The Two Great Retreats of History Part 3

rings, which he especially asked for. Thus loaded with presents, he left them, having first shown them a village wherein they could find quarters--as well as the road which they were to take through the territory of the Makrones.

When they reached the river which divided the land of the Makrones from that of the Skythini, they perceived the former a.s.sembled in arms on the opposite side to resist their pa.s.sage. The river not being fordable, they cut down some neighboring trees to provide the means of crossing.

While these Makrones were shouting and encouraging each other aloud, a light-armed foot-soldier in the Grecian army came to Xenophon, saying that he knew their language, and that he believed this to be his country. He had been a slave at Athens, exported from home during his boyhood--he had then made his escape (probably during the Peloponnesian War, to the garrison of Dekeleia), and afterwards taken military service. By this fortunate accident, the generals were enabled to open negotiations with the Makrones, and to a.s.sure them that the army would do them no harm, desiring nothing more than a free pa.s.sage and a market to buy provisions. The Makrones, on receiving such a.s.surances in their own language from a countryman, exchanged pledges of friendship with the Greeks, a.s.sisted them to pa.s.s the river, and furnished the best market in their power during the three days' march across their territory.

The army now reached the borders of the Kolchians, who were found in hostile array, occupying the summit of a considerable mountain which formed their frontier. Here Xenophon, having marshalled the soldiers for attack, with each company of 100 men in single file, instead of marching up the hill in phalanx, or continuous front with only a scanty depth--addressed to them the following pithy encouragement--"Now, fellow-soldiers, these enemies before us are the only impediment that keeps us away from reaching the point at which we have been so long aiming. We must even eat them raw, if in any way we can do so."

Eighty of these formidable companies of heavy-armed foot-soldiers, each in single file, now began to ascend the hill; the light-armed foot-soldiers and bowmen being partly distributed among them, partly placed on the flanks. Cheirisophus and Xenophon, each commanding on one wing, spread their light-armed foot-soldiers in such a way as to outflank the Kolchians, who accordingly weakened their centre in order to strengthen their wings. Hence the Arcadian light-armed foot-soldiers and heavy-armed foot-soldiers in the Greek centre were enabled to attack and disperse the centre with little resistance; and all the Kolchians presently fled, leaving the Greeks in possession of their camp, as well as of several well-stocked villages in their rear. Amidst these villages the army remained to refresh themselves for several days. It was here that they tasted the grateful, but unwholesome honey, which this region still continues to produce--unaware of its peculiar properties. Those soldiers who ate little of it were like men greatly intoxicated with wine; those who ate much, were seized with the most violent vomiting and diarrhoea, lying down like madmen in a state of delirium. From this terrible distemper some recovered on the ensuing day, others two or three days afterwards. It does not appear that any one actually died.

Two more days' march brought them to the sea, at the Greek maritime city of Trapezus or Trebizond, founded by the inhabitants of Sinope on the coast of the Kolchian territory. Here the Trapezuntines received them with kindness and hospitality, sending them presents of bullocks, barley-meal, and wine. Taking up their quarters in some Kolchian villages near the town, they now enjoyed, for the first time since leaving Tarsus, a safe and undisturbed repose during thirty days, and were enabled to recover in some degree from the severe hardships which they had undergone. While the Trapezuntines brought produce for sale into the camp, the Greeks provided the means of purchasing it by predatory incursions against the Kolchians on the hills. Those Kolchians who dwelt under the hills and on the plain were in a state of semi-dependence upon Trapezus; so that the Trapezuntines mediated on their behalf and prevailed on the Greeks to leave them unmolested, on condition of a contribution of bullocks.

These bullocks enabled the Greeks to discharge the vow which they had made, on the proposition of Xenophon, to Zeus the Preserver, during that moment of dismay and despair which succeeded immediately on the ma.s.sacre of their generals by Tissaphernes. To Zeus the Preserver, to Herakles[71] the Conductor, and to various other G.o.ds, they offered an abundant sacrifice on their mountain camp overhanging the sea; and after the festival ensuing, the skins of the victims were given as prizes to compet.i.tors in running, wrestling, boxing, and other contests. The superintendence of such festival games, so fully accordant with Grecian usage and highly interesting to the army, was committed to a Spartan named Drakontius; a man whose destiny recalls that of Patroklus and other Homeric heroes--for he had been exiled as a boy, having unintentionally killed another boy with a short sword. Various departures from Grecian customs however were admitted. The matches took place on the steep and stony hill-side overhanging the sea, instead of on a smooth plain; and the numerous hard falls of the compet.i.tors afforded increased interest to the by-standers. The captive non-h.e.l.lenic boys were admitted to run for the prize, since otherwise a boy-race could not have been obtained. ["Horses also ran; and they had to gallop down the steep, and, turning round in the sea, to come up again to the altar.[72] In the descent, many rolled down; but in the ascent, against the exceedingly steep ground, the horses could scarcely get up at a walking pace. There was consequently great shouting, and laughter, and cheering from the people."[73]] Lastly, the animation of the scene, as well as the ardor of the compet.i.tors, was much enhanced by the number of the women present.

