The Philosophy of the Plays of Shakspere Unfolded Part 13

And the report is, that this new argument, notwithstanding its every-day theme, is one that admits of being sung also; and that the Virgil who is able to compose 'these Georgies of the Mind,' may promise himself fame, though his end is one that will enable him to forego it. Let us see if we can find any further track of him and his great argument, whether in prose or verse;--this poet who cares not whether he has his 'singing robes' about him or not, so he can express and put upon record his new 'observations of this husbandry.'

THE EXEMPLAR OF GOOD.--'And surely,' he continues, 'if the purpose be in good earnest, _not to write at leisure that which men may read at leisure_'--note it--that which men may read at leisure--'but really to _instruct_ and _suborn action and active life_, these GEORGICS of the MIND, concerning the husbandry and tillage thereof, are no less worthy than _the heroical descriptions of virtue, duty_, and _felicity_; therefore the _main and primitive division_ of MORAL KNOWLEDGE, seemeth to be into the EXEMPLAR or PLATFORM of GOOD, and THE REGIMEN or CULTURE OF THE MIND, the one describing the NATURE of GOOD, the other prescribing RULES _how_ to SUBDUE, APPLY, and ACCOMMODATE THE WILL OF MAN THEREUNTO.'

As to '_the nature of good_, positive or simple,' the writers on this subject have, he says, 'set it down excellently, in describing the forms of virtue and duty, with their situations, and postures, in distributing them into their kinds, parts, provinces, actions, and administrations, and the like: nay, farther, they have commended them to man's nature and spirit, with great quickness of argument, and beauty of persuasions; yea, and fortified and entrenched them, _as much as discourse can do_, against corrupt and popular opinions. And for the degrees and comparative nature of good, they have excellently handled it also.'--That part deserveth to be reported for 'excellently laboured.'

What is it that is wanting then? What radical, fatal defect is it that he finds even in the doctrine of the NATURE OF GOOD? What is the difficulty with this platform and exemplar of good as he finds it, notwithstanding the praise he has bestowed on it? The difficulty is, that it is not scientific. It is not broad enough. It is _special_, it is limited to the species, but it is not properly, it is not effectively, specific, because it is not connected with the doctrine of nature in general. It does not strike to those universal original principles, those simple powers which determine the actual historic laws and make the nature of things itself. This is the criticism, therefore, with which this critic of the learning of the world as he finds it, is constrained to qualify that commendation.

_Notwithstanding_, if before they had come to _the popular and received notions of 'vice'_ and _'virtue,' 'pleasure'_ and _'pain,'_ and the rest, they had stayed a little longer upon the inquiry concerning THE ROOTS of GOOD and EVIL, and the strings to those roots, they had given, in my opinion, _a great light to that which followed_, and especially _if they had consulted with nature_, they had made their doctrines less prolix and more profound, which being by them in part omitted, and in part handled with much confusion, we will endeavour to resume and open in a more clear manner. Here then, is the preparation of the Platform or Exemplar of Good, the scientific platform of virtue and felicity; going behind the popular notion of vice and virtue, pain and pleasure, and the like, he strikes at once to the nature of good, as it is 'formed in everything,' for the foundation of this specific science. He lays the beams of it, in the axioms and definitions of his '_prima philosophia_' 'which do not fall within the compa.s.s of the special parts of science, but are more common and of a higher stage, for the distributions and part.i.tions of knowledge are _not_ like several lines that meet in one angle, and so touch but in a point, but are like _branches of a tree that meet in a stem_ which hath a dimension and quant.i.ty of entireness and continuance before it comes to discontinue and break itself into arms and boughs,' and it is not the narrow and specific observation on which the popular notions are framed, but the scientific, which is needed for the New Ethics,--the new knowledge, which here too, is POWER. He must detect and recognise here also, he must track even into the nature of man, those universal 'footsteps' which are but 'the same footsteps of nature treading or printing in different substances.'

