The Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen: An Exposition of the San Min Part 9

The other point to be considered in relation to Maurice William is a matter of dates. The thesis of Maurice William, that Sun Yat-sen, after having turned Marxian or near-Marxian, was returned to democratic liberal thought by William's book, is based on contrast of the first twelve lectures in the _San Min Chu I_ and the last four on _min sheng_. Dr.

William believes that Sun read his book in the meantime and changed his mind. A Chinese commentator points out that Sun Yat-sen referred to _The Social Interpretation of History_ in a speech on January 21, 1924; his first lecture on the _San Min Chu I_ was given January 24, 1924.(186) Hence, in the twelve lectures that Dr. William interprets as Marxian, Sun Yat-sen was speaking from a background which included not only Marxism, but _The Social Interpretation of History_, as well.

Only on the third part does the influence of the Western thinkers appear unmistakably. Henry George gave Sun Yat-sen the idea of the unearned increment, but Sun Yat-sen, instead of accepting the whole body of doctrine that George put forth, simply kept this one idea, and built a novel land-policy of his own on it. Marxism may have influenced the verbal tone of Sun Yat-sen's lectures, but it did not affect his ideology, although it shows a definite imprint upon his programs. Maurice William gave Sun Yat-sen a set of arguments in modern economic terms which he attached to his ideological thesis of the _jen_ interpretation of history, which he based upon Confucianism. There is no evidence to show that at any time in his life Sun Yat-sen abandoned his Chinese ideological orientation and fell under the sway of any Western thinker. The strong consistency in the ideology of Sun Yat-sen is a consistency rooted in the old Chinese ideology. On minor points of doctrine he showed the influence of the West; this influence cannot be considered solely by itself. The present discussion of Western influences may, by its length, imply a disproportionate emphasis of Western thought in the political doctrines of Sun Yat-sen, but in a work written primarily for Westerners, this may be found excusable.

_Min Sheng_ as a Socio-Economic Doctrine.

If one were to attempt to define the relations of the _min sheng_ ideology to the various types of Western economic doctrines at present current, certain misapprehensions may be eliminated at the outset. First: Capitalism in its Western form was opposed by Sun Yat-sen; _min sheng_ was to put through the national economic revolution of enrichment through a deliberately-planned industrialization, but in doing so was to prevent China from going through all the painful stages which attended the growth of capitalism in the West. "We want," said Sun Yat-sen, "a preventive remedy; a remedy which will thwart the acc.u.mulation of large private capitals and so preserve future society from the great inconvenience of the inequality between rich and poor."(187) And yet he looked forward to a society which would ultimately be communistic, although never in its strict Marxian sense. "We may say that communism is the ideal of livelihood, and that the doctrine of livelihood is the practical application of communism; such is the difference between the doctrine of Marx and the doctrine of the Kuomintang. In the last a.n.a.lysis, there is no real difference in the principles of the two; where they differ is in method."(188) This is sufficient to show that Sun Yat-sen was not an orthodox Western apologist for capitalism; as a Chinese, it would have been hard for him to be one, for the logically consistent capitalist ideology is one which minimizes all human relationships excepting those individual-contractual ones based on money bargains. The marketing of goods and services in such a way as to disturb the traditional forms of Chinese society would have been repugnant to Sun Yat-sen.

Second: if Sun Yat-sen's _min sheng_ ideology cannot be a.s.sociated with capitalism, it can as little be affiliated with Marxism or the single-tax.

What, then, in relation to Western socio-economic thought, is it? We have seen that the state it proposed was liberal-protective, and that the society from which it was derived and to which it was to lead back was one of extreme laissez-faire, bordering almost on anarchism. These political features are enough to distinguish it from the Western varieties of socialism, anarchism and syndicalism, since the ingredients of these ideologies of the West and that of Sun Yat-sen, while coincident on some points, cannot be fitted together.

Superficially, there is a certain resemblance between the ideology of the _San Min Chu I_ and that of Fascism. The resemblances may be found in the emphasis on the nation, the rejection of the cla.s.s war and of Marxism, the upholding of tradition, and the inclusion of a doctrine of intellectual inequality. But Sun Yat-sen seeks to reconcile all this with democracy in a form even more republican than that of the United States. The scheme of _min ch'uan_, with its election, recall, initiative and referendum, and with its definite demands of intellectual freedom, is in contradiction to the teachings of Fascism. His condemnation of Caesarism is unequivocal: "Therefore, if the Chinese Revolution has not until now been crowned with success, it is because the ambitions for the throne have not been completely rooted out nor suppressed altogether."(189) With these fundamental and irreconcilable distinctions, it is hard to find any possibility of agreement between the _San Min Chu I_ and the Fascist ideologies, although the transitional program of the _San Min Chu I_-in its advocacy of provisional party dictatorship, etc.-has something in common with Fascism as well as with Communism as applied in the Soviet Union.

