The Principles of Economics Part 35

John Stuart Mill contrasts this with the frequent practice by rich men in America of giving for public purposes. In France the right of bequest outside the family is legally limited; only the share of one child can be willed away by the father, and the rest must be equally divided among the children. Settlements and _fidei commissa_ are limited in many countries, because of the recognized social evils resulting from the tying up of estates for generations. Throughout the history of England, Parliament has given attention to the question of mortmain, which chiefly concerned the drifting of great estates into the hands of the church or of corporations, as a result of bequests by the pious. Only recently in England, and to a less extent in this country, has been seriously discussed the policy of permitting unlimited endowments to charitable inst.i.tutions, and new legislation has diverted from their original purposes some of the old endowments. These varied and often strict limitations of the right of private property are all determined by some thought, wise or foolish, of social expediency.

[Sidenote: Limitation of right of inheritance]

4. _The law of inheritance varies greatly with time and place._ Inheritance, in contrast with bequest, usually means succession to the property of one who has died intestate, that is, has made no will. The old idea of family unity survives in great measure in modern laws of inheritance. The nearest living relatives, no matter how distant they may be, inherit property when there is no will. When a miser dies in solitude and neglect, the world must be searched over to find a remote cousin to take the h.o.a.rded wealth. Inheritance is limited largely at present by the power of taxation. The view is growing that the claims of the society in which wealth has been acquired are stronger than those of relatives distant alike in s.p.a.ce, in blood, and in affectionate interest. This view is reflected in many recent inheritance-tax laws which take from the shares of distant relatives a goodly portion for public purposes.

The question is raised in many minds, If private property is not an absolute right, what shall be its limits? What changes should be made in it? The essential thought in the various attacks on the inst.i.tution of private property is that, because it occasions inequality in incomes, it is not socially expedient. The conviction is growing that, in some general way, incomes should correspond to, and reflect, social service.

It is well to consider more closely what the terms social expediency and social service imply.

CHAPTER 39

INCOME AND SOCIAL SERVICE

-- I. INCOME FROM PROPERTY

[Sidenote: The justice of property questioned]

1. _Property rights must meet the test of social expediency._ If private property is defended on the ground of social expediency, it must show good social results. It is not a sacred thing; it is open to examination, and must be judged by its fruits. Of all the forms of income, that from property has been most strongly attacked. The thought is that enjoyment of wealth should not be found apart from labor, and that it should bear some proportion to services performed. The enjoyment of an ample income by one who does no more than to draw checks or to sign coupons seems to many minds to be unjust; and it is often questioned whether there is any social service performed by the receivers of the rent from land. Property seems in many cases to be distributed without rule or reason. It does not correspond with beauty, strength, wit, wisdom, temperance, gentleness, or charity. Since the beginning of the Christian era, reformers have a.s.sailed and preached against the prevailing inequality of wealth. The idea that incomes, if not equal, should correspond to social service has always been present in some vague way in the minds of men.

[Sidenote: Social effect of the right to give]

2. _The right to transmit property by inheritance or by gift may be judged with reference to its effect on the giver, on the receiver, and on society at large._ It is well to take these three points of view. The right to dispose of property either during life or at death has undoubtedly in many ways a good effect on the character of men. It stimulates the father to provide for his children, the husband to provide for his wife. There is a joy in giving, a joy in the power to bestow one's wealth on those one loves. The right to give stimulates industry, frugality, ingenuity, and yields productive results. Much of the existing wealth probably never would have been created if men did not have this right of gift. But there is a limit to the working of this motive, and other motives often are much more effective. Many men after gaining a competence continue to work for love of wealth and power in their own lifetime, as the miser continues to toil for love of gold.

When men without families die wealthy, when men that have not the slightest interest in their nearest relatives labor and ama.s.s wealth till their dying day, it is evident that the right to bequeath property has little to do with their efforts. Love of acc.u.mulation and love of power in these cases supply the motive. A more limited liberty to dispose of property at death might still suffice, therefore, to call out the greater part of the efforts now made to acc.u.mulate property.

[Sidenote: Effect of the right to receive]

That the effects on the receiver of the property are good is somewhat more doubtful. It is true that children raised in great comfort or luxury would be more than ordinarily unhappy if plunged into poverty or even into humble circ.u.mstances on the death of their parents. There is much social justification for permitting families to maintain an accustomed standard of comfort. Few would deny that a moderate provision by parents to provide education and opportunity for their children is commendable and desirable. But the evil effects of waiting for dead men's shoes are proverbial. Many a boy's greatest curse has been his father's fortune. Men of native ability wait idly for fortune to come, and opportunities for self-help slip by unheeded. The world often exclaims over the failure of the sons of noted men to achieve great things, for, despite confusing evidence, men still have faith in heredity. A too easy fortune saps ambition and relaxes energy; and thus rich men's sons, if not most carefully and wisely trained, are made pitiable paupers in spirit, while the self-made fathers think their boys have chances they themselves did not enjoy. The greater social loss is not the dissipated fortunes, but the ruined characters.

