The Philosophy of the Conditioned Part 4

We have now examined the first six chapters of Mr. Mill's book, containing his remarks on that portion of Sir W. Hamilton's philosophy which he justly regards as comprising the most important of the doctrines which specially belong to Hamilton himself. The next chapter is an episode, in which Mr. Mill turns aside from Sir W. Hamilton to criticise Mr. Mansel's _Bampton Lectures_. As our limits do not permit us to carry on the argument at present through the remainder of Mr. Mill's remarks on Hamilton himself, we shall conclude our notice with a few words on this chapter, as closing the properly metaphysical portion of Mr. Mill's book, and as affording ample proof that, in this department of philosophy at least, Mr. Mill's powers of misapprehension do not cease when Sir W.

Hamilton is no longer their object.

Mr. Mill's method of criticism makes it generally necessary to commence with a statement of the criticised theory as it really is, before proceeding to his exposition of it as it is not. The present instance offers no exception to this rule. Mr. Mansel's argument may be briefly stated as follows. The primary and essential conception of G.o.d, imperatively demanded by our moral and religious consciousness, is that of a _person_. But personality implies intellectual and moral attributes; and the only direct and immediate knowledge which we have of such attributes is derived from the testimony of self-consciousness, bearing witness to their existence in a certain manner in ourselves. But when we endeavour to transfer the conception of personality, thus obtained, to the domain of theology, we meet with certain difficulties, which, while they are not sufficient to hinder us from _believing_ in the Divine Personality as a fact, yet hinder us from _conceiving_ the manner of its existence, and prevent us from exhibiting our belief as a philosophical conclusion, proved by irrefragable reasoning and secured against all objections. These difficulties are occasioned, on the one hand, by the so-called Philosophy of the Unconditioned, which in all ages has shown a tendency towards Pantheism, and which, in one of its latest and most finished manifestations, announces itself as the exhibition of G.o.d as He is in His eternal nature before creation; and, on the other hand, by the limitations and conditions to which our own personality is subject, and which, as we have pointed out in the earlier part of this article, have, from the very beginning of Christian theology, prevented theologians from accepting the limited personality of man as an exact image and counterpart of the unlimited personality of G.o.d. These difficulties Mr.

Mansel endeavours to meet in two ways. On the one side, he maintains, in common with Sir W. Hamilton, that the Philosophy of the Unconditioned, by reason of its own incongruities and self-contradictions, has no claim to be accepted as a competent witness in the matter; and on the other side, he maintains, in common with many theologians before him, that human personality cannot be a.s.sumed as an exact copy of the Divine, but only as that which is most nearly a.n.a.logous to it among finite things. But these two positions, if admitted, involve a corresponding practical conclusion as regards the criterion of religious truth or falsehood. Were we capable, either, on the one hand, of a clear conception of the Unconditioned, or, on the other, of a direct intuition of the Divine Attributes as objects of consciousness, we might be able to construct, deductively or inductively, an exact science of Theology. As it is, we are compelled to reason by a.n.a.logy; and a.n.a.logy furnishes only probabilities, varying, it may be, from slight presumptions up to moral certainties, but whose weight, in any given case, can only be determined by comparison with other evidences. There are three distinct sources from which we may form a judgment about the ways of G.o.d--first, from our own moral and intellectual consciousness, by which we judge _a priori_ of what G.o.d ought to do in a given case, by determining what we should think it wise or right for ourselves to do in a similar case; secondly, from the const.i.tution and course of nature, from which we may learn by experience what G.o.d's providence in certain cases actually is; and thirdly, from revelation, attested by its proper evidences. Where these three agree in their testimony (as in the great majority of cases they do) we have the moral certainty which results from the harmony of all accessible evidences: where they appear to differ, we have no right at once to conclude that the second or the third must give way to the first, and not _vice versa_; because we have no right to a.s.sume that the first alone is infallible. In the author's own words: "The lesson to be learnt from an examination of the Limits of Religious Thought is not that man's judgments are _worthless_ in relation to Divine things, but that they are _fallible_: and the probability of error in any particular case can never be fairly estimated without giving their full weight to all collateral considerations. We are indeed bound to believe that a Revelation given by G.o.d can never contain anything that is really unwise or unrighteous; but we are not always capable of estimating exactly the wisdom or righteousness of particular doctrines or precepts. And we are bound to bear in mind that _exactly in proportion to the strength of the remaining evidence for the Divine origin of a religion, is the probability that we may be mistaken in supposing this or that portion of its contents to be unworthy of G.o.d._ Taken in conjunction, the two arguments may confirm or correct each other: taken singly and absolutely, each may vitiate the result which should follow from their joint application."[BD]

[BD] _Bampton Lectures_, p. 156, 4th edition.