- 10. The Greek cities on the Black Sea; their feelings toward the Ten Thousand.

We now commence a third act in the history of this memorable body of men. After having followed them from Sardis to Kunaxa as mercenaries[74]

to procure the throne for Cyrus--then from Kunaxa to Trapezus as men anxious only for escape, and purchasing their safety by marvellous bravery, endurance, and organization--we shall now track their proceedings among the Greek colonies on the Euxine and at the Bosphorus of Thrace, succeeded by their struggles against the meanness of the Thracian prince Seuthes, as well as against the treachery and arbitrary harshness of the Lacedaemonian commanders Anaxibius and Aristarchus.

Trapezus, now Trebizond, where the army had recently found repose, was a colony from Sinope, as were also Kerasus and Kotyora farther westward; each of them receiving a governor from the mother-city, and paying to her an annual tribute. All these three cities were planted on the narrow strip of land dividing the Euxine from the elevated mountain range which so closely borders on its southern coast. At Sinope itself, the land stretches out into a defensible peninsula, with a secure harbor, and a large breadth of adjacent fertile soil. So tempting a site invited the Milesians,[75] even before the year 600 B.C., to plant a colony there, and enabled Sinope to attain much prosperity and power. Farther westward, not more than a long day's journey for a rowing vessel from Byzantium, was situated the Megarian[76] colony of Herakleia, in the territory of the Mariandyni.

The native tenants of this line of coast, upon which the Greek settlers intruded themselves (reckoning from the westward), were the Bythynian Thracians, the Mariandyni, the Paphlagonians, the Tibareni, Chalybes, Mosynoeki, Drilae, and Kolchians. Here as elsewhere, these natives found the Greek seaports useful, in giving a new value to inland produce, and in furnishing the great men with ornaments and luxuries to which they would otherwise have had no access. The citizens of Herakleia had reduced into dependence a considerable portion of the neighboring Mariandyni, and held them in a relation resembling that of the natives of Esthonia and Lavonia to the German colonies in the Baltic. Some of the Kolchian villages were also subject in the same manner to the Trapezuntines; and Sinope doubtless possessed a similar inland dominion of greater or less extent. But the princ.i.p.al wealth of this important city arose from her navy and maritime commerce; from the rich thunny fishery[77] attached to her promontory; from the olives in her immediate neighborhood, which was a cultivation not indigenous, but only naturalized by the Greeks on the seaboard; from the varied produce of the interior, comprising abundant herds of cattle, mines of silver, iron, and copper, in the neighboring mountains, wood for ship-building, as well as for house-furniture, and native slaves. The case was similar with the three colonies of Sinope, more to the eastward--Kotyora, Kerasus, and Trapezus; except that the mountains which border on the Euxine, gradually approaching nearer and nearer to the sh.o.r.e, left to each of them a more confined strip of cultivable land. For these cities the time had not yet arrived to be conquered and absorbed by the inland monarchies around them, as Miletus and the cities on the western coast of Asia Minor had been. The Paphlagonians were at this time the only native people in those regions who formed a considerable aggregated force, under a prince named Korylas; a prince tributary to Persia, yet half independent--since he had disobeyed the summons of Artaxerxes to come up and help in repelling Cyrus--and now on terms of established alliance with Sinope, though not without secret designs, which he wanted only force to execute, against that city. The other native tribes to the eastward were mountaineers both ruder and more divided; warlike on their own heights, but little capable of any aggressive combinations.

