The Spirit of American Government Part 10

The important changes in munic.i.p.al government were made after, and may be regarded as an effect of the adoption of the Federal Const.i.tution. As the centralization of authority in the hands of the common council could not be reconciled with the new doctrine of checks and balances, munic.i.p.al government was reorganized on the plan of distributed powers.

This effort to readjust the political organization of the city and make it conform to the general scheme of the Federal government is seen in the munic.i.p.al charters granted after the adoption of the Const.i.tution.

The tendency toward a bicameral council, the extension of the term for which members of the council were elected and the veto power of the mayor may be attributed to the influence of the Const.i.tution rather than to any intelligent and carefully planned effort to improve the machinery of munic.i.p.al government.

As in the case of the state governments, the development of the system was influenced by the growing belief in democracy. Property qualifications for the suffrage disappeared, and the mayor became a directly elected local official. The changes made in munic.i.p.al government, however, as a concession to the newer democratic thought, did not ensure any very large measure of popular control. Munic.i.p.al government in its practical working remained essentially undemocratic.

It would be perfectly reasonable to expect that popular government would reach its highest development in the cities. Here modern democracy was born; here we find the physical and social conditions which facilitate interchange of thought and concerted action on the part of the people. Moreover, the government of the city is more directly and immediately related to the citizens than is the government of state or nation. It touches them at more points, makes more demands upon them and is more vitally related to their everyday life and needs than either state or national government. For these reasons the most conspicuous successes of democracy should be the government of present-day cities.

Under a truly democratic system this would doubtless be the case. But in this country the most glaring abuses and most conspicuous failures of government occur in the cities. The enemies of popular government have used this fact for the purpose of discrediting the theory of democracy.

They would have us believe that this is the natural result of a system which places political authority in the hands of the ma.s.ses--that it is the fruit of an extreme democracy. This conclusion rests upon the a.s.sumption that munic.i.p.al government in this country is democratic--an a.s.sumption which will not bear investigation. American cities are far from being examples of extreme democracy. In some important respects they are less democratic than the government of either state or nation.

A careful a.n.a.lysis of the situation shows clearly that the munic.i.p.al evils so frequently attributed to an excess of democracy are really due to the system of checks by which all effective power to regulate munic.i.p.al matters is withheld from the majority. In this country popular control is reduced to a minimum in the cities, while in Great Britain and the countries of western Europe we find in munic.i.p.al government the nearest approach to democracy. This is the true explanation of the fact that munic.i.p.al government is our greatest failure and their most conspicuous success.

Under any consistent application of the theory of democracy a city would be ent.i.tled to the fullest measure of local self-government. It ought to be given an absolutely free hand to initiate and carry out any policies of purely local concern. This right, however, the American city does not possess. Local self-government is recognized neither in theory nor in practice under our political scheme. The true local unit is the city, and this, according to our legal and const.i.tutional theory, is merely the creature of the state legislature. The latter called it into being, determines what powers it may exercise, and may strip it of them at pleasure. According to the prevailing practice of our state legislatures and the almost uniform decisions of our courts the exercise of local self-government by our cities is to be regarded as a mere privilege and not a right.

The munic.i.p.al charter was originally a grant of certain privileges of local government in return for money payments or other services rendered to the king. It was a mere concession of privileges based upon expediency, and not a recognition on the part of the Crown of local self-government as an admitted right. As an express and formal statement of the measure of local government which the king would bind himself to respect, it tended to limit his power of interference in matters covered by such charter, since privileges solemnly granted could not with safety be lightly and arbitrarily disregarded. Munic.i.p.al charters thus have the same origin as the const.i.tution of the state itself, in that they are the outcome of an effort to place a check upon an irresponsible central authority.

The legislature of the American commonwealth in succeeding to the power of the king over munic.i.p.al charters manifested at first an inclination to concede to the city the right to a measure of local self-government.