In criticising the first part of this argument--that which is directed against the deductive philosophy of the Unconditioned--Mr. Mill manifests the same want of acquaintance with its meanings, and with the previous history of the question; which he had before exhibited in his attack on Sir W. Hamilton. He begins by finding fault with the definition of the Absolute, which Mr. Mansel (herein departing, and purposely departing, from Sir W. Hamilton's use of the term) defines as "that which exists in and by itself, having no necessary relation to any other Being." On this, Mr. Mill remarks: "The first words of his definition would serve for the description of a Noumenon; but Mr. Mansel's Absolute is only meant to denote one Being, identified with G.o.d, and G.o.d is not the only Noumenon."

The description of a Noumenon! This is almost equal to the discovery of a Noumenon s.p.a.ce. Does Mr. Mill really suppose that all noumena are self-existent? A _noumenon_ (in the sense in which we suppose Mr. Mill to understand the term, for it has different meanings in different philosophies) implies an existence out of relation to the human mind.[BE] But is this the same as being out of all relation whatever, as existing "in and by itself?" Does Mr. Mill mean to say that a creature, whether perceived by us or not, has no relation to its Creator?

But Mr. Mill, as we have seen before, is not much at home when he gets among "noumena." We must proceed to his criticism of the second part of the definition,--"having no necessary relation to any other being." Of these words he says, that "they admit of two constructions. The words in their natural sense only mean, _capable of existing out of relation to anything else_. The argument requires that they should mean _incapable of existing in relation with anything else_." And why is this non-natural sense to be forced upon very plain words? Because, says Mr. Mill,--

[BE] Strictly speaking, the term _noumenon_, as meaning that which can be apprehended only by the intellect, implies a relation to the intellect apprehending it; and in this sense [Greek: to nooumenon] is opposed by Plato to [Greek: to horomenon]--the object of intellect to the object of sight. But as the intellect was supposed to take cognisance of things as they are, in opposition to the sensitive perception of things as they appear, the term _noumenon_ became synonymous with _thing in itself_ ([Greek: to hon kath' hauto]). And this meaning is retained in the Kantian philosophy, in which the _noumenon_ is identical with the _Ding an sich_. But as Kant denied to the human intellect any immediate intuition of things as they are (though such an intuition may be possible to a superhuman intellect), hence the term _noumenon_ in the Kantian philosophy is opposed to all of which the human intellect can take positive cognisance. Hamilton, in this respect, agrees with Kant. But neither Kant nor Hamilton, in opposing the _thing in itself_ to the _phenomenon_, meant to imply that the former is necessarily self-existent, and therefore uncreated.

"In what manner is a possible existence out of all relation, incompatible with the notion of a cause? Have not causes a possible existence apart from their effects? Would the sun, for example, not exist if there were no earth or planets for it to illuminate? Mr.

Mansel seems to think that what is capable of existing out of relation, cannot possibly be conceived or known in relation. But this is not so.... Freed from this confusion of ideas, Mr. Mansel's argument resolves itself into this,--The same Being cannot be thought by us both as Cause and as Absolute, because a Cause _as such_ is not Absolute, and Absolute, as such, is not a Cause; which is exactly as if he had said that Newton cannot be thought by us both as an Englishman and as a mathematician, because an Englishman, as such, is not a mathematician, nor a mathematician, as such, an Englishman."--(P. 92.)

The "confusion of ideas" is entirely of Mr. Mill's own making, and is owing to his having mutilated the argument before criticising it. The argument in its original form consists of two parts; the first intended to show that the Absolute is not conceived _as such_ in being conceived as a Cause; the second to show that the Absolute cannot be conceived under different aspects at different times--first as Absolute, and then as Cause. It was the impossibility of this latter alternative which drove Cousin to the hypothesis of a necessary causation from all eternity. Mr.