Though we are told that Perikles had once despatched a detachment of Athenian colonists to Sinope, and had expelled from thence the despot Timesilaus,--yet neither that city nor any of her neighbors appear to have taken part in the Peloponnesian war, either for or against Athens; nor were they among the number of tributaries to Persia. They doubtless were acquainted with the upward march of Cyrus, which had disturbed all Asia; and probably were not ignorant of the perils and critical state of his Grecian army. But it was with a feeling of mingled surprise, admiration, and alarm, that they saw that army descend from the mountainous region, hitherto only recognized as the abode of Kolchians, Makrones, and other a.n.a.logous tribes, among whom was perched the mining city of Gymnias.

Even after all the losses and extreme sufferings of the retreat the Greeks still numbered, when mustered at Kerasus, 8600 heavy-armed foot-soldiers, with light-armed foot-soldiers, bowmen, and slingers, making a total of above 10,000 military persons. Such a force had never before been seen in the Euxine. Considering both the numbers and the now-acquired discipline and self-confidence of the Cyreians, even Sinope herself could have raised no force capable of meeting them in the field.

Yet they did not belong to any city, nor receive orders from any established government. They were like those mercenary armies which marched about in Italy during the fourteenth century, under the generals called Condottieri, taking service sometimes with one city, sometimes with another. No one could predict what schemes they might conceive, or in what manner they might deal with the established communities on the sh.o.r.es of the Euxine. If we imagine that such an army had suddenly appeared in Sicily, a little time before the Athenian expedition against Syracuse, it would have been probably enlisted by Leontini and Katana in their war against Syracuse. If the inhabitants of Trapezus had wished to throw off the dominion of Sinope,--or if Korylas the Paphlagonian were meditating war against that city--here were formidable auxiliaries to second their wishes. Moreover there were various tempting sites, open to the formation of a new colony, which, with so numerous a body of original Greek settlers, would probably have overtopped Sinope herself.

There was no restraining cause to reckon upon, except the general h.e.l.lenic sympathies and education of the Cyreian army; and what was of not less importance, the fact that they were not mercenary soldiers by permanent profession, such as became so formidably multiplied in Greece during the next generation--but established citizens who had come out on a special service under Cyrus, with the full intention, after a year of lucrative enterprise, to return to their homes and families. We shall find such gravitation towards home steadily operative throughout the future proceedings of the army. But at the moment when they first emerged from the mountains, no one could be sure that it would be so.

There was ample ground for uneasiness among the Euxine Greeks, especially the Sinopians, whose supremacy had never before been endangered.

- 11. Plans of the army for the future.

An undisturbed repose of thirty days enabled the Cyreians to recover from their fatigues, to talk over their past dangers, and to take pride in the antic.i.p.ated effect which their unparalleled achievement could not fail to produce in Greece. Having discharged their vows and celebrated their festival to the G.o.ds, they held an a.s.sembly to discuss their future proceedings; when a Thurian[78] soldier named Antileon exclaimed--"Comrades, I am already tired of packing up, marching, running, carrying arms, falling into line, keeping watch, and fighting.

Now that we have the sea here before us, I desire to be relieved from all these toils, to sail the rest of the way, and to arrive in Greece outstretched and asleep, like Odysseus."[79] This pithy address being received with vehement acclamations, and warmly responded to by all, Cheirisophus offered, if the army chose to empower him, to sail forthwith to Byzantium,[80] where he thought he could obtain from his friend the Lacedaemonian admiral Anaxibius, sufficient vessels for transport. His proposition was gladly accepted; and he departed to execute the project.

Xenophon then urged upon the army various resolutions and measures, proper for the regulation of affairs during the absence of Cheirisophus.

The army would be forced to maintain itself by marauding expeditions among the hostile tribes in the mountains. Such expeditions accordingly must be put under regulation: neither individual soldiers, nor small companies, must be allowed to go out at pleasure, without giving notice to the generals; moreover, the camp must be kept under constant guard and scouts, in the event of surprise from a retaliating enemy. It was prudent also to take the best measures in their power for procuring vessels; since, after all, Cheirisophus might possibly fail in bringing an adequate number. They ought to borrow a few ships of war from the Trapezuntines, and detain all the merchant ships[81] which they saw; unshipping the rudders, placing the cargoes under guard, and maintaining the crew during all the time that the ships might be required for transport of the army. Many such merchant vessels were often sailing by; so that they would thus acquire the means of transport, even though Cheirisophus should bring few or none from Byzantium. Lastly, Xenophon proposed to require the Grecian cities to repair and put in order the road along the coast, for a land-march; since, perhaps, with all their efforts, it would be found impossible to get together a sufficient stock of transports.