'There is formed in _everything_ a double nature of good, the one as everything is a total or substantive in itself, and the other, as it is a part or member of a greater body whereof the latter is in _degree_ the greater and the worthier, because it tendeth to the conservation of a more general form.... This double nature of good, and the comparison thereof, is much more engraven upon MAN, _if he degenerate not_, unto whom the conservation of duty to the public ought _to be much more precious_ than the conservation of _life and being_;' and, by way of ill.u.s.tration, he mentions first the case of Pompey the Great, 'who being in commission of purveyance for a famine at Rome, and being dissuaded with great vehemency by his friends, that he should not hazard himself to sea in an extremity of weather, he said only to them, "_Necesse est ut eam, non ut vivam_."' But, he adds, 'it may be _truly_ affirmed, that there was never any philosophy, religion, or other discipline, which did so plainly and highly _exalt_ the good which is _communicative_, and _depress_ the good which is private and particular, as the _holy faith_, well declaring that it was the _same G.o.d_ that gave the _Christian law to men_, who gave those laws of nature to inanimate creatures that we spake of before; for we read that the elected saints of G.o.d have wished themselves anathematised, and razed out of the book of life, in an ecstasy of charity, and infinite feeling of communion.'

And having first made good his a.s.sertion, that this being set down, and _strongly planted_, determines most of the _controversies_ wherein moral philosophy is conversant, he proceeds to develop still further these scientific notions of good and evil, which he has gone below the popular notions and into the nature of things to find, these scientific notions, which, because they are scientific, he has still to go out of the specific nature to define; and when he comes to nail down his scientific platform of the _human_ good with them, when he comes to strike their clear and simple lines, deep as the universal const.i.tution of things, through the popular terms, and clear up the old confused theories with them, we find that what he said of them beforehand was true; they do indeed throw great light upon that which follows.

To that exclusive, incommunicative good which inheres in the private and particular nature,--and he does not call it any hard names at all from his scientific platform; indeed in the vocabulary of the Naturalist we are told, that these names are omitted, 'for we call a nettle but a nettle, and the faults of fools their folly,'--that exclusive good he finds both pa.s.sive and active, and this also is one of those primary distinctions which 'is formed in all things,' and so too is the _subdivision_ of pa.s.sive good which follows. 'For there is impressed upon _all things_ a triple desire, or appet.i.te, proceeding from _love to themselves_; one, of preserving and continuing their form; another, of _advancing_ and perfecting their form; and a third, of multiplying and extending their form upon other things; whereof the multiplying or signature of it upon other things, is that which we handled by the name of active good.' But pa.s.sive good includes both conservation and perfection, or _advancement_, which latter is the highest degree of pa.s.sive good. For to preserve in state is the less; to preserve with advancement is the greater. As to _man_, his approach or a.s.sumption to DIVINE or ANGELICAL NATURE is the perfection of _his_ form, the error or false imitation of which good is that which is the tempest of human life. So we have heard before; but in the doctrine which we had before, it was the dogma,--the dogma whose inspiration and divinity each soul recognized; to whose utterance each soul responded, as deep calleth unto deep,--it was the Law, the Divine Law, and not the _science of it_, that was given.

And having deduced 'that good of man which is private and particular, as far as seemeth fit,' he returns 'to that good of man which respects and beholds society,' which he terms DUTY, because the term of duty is more proper to a mind well framed and disposed towards others, as the term of VIRTUE is applied to a mind well formed and composed in itself; though neither can a man understand _virtue, without some relation to society_, nor _duty, without an inward disposition_.

