The Philippine Islands Part 53

The Cebuanos are the most sociable of the Visaya population, whilst the women are the best-looking of all the Filipinas of pure Oriental descent.

Of all places in the Philippines Cebu will please the conchologist. An old native named Legaspi once had a splendid sh.e.l.l collection, which he freely exhibited to foreigners. At one time he had a _Gloria Maris_, which he sold for $150, and some Russian naval officers are said to have offered him $5,000 for a part of his collection. At certain seasons of the year the _Euplectella speciosa_, Gray, or Venus baskets, locally known as _Regaderas_, can be obtained in quant.i.ties; they are found in the Cebu waters. The _Eup. spec_, is the skeleton secretion of an insect of the Porifera division. The basket is a series of graceful fretted spirals. Also fine _Pina_ stuffs can be purchased here.

The population of Cebu City was 9,629 in 1888; 10,972 in 1896; and 18,330 in 1903. The inhabitants of the whole Island numbered 417,543 in 1876; 518,032 in 1888; 595,726 in 1896; and 653,727 in 1903.

In March, 1899, an American armed force was detailed from Cebu City to _Bojol Island_ to demand the surrender of the native provincial government established there since the Spanish evacuation. Interpreters from Cebu were sent ash.o.r.e, and after hearing their explanation of the Americans demands the native president in council resolved to yield peacefully. A volunteer regiment was then sent ash.o.r.e, positions were occupied, and all went smoothly on the surface until the Islanders'

powers of endurance were exhausted after 22 months of alleged harsh treatment imposed upon them by the troops. In January, 1901, the cry of rebellion was raised by one Pedro Sanson, whose band of Bojolanos, augmented by levies from Leyte, Samar, and Panay Islands numbered about 2,000. Expeditions were sent out against them, and the lukewarm sympathy of the Islanders was turned to general indignation against the Americans by the alleged wanton destruction of a whole town by fire, by order of a captain of volunteers. Practically the whole Island became covertly anti-American. Having finished his campaign in Cebu Island in October, 1901, General Hughes carried his troops over to Bojol Island, where measures of repression were adopted similar to those which had been so effective in reducing the Cebuanos to submission. A large number of small towns and villages within the range of military operations were entirely destroyed. The once pretty little town of Lauang was left a complete ruin, and many landmarks of a former progressive civilization have disappeared for ever. Nevertheless, the insurgents refused to yield until a decree was issued to the effect that if the leaders did not surrender by December 27 the invaders would burn down the town of Tagbilaran. In this town, formerly the seat of the native provincial government, Pedro Sanson and most of his officers had all their property and worldly possessions; and in view of the beggary which awaited them if they held out any longer, they accepted terms of peace from Pantaleon E. del Rosario, who went up to the mountains and acted as negotiator between General Hughes and the insurgent chiefs who finally surrendered. The Filipino, Aniceto Clarin, appointed provincial governor on April 20, 1901, continued in office; Pedro Sanson quietly resumed his occupation of dealer in hemp, etc., and thenceforth peace and poverty reigned in the Island.

In _Cottabato_ (Mindanao Is.), the attempt to establish a local native government ended in tragic failure. In January, 1899, a Spanish gunboat silently entered the port without the customary whistling and firing of salute. It brought a despatch to the Governor from the nominal acting-Gov.-General Rios, who, coming from Yloilo, called at Zamboanga before proceeding to Manila, to receive on board a number of Spanish refugees. One of the crew of the gunboat also brought a private communication from the Jesuit Superior in Zamboanga to the Jesuit missionary Father Suarez. The official despatch notified the Governor that the Treaty of Paris had been signed, and consequently he was to evacuate Cottabato immediately. The private communication told the same tale to the missionary, with an inquiry from the Jesuit Superior as to whether he could continue his mission after the withdrawal of the Spanish Governor, and whether it would be of any advantage to do so. The Governor informed the missionary of his intended departure, and the missionary replied negatively to his superior in Zamboanga. The Governor then called Roman Vilo, his confidential christian native a.s.sistant, and told him that he and all who had been loyal to the Spanish Government and faithful in their service could take pa.s.sage to Zamboanga. Vilo, however, for himself and his family, declined the offer on the ground that all his interests were in and about Cottabato, where he possessed real estate. The Governor then had the Moro-Chinese half-caste Datto Piang called, and in the presence of Vilo the former was appointed chief of the Moro people and the latter governor of the christian population. After making a short speech, exhorting the two chiefs, in benevolent phrases, to live in peace and act mutually for the common good, the Governor, accompanied by the Jesuit missionaries and others who were desirous of leaving the place, went to Zamboanga on the gunboat.