[Sidenote: Broader social effects of inheritance]

The effects of inheritance on the community are good in so far as it secures efficient management of wealth. If the son or relative has been in business with the deceased, there is a reason that he should inherit the property, and his succession to it makes the least disturbance to existing business conditions. But every profligate son is an argument against inheritance; every incompetent heir is an argument in the hands of the enemies of the existing order of society. It is to society's interest that no able-bodied member shall stand idle. Every child should have presented to him the motive to devote his powers to the social welfare in economic or other directions. Moreover, many feel that the great fortunes now acc.u.mulating through successive generations in the hands of a few families are endangering our free society, even if these fortunes should continue to be well administered. There is a widespread feeling that the heredity of great wealth is, like the heredity of political power, out of harmony with the democratic spirit--though this may easily become a misleading comparison. Still, democracy wishes to see men as individuals put to the test, not profiting forever by the deeds of their forebears. This feeling is shared by those who cannot be charged with radical prejudices. A few years ago the Illinois Bar a.s.sociation pa.s.sed a somewhat startling resolution favoring moderate limits to inherited fortunes. Every year sees bills of this purport introduced in the legislatures and in Congress. Andrew Carnegie says it would be a good thing if every boy had to start in poverty and make his own way. Cecil Rhodes recorded in his will his contempt for the idle, expectant heir.

[Sidenote: The test of wise inheritance laws]

3. _Social expediency will limit the right of intestate inheritance to persons in essential economic and social relations._ Public opinion is not yet crystallized in favor of this formal proposition, but tends strongly toward it. The foregoing considerations show that the right of gift in the lifetime of the giver should be the freest. The right of bequest, that is, of gift by will, should be liberal. The man who has acquired wealth may well be trusted to decide who bear to him a close social or personal relation, and to say whose lives have in a measure furnished the motives of his activity. But the right of intestate inheritance by distant relatives is one that stands on weak social foundations to-day. It appears to be an unreasonable survival from more patriarchal conditions. The true test is whether the wish to provide for these heirs has furnished the motive for the producing and preserving of the wealth. The claims of those nearest in blood and closest in personal relations are strongest. Family affection and friendship form the strongest of social ties, and it is socially expedient to cultivate them. Motives for abstinence and industry must be strengthened. But the same test shows that the zealous regard of the American law for the rights of grandnephews in Australia, or even of brothers long absent in distant quarters of this country, is irrational, and is unjust to the community where the fortune lies.

[Sidenote: Social services of favored cla.s.ses]

4. _Many fortunes built on favoring legislation are defended as due to social service._ In the Middle Ages kings often granted great estates to n.o.bles as rewards for past merit and as a payment for expected public actions. The great landlords were the magistrates, military leaders, and supporters of social order, and thus, in the judgment both of the king and of the commonalty, the n.o.bles earned their incomes by their social service. While this practice has disappeared under const.i.tutional government, large grants are still made to royal families. Many Englishmen who are democratic at heart uphold such grants as the price of social stability. Regard for royalty is so deep-rooted in the minds of the people of any long-established monarchy that there is always danger in change. England must pay many millions annually as the price of loyal and conservative sentiment. So long as this is true, a family of royal figureheads and idlers performs a social service.

[Sidenote: Possible social service of protected industries]

Protective tariffs sought by wealthy manufacturers are granted, not ostensibly to help them, but to help the country. The argument is that the benefits are diffused. Aid to enterprises in private hands, such as ship subsidies or as the grants to the Pacific railroads, are defended on the ground that, as a whole, society benefits by thus increasing the income of one cla.s.s. The promise of social service is most urged by those who get the immediate benefit. Their eyes are keenest. The manufacturer sees clearly the benefits that will come to his factory from a protective tariff, but before he can get it he must convince many others that they too will gain. The majority of the American electorate is not voting a special favor at the polls, but is recognizing what it believes to be in its own interest. Most students of social questions doubt the wisdom of most of these grants to the wealthy on grounds of social service. The burden of proof is on their advocates, but few to-day are so rash as to say that such a claim of social service is never sound.

