The Prose Works of William Wordsworth Part 13

ART. II. Vice-Admiral Seniavin, with the officers, sailors, and marines, under his command, to return to Russia, without any condition or stipulation respecting their future services; to be conveyed thither in men of war, or proper vessels, at the expence of His Britannic Majesty.

Done and concluded on board the ship Twerday, in the Tagus, and on board His Britannic Majesty's ship Hibernia, off the mouth of that river, the 3d day of September 1808.

(Signed) DE SENIAVIN. (Signed) CHARLES COTTON. (Counter-signed) By command of the Admiral, L. Sa.s.s, a.s.sesseur de College.

(Counter-signed) By command of the Admiral, JAMES KENNEDY, Secretary.

POSTSCRIPT

ON SIR JOHN MOORE'S LETTERS.

Whilst the latter sheets of this work were pa.s.sing through the press, there was laid before Parliament a series of correspondence between the English Government and its servants in Spain; amongst which were the letters of Sir John Moore. That these letters, even with minds the least vigilant to detect contradictions and to make a commentary from the past actions of the Spaniards, should have had power to alienate them from the Spanish cause--could never have been looked for; except indeed by those who saw, in the party spirit on this question, a promise that more than ordinary pains would be taken to misrepresent their contents and to abuse the public judgment. But however it was at any rate to have been expected--both from the place which Sir J. Moore held in the Nation's esteem previously to his Spanish campaign, and also especially from that which (by his death in battle) he had so lately taken in its affections--that they would weigh a good deal in depressing the general sympathy with Spain: and therefore the Author of this work was desirous that all which these letters themselves, or other sources of information, furnished to mitigate and contradict Sir J.M.'s opinions--should be laid before the public: but--being himself at a great distance from London, and not having within his reach all the doc.u.ments necessary for this purpose--he has honoured the friend, who corrects the press errors, by making over that task to him; and the reader is therefore apprised, that the Author is not responsible for any thing which follows.

Those, who have not examined these letters for themselves, will have collected enough of their general import, from conversation and the public prints, to know that they p.r.o.nounce an opinion unfavourable to the Spaniards. They will perhaps have yet to learn that this opinion is not supported by any body of _facts_ (for of facts only three are given; and those, as we shall see, misrepresented); but solely by the weight of Sir John Moore's personal authority. This being the case, it becomes the more important to a.s.sign the value of that authority, by making such deductions from the present public estimate of it, as are either fairly to be presumed from his profession and office, or directly inferred from the letters under consideration.

As reasons for questioning _a priori_ the impartiality of these letters,--it might be suggested (in reference to what they would be likely to _omit_)--first--that they are the letters of a _soldier_; that is, of a man trained (by the prejudices of his profession) to despise, or at least to rate as secondary, those resources which for Spain must be looked to as supreme;--and, secondly, that they are the letters of a _general_; that is, of a soldier removed by his rank from the possibility of any extensive intercourse with the lower cla.s.ses; concerning whom the question chiefly was. But it is more important to remark (in reference to what they would be likely to _mis-state_)--thirdly--that they are the letters of a _commander-in-chief_; standing--from the very day when he took the field--in a dilemma which compelled him to risk the safety of his army by advancing, or its honour by retreating; and having to make out an apology, for either issue, to the very persons who had imposed this dilemma upon him.--The reader is requested to attend to this. Sir John Moore found himself in Leon with a force 'which, if united,' (to quote his own words) 'would not exceed 26,000 men.' Such a force, after the defeat of the advanced armies,--he was sure--could effect nothing; the best result he could antic.i.p.ate was an inglorious retreat. That he should be in this situation at the very opening of the campaign, he saw, would declare to all Europe that somewhere there must be blame: but where? with himself he knew that there was none: the English Government (with whom he must have seen that at least a part of the blame lay--for sending him so late, and with a force so lamentably incommensurate to the demands of the service) it was not for him--holding the situation that he did--openly to accuse (though, by implication, he often does accuse them); and therefore it became his business to look to the Spaniards; and, in their conduct, to search for palliations of that inefficiency on his part--which else the persons, to whom he was writing, would understand as charged upon themselves. Writing with such a purpose--and under a double fettering of his faculties; first from anxious forebodings of calamity or dishonour; and secondly from the pain he must have felt at not being free to censure those with whom he could not but be aware that the embarra.s.sments of his situation had, at least in part, originated--we might expect that it would not be difficult for him to find, in the early events of the campaign, all which he sought; and to deceive himself into a belief, that, in stating these events without any commentary or even hints as to the relative circ.u.mstances under which they took place (which only could give to the naked facts their value and due meaning), he was making no misrepresentations,--and doing the Spaniards no injustice.