Mill entirely omits the latter part of the argument, and treats the former part as if it were the whole. The part criticised by Mr. Mill is intended to prove exactly what it does prove, and no more; namely, that a cause _as such_ is not the absolute, and that to know a cause _as such_ is not to know the absolute. We presume Mr. Mill himself will admit that to know Newton as a mathematician is not to know him as an Englishman.

Whether he can be known separately as both, and whether the Absolute in this respect is a parallel case, depends on another consideration, which Mr. Mill has not noticed. The continuation of Mr. Mill's criticism is equally confused. He says:--

"The whole of Mr. Mansel's argument for the inconceivability of the Infinite and of the Absolute is one long _ignoratio elenchi_. It has been pointed out in a former chapter that the words Absolute and Infinite have no real meaning, unless we understand by them that which is absolute or infinite in some given attribute; as s.p.a.ce is called infinite, meaning that it is infinite in extension; and as G.o.d is termed infinite, in the sense of possessing infinite power, and absolute in the sense of absolute goodness or knowledge.

It has also been shown that Sir W. Hamilton's arguments for the unknowableness of the Unconditioned do not prove that we cannot know an object which is absolute or infinite in some specific attribute, but only that we cannot know an abstraction called 'The Absolute' or 'The Infinite,' which is supposed to have all attributes at once."--(P. 93.)

The fallacy of this criticism, as regards Sir W. Hamilton, has been already pointed out: as regards Mr. Mansel, it is still more glaring, inasmuch as that writer expressly states that he uses the term _absolute_ in a different sense from that which Mr. Mill attributes to Sir W.

Hamilton. When Mr. Mill charges Mr. Mansel with "undertaking to prove the impossibility" of conceiving "a Being _absolutely_ just or _absolutely_ wise"[BF] (_i.e._, as he supposes, _perfectly_ just or wise), he actually forgets that he has just been criticising Mr. Hansel's definition of the Absolute, as something having a possible existence "out of all relation." Will Mr. Mill have the kindness to tell us what he means by goodness and knowledge "out of all relation;" _i.e._, a goodness and knowledge related to no object on which they can be exercised; a goodness which is good to nothing, a knowledge which knows nothing? Mr.

Mill had better be cautious in talking about _ignoratio elenchi_.

[BF] _Examination_, p. 95.

From the Absolute, Mr. Mill proceeds to the Infinite; and here he commits the same mistake as before, treating a portion of an argument as if it were the whole, and citing a portion intended to prove one point as if it were intended to prove another. He cites a pa.s.sage from Mr. Mansel, in which it is said that "the Infinite, if it is to be conceived at all, must be conceived as potentially everything and actually nothing; for if there is anything in general which it cannot become, it is thereby limited; and if there is anything in particular which it actually is, it is thereby excluded from being any other thing. But, again, it must also be conceived as actually everything and potentially nothing; for an unrealised potentiality is likewise a limitation. If the Infinite can be that which it is not, it is by that very possibility marked out as incomplete, and capable of a higher perfection. If it is actually everything, it possesses no characteristic feature by which it can be distinguished from anything else, and discerned as an object of consciousness." On this pa.s.sage Mr. Mill remarks, "Can a writer be serious who bids us conjure up a conception of something which possesses infinitely all conflicting attributes, and because we cannot do this without contradiction, would have us believe that there is a contradiction in the idea of infinite goodness or infinite wisdom?" The answer to this criticism is very simple. The argument is not employed for the purpose which Mr. Mill supposes. It is employed to show that the metaphysical notion of the absolute-infinite, as the sum, potential or actual, of all possible existence, is inconceivable under the laws of human consciousness; and thus that the absolutely first existence, related to nothing and limited by nothing, the _ens realissimum_ of the older philosophers, the _pure being_ of the Hegelians, cannot be attained as a starting-point from which to deduce all relative and derived existence. How far the empirical conception of certain mental attributes, such as goodness or wisdom, derived in the first instance from our own personal consciousness, can be positively conceived as extended to infinity, is considered in a separate argument, which Mr. Mill does not notice.