But he wishes us to understand and remember, now that he comes out of the particular nature, and begins to look towards society with this term of Duty, that he is still dealing with 'the will of particular persons,' that it is still the science of _morals_, and not _politics_, that he is meddling with. 'This part may seem at first,'

he says, 'to pertain to science civil and politic, but not if it be well observed; for it concerneth the regiment and _government of every man over himself_, and not over others.' And this is the plan which he has marked out in his doctrine of government as the most hopeful point in which to _commence_ political reformations; and one cannot but observe, that if this art and science should be successfully cultivated, the one which he dismisses so briefly would be cleared at once of some of those difficulties, which rendered any more direct treatment of it at that time unadvisable. This part of learning concerneth then 'the regiment and government of every man over himself, and not over others.' '_As_ in architecture _the direction_ of _the framing_ the _posts, beams_, and _other parts_ of _building_, is not the same with the manner of joining them and erecting the building; and in mechanicals, the direction _how_ to _frame_ AN INSTRUMENT OR ENGINE is not the same with the manner of _setting it on work_, and employing it; _and yet, nevertheless_, in expressing of the one, you _incidentally_ express the _aptness_ towards the other [hear]

_so_ the doctrine of the conjugation of men in society differeth from _that_ of _their conformity thereunto_.' The received doctrine of that conjugation certainly appeared to; and the more this scientific doctrine of the parts, and the conformity thereunto, is incidentally expressed,--the more the scientific direction _how to frame_ the instrument or engine, is opened, the more this difference becomes apparent.

But even in limiting himself to the individual human nature as it is developed in particular persons, regarding society only as it is incidental to that, even in putting down his new scientific platform of the good that the appet.i.te and will of man naturally seeks, and in marking out scientifically its _degrees_ and _kinds_, he gives us an opportunity to perceive in pa.s.sing, that he is not altogether without occasion for the use of that particular art, with its peculiar 'organs' and 'methods' and 'ill.u.s.tration,' which he recommends under so many heads in his treatise on that subject, for the delivery or tradition of knowledges, which tend to _innovation_ and _advancement_--knowledge which is 'progressive' and 'foreign from opinions received.'

This doctrine of _duty_ is sub-divided into two parts; the _common_ duty of every man as a MAN, or A MEMBER of A STATE, which is that part of the platform and exemplar of good, he has before reported as 'extant, and well laboured.' The other is the _respective_ or _special_ duty of every man in his PROFESSION, VOCATION and PLACE; and it is under this head of the _special_ and _respective_ duties of places, vocations and professions, where the subject begins to grow narrow and pointed, where it a.s.sumes immediately, the most critical aspects,--it is here that his new arts of delivery and tradition come in to such good purpose, and stand him instead of other weapons. For this is one of those cases precisely, which the philosopher on the Mountain alluded to, where an argument is set on foot at the table of a man of prodigious fortune, when the man himself is present. Nowhere, perhaps,--in his freest forms of writing, does he give a better reason, for that so deliberate and settled determination, which he so openly declares, and everywhere so stedfastly manifests, not to put himself in an antagonistic att.i.tude towards opinions, and vocations, and professions, as they stood authorized in his time. Nowhere does he venture on a more striking comparison or simile, for the purpose of setting forth that point vividly, and impressing it on the imagination of the reader.

'The first of these [sub-divisions of duty] is extant, and well laboured, as hath been said. The second, likewise, I may report rather dispersed than deficient; which _manner of dispersed argument I acknowledge to be best_; [it is one he is much given to;] for who can take upon him to write of the proper duty, virtue, _challenge_ and _right_ of EVERY several vocation, profession and place? [--truly?--]

For although sometimes a looker on, may see more than a gamester, and there be a proverb more arrogant than sound, 'that the _vale_ best discovereth _the hill_,' yet there is small doubt, that men can write best, and most really and materially of their own professions,' and it is to be wished, he says, 'as that which would make learning, indeed, solid and fruitful, that active men would, or could, become writers.'

And he proceeds to mention opportunely in that connection, a case very much in point, as far as he is concerned, but not on the face of it, so immediately to the purpose, as that which follows. It will, however, perhaps, repay that very careful reading of it, which will be necessary, in order to bring out its pertinence in this connection.