All the propositions of Xenophon were readily adopted by the army, except the last. But the mere mention of a renewed land-march excited such universal murmurs of repugnance, that he did not venture to put that question to the vote. He took upon himself however to send messages to the Grecian cities, on his own responsibility; urging them to repair the roads, in order that the departure of the army might be facilitated.

And he found the cities ready enough to carry his wishes into effect, as far as Kotyora.

The wisdom of these precautionary suggestions of Xenophon soon appeared; for Cheirisophus not only failed in his object, but was compelled to stay away for a considerable time. An armed ship with fifty oars was borrowed from the Trapezuntines, and committed to the charge of a Lacedaemonian provincial, named Dexippus, for the purpose of detaining the merchant vessels pa.s.sing by. This man having violated his trust, and employed the ship to make his own escape out of the Euxine, a second was obtained and confided to an Athenian, Polykrates; who brought in successively several merchant vessels. These the Greeks did not plunder, but secured the cargoes under adequate guard, and only reserved the vessels for transports. It became however gradually more and more difficult to supply the camp with provisions. Though the army was distributed into suitable detachments for plundering the Kolchian villages on the hills, and seizing cattle and prisoners for sale, yet these expeditions did not always succeed; indeed on one occasion, two Grecian companies got entangled in such difficult ground, that they were destroyed to a man. The Kolchians united on the hills in increased and menacing numbers, insomuch that a larger guard became necessary for the camp; while the Trapezuntines--tired of the protracted stay of the army, as well as desirous of exempting from pillage the natives in their own immediate neighborhood--conducted the detachments only to villages alike remote and difficult of access. It was in this manner that a large force under Xenophon himself, attacked the lofty and rugged stronghold of the Drilae--the most warlike nation of mountaineers in the neighborhood of the Euxine, well-armed, and troublesome to Trapezus by their incursions.

After a difficult march and attack, which Xenophon describes in interesting detail, and wherein the Greeks encountered no small hazard of ruinous defeat--they returned, in the end completely successful, and with a plentiful booty.

- 12. The Ten Thousand begin their march westward.

At length, after long awaiting in vain the reappearance of Cheirisophus, increasing scarcity and weariness determined them to leave Trapezus. A sufficient number of vessels had been collected to serve for the transport of the women, of the sick and wounded, and of the baggage. All these were accordingly placed on board under the command of Philesius and Sophaenetus, the two oldest generals; while the remaining army marched by land, along a road which had been just made good under the representations of Xenophon. In three days they reached Kerasus,[82]

another maritime colony of the Sinopians, still in the territory called Kolchian; there they halted ten days, mustered and numbered the army, and divided the money acquired by the sale of their prisoners. Eight thousand six hundred heavy-armed foot-soldiers, out of a total probably greater than eleven thousand, were found still remaining; besides targeteers[83] and various light troops.

During the halt at Kerasus, the declining discipline of the army became manifest as they approached home. Various acts of outrage occurred, originating now, as afterwards, in the intrigues of treacherous officers. A captain named Klearetus persuaded his company to attempt the plunder of a Kolchian village near Kerasus, which had furnished a friendly market to the Greeks, and which rested secure on the faith of peaceful relations. He intended to make off separately with the booty in one of the vessels: but his attack was repelled, and he himself slain.

The injured villagers despatched three elders as heralds, to remonstrate with the Grecian authorities; but these heralds, being seen in Kerasus by some of the repulsed plunderers, were slain. A partial tumult then ensued, in which even the magistrates of Kerasus were in great danger, and only escaped the pursuing soldiers by running into the sea. This enormity, though it occurred under the eyes of the generals, immediately before their departure from Kerasus, remained without inquiry or punishment, from the numbers concerned in it.

Between Kerasus and Kotyora, there was not then (nor is there now) any regular road. This march cost the Cyreian army not less than ten days, by an inland track departing from the seash.o.r.e, and through the mountains inhabited by the native tribes Mosynoeki and Chalybes. The latter, celebrated for their iron works, were under dependence to the former. As the Mosynoeki refused to grant a friendly pa.s.sage across their territory, the army were compelled to fight their way through it as enemies, with the aid of one section of these people themselves; which alliance was procured for them by the Trapezuntine Timesitheus, who was consul or agent of the Mosynoeki and understood their language.