Thus "the city of New York received from the English kings during the colonial period a charter which, on the Declaration of the Independence of the colony of New York, and the establishment of the new state of New York, was confirmed by the first Const.i.tution of the state. For a considerable period after the adoption of this const.i.tution, changes in that charter were made upon the initiation of the people of the city, which initiation took place through the medium of charter conventions whose members were elected by the people of the city, and no statute which was pa.s.sed by the legislature of the state relative to the affairs of the city of New York took effect within the city until it had been approved by the city."[160]

But as Professor Goodnow observes, American cities "have very largely lost their original powers of local self-government."[161] The original conception of the city charter as a contract which established certain rights of local self-government which the legislature was bound to respect, merely recognized munic.i.p.al corporations as ent.i.tled to the same exemption from unreasonable legislative interference, as the courts have since the Dartmouth College decision enforced in favor of private corporations. If this view had prevailed cities could not have been deprived arbitrarily of rights once recognized by the legislature, but they could have enforced the recognition of no rights not thus granted.

The recognition of this doctrine would have prevented many of the abuses that have characterized the relation between state and munic.i.p.al government in this country, but it would have guaranteed no rights which the legislature had not seen fit to confer. Any liberal interpretation of the theory of democracy must of necessity go farther than this, and make munic.i.p.al self-government a fundamental right which the central authority of the state can, not only neither abridge nor destroy, but can not even withhold, since it is a right having its source not in a legislative grant, but in the underlying principles of popular government.

The failure to recognize the right of local self-government as fundamental in any scheme of democracy was unfortunate. Some of the worst evils of munic.i.p.al government would have been avoided, however, if authority once granted to munic.i.p.alities had been treated by the courts as a limitation of the power of the legislature to interfere in purely local matters. The refusal of the state government to recognize an appropriate sphere of munic.i.p.al activity which it would have no right to invade, has been the main cause of corruption and inefficiency in munic.i.p.al government.

The policy of state interference in munic.i.p.al affairs was the inevitable outgrowth of the doctrine that cities had no powers except such as had been expressly given, or were necessarily implied in their charters.

This lack of the power of initiative made it necessary for cities, as they increased in size and complexity, to make constant appeals to the legislature for permission to supply their wants. Every new problem which the city had to deal with, every new function which it had to perform, was a ground for state interference. This necessity of invoking the aid of the state legislature, constantly felt in every rapidly growing city, tended to develop a feeling of dependence upon legislative intervention as an indispensable factor in the solution of local problems. Thus the refusal of the state government to recognize the right of munic.i.p.al initiative compelled the cities to welcome state interference as the only means of dealing with the new problems with which they were being continually confronted.

Another reason for the extension of state authority at the expense of the munic.i.p.ality is to be found in the twofold character of city government. Besides being a local government the city is also for certain purposes the administrative agent of the state, and as such is properly subject to state supervision. But, in the absence of any clear distinction between state and local interests, it was an easy matter for protection of the former to serve as a pretext for undue interference with the latter.

The city was thus placed at the mercy of the state government, since the legislature could make the needs of the munic.i.p.ality or the protection of the general interests of the state a pretext for any interference calculated to further the private or partisan ends of those who controlled the legislative machine. As cities increased in importance it was found that this unlimited power over them could be made a valuable a.s.set of the party machine in control of the state legislature. The city offered a rich and tempting field for exploitation. It had offices, a large revenue, spent vast sums in public improvements, let valuable contracts of various kinds and had certain needs, as for water, light, rapid transit, etc., which could be made the pretext for granting franchises and other privileges on such terms as would ensure large profits to the grantees at the expense of the general public. That the political machine in control of the state government should have yielded to the temptation to make a selfish use of its powers in this direction, is only what might have been expected.

"The legislature has often claimed also the right to appoint munic.i.p.al officers and to fix and change the details of munic.i.p.al organization, has legislated munic.i.p.al officers out of office, and established new offices. In certain cases it has even provided that certain specific city streets shall be paved, has imposed burdens upon cities for the purpose of constructing sewers or bringing in water; has regulated the methods of transportation to be adopted within the limits of cities; in a word, has attended to a great number of matters which are purely local in character; matters which do not affect the people of the state as a whole, and in regard to which there is little excuse for special legislative action."[162]

The extent to which state regulation of local matters has been carried in New York is indicated by the fact that in the year 1886 "280 of the 681 acts pa.s.sed by the legislature ... interfered directly with the affairs of some particular county, city, village, or town, specifically and expressly named....

