman'; hence there is no contradiction. The case is a.n.a.logous to that of the 'honey.' The sun in his causal state is one only, but in his effected state the Lord makes him into honey in so far namely as he then, for the purpose of enjoyment on the part of the Vasus and other G.o.ds, is the abode of nectar brought about by sacrificial works to be learned from the Rik and the other Vedas; and further makes him to rise and to set. And between these two conditions there is no contradiction. This is declared in the Madhuvidya (Ch. Up. III), from 'The sun is indeed the honey of the Devas,'

down to 'when from thence he has risen upwards he neither rises nor sets; being one he stands in the centre'--'one' here means 'of one nature.'--The conclusion therefore is that the Svetasvatara mantra under discussion refers to Prakriti as having her Self in Brahman, not to the Prakriti a.s.sumed by the Sankhyas.

Others, however, are of opinion that the one aja of which the mantra speaks has for its characteristics light, water, and earth. To them we address the following questions. Do you mean that by what the text speaks of as an aja, consisting of fire, water, and earth, we have to understand those three elements only; or Brahman in the form of those three elements; or some power or principle which is the cause of the three elements? The first alternative is in conflict with the circ.u.mstance that, while fire, water, and earth are several things, the text explicitly refers to _one_ Aja. Nor may it be urged that fire, water, and earth, although several, become one, by being made tripart.i.te (Ch. Up. VI, 3, 3); for this making them tripart.i.te, does not take away their being several; the text clearly showing that each several element becomes tripart.i.te, 'Let me make each of these three divine beings tripart.i.te.'--The second alternative again divides itself into two alternatives. Is the one aja Brahman in so far as having pa.s.sed over into fire, water, and earth; or Brahman in so far as abiding within itself and not pa.s.sing over into effects? The former alternative is excluded by the consideration that it does not remove plurality (which cannot be reconciled with the _one_ aja). The second alternative is contradicted by the text calling that aja red, white, and black; and moreover Brahman viewed as abiding within itself cannot be characterised by fire, water, and earth. On the third alternative it has to be a.s.sumed that the text denotes by the term 'aja' the three elements, and that on this basis there is imagined a causal condition of these elements; but better than this a.s.sumption it evidently is to accept the term 'aja' as directly denoting the causal state of those three elements as known from scripture.

Nor can we admit the contention that the term 'aja' is meant to teach that Prakriti should metaphorically be viewed as a she-goat; for such a view would be altogether purposeless. Where--in the pa.s.sage 'Know the Self to be him who drives in the chariot'--the body, and so on, are compared to a chariot, and so on, the object is to set forth the means of attaining Brahman; where the sun is compared to honey, the object is to ill.u.s.trate the enjoyment of the Vasus and other G.o.ds; but what similar object could possibly be attained by directing us to view Prakriti as a goat? Such a metaphorical view would in fact be not merely useless; it would be downright irrational. Prakriti is a non-intelligent principle, the causal substance of the entire material Universe, and const.i.tuting the means for the experience of pleasure and pain, and for the final release, of all intelligent souls which are connected with it from all eternity. Now it would be simply contrary to good sense, metaphorically to transfer to Prakriti such as described the nature of a she-goat--which is a sentient being that gives birth to very few creatures only, enters only occasionally into connexion with others, is of small use only, is not the cause of herself being abandoned by others, and is capable of abandoning those connected with her. Nor does it recommend itself to take the word aja (understood to mean 'she-goat') in a sense different from that in which we understand the term 'aja'

which occurs twice in the same mantra.--Let then all three terms be taken in the same metaphorical sense (aja meaning he-goat).--It would be altogether senseless, we reply, to compare the soul which absolutely dissociates itself from Prakriti ('Another aja leaves her after having enjoyed her') to a he-goat which is able to enter again into connexion with what he has abandoned, or with anything else.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the cup.'

11. Not from the mention of the number even, on account of the diversity and of the excess.

The Vajasaneyins read in their text 'He in whom the five "five-people"

and the ether rest, him alone I believe to be the Self; I, who know, believe him to be Brahman' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 17). The doubt here arises whether this text be meant to set forth the categories as established in Kapila's doctrine, or not.--The Purvapakshin maintains the former view, on the ground that the word 'five-people,' qualified by the word 'five,'