A recent well-received work on modern political thought describes a category of Western thinkers whose ideas are much in accord with those contained in the _min sheng_ ideology.(190) Professor Francis W. c.o.ker of Yale, after reviewing the leading types of socialist and liberal thought, describes a group who might be called "empirical collectivists." The men to whom he applies this term reject socialist doctrines of economic determinism, labor-created value, and cla.s.s war. They oppose, on the other hand, the making of a fetish of private ownership, and recognize that the vast ma.s.s of ordinary men in modern society do not always receive their just share of the produce of industry. They offer no single panacea for all economic troubles, and lay down no absolute and unchallengeable dogma concerning the rightness or wrongness of public or private ownership.(191) Professor c.o.ker outlines their general point of view by examining their ideas with reference to several conspicuous economic problems of the present day: public ownership; labor legislation; regulation of prices; taxation; and land policies.(192)

According to c.o.ker, the empirical collectivist is not willing to forgo the profit motive except where necessary. He is anxious to see a great part of the ruthlessness of private compet.i.tion eliminated, and capital generally subjected to a regulation which will prevent its use as an instrument of harm to the community as a whole. While not committed to public ownership of large enterprises as a matter of theory, he has little objection to the governmental operation of those which could, as a matter of practical expediency, be managed by the state on a nonprofit basis.

Sun Yat-sen's position greatly resembles this, with respect to his more immediate objectives. Speaking of public utilities, he said to Judge Linebarger: "There are so many public utilities needed in China at the present time, that the government can't monopolize all of them for the advantage of the ma.s.ses. Moreover, public utilities involve risks which a government cannot afford to take. Although the risks are comparatively small in single cases, the entire aggregate of such risks, if a.s.sumed by the government, would be of crushing proportions. Private initiative and capital can best perform the public utility development of China. We should, however, be very careful to limit the control of these public utilities enterprises, while at the same time encouraging private development as much as possible."(193) Sun had, however, already spoken of nationalization: "I think that when I hold power again, we should inst.i.tute a nationalization program through a cautious and experimental evolution of (1) public utilities; (2) public domains; (3) industrial combines, syndicates, and cartels; (4) cooperative department stores and other merchandising agencies."(194) It must be remembered that there were two considerations back of anything that Sun Yat-sen said concerning national ownership: first, China had already ventured into broad national ownership of communications and transport, even though these were in bad condition and heavily indebted; second, there was no question of expropriation of capital, but rather the free alternative of public and private industry. An incidental problem that arises in connection with the joint development of the country by public and by private capital is the use of foreign capital. Sun Yat-sen was opposed to imperialism, but he did not believe that the use of foreign capital at fair rates of interest const.i.tuted submission to imperialism. He said, in Canton, " ... we shall certainly have to borrow foreign capital in order to develop means of communication and transportation, and we cannot do otherwise than have recourse to those foreigners who are men of knowledge and of experience to manage these industries."(195) It may thus be said that Sun Yat-sen had no fixed prejudice against private capital or against foreign capital, when properly and justly regulated, although in general he favored the ownership of large enterprises by the state.

Second-to follow again Professor c.o.ker-the Western empirical collectivists favor labor legislation, and government intervention for the protection of the living standards of the working cla.s.ses. This, while it did not figure conspicuously in the theories of Sun Yat-sen,(196) was a striking feature of all his practical programs.(197) In his address to Chinese labor, on the international Labor Day, 1924, he urged that Chinese labor organize in order to fight for its own cause and that of national liberation. It had nothing to fear from Chinese capitalism, but everything from foreign imperialistic capitalism.(198) Sun did not make a special hero cla.s.s out of the workers; he did, however, advocate their organization for the purpose of getting their just share of the national wealth, and for resistance to the West and j.a.pan.