The Greeks took the mountain fastnesses of this people, and plundered the wooden turrets[84] which formed their abodes. Of their peculiar fashions Xenophon gives an interesting description which I have not s.p.a.ce to copy. The territory of the Tibareni was more easy and accessible. This people met the Greeks with presents, and tendered a friendly pa.s.sage. But the generals at first declined the presents, preferring to treat them as enemies and plunder them; which in fact they would have done, had they not been deterred by unfavorable sacrifices.

Near Kotyora, which was situated on the coast of the Tibareni, yet on the borders of Paphlagonia, they remained forty-five days, still awaiting the appearance of Cheirisophus with the transports to carry them away by sea. The Sinopian governor did not permit them to be welcomed in so friendly a manner as at Trapezus. No market was provided for them, nor were their sick admitted within the walls. But the fortifications of the town were not so constructed as to resist a Greek force, the like of which had never before been seen in those regions.

The Greek generals found a weak point, made their way in, and took possession of a few houses for the accommodation of their sick; keeping a guard at the gate to secure free egress, but doing no farther violence to the citizens. They obtained their victuals partly from the Kotyorite villages, partly from the neighboring territory of Paphlagonia, until at length envoys arrived from Sinope to remonstrate against their proceedings.

These envoys presented themselves before the a.s.sembled soldiers in the camp, when Hekatonymus, the chief and most eloquent among them, began by complimenting the army upon their gallant exploits and retreat. He then complained of the injury which Kotyora, and Sinope as the mother-city of Kotyora, had suffered at their hands, in violation of common h.e.l.lenic kinship. If such proceedings were continued, he intimated that Sinope would be compelled in her own defence to seek alliance with the Paphlagonian prince Korylas, or any other barbaric auxiliary who would lend them aid against the Greeks. Xenophon replied that if the Kotyorites had sustained any damage, it was owing to their own ill-will and to the Sinopian governor in the place; that the generals were under the necessity of procuring subsistence for the soldiers, with house-room for the sick, and that they had taken nothing more; that the sick men were lying within the town, but at their own cost, while the other soldiers were all encamped without; that they had maintained cordial friendship with the Trapezuntines, and requited all their good offices; that they sought no enemies except through necessity, being anxious only again to reach Greece; and that as for the threat respecting Korylas, they knew well enough that that prince was eager to become master of the wealthy city of Sinope, and would speedily attempt some such enterprise if he could obtain the Cyreian army as his auxiliaries.

This judicious reply shamed the colleagues of Hekatonymus so much, that they went the length of protesting against what he had said, and of affirming that they had come with propositions of sympathy and friendship to the army, as well as with promises to give them an hospitable reception at Sinope, if they should visit that town on their way home. Presents were at once sent to the army by the inhabitants of Kotyora, and a good understanding established.

Such an interchange of goodwill with the powerful city of Sinope was an unspeakable advantage to the army--indeed an essential condition to their power of reaching home. If they continued their march by land, it was only through Sinopian guidance and mediation that they could obtain or force a pa.s.sage through Paphlagonia; while for a voyage by sea, there was no chance of procuring a sufficient number of vessels except from Sinope, since no news had been received of Cheirisophus. On the other hand, that city had also a strong interest in facilitating their transit homeward, and thus removing formidable neighbors, for whose ulterior purposes there could be no guarantee. After some preliminary conversation with the Sinopian envoys, the generals convoked the army in a.s.sembly, and entreated Hekatonymus and his companions to advise them as to the best mode of proceeding westward to the Bosphorus.

Hekatonymus, after apologizing for the menacing insinuations of his former speech, and protesting that he had no other object in view except to point out the safest and easiest plan of route for the army, began to unfold the insuperable difficulties of a march through Paphlagonia. The very entrance into the country must be achieved through a narrow aperture in the mountains, which it was impossible to force if occupied by the enemy. Even a.s.suming this difficulty to be surmounted, there were s.p.a.cious plains to be pa.s.sed over, wherein the Paphlagonian horse,[85]

the most numerous and bravest in Asia, would be found almost irresistible. There were also three or four great rivers, which the army would be unable to pa.s.s--the Thermodon and the Iris, each 300 feet in breadth--the Halys, nearly a quarter of a mile in breadth--the Parthenius, also very considerable. Such an array of obstacles (he affirmed) rendered the project of marching through Paphlagonia impracticable; whereas the voyage by sea from Kotyora to Sinope, and from Sinope to Herakleia, was easy; and the transit from the latter place either by sea to Byzantium, or by land across Thrace, yet easier.