intimates the twenty-five categories of the Sankhyas. The compound 'five- people' (pankajanah) denotes groups of five beings, just as the term panka-pulyah denotes aggregates of five bundles of gra.s.s. And as we want to know how many such groups there are, the additional qualification 'five' intimates that there are five such groups; just as if it were said 'five five-bundles, i. e. five aggregates consisting of five bundles each.' We thus understand that the 'five five-people' are twenty- five things, and as the mantra in which the term is met with refers to final release, we recognise the twenty-five categories known from the Sankhya-smriti which are here referred to as objects to be known by persons desirous of release. For the followers of Kapila teach that 'there is the fundamental causal substance which is not an effect. There are seven things, viz. the Mahat, and so on, which are causal substances as well as effects. There are sixteen effects. The soul is neither a causal substance nor an effect' (San. Ka. 3). The mantra therefore is meant to intimate the categories known from the Sankhya.--To this the Sutra replies that from the mention of the number twenty-five supposed to be implied in the expression 'the five five-people,' it does not follow that the categories of the Sankhyas are meant. 'On account of the diversity,' i.e. on account of the five-people further qualified by the number five being different from the categories of the Sankhyas. For in the text 'in whom the five five-people and the ether rest,' the 'in whom' shows the five-people to have their abode, and hence their Self, in Brahman; and in the continuation of the text, 'him I believe the Self,'

the 'him' connecting itself with the preceding 'in whom' is recognised to be Brahman. The five five-people must therefore be different from the categories of the Sankhya-system. 'And on account of the excess.'

Moreover there is, in the text under discussion, an excess over and above the Sankhya categories, consisting in the Self denoted by the relative p.r.o.noun 'in whom,' and in the specially mentioned Ether. What the text designates therefore is the Supreme Person who is the Universal Lord in whom all things abide--such as he is described in the text quoted above, 'Therefore some call him the twenty-sixth, and others the twenty-seventh.' The 'even' in the Sutra is meant to intimate that the 'five five-people' can in no way mean the twenty-five categories, since there is no pentad of groups consisting of five each. For in the case of the categories of the Sankhyas there are no generic characteristics or the like which could determine the arrangement of those categories in fives. Nor must it be urged against this that there is a determining reason for such an arrangement in so far as the tattvas of the Sankhyas form natural groups comprising firstly, the five organs of action; secondly, the five sense-organs; thirdly, the five gross elements; fourthly, the subtle parts of those elements; and fifthly, the five remaining tattvas; for as the text under discussion mentions the ether by itself, the possibility of a group consisting of the five gross elements is precluded. We cannot therefore take the compound 'five people' as denoting a group consisting of five const.i.tuent members, but, in agreement with Pan. II, 1, 50, as merely being a special name. There are certain beings the special name of which is 'five-people,' and of these beings the additional word 'panka' predicates that they are five in number. The expression is thus a.n.a.logous to the term 'the seven seven- rishis' (where the term 'seven-rishis' is to be understood as the name of a certain cla.s.s of rishis only).--Who then are the beings called 'five- people?'--To this question the next Sutra replies.

12. The breath, and so on, on the ground of the complementary pa.s.sage.

We see from a complementary pa.s.sage, viz. 'They who know the breath of breath, the eye of the eye, the ear of the ear, the food of food, the mind of mind,' that the 'five-people' are the breath, and eye, and so on, all of which have their abode in Brahman.

But, an objection is raised, while the mantra 'in whom the five five- people,' &c., is common to the Kanvas and the Madhyandinas, the complementary pa.s.sage 'they who know the breath of breath,' &c., in the text of the former makes no mention of food, and hence we have no reason to say that the 'five-people' in their text are the breath, eye, and so on.

To this objection the next Sutra replies.

13. By light, food not being (mentioned in the text) of some.

In the text of some, viz. the Kanvas, where food is not mentioned, the five-people are recognised to be the five senses, owing to the phrase 'of lights' which is met with in another complementary pa.s.sage. In the mantra, 'him the G.o.ds worship as the light of lights,' which precedes the mantra about the 'five-people,' Brahman is spoken of as the light of lights, and this suggests the idea of certain lights the activity of which depends on Brahman. The mantra leaves it undetermined what these lights are; but from what follows about the 'five-people,' &c., we learn that what is meant are the senses which light up as it were their respective objects. In 'the breath of breath' the second 'breath' (in the genitive case) denotes the sense-organ of touch, as that organ is connected with air, and as the vital breath (which would otherwise suggest itself as the most obvious explanation of prana) does not harmonise with the metaphorical term 'light.' 'Of the eye' refers to the organ of sight; 'of the ear' to the organ of hearing. 'Of food'

comprises the senses of smell and taste together: it denotes the sense of smell on the ground that that sense is connected with earth, which may be 'food,' and the sense of taste in so far as 'anna' may be also explained as that by means of which eating goes on (adyate). 'Of mind'

denotes mind, i. e. the so-called internal organ. Taste and smell thus being taken in combination, we have the required number of five, and we thus explain the 'five-people' as the sense-organs which throw light on their objects, together with the internal organ, i.e. mind. The meaning of the clause about the 'five-people' therefore is that the senses-- called 'five-people'--and the elements, represented by the Ether, have their basis in Brahman; and as thus all beings are declared to abide in Brahman, the five 'five-people' can in no way be the twenty-five categories a.s.sumed by the Sankhyas.--The general Conclusion is that the Vedanta-texts, whether referring to numbers or not, nowhere set forth the categories established in Kapila's system.