"The Philadelphia City Hall Building affords a good example of how far this lack of local responsibility may sometimes carry the legislature in the exercise of local powers, and in the imposition of financial burdens on cities. 'In 1870 the legislature decided that the city should have new buildings. The act [which was pa.s.sed to accomplish this result]

selected certain citizens by name, whom it appointed commissioners for the erection of the buildings. It made this body perpetual by authorizing it to fill vacancies.... This commission was imposed by the legislature upon the city, and given absolute control to create debts for the purpose named, and to require the levy of taxes for their payment.

"'The public buildings at Broad and Market streets were,' in the words of Judge Paxson, 'projected upon a scale of magnificence better suited for the capitol of an empire than the munic.i.p.al buildings of a debt-burdened city.' Yet this act was declared const.i.tutional, the city was compelled to supply the necessary funds, and 'for nearly twenty years all the money that could be spared from immediate and pressing needs' was 'compulsorily expended upon an enormous pile which surpa.s.ses the town halls and cathedrals of the Middle Ages in extent if not in grandeur.'"[163]

The legislature is strongly tempted to abuse its power when the party machine in control of the state does not have the political support of the local authorities. One of the most notorious examples of such interference in recent years was the so-called "ripper" legislation enacted in Pennsylvania in 1901, by which the mayors of Pittsburg and Allegheny were removed from office and the governor given the power to appoint and remove their successors until the regular munic.i.p.al election in the year 1903. The motive for this legislation was the desire to crush local opposition to the state machine by putting the control of munic.i.p.al offices in the hands of a governor friendly to the political boss of the state. In order to provide an opportunity for the mayor appointed by the governor to use his office in building up and perpetuating a local machine that would support the clique in control of the state government, the appointee of the governor was declared eligible for re-election, although his locally elected successors were made ineligible. A more flagrant abuse of legislative authority could hardly be imagined; yet this act was declared const.i.tutional by the supreme court of the state.

Many such instances of partisan interference may be found in the recent legislation of some of the larger and more populous states.

The best example of the misgovernment of cities by the legislature for private or partisan ends is seen in the franchise legislation by which privileges of great value have been secured by street railway and other corporations without any compensation to the cities concerned. The power which the legislature can exercise in the interest of private corporations monopolizing for their own profit the very necessities of life in the modern city--water, light, transportation, communication, etc.--has been one of the most serious evils resulting from state domination of munic.i.p.al affairs. It exposed the legislature to the temptation which individuals and corporations seeking valuable concessions readily took advantage of for their own gain. It thus brought into active operation those forces which have been the chief factor in corrupting both state and munic.i.p.al government.

As soon as it came to be generally recognized that state control of local affairs not only did not prevent, but was, in fact, the chief source of the misrule of American cities, an effort was made to provide a remedy by the adoption of const.i.tutional provisions regulating the power of the legislature to interfere in munic.i.p.al affairs. These limitations relate to those matters wherein the evils of state interference have been most p.r.o.nounced. Thus in some states the legislature is not allowed to grant the use of streets to railways or other private companies without the consent of the munic.i.p.al authorities; to create special commissions and bestow upon them munic.i.p.al functions; or to incorporate cities or regulate them by special laws.

It was not the purpose of these const.i.tutional provisions to grant to munic.i.p.alities any immunity from state control, but merely to forbid certain modes of exercising legislative supervision which, as experience had shown, were liable to serious abuses. The prohibition of special legislation, generally incorporated in recent state const.i.tutions, has, however, largely failed to accomplish its purpose, owing to the fact that the courts have permitted the legislature to establish so many cla.s.ses of cities that it has been able to pa.s.s special acts under the guise of general laws.

