The United States Since the Civil War Part 29

Relations with j.a.pan have been a cause for negotiation on several occasions. During the Russo-j.a.panese War, which came to a close in 1905, American sympathies were mainly with the j.a.panese. The correspondence which brought about a cessation of hostilities was initiated by President Roosevelt, and the peace conference was held in Portsmouth, New Hampshire. During the course of the sessions American sympathies shifted somewhat to the Russian side, and when the j.a.panese did not receive all that they demanded of Russia they felt somewhat dissatisfied.

A subject which seemed at times to contain unpleasant possibilities was the restriction of j.a.panese immigration into the United States. The western part of the country, especially California, has objected vigorously to the presence of the j.a.panese on the coast, and as j.a.pan refused to agree to such a treaty as that which restricts Chinese immigration, recourse was had to the Root-Takahira agreement of 1908, by which the j.a.panese government itself undertook to prevent the emigration of laborers to the United States. It was more difficult to reach an agreement concerning j.a.panese who were already living in the United States. In 1913 the legislature of California had before it a law forbidding certain aliens from holding land in the state. As the act would apply almost solely to the j.a.panese, the federal government was placed in an embarra.s.sing position. Under existing treaties the j.a.panese were granted equal rights with other aliens, but the states were able to modify the practical operation of treaty provisions, as California planned to do, by declaring certain aliens ineligible to citizenship and then placing particular restrictions upon them. The Secretary of State, William J. Bryan, went to California and attempted to persuade the state authorities to alter their land laws. Although the law was eventually pa.s.sed, it was modified to the extent of allowing j.a.panese to lease agricultural lands for terms not greater than three years.

In 1917, Robert Lansing, the American Secretary of State, and Viscount Ishii, special amba.s.sador of j.a.pan, reached an important agreement concerning American relations in the Orient. By it the United States admitted the interest of j.a.pan in China, but the two placed themselves on record as mutually opposed to the acquisition by any government of special rights in China that would affect the independence or the territorial integrity of that country. Nevertheless j.a.pan had already forced China in 1915 to grant her territorial and economic concessions that const.i.tuted a grave menace to Chinese independence, and final settlement between the two awaited later events.

It is impossible at the present time to give an accurate account of American relations with Mexico during the decade preceding 1920. Mexico and Mexican affairs are but ill understood in the United States; and the purposes and acts of the chief figure in the most important events, President Wilson, will not be fully known until papers are made public and explanations presented that only he can give. His conduct of Mexican affairs, moreover, had to face constant change on account of the outbreak and progress of a European war in 1914, and many critical decisions had to be arrived at during 1915-1916 when political partisanship in the United States was at fever heat and when the most bitter opponents of the administration were ready to pounce upon every act and hold it up to public scorn. Nor is the exact character of some of the pressure brought to bear upon the President fully known.

American capital in vast amounts had gone into Mexico as into other parts of Latin America. Mining companies, railroad, ranching and plantation companies, and private individuals had invested in a land that has been called "the storehouse of the world," because of its fabulous resources in mineral wealth and fertile soil. In 1912 President Taft said that American investments had been estimated at one billion dollars. President Wilson in 1916 warned the public that agents of American property owners in Mexico were scattered along the border originating rumors which were unjustified by facts, in order to bring about intervention for the benefit of investors. For these reasons most accounts of Mexican relations, whether they uphold or condemn the steps taken by the administration, are rendered defective by prejudice or lack of information. It is possible, therefore, to give only a bare narrative of a few of the most important events following 1910.

The strong hand of Porfirio Diaz ruled Mexico from 1877 to 1880 and from 1884 to 1911. The government was autocratic; the resources of the country were in the hands of foreigners; and while a few magnates were wealthy, the ma.s.s of the people were poor and ignorant. The country was infested with bands of robbers, but Diaz managed to control them and even made some of the leaders governors of states. Such was the country that is separated from Arizona and New Mexico by an imaginary line and from Texas by a narrow river that shrinks in summer almost to a bed of sand.