Mr. Mill continues, "Instead of 'the Infinite,' subst.i.tute 'an infinitely good Being' [_i.e._, subst.i.tute what is not intended], and Mr. Mansel's argument reads thus:--'If there is anything which an infinitely good Being cannot become--if he cannot become bad--that is a limitation, and the goodness cannot be infinite. If there is anything which an infinitely good Being actually is (namely, good), he is excluded from being any other thing, as being wise or powerful.'" To the first part of this objection we reply by simply asking, "Is becoming bad a 'higher perfection?'" To the second part we reply by Mr. Mill's favourite mode of reasoning--a parallel case. A writer a.s.serts that a creature which is a horse is thereby excluded from being a dog; and that, in so far as it has the nature of a horse, it has not the nature of a dog. "What!" exclaims Mr. Mill, "is it not the nature of a dog to have four legs? and does the man mean to say that a horse has not four legs?" We venture respectfully to ask Mr. Mill whether he supposes that being wise is being "a thing,"

and being good is being another "thing?"

But, seriously, it is much to be wished that when a writer like Mr. Mill undertakes to discuss philosophical questions, he should acquire some slight acquaintance with the history of the questions discussed. Had this been done by our critic in the present case, it might possibly have occurred to him to doubt whether a doctrine supported by philosophers of such different schools of thought as Spinoza, Malebranche, Wolf, Kant, Sch.e.l.ling, could be quite such a piece of transparent nonsense as he supposes it to be. All these writers are cited in Mr. Mansel's note, as maintaining the theory that the Absolute is the _ens realissimum_, or sum of all existence; and their names might have saved Mr. Mill from the absurdity of supposing that by this expression was meant something "absolutely good and absolutely bad; absolutely wise and absolutely stupid; and so forth." The real meaning of the expression has been already sufficiently explained in our earlier remarks. The problem of the Philosophy of the Unconditioned, as sketched by Plato and generally adopted by subsequent philosophers, is, as we have seen, to ascend up to the first principle of all things, and thence to deduce, as from their cause, all dependent and derived existences. The Unconditioned, as the one first principle, must necessarily contain in itself, potentially or actually, all that is derived from it, and thus must comprehend, in embryo or in development, the sum of all existence. To reconcile this conclusion with the phenomenal existence of evil and imperfection, is the difficulty with which philosophy has had to struggle ever since philosophy began. The Manichean, by referring evil to an independent cause, denies the existence of an absolute first principle at all; the Leibnitzian, with his hypothesis of the best possible world, virtually sets bounds to the Divine omnipotence: the Pantheist identifies G.o.d with all actual existence, and either denies the real existence of evil at all, or merges the distinction between evil and good in some higher indifference. All these conclusions may be alike untenable, but all alike testify to the existence of the problem, and to the vast though unsuccessful efforts which man's reason has made to solve it.

The reader may now, perhaps, understand the reason of an a.s.sertion which Mr. Mill regards as supremely absurd,--namely, that we must believe in the existence of an absolute and infinite Being, though unable to conceive the nature of such a Being. To believe in such a Being, is simply to believe that G.o.d made the world: to declare the nature of such a Being inconceivable, is simply to say that we do not know how the world was made. If we believe that G.o.d made the world, we must believe that there was a time when the world was not, and when G.o.d alone existed, out of relation to any other being. But the mode of that sole existence we are unable to conceive, nor in what manner the first act took place by which the absolute and self-existent gave existence to the relative and dependent. "The contradictions," says Mr. Mill, "which Mr. Mansel a.s.serts to be involved in the notions, do not follow from an imperfect mode of apprehending the Infinite and the Absolute, but lie in the definitions of them, in the meaning of the words themselves." They do no such thing: the meaning of the words is perfectly intelligible, and is exactly what is expressed by their definitions: the contradictions arise from the attempt to combine the attributes expressed by the words in one representation with others, so as to form a positive object of consciousness. Where is the incongruity of saying, "I believe that a being exists possessing certain attributes, though I am unable in my present state of knowledge to conceive the manner of that existence?" Mr. Mill, at all events, is the last man in the world who has any right to complain of such a distinction--Mr. Mill, who considers it not incredible that in some part of the universe two straight lines may enclose a s.p.a.ce, or two and two make five; though he is compelled to allow that under our present laws of thought, or, if he pleases, of a.s.sociation, we are unable to conceive how these things can be.