The state of Ohio furnishes a good example of the practical nullification of a const.i.tutional provision by the legislature through the abuse of its power of cla.s.sification. The const.i.tution of 1851 prohibited the legislature from pa.s.sing any special act conferring corporate powers and provided for the organization of cities by general laws. The legislature, however, adopted a method of cla.s.sifying cities which defeated the object of this provision. In 1901 each of the eleven princ.i.p.al cities in the state was in a separate cla.s.s. Consequently all laws enacted for each of these cla.s.ses were in reality special acts, and as such were clearly an evasion of the const.i.tutional prohibition of special legislation. Nevertheless, this method of cla.s.sification had been repeatedly upheld by the courts. Its advantages to the party in control of the state government were obvious, since it gave the legislature a free hand in interfering in local affairs for partisan ends. It permitted the state machine to make concessions to a city which gave it political support and at the same time extend state control over those cities in which it encountered opposition. This was the situation down to 1902, when the supreme court rendered two decisions which overthrew the system of cla.s.sification in vogue and invalidated the charter of every city in the state. It is unfortunate that this change in the att.i.tude of the court, though much to be desired, occurred at a time when it had the appearance of serving a partisan end. One of these suits was brought by the Republican attorney-general of the state to have the charter of the city of Cleveland declared invalid on the ground that it was a special act. This charter had been in force for over ten years, having granted liberal corporate powers at a time when Cleveland was a Republican city. Later it pa.s.sed into the Democratic column, and this suit was inst.i.tuted as part of the plan of the Republican machine of the state to curb the power and influence of the mayor of that city.

The new munic.i.p.al code which was adopted at an extra session of the legislature provided a scheme of government applicable to Cleveland under which the powers of the mayor were much curtailed.

In the New York const.i.tution of 1894 an effort was made to guard against the abuse of special legislation. The cities of the state were by the const.i.tution itself divided into three cla.s.ses according to population, and any law which did not apply to all the cities of a cla.s.s was declared to be a special act. Special legislation was not prohibited; but when any act of this kind was pa.s.sed by the legislature it was required to be submitted to the authorities of the city or cities in question, and if disapproved of by them after a public hearing, it could become law only by being pa.s.sed again in the regular manner. This merely afforded to the cities affected by the proposed special legislation an opportunity to protest against its enactment, the legislature having full power to pa.s.s it in the face of local disapproval. That this is not an adequate remedy for the evils of special legislation is shown by the fact that the two charters of New York City enacted since this const.i.tution went into effect, have both been framed by a state-appointed commission and pa.s.sed over the veto of the mayor.

The const.i.tutional changes which have been mentioned must not be understood as implying any repudiation of the doctrine that a munic.i.p.al corporation is a creature of the general government of the state. These provisions merely secured, or rather sought to secure, to cities some benefits of a negative character--immunity from certain recognized abuses of legislative authority. They are the expression of an effort to find a remedy for the evils of munic.i.p.al government by restricting the authority of the legislature rather than by giving cities the power to act independently in local matters. They have diminished somewhat the evils of state interference, but they failed to remove the cause by giving the cities the const.i.tutional right to control their own affairs.

The failure of all these measures to accomplish what was expected of them finally brought the advocates of munic.i.p.al reform to a realization of the fact that the American system made no provision for real local self-government, and that our refusal to recognize this principle was the chief cause of the prevalent corruption and misrule of our cities and the insuperable obstacle to all effective and thoroughgoing reform.

As soon as attention was directed to this feature of the problem it was seen that no system could be devised that would be better adapted to the purpose of defeating the end of good city government, since those who would be directly benefited by the reforms in munic.i.p.al government were powerless to bring them about except with the co-operation of the legislature. Moreover the consent of the legislature, though once given, was liable at any time to be withdrawn at the instigation of private or partisan interests, since this body was not directly interested in establishing and maintaining good munic.i.p.al government nor responsible to those who were.