These suggestions are made with the greater earnestness, as it is probable that the honourable death of Sir John Moore will have given so much more weight to his opinion on any subject--as, if these suggestions be warranted, it is ent.i.tled on this subject to less weight--than the opinion of any other individual equally intelligent, and not liable (from high office and perplexity of situation) to the same influences of disgust or prejudice.

That these letters _were_ written under some such influences, is plain throughout: we find, in them, reports of the four first events in the campaign; and, in justice to the Spaniards, it must be said that all are virtually mis-statements. Take two instances:

1. The main strength and efforts of the French were, at the opening of the campaign, directed against the army of Gen. Blake. The issue is thus given by Sir J.M.:--'Gen. Blake's army in Biscay has been defeated--dispersed; and its officers and men are flying in every direction.' Could it be supposed that the army, whose matchless exertions and endurances are all merged in this over-charged (and almost insulting) statement of their result, was, 'mere peasantry' (Sir J.M.'s own words) and opposed to greatly superior numbers of veteran troops?

Confront with this account the description given by an eye-witness (Major-Gen. Leith) of their constancy and the trials of their constancy; remembering that, for ten successive days, they were engaged (under the pressure of similar hardships, with the addition of one not mentioned here, viz.--a want of clothing) in continued actions with the French:--'Here I shall take occasion to state another instance of the patience (and, I will add, the chearfulness) of the Spanish soldiers under the greatest privations.--After the action of Soronosa on the 31st ult., it was deemed expedient by Gen. Blake, for the purpose of forming a junction with the second division and the army of Asturias, that the army should make long, rapid, and continued marches through a country at any time incapable of feeding so numerous an army, and at present almost totally drained of provisions. From the 30th of October to the present day (Nov. 6), with the exception of a small and partial issue of bread at Bilboa on the morning of the 1st of November, this army has been totally dest.i.tute of bread, wine, or spirits; and has literally lived on the scanty supply of beef and sheep which those mountains afford. Yet never was there a symptom of complaint or murmur; the soldiers' minds appearing to be entirely occupied with the idea of being led against the enemy at Bilboa.'--'It is impossible for me to do justice to the gallantry and energy of the divisions engaged this day. The army are loud in expressing their desires to be led against the enemy at Bilboa; the universal exclamation is--The bayonet! the bayonet! lead us back to Soronosa.'

2. On the 10th of November the Estramaduran advanced guard, of about 12,000 men, was defeated at Burgos by a division of the French army _selected_ for the service--and having a vast superiority in cavalry and artillery. This event, with the same neglect of circ.u.mstances as in the former instance, Sir J.M. thus reports:--'The French, after beating the army of Estramadura, are advanced at Burgos.' Now surely to any unprejudiced mind the bare fact of 12,000 men (chiefly raw levies) having gone forward to meet and to find out the main French army--under all the oppression which, to the ignorant of the upper and lower cla.s.ses throughout Europe, there is in the name of Bonaparte--must appear, under any issue, a t.i.tle to the highest admiration, such as would have made this slight and incidental mention of it impossible.

The two next events--viz. the forcing of the pa.s.s at Somosierra by the Polish horse, and the partial defeat of Castanos--are, as might be shewn even from the French bulletins, no less misrepresented. With respect to the first,--Sir J. Moore, over-looking the whole drama of that n.o.ble defence, gives only the catastrophe; and his account of the second will appear, from any report, to be an exaggeration.