In 1910 Francisco Madero organized a revolt, compelled Diaz to flee to Europe in 1911, and was himself chosen President. Taft meanwhile had sent troops to the border, stray bullets from across the line killed a few American citizens and the demand for intervention began. Madero was soon overthrown by General Victoriano Huerta, who became provisional president. Shortly afterward Madero was shot under circ.u.mstances that pointed to Huerta as the instigator of the a.s.sa.s.sination, but his friends kept the fires of revolt alive, and Governor Carranza of Coahuila, the state across the border from northwest Texas, refused to recognize the new ruler. It was at this juncture that Wilson succeeded Taft. General Huerta was promptly recognized by the leading European nations but President Wilson refused to do so, on the ground that the new government was founded on violence, in defiance of the const.i.tution of Mexico and contrary to the dictates of morality. He then sent John Lind to Mexico to convey terms to Huerta--peace, amnesty and a free election at which Huerta himself would not be a candidate. When the latter refused the proposal, President Wilson warned Americans to leave Mexico and adopted the policy of "watchful waiting," hoping that Huerta would be eliminated through inability to get funds to administer his government. In the meanwhile the destruction of lives and property continued.

War was barely avoided in the spring of 1914 when a boat's crew of American marines was imprisoned in Tampico. An apology was made, but General Huerta refused to order a salute to the United States flag, and troops were accordingly landed at Vera Cruz, where slight encounters ensued. At this juncture Argentina, Brazil and Chile, "the ABC powers"

made a proposal of mediation which was accepted. The conference averted war between the United States and Mexico, although failing to solve the questions at issue. Shortly afterward, however, Huerta retired from the field unable to continue his dictatorship, and the American troops were withdrawn.

The end was not yet however. Carranza and his a.s.sociate, Villa, fell to quarreling. Bands of ruffians made raids across the border, and Mexico became more than before a desolate waste peopled with fighting factions. At President Wilson's suggestion six Latin-American powers met in Washington in 1915 for conference, and decided to recognize Carranza as the head of a _de facto_ government. Diplomatic relations were then renewed after a lapse of two and a half years. In a message to Congress the President reviewed the imbroglio, but expressed doubts whether Mexico had been benefited.

His fears soon proved to be well founded. In 1916 Villa crossed into New Mexico and raided the town of Columbus. With the consent of Carranza the United States sent troops under General Pershing across the line to run down the bandits, but the only result was to drive the Villistas from the region near the border. Renewed raids, this time into Texas, indicated the need of larger forces and the state militia were called upon, but after nearly a year of service they were withdrawn early in 1917. Not long afterward Carranza was elected president for a term of four years, but in 1920 another revolt ended in his a.s.sa.s.sination. The country is in a condition of wretchedness, and neither life nor property is safe from bands of marauders, President Wilson has patiently attempted to give Mexico a chance to work out her own salvation without hindrance from other countries and without exploitation by investors,--but the problem remains unsettled.[9]

In view of some aspects of the foreign relations of the United States since 1914, it is apparent that such diplomatic incidents as those concerned with boundaries, fisheries and Latin-American protectorates were not the most important forces in determining the outlook of America upon Europe. In spite of the huge immigration of Europeans into America since the Civil War, the United States has seldom drawn upon European experience and has never sought to model itself on European lines. American legislators have not commonly studied either English or continental practices; our inst.i.tutions and our const.i.tutional limitations have been so peculiarly our own that slight attention has been paid to the outside world. Even the ancient resentment against England had dwindled by 1914, leaving the United States without any traditional "enemy." Tradition, as well as geographical isolation, tended to keep us apart from the currents of European action.

Nevertheless America was being inter-related with the rest of the world through means with which the diplomats had little to do. In 1867 the Atlantic cable had finally been placed in successful operation, and forty years afterward the globe was enmeshed in 270,000 miles of submarine telegraph wires. In 1901 wireless telegraphic messages were sent across the ocean, and within a few years private and press notices were being sent across the Atlantic, vessels were commonly equipped with instruments, and international regulations concerning radio-telegraphy were adopted by the chief powers of the world. Most important of all was the constant pa.s.sage of merchant vessels shuttling back and forth between America and Europe, and weaving the two into one commercial fabric. With Great Britain, with Germany, with France, Italy and the Netherlands, during 1913, the United States exchanged products valued at nearly two and a half billion dollars. This was an amount more than twice as great as the entire trade with Europe twenty years before. Over half a billion dollars' worth was with Germany, to which country we sent cotton, copper, food-stuffs, lard and furs in return for fertilizers, drugs, dyes, cotton manufactures and toys. American corporations had branches in Germany, while German manufacturers invested hundreds of millions of dollars in factories here. So huge a volume of commerce concerned the welfare not only of the ordinary commercial cla.s.ses--ship owners, exporters and investors--but the much larger number of producers, manufacturers, miners, meat-packers, and farmers who directly and indirectly supplied the materials for export.