It was finally seen that some more effective measure than the prohibition of special legislation was required. The next step was the attempt to secure to cities the needed authority in local matters by means of a const.i.tutional provision authorizing them to frame their own charters. In this movement the state of Missouri led the way by incorporating a home-rule provision in its const.i.tution of 1875.

California, Washington, Minnesota, and Colorado have since adopted similar provisions. In each of these states the charter is framed by a commission locally elected except in Minnesota, where it is appointed by the district judge.

In Missouri this privilege is accorded only to cities having more than 100,000 inhabitants. The const.i.tution of California adopted in 1879 also restricted the benefits of home rule to cities of more than 100,000 population, but it has since been extended to all cities having more than 3,500 inhabitants. Washington allows all cities having 20,000 or more population to frame their own charters. Minnesota extends the privilege to all cities and villages without respect to size, while Colorado restricts it to cities having more than 2,000 inhabitants.

The right to serve as a member of a charter commission is limited to freeholders in all these states except Colorado, where it is restricted to taxpayers. The object of these home-rule provisions was to give cities some measure of initiative in local affairs without at the same time permitting them to organize on the plan of simple majority rule. In the Missouri const.i.tution of 1875 a four-sevenths vote was required to adopt a charter and a three-fifths vote to ratify an amendment, although the const.i.tution itself was adopted and could be amended by mere majority vote. The const.i.tution of California permits ratification by a majority of the qualified voters, but every charter thus ratified must be submitted to the legislature for its approval or rejection as a whole. No charter amendment can be adopted except by a three-fifths majority of the popular vote and subsequent legislative approval, although, as in the case of Missouri, a majority vote is sufficient to approve an amendment to the state const.i.tution. In Washington the const.i.tution provides for the ratification of charters and charter amendments by a majority of the qualified electors. The const.i.tutional amendment adopted in Minnesota in 1896, with its subsequent modifications, provides for the ratification of charters and charter amendments by a four-sevenths vote except in the case of certain cities where a three-fourths majority is required. A three-fifths vote in favor of a charter amendment is necessary for its ratification. Colorado, by a const.i.tutional amendment adopted in 1902, permits the ratification and amendment of charters by a majority vote. A const.i.tutional amendment adopted in Missouri in 1902 provides for the ratification of charters by majority vote.

With the exception of California, where the const.i.tutional amendment of 1902 allows 15 per cent. of the qualified voters to require the submission of a charter amendment, and Colorado, where 25 per cent. of the voters have that right, the states above mentioned make no provision in their const.i.tutions for the popular initiative. Both Washington and Minnesota, however, have permitted it by statute, the former on the application of 15 per cent., and the latter when 5 per cent. of the qualified voters demand it.

The chief defect of these const.i.tutional provisions relating to home rule is that they do not really grant it. There are too many restrictions imposed upon cities availing themselves of this privilege, and in two of the states in question, notably in Missouri, they are for the benefit of the larger cities only. The restriction of the charter-framing right to freeholders, the withholding from the majority of the power to amend in California and Minnesota, and the failure to provide in the const.i.tution for the popular initiative in Missouri, Washington, and Minnesota indicate a willingness to grant the right of home rule only under such conditions as are calculated to ensure adequate limitation of the power of the majority.

These const.i.tutional provisions certainly point in the direction which we must follow if we would find any satisfactory solution of our munic.i.p.al problem. They would, if liberally interpreted by the courts, secure to cities immunity from interference in local matters. But the courts are naturally opposed to innovations in our const.i.tutional system, and have consequently been disposed to give provisions of this character such an interpretation as will minimize their effect. The requirement that the charters framed under these provisions must be in harmony with the const.i.tution and laws of the state has been declared by the courts to mean that they must not only conform to the laws in force at the time the charters are adopted, but also that they must conform to all legislation subsequently enacted. Had the courts been thoroughly imbued with the principle of local self-government, they could easily have given these const.i.tutional provisions an interpretation which would have effectually deprived the legislature of the power to interfere in purely local affairs. They could have declared all acts by which the state government sought to invade the sphere of local affairs null and void, just as they have all acts of the munic.i.p.al government which have encroached upon the powers reserved exclusively to the state. What the courts have done, however, is to hold that these const.i.tutional provisions merely authorize cities to govern themselves in accordance with the const.i.tution and in harmony with such laws as the legislature has or may hereafter enact. The city may adopt a charter which is in harmony with the const.i.tution and the laws of the state, but the charter thus adopted may be freely modified by general laws relating to cities.