It may be objected that--since Sir J.M. no where alleges these events as proving any thing against the Spaniards, but simply as accounting for his own plans (in which view, howsoever effected, whether with or without due resistance, they were ent.i.tled to the same value)--it is unfair to say that, by giving them uncirc.u.mstantially, he has misrepresented them. But it must be answered, that, in letters containing elsewhere (though not immediately in connexion with these statements) opinions unfavourable to the Spaniards, to omit any thing making _for_ them--_is_ to misrepresent in effect. And, further, it shall now be shewn that even those three charges--which Sir J.M. _does_ allege in proof of his opinions--are as glaringly mis-stated.

The first of these charges is the most important: I give it to the reader in the words of Sir John Moore:--'The French cavalry from Burgos, in small detachments, are over-running the province of Leon; raising contributions; to which the inhabitants submit without the least resistance.' Now here it cannot be meant that no efforts at resistance were made by individuals or small parties; because this would not only contradict the universal laws of human nature,--but would also be at utter variance with Sir J.M.'s repeated complaints that he could gain no information of what was pa.s.sing in his neighbourhood. It is meant therefore that there was no regular organised resistance; no resistance such as might be made the subject of an official report. Now we all know that the Spaniards have every where suffered deplorably from a want of cavalry; and, in the absence of that, hear from a military man (Major-Gen. Brodrick) _why_ there was no resistance: '--At that time I was not aware how remarkably the plains of Leon and Castille differ from any other I have seen; nor how strongly the circ.u.mstances, which const.i.tute that difference, enforce the opinion I venture to express.'

(He means the necessity of cavalry reinforcements from England.) 'My road from Astorga lay through a vast open s.p.a.ce, extending from 5 to 20 or more miles on every side; without a single accident of ground which could enable a body of infantry to check a pursuing enemy, or to cover its own retreat. In such ground, any corps of infantry might be insulted, to the very gates of the town it occupied, by cavalry far inferior in numbers; _contributions raised under their eyes_, and the whole neighbourhood exhausted of its resources, _without the possibility of their opposing any resistance to such incursions_.'

The second charge is made on the retreat to Corunna: 'the Gallicians, though armed,' Sir J.M. says, 'made no attempt to stop the pa.s.sage of the French through the mountains.' That they were armed--is a proof that they had an _intention_ to do so (as one of our journals observed): but what encouragement had they in that intention from the sight of a regular force--more than 30,000 strong--abandoning, without a struggle, pa.s.ses where (as an English general a.s.serts) 'a body of a thousand men might stop an army of twenty times the number?'

The third charge relates to the same Province: it is a complaint that 'the people run away; the villages are deserted;' and again, in his last letter,--'They abandoned their dwellings at our approach; drove away their carts, oxen, and every thing which could be of the smallest aid to the army.' To this charge, in so far as it may be thought to criminate the Spaniards, a full answer is furnished by their accuser himself in the following memorable sentence in another part of the very same letter:--'I am sorry to say that the army, whose conduct I had such reason to extol in its march through Portugal and on its arrival in Spain, has totally changed its character since it began to retreat.'

What do we collect from this pa.s.sage? a.s.suredly that the army ill-treated the Gallicians; for there is no other way in which an army, as a body, can offend--excepting by an indisposition to fight; and that interpretation (besides that we are all sure that no English army could _so_ offend) Sir J. Moore expressly guards against in the next sentence.

The English army then treated its Ally as an enemy: and,--though there are alleviations of its conduct in its great sufferings,--yet it must be remembered that these sufferings were due--not to the Gallicians--but to circ.u.mstances over which they had no controul--to the precipitancy of the retreat, the inclemency of the weather, and the poverty of the country; and that (knowing this) they must have had a double sense of injustice in any outrages of an English army, from, contrasting them with the professed objects of that army in entering Spain.--It is to be observed that the answer to the second charge would singly have been some answer to this; and, reciprocally, that the answer to this is a full answer to the second.

Having thus shewn that, in Sir J. Moore's very inaccurate statements of facts, we have some further reasons for a previous distrust of any opinion which is supported by those statements,--it is now time to make the reader acquainted with the real terms and extent of that opinion.