And we shall, perhaps, not lose time ourselves, by taking, as we pa.s.s, the glimpse which this author sees fit to give us, of the facilities and encouragements which existed then, for the scientific treatment of this so important question of the duties and vices of vocations and professions.

'In which I _cannot but_ mention, _honoris causa, your majesty's_ excellent book, touching the _duty_ of A KING' [and he goes on to give a description which applies, without much 'forcing,' to the work of another king, which he takes occasion to introduce, with a direct commendation, a few pages further on]--'a work richly compounded of divinity, morality, and policy, with great _aspersion_ of all other arts; and being, in mine opinion, one of the most sound and healthful writings that I have read. Not sick of business, as those are who lose themselves in their order, nor of convulsions, as those which cramp in matters impertinent; not savoring of perfumes and paintings as those do, who seek to please the reader more than nature beareth, and chiefly _well disposed_ in the _spirits_ thereof, being _agreeable to truth_, and _apt for action_;'--[this pa.s.sage contains some hints as to this author's notion of what a book should be, in form, as well as substance, and, therefore, it would not be strange, if it should apply to some other books, as well]--'and far removed from _that natural infirmity_, whereunto _I noted those that write in their own professions_, to be _subject_, which is that they _exalt it above measure_; for your majesty hath truly described, _not_ a king of a.s.syria or Persia, in their _external_ glory, [and not that kind of king, or kingly author is he talking of] but a _Moses_, or a _David, pastors of their people_.

'Neither can I _ever lose out of my remembrance_, what I heard your majesty, in the same sacred spirit of government, deliver in a great cause of judicature, which was, that kings ruled by _their laws_, as G.o.d did by the laws of nature, and ought rarely to put in use their supreme prerogative, as G.o.d doth his power of working miracles. _And yet, notwithstanding_, in your book of _a free monarchy_, you do well give men to understand, that you know the plenitude of the _power_ and _right_ of a king, as well as _the circle of his office and duty. Thus have I presumed to _allege_ this excellent writing of your majesty, _as a prime_ or _eminent example_ of Tractates, concerning _special_ and _respective_ duties.' [It is, indeed, an _exemplar_ that he talks of here.] 'Wherein _I should have said as much, if it had been written a thousand years since_: neither am I moved with certain courtly decencies, which I esteem it flattery to praise in presence; no, it is flattery to _praise in absence: that is_, when _either_ the virtue is absent, _or--the occasion_ is absent, and so the praise is _not natural_, but _forced_, either in truth, _or--in time_. But let Cicero be read in his oration _pro Marcello_, which is nothing but an excellent TABLE of _Caesar's_ VIRTUE, and _made to his face_; besides the _example_ of many other excellent persons, _wiser a great deal than such observers_, and we will never doubt upon a _full occasion_, to give _just_ praises to _present_ or _absent_.'

The reader who does not think that is, on the whole, a successful paragraph, considering the general slipperiness of the subject, and the state of the ice in those parts of it, in particular where the movements appear to be the most free and graceful; such a one has, probably, failed in applying to it, that key of 'times,' which a _full occasion_ is expected to produce for this kind of delivery. But if any doubt exists in any mind, in regard to this author's opinion of the rights of his own profession and vocation, and _the circle_ of _its_ office and duties,--if any one really doubts what only allegiance this author professionally acknowledges, and what kingship it is to which this great argument is internally dedicated, it may be well to recall the statement on that subject, which he has taken occasion to insert in another part of the work, so that that point, at least, may be satisfactorily determined.