The unfriendly att.i.tude of the courts has thus largely defeated the object of these home-rule provisions. The state legislature is still free to encroach upon or abridge the sphere of munic.i.p.al self-government.

The const.i.tutional provisions above mentioned may be regarded as having a twofold purpose. They were designed to limit, if not destroy, the power of the legislature to invade the sphere of munic.i.p.al affairs, and also to confer upon cities the general power to act for themselves, by virtue of which they could on their own initiative, subject to certain restrictions contained in the const.i.tution, set up their own government, formulate and carry out a munic.i.p.al policy and manage their own affairs to suit themselves. This would seem to be implied necessarily in the grant of const.i.tutional power to frame a charter for their own government. A liberal interpretation of this feature of the const.i.tutions in question would have held that all cities to which it applied were thereby authorized to exercise all powers not expressly withheld by the const.i.tution or the statutes of the state. This, however, has not been the att.i.tude of the courts. Their reluctance to give home-rule provisions a liberal interpretation may be ill.u.s.trated by a decision of the supreme court of Washington. In addition to the power granted to cities of the first cla.s.s to frame their own charters the const.i.tution of this state provides that "any county, city, town, or township, may make and enforce within its limits all such local, police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with general laws." In view of the att.i.tude that courts have generally taken in this matter it is not surprising that the supreme court of Washington has intimated that the above-mentioned const.i.tutional provisions are not self-executing. Moreover, it does not seem disposed to concede even to cities of the first cla.s.s any important powers except such as have been expressly conferred by statute. For example, the statutes of Washington authorize cities of the first cla.s.s "to regulate and control the use" of gas supplied by a private corporation, and the charter of Tacoma expressly gave to the city council the power to fix the price of gas so supplied. Suit was brought to enjoin the city from exercising this power which was claimed under the const.i.tutional and statutory authority given to cities of the first cla.s.s. The supreme court held that while Tacoma had the power to regulate and control, expressly given it by statute, it did not have the power to fix the price.[164] This decision evinces a singular lack of sympathy on the part of the court with the home-rule provisions of the const.i.tution of Washington.

But although the effort to confer upon cities by const.i.tutional enactment the power to manage their own affairs has thus far largely failed, it indicates a growing appreciation of the nature of the problem and the character of the remedy that must be applied. A more clearly defined and effective public opinion in favor of munic.i.p.al self-government must in the end overcome judicial opposition.

The most liberal interpretation of which these const.i.tutional provisions are susceptible, however, would not have ensured complete munic.i.p.al self-government. Unless a city is given adequate financial powers, a const.i.tutional grant of the right of local self-government does not enable it to exercise much choice in relation to the more important matters of munic.i.p.al policy. By narrowly limiting the powers of cities in this direction, they have been largely deprived of the advantages which they would have enjoyed under a consistent application of the home-rule principle. A certain amount of freedom in the use of the taxing power would seem to be no less essential to the city than to the state itself. Within reasonable limits it ought to be conceded the right to formulate its own scheme of taxation. In every important American city the taxes collected for munic.i.p.al purposes greatly exceed those imposed for the support of the county and state government. In a matter which so vitally concerns the city it ought to have some right to pursue a policy of its own. This right has not been recognized, however, even in the const.i.tutions which have made most concessions to the principle of munic.i.p.al home rule. By this means all innovations or reforms in munic.i.p.al taxation except such as may be authorized by the state itself are effectually prevented. It could not, for instance, exempt personal property from taxation, or make a tax on ground rent the main source of its revenue.