14. And on account of (Brahman) as described being declared to be the cause with regard to Ether, and so on.

Here the philosopher who holds the Pradhana to be the general cause comes forward with another objection. The Vedanta-texts, he says, do not teach that creation proceeds from one and the same agent only, and you therefore have no right to hold that Brahman is the sole cause of the world. In one place it is said that our world proceeded from 'Being', 'Being only this was in the beginning' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 1). In other places the world is said to have sprung from 'Non-being', 'Non-being indeed this was in the beginning' (Taitt. Up. II, 7, i); and 'Non-being only was this in the beginning; it became Being' (Ch. Up. III, 19, 1).

As the Vedanta-texts are thus not consequent in their statements regarding the creator, we cannot conclude from them that Brahman is the sole cause of the world. On the other hand, those texts do enable us to conclude that the Pradhana only is the universal cause. For the text 'Now all this was then undeveloped' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 7) teaches that the world was merged in the undeveloped Pradhana. and the subsequent clause, 'That developed itself by form and name,' that from that Undeveloped there resulted the creation of the world. For the Undeveloped is that which is not distinguished by names and forms, and this is none other than the Pradhana. And as this Pradhana is at the same time eternal, as far as its essential nature is concerned, and the substrate of all change, there is nothing contradictory in the different accounts of creation calling it sometimes 'Being' and sometimes 'Non-being'; while, on the other hand, these terms cannot, without contradiction, both be applied to Brahman. The causality of the Undeveloped having thus been ascertained, such expressions as 'it _thought_, may I be many,' must be interpreted as meaning its being about to proceed to creation. The terms 'Self' and 'Brahman' also may be applied to the Pradhana in so far as it is all-pervading (atman from apnoti), and preeminently great (brihat).

We therefore conclude that the only cause of the world about which the Vedanta-texts give information is the Pradhana.

This view is set aside by the Sutra. The word _and_ is used in the sense of _but_. It is possible to ascertain from the Vedanta-texts that the world springs from none other than the highest Brahman, which is all- knowing, lord of all, free from all shadow of imperfection, capable of absolutely realising its purposes, and so on; since scripture declares Brahman as described to be the cause of Ether, and so on. By 'Brahman as described' is meant 'Brahman distinguished by omniscience and other qualities, as described in the Sutra "that from which the origination, and so on, of the world proceed," and in other places.' That Brahman only is declared by scripture to be the cause of Ether, and so on, i.e.

the being which is declared to be the cause in pa.s.sages such as 'From that Self sprang Ether' (Taitt. Up. II, 1); 'that sent forth fire'(Ch.

Up. VI, 2, 3), is none other than Brahman possessing omniscience and similar qualities. For the former of these texts follows on the pa.s.sage 'The True, intelligence, infinite is Brahman; he reaches all desires together with the intelligent Brahman,' which introduces Brahman as the general subject-matter--that Brahman being then referred to by means of the connecting words 'from that.' In the same way the 'that' (in 'that sent forth fire') refers back to the omniscient Brahman introduced in the clause 'that thought, may I be many.' This view is confirmed by a consideration of all the accounts of creation, and we hence conclude that Brahman is the sole cause of the world.--But the text 'Non-being indeed this was in the beginning' calls the general cause 'something that is not'; how then can you say that we infer from the Vedanta-texts as the general cause of the world a Brahman that is all-knowing, absolutely realises its purposes, and so on?--To this question the next Sutra replies.