Third, the empirical collectivist tends to advocate price-control by the state, if not over the whole range of commodities, at least in certain designated fields. Sun was, has been stated, in favor of the regulation of capital at all points, and of public ownership in some. This naturally implies an approval of price-control. He more specifically objected to undue profits by middlemen, when, in discussing salesmen, he said: "Under ideal conditions, society does not need salesmen or any inducement to buy.

If a thing is good, and the price reasonable, it should sell itself on its own merits without any salesmanship. This vast army of middlemen should hence be made to remember that they should expect no more from the nonproductive calling in which they are engaged than any other citizen obtains through harder labor."(199) In this, too, _min sheng_ coincides with empirical collectivism; the coincidence is made easy by the relative vagueness of the latter.

Fourth, in the words of Mr. c.o.ker, "many collectivists look upon taxation as a rational and practical means for reducing extreme differences in wealth and for achieving other desired economic changes."(200) Sun Yat-sen agrees with this definitely; his land policy is one based upon taxation and confiscation of the amount of the unearned increment (which, not involving the confiscation of the land itself, is perhaps also taxation), and proposes to apply taxes extensively. Quite apart from the question of distributive justice, a heavy tax burden would be necessary in a country which was being rigorously developed.

Fifth, empirical collectivists believe in land control, not only in the cities, but in the open country as well, as a matter of agrarian reform.

We have seen that the land figured extensively in the ideology of _min sheng_, and shall observe that Sun Yat-sen, in his plans for _min sheng_, stressed the importance of proper control of land.

In summing up the theory of distributive justice which forms a third part of the principle of _min sheng_, one may say that, as far as any comparison between a Chinese and a Western idea is valid, the positive social-revolutionary content of _min sheng_ coincides with the doctrines of that group of Western politico-economic writers whom c.o.ker calls empirical collectivists. The correspondence between the two may not be a mere coincidence of names, for in considering Sun Yat-sen's _min sheng_, one is struck by the empirical, almost opportunistic, nature of the theory. A great part of the activity of the Chinese, whether material or intellectual, has been characterized by a sort of opportunism; not necessarily an opportunism of insincerity, it may be more aptly described as a tendency to seek the golden mean, the reasonable in any situation. It is this habit of compromise with circ.u.mstance, this bland and happy disregard of absolutes in theory, which has preserved-with rare exceptions-the Chinese social mind from the torment of any really bitter and profound religious conflict, and which may, in these troubled times, keep even the most irreconcilable enemies from becoming insane with intolerance. This fashion of muddling through, of adhering to certain traditional general rules of reasonableness, while rendering lip-service to the doctrines of the moment, has been the despair of many Western students of China, who, embittered at the end, accuse the Chinese of complete insincerity. They do not realize that it is the moderateness of the Confucian ideology, the humane and conciliatory outlook that centuries of cramped civilized life have given the Chinese, that is the basis of this, and that this indisposition to adopt hard and fast systems has been one of the ameliorating influences in the present period of serious intellectual antagonisms. Generalizations concerning China are rarely worth much. It may be, however, that the doctrine of _min sheng_, with respect to its positive socio-economic content, may appear vague to the Western student, and that he may surmise it to be a mere cloak for demagogues. It could easily do that in the West, or in the hands of insincere and unscrupulous leaders. In China, however, it need not necessarily have been formulated more positively than it was, because, as we have seen, the intellectual temper of the Chinese makes any strict adherence to a schedule or a plan impossible. It is easy, always, to render the courtesies; it is hard to follow the specific content. Sun Yat-sen apparently realized this, and wished to leave a general body of doctrine which could be followed and which would not be likely to be violated. In any case, the theses of _min sheng_, both ideologically and programmatically, can scarcely be contrasted with the detailed schedules of social revolution to be found in the West.

Sun Yat-sen's frequent expressions of sympathy with communism and socialism, and his occasional identification of the large principles of _min sheng_ with them, are an indication of his desire for ultimate collectivism. (It may be remarked, in pa.s.sing, that Sun Yat-sen used the word _collectivist_ in a much more rigid sense than that employed by c.o.ker.) His concessions to the economic situation of his time, the pragmatic, practical method in which he conceived and advocated his plans, are a manifestation of the empirical element in his collectivism.

_Ming sheng_ cannot, however, be thought of as another Western doctrine for national economic strength, national economic reconst.i.tution, and national distributive justice; it is also a program for the improvement of the morale of the people.