The power to incur debt for munic.i.p.al purposes is no less essential than the power to tax. The present-day city must spend large sums in making public improvements the cost of which it is necessary to distribute over a period of years. To limit too narrowly the borrowing power of cities for these purposes would prevent them from realizing the full benefits of unhampered self-government. This does not imply that a city should own and operate all industries of a quasi-public character, but it does imply that it should have the unquestioned right and the power to do so.

Unless this is the case it is not in a position to secure the most favorable terms from such private corporations as may be allowed to occupy this field. Unreasonable restrictions upon the borrowing power of cities by placing obstacles in the way of munic.i.p.al ownership of public utilities tend to deprive the people of the most effective safeguard against the extortion of private monopolies.

The limitation placed upon the amount of munic.i.p.al indebtedness has not had altogether the effect intended. This is mainly due to the fact that the debt limit fixed in the state const.i.tutions was in many cases so low that it did not permit cities to make absolutely necessary public improvements, such as the paving of streets and construction of sewers.

To make these improvements without resorting to credit would require the owners of the property affected to advance the full amount of their cost. This would in many instances be extremely inconvenient.

Accordingly, an effort was made to find some method of evading these restrictions which would be upheld by the courts. This was accomplished by issuing bonds to be paid out of a special fund which was to be created by taxes a.s.sessed against the property of the district charged with the cost of the improvements. The courts held that this was merely a lien upon the property of the district in question, and not a munic.i.p.al debt within the meaning of the above-mentioned const.i.tutional limitations. These decisions by the courts may not appear to be in harmony with the letter of the const.i.tutional provisions relating to munic.i.p.al indebtedness, but they are hardly at variance with their spirit. The object of these restrictions was not so much to limit the rights of the property-owning cla.s.ses as to protect them against the extravagance of the propertyless voters. To make an exception in favor of munic.i.p.al indebtedness incurred in this way and for these purposes was not calculated to work any hardship upon property owners, but rather to give them the power to authorize the employment of credit for their own advantage. They were protected against the abuse of this particular kind of indebtedness inasmuch as the consent of the owners of a majority of the property affected was quite generally required.

One influence which helped to mold a public sentiment in favor of const.i.tutional provisions limiting the amount of munic.i.p.al indebtedness was the rapid increase in the debts of American cities during the period that immediately followed the Civil war. For this condition of affairs the state government itself was largely to blame. It had prescribed a form of munic.i.p.al organization which was scarcely compatible with an efficient and responsible management of financial matters. Moreover, the state government, as we have seen, could empower its own agents to borrow money for a purpose which it had authorized and obligate the city to pay it. The effort to correct these evils, first noticeable about the year 1870, took the form of const.i.tutional provisions limiting the amount of indebtedness which could be incurred by or on behalf of cities. The main object of these provisions was to protect munic.i.p.al taxpayers against an extravagant use of the borrowing power for local purposes, whether exercised by state or munic.i.p.al authorities.

Another advantage which these provisions seemed likely to secure to the capital-owning cla.s.s deserves at least a pa.s.sing mention. This policy of limiting the amount of munic.i.p.al indebtedness was adopted at a time when, owing to the rapid growth of urban population, the local monopolies of water, light, transportation, etc., were becoming an important and extremely profitable field for the investment of private capital. The restrictions imposed upon the power of cities to borrow money would r.e.t.a.r.d, if not preclude, the adoption of a policy of munic.i.p.al ownership and thus enable the private capitalist to retain exclusive possession of this important cla.s.s of industries.

That the const.i.tutional restrictions upon the general indebtedness of cities have r.e.t.a.r.ded the movement toward munic.i.p.al ownership is beyond question. It is not likely, however, that they will much longer block the way to munic.i.p.al acquisition of those industries in which private management has proven unsatisfactory, since it may be possible to evade them by resorting to the device of a _special fund_. The same line of argument which has been accepted by the courts as supporting the const.i.tutionality of the special fund for local improvement purposes is no less applicable to special debts incurred for the purchase of revenue-producing public utilities, such as water works, lighting plants and street railways. Under this arrangement, however, the city must not a.s.sume any responsibility for the payment of the capital borrowed, the creditors advancing the purchase price or cost of construction, looking solely to the earnings under munic.i.p.al operation for the payment of both princ.i.p.al and interest. It may be doubted whether the courts in permitting cities to employ the special fund in relation to local improvements realized its possibilities in the direction of munic.i.p.al ownership.[165]