[Sidenote: Private property in land questioned]

5. _Property in natural agents is the most strongly attacked._ In the case of great natural deposits, such as those of coal or iron, the social service that is performed by the mine-owner is hard to see. Great incomes are drawn in the form of royalty or rent by those who never lift a pick or direct a stroke of work. Agricultural land in the hands of absentee landlords yields an income not very clearly due to social service, and this phase of property has been especially a.s.sailed during the past century. The modern form of this discussion is concerning "the unearned increment," the rise in the value of lands as a result of social growth. It is proposed to appropriate by "the single tax" the entire rental value of the land for the use of the public.

The defense of property in land is first positive: taking not the extreme but the usual case, private property secures the discovery and development of natural resources and their thorough use and good management (not necessarily by personal labor with the hands). If this is true, it is well for the individual and for the community to have this wealth in private hands. But in other cases there is merely a negative argument for property in land: no other better method of employing it has been devised and found practicable The experience with state ownership of mines, forests, and estates has not definitely answered in every case the question whether the social results of state ownership are more favorable than those of private ownership. In some cases they clearly are not, in others they may be; and as the balance of opinion inclines in the direction of public ownership, other reforms will doubtless be undertaken.

[Sidenote: Inequality of fortunes]

6. _The present inequality of wealth, not private property as such, is often attacked._ It is estimated that in the United Kingdom two per cent. of the families own seventy-five per cent. of all the wealth, while ninety-three per cent. own less than eight per cent. In the United States it is estimated that one per cent. of all the families own more than the remaining ninety-nine per cent.; and at the other part of the scale eighty-seven per cent. of all the families own less than twelve per cent. of all the wealth. The trend has been toward concentration of fortunes and a larger proportion of the growing income from property is in a few hands. Many feel that the law of property is defective when this is possible, although at the same time the average income of the wage-earner is increasing. Yet, it is not the inst.i.tution as a whole that is attacked, but its details. The custom of equal division of property among children in the United States has not been as effective in keeping fortunes small as was expected. The wealthy American families have averaged small, and in some of the most prominent the rule of equal division has not been followed. Opportunities for the investment of small savings at low interest are not lacking, but the great fortunes overtower the little ones, securing the great profits and great political and economic power. The farms and the villages are refuges for the small industry and for the small fortunes, and this fact has a great influence on our national character. The whole social atmosphere in the cities, with their extremes of wealth, differs from that in the country, and this contrast promises to become greater as the years go on.

[Sidenote: Private property vs. socialism]

7. _The ideal of property rights is that they shall furnish the highest motives for efficient social service._ Private property furnishes such a motive in a broad way, but its most ardent defenders will recognize that it does so imperfectly. It is an inst.i.tution that has been tried and that does the work, while other methods suggested to do away with it are found to be dreams. The ideal of socialism is the abolition of private property, the centralizing under the control of the state of all wealth, except the simple personal belongings, clothing and other consumption goods. But history and human nature unite to testify that extreme socialism is an unworkable plan, excepting under special conditions, as in barbarous times and under a political despotism. The modern ideal for the control of wealth is the best attainable harmony of liberty and efficiency. If private property as it is, falls short of that ideal, at any rate it works either on a small or on a large scale, and socialism does not work at all. Property rights as they exist are not a product of pure reason. They are the result of social evolution, of historical accidents, of cla.s.s legislation, and of selfish interest in many cases.

Changing social conditions and ideas are bringing many changes in law, and further change must be expected to come.

-- II. INCOME FROM PERSONAL SERVICES

[Sidenote: Some anti-social speculative gains]

1. _Incomes from legitimate enterprise and speculation correspond roughly to social service._ It has been recognized above that there are many grades of chance, of speculation, and of enterprise. The extreme cases are bald crimes and are punished as such. Over some men that never directly break the law there always hangs a suspicion of guilt. It is the purpose of the law to make dishonesty unprofitable, but how imperfectly it does so! There are many cases of chance gains where the lucky man without social service legally enjoys his fortune. The law must be framed in broad terms, and cannot provide for every case. It may broadly forbid lotteries whose evils clearly exceed their benefits. But what would be the effect of taking away reward for the discovery of a gold-mine, even though sometimes it is awkward stumbling, not industry, that reveals the veins of metal? Society has studied that question in the past; even now changes are being made in the laws; and in their turn the citizens and legislators of the next generation must decide the question. It is always under consideration.

[Sidenote: Reward and enterprise]

Are the rewards of the successful enterpriser greater than he deserves?