15. From connexion.

The fact is that Brahman intelligent, consisting of bliss, &c., connects itself also with the pa.s.sage 'Non-being was this in the beginning'

(Taitt. Up. II, 7). For the section of the text which precedes that pa.s.sage (viz. 'Different from this Self consisting of understanding is the Self consisting of Bliss;--he wished, may I be many;--he created all whatever there is. Having created he entered into it; having entered it he became sat and tyat') clearly refers to Brahman consisting of Bliss, which realises its purposes, creates all beings, and entering into them is the Self of all. When, therefore, after this we meet with the sloka ('Non-being this was in the beginning') introduced by the words 'On this there is also this sloka'--which shows that the sloka is meant to throw light on what precedes; and when further or we have the pa.s.sage 'From fear of it the wind blows' &c., which, referring to the same Brahman, predicates of it universal rulership, bliss of nature, and so on; we conclude with certainty that the sloka about 'Non-being' also refers to Brahman. As during a pralaya the distinction of names and forms does not exist, and Brahman also then does not exist in so far as connected with names and forms, the text applies to Brahman the term 'Non-being.' The text 'Non-being only this was in the beginning' explains itself in the same way.--Nor can we admit the contention that the text 'Now all this was then undeveloped 'refers to the Pradhana as the cause of the world; for the Undeveloped there spoken of is nothing else but Brahman in so far as its body is not yet evolved. For the text continues 'That same being entered thither to the very tips of the finger-nails;' 'When seeing, eye by name; when hearing, ear by name; when thinking, mind by name;' 'Let men meditate upon him as Self;' where the introductory words 'that same being' refer back to the Undeveloped--which thus is said to enter into all things and thereby to become their ruler. And it is known from another text also (Ch. Up. VI, 3, 2) that it is the all-creative highest Brahman which enters into its creation and evolves names and forms. The text 'Having entered within, the ruler of creatures, the Self of all' moreover shows that the creative principle enters into its creatures for the purpose of ruling them, and such entering again cannot be attributed to the non-sentient Pradhana. The Undeveloped therefore is Brahman in that state where its body is not yet developed; and when the text continues 'it developed itself by names and forms' the meaning is that Brahman developed itself in so far as names and forms were distinguished in the world that const.i.tutes Brahman's body. On this explanation of the texts relating to creation we further are enabled to take the thought, purpose, &c., attributed to the creative principle, in their primary literal sense. And, we finally remark, neither the term 'Brahman' nor the term 'Self in any way suits the Pradhana, which is neither absolutely great nor pervading in the sense of entering into things created with a view to ruling them. It thus remains a settled conclusion that Brahman is the sole cause of the world.--Here terminates the adhikarana of '(Brahman's) causality.'

16. Because it denotes the world.

The Sankhya comes forward with a further objection. Although the Vedanta-texts teach an intelligent principle to be the cause of the world, they do not present to us as objects of knowledge anything that could be the cause of the world, apart from the Pradhana and the soul as established by the Sankhya-system. For the Kaus.h.i.takins declare in their text, in the dialogue of Balaki and Ajatasatru, that none but the enjoying (individual) soul is to be known as the cause of the world, 'Shall I tell you Brahman? He who is the maker of those persons and of whom this is the work (or "to whom this work belongs") he indeed is to be known' (Kau. Up. IV, 19). Balaki at the outset proposes Brahman as the object of instruction, and when he is found himself not to know Brahman, Ajatasatru instructs him about it, 'he indeed is to be known.'

But from the relative clause 'to whom this work belongs,' which connects the being to be known with work, we infer that by Brahman we have here to understand the enjoying soul which is the ruler of Prakriti, not any other being. For no other being is connected with work; work, whether meritorious or the contrary, belongs to the individual soul only. Nor must you contest this conclusion on the ground that 'work' is here to be explained as meaning the object of activity, so that the sense of the clause would be 'he of whom this entire world, as presented by perception and the other means of knowledge, is the work.' For in that case the separate statements made in the two clauses, 'who is the maker of those persons' and 'of whom this is the work,' would be devoid of purport (the latter implying the former). Moreover, the generally accepted meaning of the word 'karman,' both in Vedic and worldly speech, is work in the sense of good and evil actions. And as the origination of the world is caused by actions of the various individual souls, the designation of 'maker of those persons' also suits only the individual soul. The meaning of the whole pa.s.sage therefore is 'He who is the cause of the different persons that have their abode in the disc of the sun, and so on, and are instrumental towards the retributive experiences of the individual souls; and to whom there belongs karman, good and evil, to which there is due his becoming such a cause; _he_ indeed is to be known, _his_ essential nature is to be cognised in distinction from Prakriti.' And also in what follows, 'The two came to a person who was asleep. He pushed him with a stick,' &c., what is said about the sleeping man being pushed, roused, &c., all points only to the individual soul being the topic of instruction. Further on also the text treats of the individual soul only, 'As the master feeds with his people, nay as his people feed on the master, thus does this conscious Self feed with the other Selfs.' We must consider also the following pa.s.sage--which contains the explanation given by Ajatasatru to Balaki, who had been unable to say where the soul goes at the time of deep sleep--' There are the arteries called Hitas. In these the person is; when sleeping he sees no dream, then he (or that, i.e. the aggregate of the sense-organs) becomes one with this prana alone. Then speech goes to him with all names, &c., the mind with all thoughts. And when he awakes, then, as from a burning fire sparks proceed in all directions, thus from that Self the pranas proceed each towards its place, from the pranas the G.o.ds, from the G.o.ds the worlds.' The individual soul which pa.s.ses through the states of dream, deep sleep and waking, and is that into which there are merged and from which there proceed speech and all the other organs, is here declared to be the abode of deep sleep 'then it (viz. the aggregate of the organs) becomes one in that prana.' Prana here means the individual soul in so far as supporting life; for the text continues 'when _that_ one awakes' and neither the vital breath nor the Lord (both of whom might be proposed as explanations of prana) can be said to be asleep and to wake. Or else 'asmin prane' might be explained as 'in the vital breath (which abides) in the individual soul,' the meaning of the clause being 'all the organs, speech and so on, become one in the vital breath which itself abides in this soul.'