These restrictions upon the powers of cities indicate a fear that too much local self-government might jeopardize the interests of the propertied cla.s.ses. This att.i.tude on the part of those who have framed and interpreted our state const.i.tutions is merely an expression of that distrust of majority rule which is, as we have seen, the distinguishing feature of the American system of government. It is in the cities that the non-possessing cla.s.ses are numerically strongest and the inequality in the distribution of wealth most p.r.o.nounced. This largely explains the reluctance of the state to allow cities a free hand in the management of local affairs. A munic.i.p.al government responsive to public opinion might be too much inclined to make the public interests a pretext for disregarding property rights. State control of cities, then, may be regarded as a means of protecting the local minority against the local majority. Every attempt to reform this system must encounter the opposition of the property-owning cla.s.s, which is one of the chief reasons why all efforts to establish munic.i.p.al self-government have thus far largely failed.

We thus see that while property qualifications for the suffrage have disappeared, the influence of property still survives. In many ways and for many purposes property is directly or indirectly recognized in the organization and administration of munic.i.p.al government. The movement toward democracy has had less influence upon property qualifications for the suffrage and for office-holding in its relation to munic.i.p.al than in its relation to state and national affairs. When the Federal Const.i.tution was adopted the property qualifications for voting and office-holding in force in the various states were not disturbed. The Const.i.tution did not recognize the principle of universal suffrage. It not only allowed the states to retain the power to prescribe the qualifications of voters in state and munic.i.p.al elections, but also limited the suffrage for Federal purposes to those who were qualified to vote at state elections.[166] The removal, during the first half of the nineteenth century, of property qualifications for voting at state elections and holding state offices had the effect of placing the Federal suffrage upon a popular basis.

The influence of the democratic movement was less marked, however, in the domain of munic.i.p.al affairs. Here the old system under which voting and office-holding were regarded as the exclusive right of the property-owning cla.s.s has not entirely disappeared. In this as in other respects the American state has evinced a fear of munic.i.p.al democracy.

It is true that in the choice of public officials the principle of manhood suffrage prevails. But the suffrage may be exercised either with reference to candidates or measures; and in voting upon questions of munic.i.p.al policy, which is far more important than the right to select administrative officers, the suffrage is often restricted to taxpayers or the owners of real estate. Thus in Colorado, which has gone as far as any state in the Union in the direction of munic.i.p.al democracy, no franchise can be granted to a private corporation or debt incurred by a city for the purpose of munic.i.p.al ownership without the approval of the taxpaying electors. When we consider that 72 per cent. of the families living in Denver in the year 1900 occupied rented houses,[167] and that the household goods of a head of a family to the value of two hundred dollars are exempt from taxation,[168] the effect of this restriction is obvious. In thus limiting the right to vote, the framers of the state const.i.tution evidently proceeded upon the theory that the policy of a city with reference to its public utilities should be controlled by its taxpayers. The justification for this const.i.tutional provision is not apparent, however, inasmuch as the burden of supporting the public service industries of a city is not borne by the taxpayers as such, but by the people generally. Such a system makes it possible for the taxpaying cla.s.s to control public utilities in their own interest and to the disadvantage of the general public. The part of the community who are taxpayers, if given the exclusive right to control these industries, would be tempted to make them an important source of munic.i.p.al revenue.

They would be likely to favor high rather than low or reasonable charges for these necessary public services, since their taxes would be diminished by the amount thus taken from the non-taxpayers through excessive charges. Where the majority of the citizens are property owners and taxpayers there is but little danger that public ownership will be subject to this abuse. But where there is great inequality in the distribution of wealth and a large propertyless cla.s.s, democracy is the only guarantee that the benefits of munic.i.p.al ownership will not be monopolized by the property-owning cla.s.s.