He is speaking of 'certain base conditions and courses,' in his criticism on the manners of learned men, which he says 'he has no purpose to give allowance to, wherein divers professors of learning have wronged themselves and gone too far,'--glancing in particular at the trencher philosophers of the later age of the Roman state, 'who were little better than parasites in the houses of the great. But above all the rest,' he continues, 'the _gross_ and _palpable flattery_, whereunto, many, not unlearned, have abased and abused their wits and pens, turning, as Du Bartas saith, Hecuba into Helena, and Faustina into Lucretia, hath most diminished the price and estimation of learning. Neither is the _modern dedication_, of books and writings _as to patrons_, to be commended: for that books--such as are _worthy the name of books_, ought to have _no patrons, but_--(hear) but--Truth and Reason. And the ancient custom was to dedicate them only to _private and equal friends_, or to _ent.i.tle_ the books with their names, or if to _kings_ and _great persons_, it was _some such_ as the argument of the book was fit and proper for: but these and the like courses may deserve rather _reprehension_ than defence.

'Not that I can tax,' he continues, however, 'or condemn the application of learned men to men in fortune.' And he proceeds to quote here, approvingly, a series of speeches on this very point, which appear to be full of pertinence; the first of the philosopher who, when he was asked in mockery, 'How it came to pa.s.s that philosophers were followers of rich men, and not rich men of philosophers,' answered soberly, and yet sharply, 'Because the one sort knew what they had need of, and the other did not'. And then the speech of Aristippus, who, when some one, tender on behalf of philosophy, reproved him that he would offer the profession of philosophy such an indignity, as for a private suit to fall at a tyrant's feet, replied, 'It was not his fault, but it was the fault of Dionysius, that he had his ears in his feet'; and, lastly, the reply of another, who, yielding his point in disputing with Caesar, claimed, 'That it was reason to yield to him who commanded thirty legions,' and 'these,' he says, 'these, and _the like_ applications, and stooping to points of necessity and convenience, cannot be disallowed; for, though they may have _some outward baseness_, yet, in a _judgment truly made_, they are to be accounted submissions _to the occasion_, and _not to the person_.'

And that is just _Volumnia's_ view of the subject, as will be seen in another place.

Now, this no more dishonors you at all, Than to take in a town with gentle words, Which else would put you to your fortune, and The hazard of much blood.-- And you will rather show our general louts How you can frown, than spend a _fawn_ upon them, For the inheritance of their loves, and _safeguard_ Of _what that want might ruin_.

But then, in the dramatic exhibition, the other side comes in too:--

I will not do't; Lest I surcease to honor mine own truth, And by my body's action, teach my mind _A most inherent baseness._

It is the same poet who says in another place:--

Almost my nature is subdued to that it works in.

'But to return,' as our author himself says, after his complimentary notice of the king's book, accompanied with that emphatic promise to give an account of himself upon a full occasion, and we have here, apparently, a longer digression to apologize for, and return from; but, in the book we are considering, it is, in fact, rather apparent than real, as are most of the author's digressions, and casual introductions of impertinent matter; for, in fact, the exterior order of the discourse is often a submission to the _occasion_, and is not so essential as the author's apparent concern about it would lead us to infer; indeed he has left dispersed directions to have this treatise broken up, and recomposed in a more lively manner, upon a full occasion, and when time shall serve; for, at present, this too is chiefly well disposed in the spirits thereof.