For it is far less to be feared that, from his just respect for him who gave it, he should allow it an undue weight in his judgment--than that, reposing on the faithfulness of the abstracts and reports of these letters, he should really be still ignorant of its exact tenor.

The whole amount then of what Sir John Moore has alleged against the Spaniards, in any place but one, is comprised in this sentence:--'The enthusiasm, of which we have heard so much, no where appears; whatever good-will there is (and I believe amongst the lower orders there is a great deal) is taken no advantage of.' It is true that, in that one place (viz. in his last letter written at Corunna), he charges the Spaniards with 'apathy and indifference:' but, as this cannot be reconciled with his concession of _a great deal of good-will_, we are bound to take that as his real and deliberate opinion which he gave under circ.u.mstances that allowed him most coolness and freedom of judgment.--The Spaniards then were wanting in enthusiasm. Now what is meant by enthusiasm? Does it mean want of ardour and zeal in battle?

This Sir J. Moore no where a.s.serts; and, even without a direct acknowledgement of their good conduct in the field (of which he had indeed no better means of judging than we in England), there is involved in his statement of the relative numbers of the French and Spaniards--combined with our knowledge of the time during which they maintained their struggle--a sufficient testimony to that; even if the events of the first campaign had not made it superfluous. Does it mean then a want of good-will to the cause? So far from this, we have seen that Sir J.M. admits that there was, in that cla.s.s where it was most wanted, 'a great deal' of good-will. And, in the present condition of Spain, let it be recollected what it is that this implies. We see, in the intercepted letter to Marshal Soult (transmitted by Sir J.M.), that the French keep accurate registers of the behaviour of the different towns; and this was, no doubt, well known throughout Spain. Therefore to shew any signs of good-will--much more to give a kind welcome to the English (as had been done at Badajoz and Salamanca)--was, they knew, a pledge of certain punishment on any visit from the French. So that good-will, manifested in these circ.u.mstances, was nothing less than a testimony of devotion to the cause.

Here then, the reader will say, I find granted--in the courage and the good-will of the Spaniards--all the elements of an enthusiastic resistance; and cannot therefore imagine what more could be sought for except the throwing out and making palpable of their enthusiasm to the careless eye in some signal outward manifestations. In this accordingly we learn what interpretation we are to give to Sir J.M.'s charge:--there were no tumults on his entrance into Spain; no insurrections; they did not, as he says, 'rally round' the English army. But, to determine how far this disappointment of his expectations tells against the Spaniards, we must first know how far those expectations were reasonable. Let the reader consider, then,

First; what army was this round which the Spaniards were to rally? If it was known by the victory of Vimiera, it was known also to many by the Convention of Cintra; for, though the government had never ventured to communicate that affair officially to the nation, dark and perplexing whispers were however circulated about it throughout Spain. Moreover, it must surely demand some superst.i.tion in behalf of regular troops--to see, in an army of 20,000 men, a dignity adequate to the office here claimed for it of awakening a new vigour and enthusiasm in such a nation as Spain; not to mention that an English army, however numerous, had no right to consider itself as other than a tributary force--as itself tending to a centre--and attracted rather than attracting.

Secondly; it appears that Sir J.M. has overlooked one most important circ.u.mstance;--viz. that the harvest, in these provinces, had been already reaped; the English army could be viewed only as gleaners. Thus, as we have already seen, Estramadura had furnished an army which had marched before his arrival; from Salamanca also--the very place in which he makes his complaint--there had gone out a battalion to Biscay which Gen. Blake had held up, for its romantic gallantly, to the admiration of his whole army.

Yet, thirdly, it is not meant by any means to a.s.sert that Spain has put forth an energy adequate to the service--or in any tolerable proportion to her own strength. Far from it! But upon whom does the blame rest? Not surely upon the people--who, as long as they continued to have confidence in their rulers, could not be expected (after the early fervours of their revolution had subsided) much to overstep the measure of exertion prescribed to them--but solely upon the government. Up to the time when Sir J.M. died, the Supreme Junta had adopted no one grand and comprehensive measure for calling out the strength of the nation;--scarcely any of such ordinary vigour as, in some countries, would have been adopted to meet local disturbances among the people.