How shall it be judged what he deserves? The answer is in the form of a question, Could society have the service without the reward? Society may be thought of as hiring the services of the efficient business man at the lowest price. Does it wish the services of Cornelius Vanderbilt in organizing a great system of railroads, of Andrew Carnegie, of Pierpont Morgan? What can it get them for? It must appeal not only to their love of money but to their love of power. Large services and large results can be bought only with large rewards. The shrewd enterpriser is not to be paid with abstract social grat.i.tude. He is not to be tricked, as is a Chinese G.o.d, with tissue-paper gold.

[Sidenote: Unmeasured gains of vast wealth]

But in many ways fortunes appear to grow without social services, and sometimes with social harm. Russell Sage, the noted capitalist (who should know something of Wall Street), in speaking of the greatest of American corporations, said: "They dominate wherever they choose to go.

They can make and unmake any property, no matter how vast. They can almost compel any man to sell out anything, at any price." Henry Clews, the well-known New York banker, said of a certain group of financiers: "Their resources are so vast that they need only to concentrate on any given property in order to do with it what they please.... There is an utter absence of chance that is terrible to contemplate. This combination controls Wall Street almost absolutely. With such power and facilities it is easily conceivable that these men must make enormous sums on either side of the market."

[Sidenote: Antisocial use of rare ability]

2. _The high pay of rare ability and skilled labor reflects in general a high social service._ The large income of some men reflects service to a narrow cla.s.s, not to society as a whole. Lawyers as a cla.s.s aid in maintaining right, but a corporation lawyer may get enormous fees for defeating just public claims; a skilful criminal lawyer may grow rich aiding the guilty to escape justice. Other service ministers to the whims, follies, and vices of the men who pay the bill. Such a service is "social" in a mean sense, corresponding to the low standards of desire in that social group. But what of the high rewards of skilled service ministering to worthy ends? Such favorites of fortune as Jenny Lind and Patti have received five thousand dollars for a single concert. Is this because they are the lucky possessors of a rare gift, or because they perform a social service deserving such reward? Certainly many of their auditors get what they want and believe they are getting the worth of their money.

[Sidenote: General social result of rewarding talent]

In general the legal right of everyone to get the highest pay he can in a free and open market is essential to the calling forth of ability. In a particular instance it is possible that the service would continue if one half or more of the income were confiscated by the public; but such a personal discrimination would introduce an arbitrary and demoralizing uncertainty into the problem. Who can tell how far the exceptional money rewards have inspired to the highest cultivation of great genius and of many minor talents? In a broad but very true sense, therefore, it appears that high personal achievement, large economic reward, and large social service are connected.

[Sidenote: Social service of manual workers]

3. _The low income of unskilled labor seems to fall short of its social service._ This does not refer to the feeble-minded or utterly inefficient, but rather to honest, industrious, "day-laborers," and to the low-paid manual workers in field, on railroad, and in factory. Their service is essential to the existence of society as it is, to all the higher arts, to the sciences, and to the amenities of life; their tasks are the roughest, most painful, most dangerous; yet their pecuniary rewards are the lowest. There is such a unity in society that each more fortunate man is dependent on the services of the humbler laborers who make up a large part of society. According to the breadth of social sympathy their claims seem more or less urgent.

[Sidenote: The problem of increasing their reward]

There is a vaguely recognized and growing conviction that these hewers of wood and drawers of water should enjoy a larger income. But how are they to get it? How is society to grant it to them? They get what they can under the compet.i.tive conditions, they get what their service is worth in the market. Are the conditions of the compet.i.tion fair? If not, what will be the effect of a change? If they get more, others will get less; and with what result? However great the wish for better things, the attempt to change conditions fundamentally in a forcible and artificial way is both dangerous and foolish. Improvement must come through the cooperation of many indirect agencies gradually changing the nature and direction of the deeper economic forces.

[Sidenote: Imperfect social and individual estimates of service]

4. _The services of each are being measured and paid for by each and all._ In two ways society is putting its valuation on the economic services of other members of society: first, by law, or formal social convention; secondly, by individual estimates. By formal law is determined what inst.i.tutions shall be continued. If the cla.s.s of property owners is considered worthy of this reward, the inst.i.tution of property will be continued; if not, it will be altered or destroyed.

These decisions are made imperfectly, but as well as men of limited intelligence and honesty can make them. If men were more capable in both these ways they would enact better laws. Again, individuals are putting their estimates on others in bidding for services to minister to wisdom and virtue or to ignorance and vice. If there is to be a much juster estimate of social service, there must be wiser men in society.