Difficulties like these, apparently quite real, were more than sufficient to determine the vote of the army, already sick of marching and fighting, in favor of the sea voyage; though there were not wanting suspicions of the sincerity of Hekatonymus. But Xenophon, in communicating to the latter the decision of the army, distinctly apprised him that they would on no account permit themselves to be divided; that they would either depart or remain all in a body; and that vessels must be provided sufficient for the transport of all.

Hekatonymus desired them to send envoys of their own to Sinope to make the necessary arrangements. Three envoys were accordingly sent--Ariston, an Athenian, Kallimachus, an Arcadian, and Samolas, an Achaean; the Athenian, probably, as possessing the talent of speaking in the Sinopian senate or a.s.sembly.

During the absence of the envoys, the army still continued near Kotyora, with a market provided by the town, and with traders from Sinope and Herakleia in the camp. Such soldiers as had no money wherewith to purchase, subsisted by pillaging the neighboring frontier of Paphlagonia. But they were receiving no pay; every man was living on his own resources; and instead of carrying back a handsome purse to Greece, as each soldier had hoped when he first took service under Cyrus, there seemed every prospect of their returning poorer than when they left home. Moreover, the army was now moving onward without any definite purpose, with increasing dissatisfaction and decreasing discipline; insomuch that Xenophon foresaw the difficulties which would beset the responsible commanders when they should come within the stricter restraints and obligations of the Grecian world.

- 13. Plans of Xenophon for founding a city on the Black Sea.

It was these considerations which helped to suggest to him the idea of employing the army on some enterprise of conquest and colonization on the Euxine itself; an idea highly flattering to his personal ambition, especially as the army was of unrivalled efficiency against an enemy, and no such second force could ever be got together in those distant regions. His patriotism as a Greek was inflamed with the thoughts of procuring for h.e.l.las[86] a new self-governing city, occupied by a considerable h.e.l.lenic population, possessing a s.p.a.cious territory, and exercising dominion over many neighboring natives. He seems to have thought first of attacking and conquering some established non-h.e.l.lenic city; an act which his ideas of international morality did not forbid, in a case where he had contracted no special convention with the inhabitants--though he (as well as Cheirisophus) strenuously protested against doing wrong to any innocent h.e.l.lenic community. He contemplated the employment of the entire force in capturing Phasis or some other native city; after which, when the establishment was once safely effected, those soldiers who preferred going home to remaining as settlers, might do so without emperiling those who stayed, and probably with their own purses filled by plunder and conquest in the neighborhood. To settle as one of the richest proprietors and chiefs,--perhaps even the recognized founder, like Agnon at Amphipolis,--of a new h.e.l.lenic city such as could hardly fail to become rich, powerful, and important--was a tempting prospect for one who had now acquired the habits of command. Moreover, the sequel will prove how correctly Xenophon appreciated the discomfort of leading the army back to Greece without pay and without certain employment.

It was the practice of Xenophon, and the advice of his master, Sokrates,[87] in grave and doubtful cases where the most careful reflection was at fault, to recur to the inspired authority of an oracle or a prophet, and to offer sacrifice, in full confidence that the G.o.ds would vouchsafe to communicate a special revelation to such persons as they favored. Accordingly Xenophon, previous to any communication with the soldiers respecting his new project, was anxious to ascertain the will of the G.o.ds by a special sacrifice; for which he invoked the presence of Sila.n.u.s, the chief prophet in the army. This prophet (as I have already mentioned), before the battle of Kunaxa, had a.s.sured Cyrus that Artaxerxes would not fight for ten days--and the prophecy came to pa.s.s; which made such an impression on Cyrus, that he rewarded him with the prodigious present of 3000 darics or ten Attic talents. While others were returning poor, Sila.n.u.s, having contrived to preserve this sum through all the hardships of the retreat, was extremely rich, and anxious only to hasten home with his treasure in safety. He heard with strong repugnance the project of remaining on the Euxine, and determined to traverse[88] it by intrigue. As far as concerned the sacrifices, indeed, which he offered apart with Xenophon he was obliged to admit that the indications of the victims were favorable; Xenophon himself being too familiar with the process to be imposed upon. But he at the same time tried to create alarm by declaring that a nice inspection disclosed evidence of treacherous snares laid for Xenophon; which latter indications he himself began to realize by spreading reports among the army that the Athenian general was laying clandestine plans for keeping them away from Greece without their own concurrence.[89]