The word 'prana' would thus be taken in its primary literal sense; yet all the same the soul const.i.tutes the topic of the section, the vital breath being a mere instrument of the soul. The Brahman mentioned at the outset therefore is none other than the individual soul, and there is nothing to prove a lord different from it. And as the attributes which the texts ascribe to the general cause, viz. thought and so on, are attributes of intelligent beings only, we arrive at the conclusion that what const.i.tutes the cause of the world is the non-intelligent Pradhana guided by the intelligent soul.

This prima facie view the Sutra disposes of, by saying 'because (the work) denotes the world.' It is not the insignificant individual soul-- which is under the influence of its good and evil works, and by erroneously imputing to itself the attributes of Prakriti becomes the cause of the effects of the latter--that is the topic of our text; but rather the Supreme Person who is free from all shadow of imperfection such as Nescience and the like, who is a treasure of all possible auspicious qualities in their highest degree of perfection, who is the sole cause of this entire world. This is proved by the circ.u.mstance that the term 'work' connected with 'this' (in 'of whom this (is) the work') denotes the Universe which is an effect of the Supreme Person. For the word 'this' must, on account of its sense, the general topic of the section and so on, be taken in a non-limited meaning, and hence denotes the entire world, as presented by Perception and the other means of knowledge, with all its sentient and non-sentient beings. That the term 'work' does not here denote good and evil actions, appears from the following consideration of the context. Balaki at first offers to teach Brahman ('Shall I tell you Brahman?') and thereupon holds forth on various persons abiding in the sun, and so on, as being Brahman.

Ajatasatru however refuses to accept this instruction as not setting forth Brahman, and finally, in order to enlighten Balaki, addresses him 'He, O Balaki, who is the maker of those persons,' &c. Now as the different personal souls abiding in the sun, &c., and connected with karman in the form of good and evil actions, are known already by Balaki, the term 'karman'--met with in the next clause--is clearly meant to throw light on some Person so far not known to Balaki, and therefore must be taken to mean not good and evil deeds or action in general, but rather the entire Universe in so far as being the outcome of activity.

On this interpretation only the pa.s.sage gives instruction about something not known before. Should it be said that this would be the case also if the subject to which the instruction refers were the true essential nature of the soul, indicated here by its connexion with karman, we reply that this would involve the (objectionable) a.s.sumption of so-called implication (lakshana), in so far namely as what the clause would directly intimate is (not the essential nature of the soul as free from karman but rather) the connexion of the soul with karman. Moreover if the intention of the pa.s.sage were this, viz. to give instruction as to the soul, the latter being pointed at by means of the reference to karman, the intention would be fully accomplished by saying 'to whom karman belongs, he is to be known;' while in the text as it actually stands 'of whom this is the karman' the 'this' would be unmeaning. The meaning of the two separate clauses 'who is the maker of those persons'

and 'of whom this is the work' is as follows. He who is the creator of those persons whom you called Brahman, and of whom those persons are the creatures; he of whom this entire world is the effect, and before whom all things sentient and non-sentient are equal in so far as being produced by him; he, the highest and universal cause, the Supreme Person, is the object to be known. The meaning implied here is--although the origination of the world has for its condition the deeds of individual souls, yet those souls do not independently originate the means for their own retributive experience, but experience only what the Lord has created to that end in agreement with their works. The individual soul, hence, cannot stand in creative relation to those persons.--What the text under discussion inculcates as the object of knowledge therefore is the highest Brahman which is known from all Vedanta-texts as the universal cause.

17. Should it be said that this is not so on account of the inferential marks of the individual soul and the chief vital air; we reply that this has been explained before.