In the meantime a change was taking place in the att.i.tude of America toward world affairs. Inaccurate as it was to describe the United States as a world power at the time of the Spanish War, nevertheless the war itself and the colonial responsibilities which it entailed helped to a small degree to break down the isolation of America; frequent communication with Europe, and the expansion of American commerce tended in the same direction.

The international relations of the United States for the twenty years immediately preceding 1914 may then be briefly summarized. The one international problem which interested the greatest numbers of people was the best method of arriving at international peace. Other problems, except the Mexican question, were simple and inconspicuous, and the majority of Americans knew little of European politics or international relations. Only in the fields of communication and commerce was the United States becoming increasingly and intimately related to the remainder of the world, and the extent to which this change supplemented the effect of the war with Spain in broadening the American international outlook was a matter of conjecture.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

The general texts mentioned at the close of Chapter XIII continue to be useful.

On the Hague Conferences reliance should be placed upon G.F.W. Holls, _The Peace Conference at the Hague_ (1900), by the secretary of the American delegation; A.D. White, _Autobiography of Andrew D. White_ (2 vols., 1905), by a member of the delegation; J.W. Foster, _Arbitration and the Hague Court_ (1904); P.S. Beinsch, in _American Political Science Review_, II, 204 (Second Conference).

The best brief account of the acquisition of the ca.n.a.l strip is in Latane; Theodore Roosevelt's story is in his _Autobiography_ and his _Addresses and Presidential Messages_. On the Caribbean, C.L. Jones, _Caribbean Interests of the United States_ (1916). The Venezuela arbitrations are in _Senate Doc.u.ments_, 58th Congress, 3rd session, No.

119 (Serial Number 4769). The Alaskan boundary question is clearly discussed in Latane, with a good map, and J.W. Foster, _Diplomatic Memoirs_ (2 vols., 1909). _The Proceedings in the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Arbitration_ are in _Senate Doc.u.ment_ No. 870, 61st Congress, 3rd session (12 vols, 1912-1913): more briefly in G.G. Wilson, _Hague Arbitration Cases_ (1915). S.K. Hornbeck, _Contemporary Politics in the Far East_ (1916), is useful for Asiatic relations. Ogg, Fish, and the _American Year Book_ provide material on Mexican affairs.

[1] The Presidents and Secretaries of State during this period were as follows:

McKinley, 1897-1901; John Sherman, William R. Day, John Hay.

Roosevelt, 1901-1909; John Hay, Elihu Root, Robert Bacon.

Taft, 1909-1913; P.C. Knox.

Wilson, 1913-1921; W.J. Bryan, Robert Lansing, B. Colby.

[2] The French company had a concession on the isthmus and had already done considerable work.

[3] Roosevelt, after his retirement from office was widely reported as having said in an address at the University of California: "If I had followed traditional, conservative methods, I would have submitted a dignified state paper of probably two hundred pages to Congress, and the debate on it would have been going on yet; but I took the Ca.n.a.l Zone and let Congress debate." Cf. Jones, _Caribbean Interests_, 238-239.

[4] For the Roosevelt "threat," together with another version of the story, cf. Thayer, _Hay_, II, 284-289 and _North American Review_, Sept., 1919, 414-417, 418-420.

[5] Above, p. 289.

[6] The latest acquisition of the U.S. in the Caribbean Sea was the Virgin Islands which were purchased from Denmark in 1916.

[7] The American members of the Commission were Elihu Root, who was then Secretary of War, Senator H.C. Lodge, and ex-Senator George Turner. The English member was the Lord Chief Justice, Baron Alverstone; the Canadians were Sir Louis Amable Jette, Lieutenant Governor of Quebec, and Allen B. Aylesworth of Toronto.

[8] The American member of the tribunal was Judge George Gray. The closing argument for the United States was made by Elihu Root. Robert Lansing was one of the a.s.sociate counsel.