How is the _min sheng_ doctrine to fit in with the essentially conservative spirit of the nationalist ideology? If, as Sun proposed, the new ideology is to be compounded of the old morality, the old knowledge, and modern physical science, how is _min sheng_, referring to social as well as material programs, to be developed in harmony with the old knowledge? In the terminology of ultramodern Western political science, the ethical, the moral, and the emotional are likely to appear as words of derision. In a milieu characterized by the curiously warmblooded social outlook of the Confucians, such terms are still relevant to reality, still significant in the lives of men. The sentimental is intangible in politics; for that reason it is hard to fit into contemporary thought, but though it cannot be measured and fully understood, its potency cannot be disregarded; and for Sun Yat-sen it was of the utmost importance.

_Min Sheng_ as an Ethical Doctrine.

Reference has been made to the Confucian doctrine of _jen_, the fellow-feeling of all mankind-each man's consciousness of membership in society. This doctrine was formulated in a society unacquainted with Greek logic, nor did it have the strange European emphasis upon sheer intellectuality which has played its way through Western thought. Not, of course, as profoundly introspective as Christianity, nor appealing so distinctly to the mystical in man's nature, it was nevertheless concerned with man's inner life, as well as with the ethics of his outward behavior.

The Confucian was suffused throughout with the idea of virtue; the moral and the physical were inextricably intertwined. Its non-logical content scarcely approached the form of a religion; commentators on the old ideology have not called it religious, despite the prominence of beliefs in the supernatural.(201) The religion of the Chinese has been this-worldly,(202) but it has not on that account been indifferent to the subjective aspects of the moral life.(203)

The nationalist ideology was designed as the inheritor of and successor to, the old ideology of China. The doctrine of nationalism narrowed the field of the application of Confucianism from the whole civilized world to the state-ized society of the Chinese race-nation. The doctrine of democracy implemented the old teachings of popular power and intellectual leadership with a political mechanism designed to bring forth the full strength of both. And the doctrine of _min sheng_ was the economic application of the old social ethos.

It is in this last significance, rather than in any of its practical meanings of recovery, development, and reform, that Sun Yat-sen spoke most of it to one of his followers.(204) He was concerned with it as a moral force. His work was, among other things, a work of moral transformation of individual motives.(205) _Min sheng_ must, in addition to its other meanings be regarded as an attempt to extend the Chinese ideology to economic matters, to lead the Chinese to follow their old ethics. Sun Yat-sen had ample time in his visits to the West to observe the ravages that modern civilization had inflicted upon the older Western moral life, and did not desire that China should also follow the same course. The humanity of the old tradition must be kept by the Chinese in their venture into the elaborate and dangerous economy of modern life; the machine civilization was needed, and was itself desirable,(206) but it could not overthrow the humane civilization that preceded it and was to continue on beneath and throughout it.

In this manner a follower of Sun Yat-sen seeks to recall his words: "I should say that _min sheng_ focuses our ethical tradition even more than the other two principles; after a Chinese has become nationalistic and democratic, he will become socialized through the idea of his own personality as an instrument of good for human welfare. In this proud feeling of importance to and for the world, egotism gives way to altruism.... So, I say again that _min sheng_ is an ethical endeavor ...

this, the final principle (and yet, the first principle which I discovered, in the bitterness and poverty of my boyhood days), will come imperceptibly into our lives."(207)

In a philosophy for intellectuals such att.i.tudes need not, perhaps, be reckoned with; in an ideology for revolution and reconst.i.tution, perhaps they should. Sun Yat-sen conceived of his own work and his ideology not only as political acts but as moral forces; _min sheng_ was at once to invigorate the national economy, to industrialize the material civilization, and to inst.i.tute distributive justice, and in addition to this, it was to open a new, humane epoch in economic relations. That is why the term, instead of being translated, is left in the Chinese: _min sheng_.

CHAPTER V. THE PROGRAMS OF NATIONALISM.

Kuomintang.