And in marking out the grounds in human life, then lying waste, or covered with superst.i.tious and empirical arts and inventions, in merely showing the fields into which the inventor of this new instrument of observation and inference by rule, was then proposing to introduce it, and in presenting this new report, and this so startling proposition, in those differing aspects and shifting lights, and under those various divisions which the art of delivery and tradition under such circ.u.mstances appeared to prescribe; having come, in the order of his report, to that main ground of the good which the will and appet.i.te of man aspires to, and the direction thereto,--this so labored ground of philosophy,--when it was found that the new scientific platform of good, included--not the exclusive good of the individual form only, but that of those 'larger wholes,' of which men are _const.i.tutionally_ parts and members, and the special DUTY,--for that is the specific name of this principle of integrity in the _human_ kind, that is the name of that larger law, that spiritual principle, which informs and claims the parts, and conserves the larger form which is the worthier,--when it was found that this part included the particular duty of every man in his _place, vocation_, and _profession_, as well as the common duty of men as men, surely it was natural enough to glance here, at that _particular profession and vocation_ of authorship, and the claims of the respective _places_ of _king_ and _subject_ in that regard, as well as at the _duty_ of the _king_, and the superior advantages of a government of laws in general, as being more in accordance with the order of nature, than that other mode of government referred to. It was natural enough, since this subject lies always in abeyance, and is essentially involved in the work throughout, that it should be touched here, in its proper place, though never so casually, with a glance at those nice questions of conflicting claims, which are more fully debated elsewhere, distinguishing that which is forced in _time_, from that which is forced in _truth_, and the absence of the person, from the absence of the occasion.

But the approval of that man of prodigious fortune, to whom this work is openly dedicated, is always, with this author, who understands his ground here so well, that he hardly ever fails to indulge himself in pa.s.sing, with a good humoured, side-long, glance at 'the situation,'

this approval is the least part of the achievement. That which he, too, adores in kings, is 'the throng of their adorers'. It is the sovereignty which makes kings, and puts them in its liveries, that he bends to; it is that that he reserves his art for. And this proposal to run the track of the science of nature through this new field of human nature and its higher and highest aims, and into the very field of _every man's_ special place, and vocation, and profession, could not well be made without a glance at those difficulties, which the clashing claims of authorship, and _other professions_, would in this case create; without a glance at the imperious necessities which threaten the life of the new science, which here also imperiously prescribe the form of its TRADITION; he could not go by this place, without putting into the reader's hands, with one bold stroke, the key of its DELIVERY.

For it is in the paragraph which follows the compliment to the king in his character as an author, in pursuing still further this subject of vocations and professions, that we find in the form of '_fable_' and '_allusion_,'--that form which the author himself lays down in his Art of Tradition, as _the_ form of inculcation for new truth,--the precise position, which is the key to this whole method of new sciences, which makes the method and the interpretation, the vital points, in the writing and the reading of them.

'But, to return, there belongeth farther to the handling of this part, touching the _Duties_ of Professions and Vocations, a relative, or _opposite_, touching the _frauds, impostures and vices of every profession_, which hath been likewise handled. But how? Rather in _a satire_ and _cynically_, than _seriously_ and _wisely_; for men have rather sought by _wit_ to deride and traduce _much of that which is good in_ PROFESSIONS, than _with judgment to discover and sever that which is corrupt_. For, as Solomon saith, he that cometh to seek after knowledge with a mind to scorn and censure, shall be sure to find matter for his humour, but no matter for his instruction. But _the managing of this argument_ with _integrity_ and _truth_, _which I note as deficient_, seemeth to me to be _one of the best fortifications for honesty and virtue that can be planted_. _For_, as the fable goeth of the _basilisk_, that if _he see you first_, you die for it, but if YOU SEE HIM FIRST--HE DIETH; _so_ it is with deceits and _evil arts_, which if they be first ESPIED _lose their life_, but if they _prevent_, endanger.' [If they see you first, you die for it; and not you only, but your science.

Yet were there but this single plot to lose, This _mould_ of Marcius, they to dust should grind it, And throw it against the wind.]

'So that we are much beholden' he continues, 'to Machiavel _and others_ that write _what men do_, and not what they ought to do, [perhaps he refers here to that writer before quoted, who writes, "others _form_ men,--_I_ report him"]; for it is not possible,'