From their jealousy of popular feeling,--they had never taken any steps, by books or civic a.s.semblies, to make the general enthusiasm in the cause available by bringing it within the general consciousness; and thus to create the nation into an organic whole. Sir J.M. was fully aware of this:--'The Spanish Government,' he says, 'do not seem ever to have contemplated the possibility of a second attack:' and accordingly, whenever he is at leisure to make distinctions, he does the people the justice to say--that the failure was with those who should have 'taken advantage' of their good will. With the people therefore will for ever remain the glory of having resisted heroically with means utterly inadequate; and with the government the whole burthen of the disgrace that the means were thus inadequate.

But, further,--even though it should still be thought that, in the three Provinces which Sir J. Moore saw, there may have been some failures with the people,--it is to be remembered that these were the very three which had never been the theatre of French outrages; which therefore had neither such a vivid sense of the evils which they had to fear, nor so strong an animation in the recollection of past triumphs: we might accordingly have predicted that, if any provinces should prove slack in their exertions, it would be these three. So that, after all, (a candid inquirer into this matter will say) admitting Sir J.M.'s description to be faithful with respect to what he saw, I can never allow that the conduct of these three provinces shall be held forth as an exponent of the general temper and condition of Spain. For that therefore I must look to other authorities.

Such an inquirer we might then refer to the testimonies of Gen. Leith and of Capt. Pasley for Biscay and Asturias; of Mr. Vaughan (as cited by Lord Castlereagh) for the whole East and South; of Lord Cochrane (himself a most gallant man, and giving _his_ testimony under a trying comparison of the Spaniards with English Sailors) for Catalonia in particular; of Lord W. Bentinck for the central provinces; and, for all Spain, we might appeal even to the Spanish military reports--which, by the discrimination of their praises (sometimes giving severe rebukes to particular regiments, &c.), authenticate themselves.

But, finally, we are ent.i.tled--after the _actions_ of the Spaniards--to dispense with such appeals. Spain might justly deem it a high injury and affront, to suppose that (after her deeds performed under the condition of her means) she could require any other testimony to justify her before nil posterity. What those deeds have been, it cannot surely now be necessary to inform the reader: and therefore the remainder of this note shall be employed in placing before him the present posture of Spain--under two aspects which may possibly have escaped his notice.

First, Let him look to that part of Spain which is now in the possession of the enemy;--let him bear in mind that the present campaign opened at the latter end of last October; that the French were then masters of the country up to the Ebro; that the contest has since lain between a veteran army (rated, on the lowest estimate, at 113,000 men--with a prodigious superiority in cavalry, artillery, &c.) opposed (as to all _regular_ opposition) by unpractised Spaniards, split into three distinct armies, having no communication with each other, making a total of not more than 80,000 men;--and then let him inquire what progress, in this time and with these advantages, the French have been able to make (comparing it, at the same time, with that heretofore made in Prussia, and elsewhere): the answer shall be given from the _Times_ newspaper of April 8th--'It appears that, at the date of our last accounts from France as well as Spain, about one half of the Peninsula was still unsubdued by the French arms. The Provinces, which retain their independence, form a sort of irregular or broken crescent; of which one horn consists in parts of Catalonia and Valencia, and the other horn includes Asturias (perhaps we may soon add Gallicia). The broader surface contains the four kingdoms of Andalusia (Seville, Grenada, Cordova, and Murcia), and considerable parts of Estramadura, and La Mancha; besides Portugal.'--The writer might have added that even the Provinces, occupied by the French, cannot yet be counted substantially as conquests: since they have a military representation in the south; large proportions of the defeated armies having retreated thither.