It is wearisome work to wade through this ma.s.s of misconceptions; yet we must entreat the reader's patience a little longer, while we say a few words in conclusion on perhaps the greatest misconception of all--though that is bold language to use with regard to Mr. Mill's metaphysics,--at any rate, the one which he expresses in the most vehement language. Mr.

Mansel, as we have said, a.s.serts, as many others have a.s.serted before him, that the relation between the communicable attributes of G.o.d and the corresponding attributes of man is one not of ident.i.ty, but of a.n.a.logy; that is to say, that the Divine attributes have the same relation to the Divine nature that the human attributes have to human nature. Thus, for example, there is a Divine justice and there is a human justice; but G.o.d is just as the Creator and Governor of the world, having unlimited authority over all His creatures and unlimited jurisdiction over all their acts; and man is just in certain special relations, as having authority over some persons and some acts only, so far as is required for the needs of human society. So, again, there is a Divine mercy and there is a human mercy; but G.o.d is merciful in such a manner as is fitting compatibly with the righteous government of the universe; and man is merciful in a certain limited range, the exercise of the attribute being guided by considerations affecting the welfare of society or of individuals. Or to take a more general case: Man has in himself a rule of right and wrong, implying subjection to the authority of a superior (for conscience has authority only as reflecting the law of G.o.d); while G.o.d has in Himself a rule of right and wrong, implying no higher authority, and determined absolutely by His own nature. The case is the same when we look at moral attributes, not externally, in their active manifestations, but internally, in their psychological const.i.tution. If we do not attribute to G.o.d the same complex mental const.i.tution of reason, pa.s.sion, and will, the same relation to motives and inducements, the same deliberation and choice of alternatives, the same temporal succession of facts in consciousness, which we ascribe to man,--it will follow that those psychological relations between reason, will, and desire, which are implied in the conception of human action, cannot represent the Divine excellences in themselves, but can only ill.u.s.trate them by a.n.a.logies from finite things. And if man is liable to error in judging of the conduct of his fellow-men, in proportion as he is unable to place himself in their position, or to realise to himself their modes of thought and principles of action--if the child, for instance, is liable to error in judging the actions of the man,--or the savage of the civilised man,--surely there is far more room for error in men's judgment of the ways of G.o.d, in proportion as the difference between G.o.d and man is greater than the difference between a man and a child.

This doctrine elicits from Mr. Mill the following extraordinary outburst of rhetoric:--

"If, instead of the glad tidings that there exists a Being in whom all the excellences which the highest human mind can conceive, exist in a degree inconceivable to us, I am informed that the world is ruled by a being whose attributes are infinite, but what they are we cannot learn, nor what are the principles of his government, except that 'the highest human morality which we are capable of conceiving' does not sanction them; convince me of it, and I will bear my fate as I may. But when I am told that I must believe this, and at the same time call this being by the names which express and affirm the highest human morality, I say in plain terms that I will not. Whatever power such a being may have over me, there is one thing which he shall not do: he shall not compel me to worship him.

I will call no being good, who is not what I mean when I apply that epithet to my fellow-creatures; and if such a being can sentence me to h.e.l.l for not so calling him, to h.e.l.l I will go."--(P. 103.)

We will not pause to comment on the temper and taste of this declamation; we will simply ask whether Mr. Mill really supposes the word _good_ to lose all community of meaning, when it is applied, as it constantly is, to different persons among our "fellow-creatures," with express reference to their different duties and different qualifications for performing them? The duties of a father are not the same as those of a son; is the word therefore wholly equivocal when we speak of one person as a _good father_, and another as a _good son_? Nay, when we speak generally of a man as _good_, has not the epithet a tacit reference to human nature and human duties? and yet is there no community of meaning when the same epithet is applied to other Creatures? [Greek: He arete pros to ergon to oikeion]--the goodness of any being whatever has relation to the nature and office of that being. We may therefore test Mr. Mill's declamation by a parallel case. A wise and experienced father addresses a young and inexperienced son: "My son," he says, "there may be some of my actions which do not seem to you to be wise or good, or such as you would do in my place. Remember, however, that your duties are different from mine; that your knowledge of my duties is very imperfect; and that there may be things which you cannot now see to be wise and good, but which you may hereafter discover to be so." "Father," says the son, "your principles of action are not the same as mine; the highest morality which I can conceive at present does not sanction them; and as for believing that you are good in anything of which I do not plainly see the goodness,"--We will not repeat Mr. Mill's alternative; we will only ask whether it is not just possible that there may be as much difference between man and G.o.d as there is between a child and his father?