Sun Yat-sen was a political leader as well as a political philosopher. His growth as a thinker was intimately a.s.sociated with the development of his political activities. It would be difficult to say which came first, either in time or in importance, in his life-his teachings or his work. At times the line between the two becomes vague. Sun made vital commitments concerning his ideology in furthering his revolutionary work. These have to be sifted out from other utterances bearing only upon the immediate situation. This is not easy, but neither is it impossible. Lyon Sharman wrote, "It might be cogently argued that, in dealing with an easily absorbent, propagandist mind like Sun Yat-sen's one should not look to the shifting ideas for his real opinions, but to those formulations which he clung to tenaciously all his life."(208)

The ideology of the _San Min Chu I_ provides a broad scheme of terms and values by means of which the Chinese of the twentieth century could orient themselves simultaneously in the modern world and in the continuing world of Confucian civilization. Between this philosophy and the necessity of immediate practical action there stands an intermediate step-that of the plans. The plans provide a theory of means leading to the establishment of the ends set up in the ideology. The ideology, left on paper by itself, could not bring about China's salvation; it had to be spread and implemented with political action. Sun Yat-sen planned the programs and activities of the Chinese revolutionaries in some detail; he proposed policies reaching far out into the future. While, since his death, these plans have been modified to a greater or less degree,(209) they have not lost all relevance to the course of affairs in China, and, in any case, possess an interest of their own in the history of political thought, as ill.u.s.trating the political doctrines to which Sun Yat-sen's ideology led him. The first problem the plans had to include was that of providing a tool by which they could be set in motion.

What instrument could preach nationalism to the Chinese people and awaken them, and, having awakened them, lead them on to a victorious defense of their race and civilization? Sun's answer was: "The Kuomintang." The nationalist revolutionary party was the designated heir to the leadership of the people, and even in his life-time Sun Yat-sen worked through the party that was almost entirely his own creation.

This party had begun as a small group of the personal followers of Sun Yat-sen in the days when he was struggling against the Manchu monarchy almost singlehanded. Gradually this group increased and became a federation of the great secret orders which had resisted the Manchus for centuries. It developed into a modern parliamentary party under the name _Kuomintang_-literally _nation people party_-with the inauguration of the first republic, but was soon driven underground by the would-be emperor Yuan Shih-k'ai. It emerged again in South China at the end of the World War, was reorganized after the Communist model (so far as intra-party organization was concerned) before the death of Sun Yat-sen, led the revolution to the North, and, now, though somewhat less united than before, rules the greater part of China in the name of the Three Principles.(210)

Confucius preached the slow transformation of society by means of an intellectual leaven, scholar cla.s.s, which, by re-forming and clarifying the ideology, could gradually minimize conflict among men and bring about an epoch of concord in which all men would live by reason as found in tradition. The function of the Kuomintang was, in Sun's mind, only remotely similar. The Kuomintang was designed to intervene in a chaos of wars and corrupt politics, to propagate the nationalist ideology, and avert a tragic fate which would otherwise be inevitable-the disappearance of China from the map of the world, and the extinction not only of Chinese civilization but-as Sun Yat-sen thought-of the Chinese race as well.

In the days before the downfall of the monarchy, and for the few years of defeat under the first republic, the Kuomintang was not highly organized.

Sun Yat-sen's genius for leadership, and the fervor of his adherents-which can be understood only at first-hand, and cannot be explained in rational terms-were sufficient to hold the party together. But there was far too much discord as to final principles as well as to points of immediate action, and party activities were not so specialized as to permit maximum efficiency.(211) Furthermore, there was the question of the relations of the party and the state. It was somewhat absurd for the partizans of Sun Yat-sen, having brought about the revolution, to stand back and let whomever would walk away with it. The party's power had ebbed with its success in 1911. There had to be some way of keeping the party in power after it had achieved the overthrow of its enemies, and won the revolutionary control of the country. Reorganization was definitely necessary if party effectiveness were to be raised to the point of guaranteeing the success of the next revolution-which Sun did not live to see-and party supremacy to the point of a.s.suring the Nationalists control of the government after the revolution had been accomplished.

Reorganization was effected through the a.s.sistance of the Communists during the period of the Canton-Moscow entente (1923-1927).(212) Under the leadership of the extraordinarily able Michael Borodin, the Soviet advisers sent from Russia completely re-shaped the internal structure of the Kuomintang and won for themselves positions of considerable confidence and influence, which they lost only when they attempted to transform the principles and objectives of the Party as thoroughly as they had the organization.

The Kuomintang of today, which is irreconcilably opposed to Marxism, still bears the imprint of Communist design.(213) Though the working details of the Party organization do not, for the most part, appear directly relevant to the principle of _min ch'uan_ of Sun Yat-sen, the arrangements for Party control ill.u.s.trate the curious compromise between Chinese and Western democratic patterns, on the one hand, and the revolutionary requirements of absolutism, on the other, which have made Chinese republicanism seem a sham, if not a farce, to Western scholars who expect to find in China the same openness and freedom in democratic government to which they are accustomed at home.