continues the proposer of the science of special duties of _place_, and _vocation_, and _profession_, 'the _critic_ of this department, too,--it is not possible to join the serpentine wisdom with the columbine innocency, except men know exactly all the conditions of the serpent,--that is, _all forms_ and _natures of evil_, for without this, _virtue_ lieth open and un-fenced. Nay, an honest man can do no good upon those that are wicked, to reclaim them, without the help of the knowledge of evil: for men of corrupted minds pre-suppose that honesty groweth out of simplicity of manners, and believing of preachers, schoolmasters, and _men's exterior language_; so as, except you can make them perceive that you know the utmost reaches of their own corrupt opinions, they despise all morality.' A book composed for the express purpose of meeting the difficulty here alluded to, has been already noticed in the preceding pages, on account of its being one of the most striking samples of that peculiar style of _tradition_, which the advancement of Learning prescribes, and here is another, in which the same invention and discovery appears to be indicated:--'Why I can teach you'--says a somewhat doubtful claimant to supernatural gifts:

'Why, I can teach you, cousin, to command The devil.'

'And I can teach _thee_, coz, to shame the devil; By telling truth; If thou hast power to raise him, bring him hither, And I'll be sworn I have power to shame him hence: Oh, while you live, TELL TRUTH.'

But _this_ is the style, in which the one before referred to, falls in with the humour of this Advancer of Learning. 'As to the rest, I have enjoined _myself_ to dare to _say_, all that I dare _to do_, and even _thoughts_ that are not to be published, displease me. The worst of my actions and qualities do not appear to me so foul, as I find it foul and base not to dare to own them. Every one is wary and discreet in _confession_, but men ought to be so in _action_. I wish that this excessive license of mine, may draw men to freedom _above these timorous and mincing pretended virtues, sprung from our imperfections_, and that at the expense of my immoderation, I may reduce them to reason. A man must see and study his vice to correct it, they who conceal it from others, commonly conceal it from themselves and do not think it covered enough, if they themselves see it.... the diseases of the soul, the greater they are, keep themselves the more obscure; the most sick are the least sensible of them: for these reasons they must often be dragged into light, by an unrelenting and pitiless hand; they must be opened and torn from the caverns and secret recesses of the heart.' 'To meet the Huguenots, who condemn our auricular and private confession, I confess myself in public, religiously and purely,--others have published the errors of their _opinions_, I of my _manners_. I am greedy of making myself known, and I care not to how many, provided it be truly; or rather, I hunger for nothing, but I mortally hate to be _mistaken_ by those who happen to come across _my name_. _He that does_ all things for honor and glory [as some great men in that time were supposed to], what can he think to gain by showing himself to the world _in a mask, and by concealing his true being from the people_? Commend a hunchback for his fine shape, he has a right to take it for an affront: if you are a coward, and men commend you for your valor, is it of _you_ that they speak?

They take you for another. Archelaus, king of Macedon, walking along the street, somebody threw water on his head; which they who were with him said he ought to punish, "Ay, but," said the other, "he did not throw the water upon _me_, but upon _him_ whom he took me to be."

Socrates being told that people spoke ill of him, "Not at all," said he, "there is nothing in me of what they say!" _I am content to be less commended provided I am better known_. I may be reputed a wise man, in such a sort of wisdom as I take to be folly.' Truly the Advancement of Learning would seem to be not all in the hands of one person in this time. It appears, indeed, to have been in the hands of some persons who were not content with simply propounding it, and noting deficiencies, but who busied themselves with actively carrying out, the precise plan propounded. Here is one who does not content himself with merely criticising '_professions_ and _vocations_' and suggesting improvements, but one who appears to have an inward call himself to the cure of diseases. Whoever he may be, and since he seems to care so very little for his name himself, and looks at it from such a philosophical point of view, we ought not, perhaps, to be too particular about it; whoever he may be, he is unquestionably a Doctor of the New School, the scientific school, and will be able to produce his diploma when properly challenged; whoever he may be, he belongs to 'the Globe' for the manager of that theatre is incessantly quoting him, and dramatizing his philosophy, and he says himself, 'I look on all men as my compatriots, and prefer the _universal and common tie to the national_.'