This declamation is followed by a sneer, which is worth quoting, not on its own account, but as an evidence of the generosity with which Mr. Mill deals with the supposed motives of his antagonists, and of the accuracy of his acquaintance with the subject discussed. He says:--

"It is worthy of remark, that the doubt whether words applied to G.o.d have their human signification, is only felt when the words relate to his moral attributes; it is never heard of with regard to his power. We are never told that G.o.d's omnipotence must not be supposed to mean an infinite degree of the power we know in man and nature, and that perhaps it does not mean that he is able to kill us, or consign us to eternal flames. The Divine Power is always interpreted in a completely human signification; but the Divine Goodness and Justice must be understood to be such only in an unintelligible sense. Is it unfair to surmise that this is because those who speak in the name of G.o.d, have need of the human conception of his power, since an idea which can overawe and enforce obedience must address itself to real feelings; but are content that his goodness should be conceived only as something inconceivable, because they are so often required to teach doctrines respecting him which conflict irreconcilably with all goodness that we can conceive?"--(P. 104.)

On the latter part of this paragraph we will not attempt to comment. But as regards the former part, we meet Mr. Mill's confident a.s.sertion with a direct denial, and take the opportunity of informing him that the conception of infinite Power has suggested the same difficulties; and has been discussed by philosophers and theologians in the same manner, as those of infinite Wisdom and infinite Goodness. Has Mr. Mill never heard of such questions as, Whether Omnipotence can reverse the past?--Whether G.o.d can do that which He does not will to do?--Whether G.o.d's perfect foreknowledge is compatible with his own perfect liberty?--Whether G.o.d could have made a better world than the existing one? Nay, has not our critic, in this very chapter, been arguing against Mr. Mansel on the question, whether the Absolute can be conceived as a Cause acting in time: and what is this but a form of the question, whether power, when predicated of G.o.d is exactly the same thing as power when predicated of man? Or why has it been said that creation _ex nihilo_--an absolutely first act of causation, is inconceivable by us, but from the impossibility of finding in human power an exact type of Divine power? To attribute discreditable motives to an opponent, even to account for unquestionable facts, is usually considered as an abuse of criticism.

What shall we say when the facts are fict.i.tious as well as the motives?

With regard to Mr. Mansel, the only person who is included by name in this accusation, it is "worthy of remark," that the earliest mention of the obnoxious theory in his writings occurs in connection with a difficulty relating solely to the conception of infinite power, and not at all to the moral attributes of G.o.d.[BG]

[BG] See _Prolegomena Logica_, p. 77 (2nd ed., p. 85.)

Mr. Mill concludes this chapter with another instance of that _ignoratio elenchi_ which has been so abundantly manifested throughout his previous criticisms. His opponent, he allows, "would and does admit that the qualities as conceived by us bear _some likeness_ to the justice and goodness which belong to G.o.d, since man was made in G.o.d's image." But he considers that this "semi-concession" "destroys the whole fabric" of Mr.

Mansel's argument. "The Divine goodness," he says, "which is said to be a different thing from human goodness, but of which the human conception of goodness is some imperfect reflexion or resemblance, does it agree with what men call goodness in the _essence_ of the quality--in what _const.i.tutes_ it goodness? If it does, the 'Rationalists' are right; it is not illicit to reason from the one to the other. If not, the divine attribute, whatever else it may be, is not goodness, and ought not to be called by the name." Now the question really at issue is not whether the "Rationalist" argument is licit or illicit, but whether, in its lawful use, it is to be regarded as infallible or fallible. We have already quoted a portion of Mr. Mansel's language on this point; we will now quote two more pa.s.sages, which, without any comment, will sufficiently show how utterly Mr. Mill has mistaken the purport of the argument which he has undertaken to examine.