Thus prematurely and insidiously divulged, the scheme found some supporters, but a far larger number of opponents; especially among those officers who were jealous of the ascendency of Xenophon. Timasion and Thorax employed it as a means of alarming the Herakleotic and Sinopian traders in the camp; telling them that unless they provided not merely transports, but also pay for the soldiers, Xenophon would find means to detain the army in the Euxine, and would employ the transports when they arrived not for the homeward voyage, but for his own projects of acquisition. This news spread so much terror both at Sinope and Herakleia that large offers of money were made from both cities to Timasion, on condition that he would ensure the departure of the army, as soon as the vessels should be a.s.sembled at Kotyora. Accordingly these officers, convening an a.s.sembly of the soldiers, protested against the duplicity of Xenophon in thus preparing momentous schemes without any public debate or decision. And Timasion, seconded by Thorax, not only strenuously urged the army to return, but went so far as to promise to them, on the faith of the a.s.surances from Herakleia and Sinope, future pay on a liberal scale, to commence from the first new moon after their departure; together with a hospitable reception in his native city of Darda.n.u.s on the h.e.l.lespont, from whence they could make incursions on the rich neighboring satrapy of Pharnabazus.

It was not, however, until these attacks were repeated from more than one quarter--until the Achaeans Philesius and Lykon had loudly accused Xenophon of underhand manoeuvring to cheat the army into remaining against their will--that the latter rose to repel the imputation; saying that all he had done was, to consult the G.o.ds whether it would be better to lay his project before the army or keep it in his own bosom. The encouraging answer of the G.o.ds, as conveyed through the victims and testified even by Sila.n.u.s himself, proved that the scheme was not ill-conceived; nevertheless (he remarked) Sila.n.u.s had begun to lay snares for him, obtaining by his own proceedings a collateral indication which he had announced to be visible in the victims. "If (added Xenophon) you had continued as dest.i.tute and unprovided, as you were just now--I should still have looked out for a resource in the capture of some city which would have enabled such of you as chose, to return at once; while the rest stay behind to enrich themselves. But now there is no longer any necessity; since Herakleia and Sinope are sending transports, and Timasion promises pay to you from the next new moon.

Nothing can be better; you will go back safely to Greece, and will receive pay for going thither. I desist at once from my scheme, and call upon all who were favorable to it to desist also. Only let us all keep together until we are on safe ground; and let the man who lags behind or runs off, be condemned as a wrongdoer."

Xenophon immediately put this question to the vote, and every hand was held up in its favor. There was no man more disconcerted with the vote than the prophet Sila.n.u.s, who loudly exclaimed against the injustice of detaining any one desirous to depart. But the soldiers put him down with vehement disapprobation, threatening that they would a.s.suredly punish him if they caught him running off. His intrigue against Xenophon thus recoiled upon himself, for the moment. But shortly afterwards, when the army reached Herakleia, he took his opportunity for clandestine flight, and found his way back to Greece with the 3000 darics.

If Sila.n.u.s gained little by his manoeuvre, Timasion and his partners gained still less. For so soon as it became known that the army had taken a formal resolution to go back to Greece, and that Xenophon himself had made the proposition, the Sinopians and the Herakleots felt at their ease. They sent the transport vessels, but withheld the money which they had promised to Timasion and Thorax. Hence these officers were exposed to dishonor and peril; for having positively engaged to find pay for the army, they were now unable to keep their word. So keen were their apprehensions, that they came to Xenophon and told him that they had altered their views, and that they now thought it best to employ the newly-arrived transports in conveying the army, not to Greece, but against the town and territory of Phasis[90] at the eastern extremity of the Euxine. Xenophon replied, that they might convene the soldiers and make the proposition, if they chose; but that he would have nothing to say to it. To make the very proposition themselves, for which they had so much inveighed against Xenophon, was impossible without some preparation; so that each of them began individually to sound his captains, and get the scheme suggested by them. During this interval, the soldiery obtained information of the manoeuvre, much to their discontent and indignation; of which Neon (the lieutenant of the absent Cheirisophus) took advantage, to throw the whole blame upon Xenophon; alleging that it was he who had converted the other officers to his original project, and that he intended, as soon as the soldiers were on shipboard, to convey them fraudulently to Phasis instead of to Greece.