Secondly. Let him look to that part of Spain which yet remains unsubdued.--It was thought no slight proof of heroism in the people of Madrid, that they prepared for their defence--not as the foremost champions of Spain (in which character they might have gained an advent.i.tious support from the splendour of their post; and, at any rate, would have been free from the depression of preceding disasters)--but under a full knowledge of recent and successive overthrows; their advanced armies had been defeated; and their last stay, at Somosierra, had been driven in upon them. But the Provinces in the South have many more causes for dejection: they have heard, since these disasters, that this heroic city of Madrid has fallen; that their forts in Catalonia have been wrested from them; that an English army just moved upon the horizon of Spain--to draw upon itself the gaze and expectations of the people, and then to vanish like an apparition; and, finally, they have heard of the desolation of Saragossa. Under all this acc.u.mulation of calamity, what has been their conduct? In Valencia redoubled preparations of defence; in Seville a decree for such energetic retaliation on the enemy,--as places its authors, in the event of his success, beyond the hopes of mercy; in Cadiz--on a suspicion that a compromise was concerted with their enemy--tumults and clamours of the people for instant vengeance; every where, in their uttermost distress, the same stern and unfaultering att.i.tude of defiance as at the glorious birth of their resistance.

In this statement, then, of the past efforts of Spain--and of her present preparations for further efforts--will be found a full answer to all the charges alleged, by Sir John Moore in his letters, against the people of Spain, even if we did not find sufficient ground for rejecting them in an examination of these letters themselves.

The Author of the above note--having, in justice to the Spaniards, spoken with great plainness and freedom--feels it necessary to add a few words, that it may not thence be concluded that he is insensible to Sir J. Moore's claims upon his respect. Perhaps--if Sir J.M. could himself have given us his commentary upon these letters, and have restricted the extension of such pa.s.sages as (from want of vigilance in making distinctions or laxity of language) are at variance with concessions made elsewhere--they would have been found not more to differ from the reports of other intelligent and less prejudiced observers, than we might have expected from the circ.u.mstances under which they were written. Sir J.M. has himself told us (in a letter published since the above note was written) that he thinks the Spaniards 'a fine people;'

and that acknowledgement, from a soldier, cannot be supposed to exclude courage; nor, from a Briton, some zeal for national independence. We are therefore to conclude that, when Sir J.M. p.r.o.nounces opinions on 'the Spaniards' not to be reconciled with this and other pa.s.sages, he speaks--not of the Spanish people--but of the Spanish government. And, even for what may still remain charged uncandidly upon the people, the writer does not forget that there are infinite apologies to be found in Sir J. Moore's situation: the earliest of these letters were written under great anxiety and disturbance of mind from the antic.i.p.ation of calamity;--and the latter (which are the most severe) under the actual pressure of calamity; and calamity of that sort which would be the most painful to the feelings of a gallant soldier, and most likely to vitiate his judgment with respect to those who had in part (however innocently) occasioned it. There may be pleaded also for him--that want of leisure which would make it difficult to compare the different accounts he received, and to draw the right inferences from them. But then these apologies for his want of fidelity--are also reasons before-hand for suspecting it: and there are now (May 18th) to be added to these reasons, and their confirmations in the letters themselves, fresh proofs in the present state of Gallicia, as manifested by the late re-capture of Vigo, and the movements of the Marquis de la Romana; all which, from Sir J. Moore's account of the temper in that province, we might have confidently p.r.o.nounced impossible. We must therefore remember that what in him were simply mis-statements--are now, when repeated with our better information, calumnies; and calumnies so much the less to be excused in us, as we have already (in our conduct towards Spain) given her other and no light matter of complaint against ourselves.

END OF THE APPENDIX.

III. VINDICATION OF OPINIONS IN THE TREATISE ON THE 'CONVENTION OF CINTRA:'

=VIZ=.

(_a_) LETTER TO MAJOR-GENERAL SIR CHARLES W. PASLEY, K.C.B., ON HIS 'MILITARY POLICY AND INSt.i.tUTIONS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE,' 1811.

(_b_) LETTER ENCLOSING THE PRECEDING TO A FRIEND UN-NAMED.

NOTE.

These two Letters--the latter for the first time printed--form a fitting sequel to the 'Convention of Cintra.' See Preface in the present volume for more on them. G.

TO CAPTAIN PASLEY, ROYAL ENGINEERS.