But in marking out and indicating the plan and method of the new operation, which has for its end to subst.i.tute a scientific, in the place of an empirical procedure, in the main pursuits of human life, the philosopher does not limit himself in this survey of the special social duties to the special duties of professions and vocations.

'Unto this part,' he says, 'touching _respective_ duty, doth also appertain the duties between husband and wife, parent and child, master and servant: so likewise the laws of _friendship_ and _grat.i.tude_, the civil bond of _companies, colleges_, and _politic bodies_, of _neighbourhood_, and all other proportionate duties; _not_ as they are parts of a government and society, _but as to the framing of the mind of particular persons_.'

The reader will observe, that that portion of moral philosophy which is here indicated, contains, according to this index, some extremely important points, points which require learned treatment; and in our further pursuit of this inquiry, we shall find, that the new light which the science of nature in general throws upon the doctrine of the special duties and upon these points here emphasized, has been most ably and elaborately exhibited by a contemporary of this philosopher, and in the form which he has so specially recommended,--with all that rhetorical power which he conceives to be the natural and fitting accompaniment of this part of learning. And the same is true also throughout of that which follows.

'The knowledge concerning good respecting society, doth handle it also not simply alone, but _comparatively_, whereunto belongeth the weighing of duties _between person and person, case and case, particular and public_: as we see in the proceeding of Lucius Brutus against his own sons, which was so much extolled, yet what was said?

Infelix utcunque ferent ea fata minores.

'So the case was doubtful, and had opinion on both sides. [So the philosopher on the mountain tells us, too, for his common-place book and this author's happen to be the same.] Again we see when M. Brutus and Ca.s.sius _invited to a supper_ certain _whose opinions they meant to feel_, whether they were fit to be made their a.s.sociates, and cast forth the question touching the killing of a tyrant,--being an usurper,--_they were divided in opinion_;' [this of itself is a very good specimen of the style in which points are sometimes introduced casually in pa.s.sing, and by way of ill.u.s.tration merely] some holding that _servitude_ was the _extreme_ of evils, and _others_ that tyranny was _better than a civil war_; and this question also our philosopher of the mountain has considered very carefully from his retreat, weighing all the _pros_ and _cons_ of it. And it is a question which was treated also, as we all happen to know, in that other form of writing for which this author expresses so decided a preference, in which the art of the poet is brought in to enforce and impress the conclusion of the philosopher. Indeed, as we proceed further with the plan of this so radical part of the subject, we shall find, that the ground indicated has everywhere been taken up on the spot by somebody, and to purpose.

CHAPTER IV.

THE SCIENCE OF MORALITY.

Section II.--THE HUSBANDRY THEREUNTO; OR, THE CURE AND CULTURE OF THE MIND.

'Tis an unweeded garden That grows to seed--'

Hamlet.

But we have finished now with what he has to say here of the EXEMPLAR or science of GOOD, and its _kinds_, and _degrees_, and the comparison of them, the good that is proper to the individual, and the good that includes society. He has found much fine work on that platform of virtue, and felicity,--excellent exemplars, the purest doctrine, the loftiest virtue, tried by the scientific standard. And though he has gone behind those popular names of vice and virtue, pain and pleasure, and the like, in which these doctrines _begin_, to the more simple and original forms, which the doctrine of nature in general and its laws supplies, for a platform of moral science, his doctrine is large enough to include all these works, in all their excellence, and give them their true place. A reviewer so discriminating, then, so far from that disposition to scorn and censure, which he reprehends, so careful to conserve that which is good in his scientific constructions and reformations, so pure in judgment in discovering and severing that which is corrupt, a reporter so clearly scientific, who is able to maintain through all this astounding report of the deficiences in human learning, a tone so quiet, so undemonstrative, such a one deserves the more attention when he comes now to 'the art and practic part' of this great science, to which all other sciences are subordinate, and declares to us that he finds it, as a part of science, 'WANTING!' not defective, but _wanting_.