There was something so plausible in this glaring falsehood, which represented Xenophon as the author of the renewed project, once his own--and something so improbable in the fact that the other officers should spontaneously have renounced their own strong opinions to take up his--that we can hardly be surprised at the ready credence which Neon's calumny found among the army. Their exasperation against Xenophon became so intense, that they collected in fierce groups; and there was even a fear that they would break out into mutinous violence, as they had before done against the magistrates of Kerasus.

Well knowing the danger of such spontaneous and informal a.s.semblages, and the importance of the habitual solemnities of convocation and arrangement, to ensure either discussion or legitimate defence--Xenophon immediately sent round the herald to summon the army into the regular place of a.s.sembly with customary method and ceremony. The summons was obeyed with unusual alacrity, and Xenophon then addressed them--refraining, with equal generosity and prudence, from saying anything about the last proposition which Timasion and others had made to him. Had he mentioned it, the question would have become one of life and death between him and those other officers.

- 14. Xenophon defends himself against false accusations.

"Soldiers (said he), I understand that there are some men here calumniating me, as if I were intending to cheat you and carry you to Phasis. Hear me then, in the name of the G.o.ds. If I am shown to be doing wrong, let me not go from hence unpunished; but if, on the contrary, my calumniators are proved to be the wrong-doers, deal with them as they deserve. You surely well know where the sun rises and where he sets; you know that if a man wishes to reach Greece, he must go westward--if to the barbaric territories, he must go eastward. Can any one hope to deceive you on this point, and persuade you that the sun rises on _this_ side, and sets on _that_? Can any one cheat you into going on shipboard with a wind which blows you away from Greece? Suppose even that I put you aboard when there is no wind at all. How am I to force you to sail with me against your own consent--I being only in one ship, you in a hundred and more? Imagine however that I could even succeed in deluding you to Phasis. When we land there, you will know at once that we are not in Greece; and what fate can I then expect--a detected impostor in the midst of ten thousand men with arms in their hands? No--these stories all proceed from foolish men, who are jealous of my influence with you; jealous, too, without reason--for I neither hinder _them_ from out-stripping me in your favor, if they can render you greater service--nor _you_ from electing them commanders, if you think fit.

Enough of this now: I challenge any one to come forward and say how it is possible either to cheat, or to be cheated, in the manner laid to my charge."

Having thus grappled directly with the calumnies of his enemies, and dissipated them in such manner as doubtless to create a reaction in his own favor, Xenophon made use of the opportunity to denounce the growing disorders in the army; which he depicted as such, that if no corrective were applied, disgrace and contempt must fall upon all. As he paused after this general remonstrance, the soldiers loudly called upon him to go into particulars; upon which he proceeded to recall, with lucid and impressive simplicity, the outrages which had been committed at and near Kerasus--the unauthorized and unprovoked attack made by Klearetus and his company on a neighboring village which was in friendly commerce with the army--the murder of the three elders of the village, who had come as heralds to complain to the generals about such wrong--the mutinous attack made by disorderly soldiers even upon the magistrates of Kerasus, at the very moment when they were remonstrating with the generals on what had occurred; exposing these magistrates to the utmost peril, and putting the generals themselves to ignominy. "If such are to be our proceedings (continued Xenophon), look you well into what condition the army will fall. You, the aggregate body, will no longer be the sovereign authority to make war or peace with whom you please; each individual among you will conduct the army against any point which he may choose.

And even if men should come to you as envoys, either for peace or for other purposes, they may be slain by any single enemy; so that you will be debarred from all public communications whatever. Next, those whom your universal suffrage shall have chosen commanders, will have no authority; while any self-elected general who chooses to give the word, Cast, Cast (_i.e._ darts or stones), may put to death without trial either officer or soldier as it suits him; that is, if he finds you ready to obey him, as it happened near Kerasus. Look now what these self-elected leaders have done for you. The magistrate of Kerasus, if he was really guilty of wrong towards you, has been enabled to escape with impunity; if he was innocent, he has been obliged to run away from you, as the only means of avoiding death without pretence of trial. Those who stoned the heralds to death have brought matters to such a pa.s.s, that you alone, of all Greeks, cannot enter the town of Kerasus in safety, unless in commanding force; and that we cannot even send in a herald to take up our dead (Klearetus and those who were slain in the attack on the Kerasuntine village) for burial; though at first those who had slain them in self-defence were anxious to give up the bodies to us. For who will take the risk of going in as herald, from those who have set the example of putting heralds to death? We generals were obliged to entreat the Kerasuntines to bury the bodies for us."