"We do not certainly know the exact nature and operation of the moral attributes of G.o.d: we can but infer and conjecture from what we know of the moral attributes of man: and the a.n.a.logy between the Finite and the Infinite can never be so perfect as to preclude all possibility of error in the process. But the possibility becomes almost a certainty, when any one human faculty is elevated by itself into an authoritative criterion of religious truth, without regard to those collateral evidences by which its decisions may be modified and corrected."[BH]... "Beyond question, every doubt which our reason may suggest in matters of religion is ent.i.tled to its due place in the examination of the evidences of religion; if we will treat it as a part only, and not the whole; if we will not insist on a positive solution of that which, it may be, is given us for another purpose than to be solved. It is reasonable to believe that, in matters of belief as well as of practice, G.o.d has not thought fit to annihilate the free will of man, but has permitted speculative difficulties to exist as the trial and the discipline of sharp and subtle intellects, as He has permitted moral temptations to form the trial and the discipline of strong and eager pa.s.sions.... We do not doubt that the conditions of our moral trial tend towards good, and not towards evil; that human nature, even in its fallen state, bears traces of the image of its Maker, and is fitted to be an instrument in His moral government. And we believe this, notwithstanding the existence of pa.s.sions and appet.i.tes which, isolated and uncontrolled, appear to lead in an opposite direction. Is it then more reasonable to deny that a system of revealed religion, whose unquestionable tendency as a whole is to promote the glory of G.o.d and the welfare of mankind, can have proceeded from the same Author, merely because we may be unable to detect the same character in some of its minuter features, viewed apart from the system to which they belong?"[BI]

[BH] _Bampton Lectures_, p. 157, Fourth Edition.

[BI] _Bampton Lectures_, p. 166, Fourth Edition.

Surely this is very different from denouncing all reasoning from human goodness to Divine as "illicit." To take a parallel case. The manufacture of gunpowder is a dangerous process, and, if carried on without due precautions, is very likely to lead to disastrous consequences. Surely it is one thing to point out what precautions are necessary, and what evils are to be apprehended from the neglect of them, and another to forbid the manufacture altogether. Mr. Mill does not seem to see the difference.

We have now considered in detail all that part of Mr. Mill's book which is devoted to the examination of Sir W. Hamilton's chief and most characteristic doctrines--those which const.i.tute the Philosophy of the Conditioned. The remainder of the work, which deals chiefly with subordinate questions of psychology and logic, contains much from which we widely dissent, but which we cannot at present submit to a special examination. Nor is it necessary, so far as Sir W. Hamilton's reputation is concerned, that we should do so. If the Philosophy of the Conditioned is really nothing better than the ma.s.s of crudities and blunders which Mr. Mill supposes it to be, the warmest admirers of Hamilton will do little in his behalf, even should they succeed in vindicating some of the minor details of his teaching. If, on the other hand, it can be shown, as we have attempted to show, that Mr. Mill is utterly incapable of dealing with Hamilton's philosophy in its higher branches, his readers may be left to judge for themselves whether he is implicitly to be trusted as regards the lower. In point of fact, they will do Mr. Mill no injustice, if they regard the above specimens as samples of his entire criticism. We gladly except, as of a far higher order, those chapters in which he is content with stating his own views; but in the perpetual baiting of Sir W. Hamilton, which occupies the greater part of the volume, we recognise, in general, the same captiousness and the same incompetence which we have so often had occasion to point out in the course of our previous remarks.

It is, we confess, an unpleasant and an invidious task, to pick to pieces, bit by bit, the work of an author of high reputation. But Mr.

Mill has chosen to put the question on this issue, and he has left those who dissent from him no alternative but to follow his example. He has tasked all the resources of minute criticism to destroy piece-meal the reputation of one who has. .h.i.therto borne an honoured name in philosophy: he has no right to complain if the same measure is meted to himself:--

"Neque enim lex aequior ulla Quam necis artifices arte perire sua."

But it is not so much the justice as the necessity of the case which we would plead as our excuse. Mr. Mill's method of criticism has reduced the question to a very narrow compa.s.s. Either Sir W. Hamilton, instead of being a great philosopher, is the veriest blunderer that ever put pen to paper, or the blunders are Mr. Mill's own. To those who accept the first of these alternatives it must always remain a marvel how Sir W. Hamilton could ever have acquired that reputation which compels even his critic to admit that "he alone, of our metaphysicians of this and the preceding generation, has acquired, merely as such, an European celebrity;" how he could have been designated by his ill.u.s.trious opponent, Cousin, as the "greatest critic of our age," or described by the learned Brandis as "almost unparalleled in the profound knowledge of ancient and modern philosophy." The marvel may perhaps disappear, should it be the case, as we believe it to be, that the second alternative is the true one.