[9] The number of Americans killed in Mexico as given by the amba.s.sador in 1919 was as follows: 1911, 10; 1912, 6; 1913, 24; 1914, 30; 1915, 26; 1916, 46; 1917, 39; 1918, 31. N.Y. _Times_, July 20, 1919. For the revolution of 1920 consult N.Y. _Times_, May 16 ff.

CHAPTER XXIV

WOODROW WILSON

A definite account of the eventful years following 1913 can be written only after time has allayed partisanship; after long study of the social, economic and political history has separated the essential from the trivial; after papers that are now locked in private files have been opened to students; and after the pa.s.sage of years has given that perspective which alone can measure the wisdom or the folly of a policy. It will be little less difficult to make a just appraisal of the chief American partic.i.p.ants in those years, and particularly of President Woodrow Wilson. At present it is possible only to avoid partisanship so far as it can be done, read with open mind whatever doc.u.ments are available, and refrain from either praise or condemnation.

On all sides it is agreed that during his administration Wilson became one of the three or four world-figures, and for that reason his characteristics, as well as the events of his presidency demand unusual attention.

Woodrow Wilson was born in Staunton, Virginia, in 1856. His ancestors were Scotch-Irish and his father an educator and Presbyterian clergyman. After graduating from Princeton College he practiced law, studied history and politics, and taught these subjects at several different inst.i.tutions. Subsequently he became a professor at Princeton and later its President. He was a prolific and successful writer. His book on _Congressional Government_, for example, went through twenty-four impressions before he became President of the United States. _The State_, an account of the mechanism of government in ancient and modern times, and some of his portrayals of American history were hardly less in demand. His election as Governor of New Jersey in 1910 and his election to the presidency two years later have already been mentioned.

The outstanding characteristic of Wilson is a finely-organized, penetrating intelligence. Somewhat like a silent chess-player he thinks many moves in advance, a fact which makes it difficult to judge a single act of his without a knowledge of the whole plan. Before coming to the presidency he had long pondered on the proper and possible function of that office, and had drawn in imagination the outlines and many of the details of the role which he was to play.

Years of careful study had drilled him in the acc.u.mulation of facts.

As a specialist in polities and history he was accustomed to make up his mind on the basis of his own researches, and to change his judgments without embarra.s.sment when new facts presented themselves.

His literary style is characterized by precision, a close texture and frequently by suppressed emotion. He thinks on an international scale and with a profundity that often dwarfs a.s.sociates who are by no means pygmies themselves. An unbending will, an alert conscience, stubborn courage, restrained patience, political sagacity, a thoroughgoing belief in democracy and above all an instinctive understanding of the spiritual aspirations of the common people made him the most powerful political figure in America within a brief time after his accession to the presidency. On the other hand, his aloofness from counsel during the later part of his presidency exceeded that of Cleveland, and his abnormal self-reliance was greater than that of Roosevelt.

In reviewing the history of the years following 1913, it is necessary to have a sense of the immensity of the problems involved, as well as a restrained judgment and some knowledge of the chief actors.

Beginning in 1914, the great nations of Europe were constantly menaced by appalling dangers; their leaders were daily confronted with decisions of the utmost importance. Because of the close commercial, industrial and financial bonds between the two continents, America could not fail to be affected. She too was compelled to take her part in a drama which was far greater than any in which she had before engaged. Both the President and Congress were confronted with problems the solution of which would vitally affect not only the people of America, but the people of the world; never before had their decisions been so subject to the possibilities of mistakes which would certainly be momentous and might be tragic.

When Wilson and his party came into power in 1913, as the result of the schism among the Republicans, their position was by no means secure. The President had been elected by a distinct minority in the popular vote and his practical political experience had been less than that of any chief executive since Grant. His party had been in power so little since the Civil War that it had no body of experienced administrators from which to pick cabinet officers, and no corps of parliamentary leaders practiced in the task of framing and pa.s.sing a constructive program. The party as a whole was lacking in cohesion and had perforce played the role of destructive critic most of the time for more than half a century; its principles were untested in actual experience, and although its majority in the House was large, in the Senate its margin of control was so narrow as to suggest the near possibility of the failure of a party program. Wilson was under no illusions as to the circ.u.mstances of his election and he realized that both he and his party were on probation.