During the life-time of Sun there was no question of an elective headship for the Party. In spite of the fact that the party stood for democracy, it seemed impossible that any alternative to Sun Yat-sen himself should be considered. Sun Yat-sen's complete willingness to continue as head of the Party without troubling to have himself elected from time to time has been variously interpreted: his friends term it the humble and natural recognition of a celebrated fact; his enemies regard it as the hallucination of an egotism as distorted as it was colossal. The truth would appear to be that Sun regarded the initiation and the guidance of the Nationalist revolution as his particular mission in life. He was, in a sense, the intellectual proprietor of the Three Principles. Unselfish in all personal matters, he had few doubts of his own capacity when he had discovered what he believed to be his duty, and unquestioningly set out to perform it. In the lawlessness and tumult of the revolution, it would have seemed absurd for Sun Yat-sen to submit to the periodical formula of reelection for the sake of any merely theoretical harmony of action and theory.

Not only was Sun Yat-sen the leader of the Party; he was not even to have a successor. The first revised const.i.tution of the Kuomintang provided for his life-time headship; the second stipulated that the post of _Tsung Li_ should never be filled by any other person. As _Tsung Li_-the Party Leader, it is still customary to refer to Sun Yat-sen in China today.

This, again, was not the display of a superhuman vanity so much as a practical requirement designed to offset the possibility of conflict and intrigue among the most conspicuous party chiefs, which would quite probably arise should the question of a succession to Sun Yat-sen ever be mentioned. There was, of course, the element of respect in this gesture-the implication that the magistral chair of Sun Yat-sen was too high a place for any common man to sit.

So far as leadership was concerned the Kuomintang was an autocracy until the death of Sun Yat-sen. In all other party matters attempts were made to cultivate democratic form and instil democratic morale. The prudence of this choice may seem to have been borne out by the course of history, since the Communists did not become ambitious, nor the Nationalists jealous, to the point of open conflict until after the death of Sun Yat-sen. Western thought will have to make extensive allowances before it can comprehend a democratic Party which operated under the unquestioned authority of a single man, without recourse to the formula of a plebiscite or election to a boss-ship in the form of a nominal post made significant only by the personal conspicuousness of the inc.u.mbent.

Had Karl Marx lived to work in the Russian Revolution, he might have occupied a position a.n.a.logous to that which Sun Yat-sen did in the Chinese. In other respects the new Kuomintang organization was remarkably like the Communist. There was the extraordinarily complex, but somehow effective, mechanism of a Party Congress, a Central Executive Committee, and a Standing Committee. There was a Political Bureau and an agency for overseas agitation. There were also the wide ramifications of an extensive net work of auxiliary organizations designed to draw strength from every popular enthusiasm, and deflect it to the cause of the Nationalist revolution. In due time these agencies were turned about and swung into action against the Communists who had attempted to master them.

The precise details of Kuomintang organization need not be described. In general the pattern of authority proceeded from the whole membership, by a sequence of indirect elections, to the inner group of the Central Executive Committee, a body which possesses as much power in China as does its Soviet prototype.(214) An instance of its power may be given: representatives are sent by the _tang pu_ (Party Branches) to the Party Congress; in the event that delegates do not or cannot come, the C. E. C.

has the power of appointing persons to serve _pro tempore_ as the representatives of the otherwise unrepresented branches. Since the same committee examines delegates' credentials, it is apparent that the trustworthiness of the Party Congress can be a.s.sured in the same manner that, to the understanding of the present author, the earlier All-Union Congresses of Soviets and the C. P. were a.s.sured in the Russian Revolution. The pattern given the Kuomintang by the Russians gave the Party a strong central control able to a.s.sure orthodoxy within the Party; for some years, as a matter of history, differences of opinion within the Party could only be expressed by schism (as in the case of the "Kuomintang" of w.a.n.g Ch'ing-wei). While the aim of the Party was democracy, it cannot be said truthfully that democracy worked in a militant Party engaged in turning an anarchy into a revolution. The requirements of revolutionary endeavor, among other things, seem to include an iron-handed leadership of the right sort. Such leadership could, in the Sun Yat-sen ideology, be justified by reference to the three stages of the revolution.