But even in this case, it should be borne in mind that the blow will by no means fall on Mr. Mill with the same weight with which he designed it to fall on the object of his criticism. Sir W. Hamilton had devoted his whole life to the study of metaphysics; he was probably more deeply read in that study than any of his contemporaries; and if all his reading could produce nothing better than the confusion and self-contradiction which Mr. Mill imputes to him, the result would be pitiable indeed. Mr.

Mill, on the other hand, we strongly suspect, despises metaphysics too much to be at the pains of studying them at all, and seems to think that a critic is duly equipped for his task with that amount of knowledge which, like Dogberry's reading and writing, "comes by nature." His work has a superficial cleverness which, together with the author's previous reputation, will insure it a certain kind of popularity; but we venture to predict that its estimation by its readers will be in the inverse ratio to their knowledge of the subject. But Mr. Mill's general reputation rests on grounds quite distinct from his performances in metaphysics; and though we could hardly name one of his writings from whose main principles we do not dissent, there is hardly one which is not better fitted to sustain his character as a thinker than this last, in which the fatal charms of the G.o.ddess Necessity seem to have betrayed her champion into an unusual excess of polemical zeal, coupled, it must be added, with an unusual deficiency of philosophical knowledge.

POSTSCRIPT.

It was not till after the preceding pages had been sent to press that I became acquainted with a little work recently published under the t.i.tle of _The Battle of the two Philosophies, by an Inquirer_. The author appears to have been a personal pupil of Sir W. Hamilton's, as well as a diligent student of his writings. At all events, he has "inquired" to some purpose, and obtained a far more intelligent knowledge of Hamilton's system than is exhibited by the majority of recent critics. It is gratifying to find many of my remarks confirmed by the concurrent testimony of so competent a witness. The following would have been noticed in their proper places had I been sooner acquainted with them.

Of the popular confusion between the _infinite_ and the _indefinite_, noticed above, pp. 50, 112, "An Inquirer" observes:--

"If we could realise in thought infinite s.p.a.ce, that conception would be a perfectly definite one; but the notion that is here offered us in its place, though it may be real, is certainly not definite; it is merely the conception of an indefinite extension.... In truth, when we strive to think of infinite s.p.a.ce, the nearest approach we can make to it is this notion of an indefinite s.p.a.ce, which Mr. Mill has subst.i.tuted for it. But these two conceptions are not only verbally, they are really wholly distinct. An indefinite s.p.a.ce is a s.p.a.ce of the extent of which we think vaguely, without knowing or without thinking where its boundaries are.

Infinite s.p.a.ce has certainly, and quite distinctly, no boundaries anywhere."--(Pp. 18-20.)

On Mr. Mill's strange distinction between the Divine Attributes, as some infinite and others absolute, the author's remarks are substantially in agreement with what has been said above on pp. 105-6.

"Mr. Mill argues that all the attributes of G.o.d cannot be infinite; but that some, as power, may be infinite; and some, as goodness and knowledge, must be absolute, because neither can knowledge be more than complete, nor goodness more than perfect. When we know all there is to be known, he says, knowledge has attained its utmost limit. But this is merely begging the whole question. If there be an Infinite Being, He cannot know all there is to be known unless He know Himself; and adequately to know what is infinite is to have infinite knowledge. The same thing would be true if there could be a Being whose power and duration only were infinite. 'The will,' he adds, 'is either entirely right, or wrong in different degrees: downwards there are as many gradations as we choose to distinguish; but upwards there is an ideal limit. Goodness can be imagined complete,--such that there can be no greater goodness beyond it,'... But a Being of infinite power and finite goodness would not be perfectly good, because His power would not be wholly, but only in part directed by His goodness. Nay, as that which is finite bears no proportion whatever to what is infinite: as, however great it be absolutely, it is still infinitely less than infinity, such a Being would be partly good and yet infinitely evil, which is absurd in reason and impossible in fact."--(Pp. 24, 25.)

The following estimate of Mr. Mill's merits as a metaphysician coincides with that which, contrary to my expectation, I found forced upon myself after a careful examination of his book.--(See above, Pp. 62, 182.)