The appointment of the cabinet occasioned unusual interest. Bryan, the one Democrat who had a large and devoted personal following, became Secretary of State. His influence in nominating Wilson had been very great and the adherence of his admirers was necessary if the party was to be welded into an effective organization. Several of the other members of the cabinet proved themselves to be men of unusual capacity, and their ability to cooperate with one another provided the "teamwork" which the President was anxious to obtain.[1]

His conception of the part which the chief executive ought to play was a definite one. He looked upon the President as peculiarly the representative of the whole people in the federal government, as the leader of the party in power and as commissioned by the voting population to carry out the platform of principles upon which the party and its leader were elected. He believed that the unofficial leaders who are better known as "bosses" existed partly because of the absence of official leaders. As Governor of New Jersey he had acted on the principles that he had outlined for the chief executive of the nation, and upon his accession to the presidency he began at once to put into effect a similar program.

Congress was called for a special session on April 7, 1913, in order to revise the tariff. It was a dangerous task--one which had discredited the Democrats in 1894 and divided the Republicans in 1909--but plans had been laid with care in order to avoid previous mistakes. The Chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means in the House, Oscar W. Underwood, had begun the preparation of a bill during the session before and had discussed it with Democratic members of the Senate Committee on Finance, and with the President.

At the opening of the session Wilson broke the precedent established by Jefferson in 1801, and read his message personally to Congress, instead of sending it in written form to be read by a clerk. In substance the message expressed the President's conviction that the appearance of the chief executive in Congress would a.s.sist in developing the spirit of cooperation, and outlined the tariff problem which they were together called upon to settle. He declared that the country wished the tariff changed, that the task ought to be completed as quickly as possible and that no special privileges ought to be granted to anybody. He advocated a tariff on articles which we did not produce and upon luxuries, but he urged that otherwise the schedules be reduced vigorously but without undue haste. Other considerations were more important, however, than the substance of the message.

Previous doc.u.ments of this kind had been long and filled with a wide variety of recommendations concerning both international and domestic relations; Wilson's speech occupied but a few moments, it focused the attention of Congress upon one subject, and fixed the eyes of the country upon the problem. The nation knew that one task was in hand, and knew where to lay the blame if delay should ensue. It was a great responsibility that the President had a.s.sumed, but he a.s.sumed it without hesitation.

Underwood presented his bill at once and it pa.s.sed the House without difficulty, but in the Senate the Democratic majority of six was too small to guarantee success in the face of the objections of Louisiana senators to the proposal for free sugar, and the usual bargaining for the protection of special interests. When the lobby appeared--the group that had so mangled the Wilson-Gorman bill and discredited the Payne-Aldrich Act--the President issued a public statement warning the country of the "extraordinary exertions" of a body of paid agents whose object was private profit and not the good of the public. So vigorous an action resulted in hostility to Wilson, but Congress found itself unusually free from objectionable pressure. Hence while experts differed in regard to the wisdom of one part or another of the bill, it was not charged that its schedules bore the imprint of favoritism for any particular private interests. Discussion in the Senate was so extended that the Underwood act did not finally pa.s.s and receive the President's signature until October 3.

The general character of the measure is indicated by the number of changes made in the tariffs as they existed at the time of the pa.s.sage of the act. On 958 articles the duties were reduced; on 307 they were left unchanged; and on eighty-six (mainly in the chemical schedule), they were increased. Despite the numerous reductions, the Underwood law retained much of the protective purpose of preceding enactments.

Attempts were made to decrease the cost of living by considerable reductions on certain agricultural products and by placing others on the free list; wool was to be free after December 1, 1913, and the duty on sugar was to be reduced gradually and taken off completely on May 1, 1916; duties on cotton goods and on woolens ("Schedule K") were heavily reduced. Underwood represented an iron manufacturing section of Alabama, but he showed an uncommon attention to the general interest by favoring large reductions on pig-iron and placing iron ore and steel rails on the free list. An important part of the law was a provision for an income tax, which had been made possible by the Sixteenth Amendment to the Const.i.tution proclaimed on February 25, 1913. Incomes over $3,000 ($4,000 in the case of married persons), were to be taxed one per cent., with an additional one per cent. on incomes of $20,000 to $50,000, and similar graded "surtaxes" on higher incomes, reaching six per cent. on those above $500,000. The board which the Republicans had established for the scientific study of the tariff had been allowed to lapse by the Democrats, but was revived in 1916 through the appointment of a bi-partisan Commission of six members with twelve-year terms.