When, after the lapse of some weeks, Datto Piang felt sure that the Spaniards would never be again in authority at Cottabato, he begged Vilo to let him have twenty rifles to defend himself against a rival. The christian governor agreed to this, and week by week Datto Piang's demands grew until, at length, all the rifles in the possession of the Christians pa.s.sed to the Moros. But there still remained some cannons, and Datto Piang, having represented the necessity of making war on another chief up the Cottabato River, Vilo was persuaded to lend them to him. Piang had them placed in _vintas_ (war-junks) and Vilo, with several friends, went down to the river-side to witness the departure of the supposed armed expedition. Suddenly Piang, his son-in-law Datto Ali and this man's brother, Datto Djimbangan, at the head of a large party of armed Moros, fell upon and slaughtered the Christians. Vilo's head was cut off and the savage Mahometans made a raid on the town, looting all but the shops of the Chinese who were in league, or accord, with their half-countryman Piang. The Christians who were unable to escape were either ma.s.sacred or carried off as slaves into the interior, with the loot. Datto Djimbangan caused the Christian women to be stripped naked and marched through the streets, whilst he and his companions made their selections for themselves, leaving the remainder for their followers. Amongst the captives were a father and two sons. In October, 1899, the Americans sent a gunboat to Cottabato, and the wife of this captive, mother of his two boys, represented her plight to the commander, who forthwith sent for Piang and ordered him immediately to send a message to the individual holding the captives to release them and hand them over to the messenger, who would conduct them back to Cottabato. Piang, without a moment's hesitation, offered to comply, and sent a _vinta_ up the river with the required order, but at the same time he secretly sent another emissary overland with contrary instructions. The land messenger, as was expected, arrived first, and when the _vinta_ party reached the place of captivity, Piang's people expressed their regret that they could not oblige the party because they had just cut off the captives' heads. In 1904 a member of the victims' family was a teacher in the Jesuits' Catholic School in Zamboanga. Datto Piang, who owes his position and influence over the Moros to the protection of the late great Datto Utto (_vide_ p. 143) is the father-in-law of the terrible Datto Ali whose continual depredations and defiance made Cottabato the centre of that unabated conflict for the Americans described in Chapter xxix.

In the belief that the Zamboanguenos were loyally disposed towards Spain, the Spaniards, after the signing of the Treaty of Paris, chose _Zamboanga_ (Mindanao Is.) as their point of concentration of all the Spanish troops and civil servants in the southern islands. At that time General Jaramillo was Gov.-General of Mindanao Island and commander of the forces in Zamboanga; but on the arrival there, December 27, 1898, of the ex-governor of Cebu, General Montero, with his co-refugees, General Jaramillo transferred his command to him and left for Manila with General Rios, who had come from Yloilo to Zamboanga to receive refugee pa.s.sengers for the capital. Before his departure Jaramillo had led the Zamboangueno Christians to believe that the war with America was, at every turn, a triumphant success for Spanish arms; fict.i.tious printed telegrams were circulated announcing Spanish victories everywhere, and one of the most extravagant reported that General Weyler had landed on American soil at Key West with an army of 80,000 Spanish troops. The motive of this harmless ruse was to bolster up Spanish prestige and thereby avoid bloodshed. During several months no trading or mail-steamer came, and the Zamboanguenos were practically cut off from the rest of the world. Military preparations were made for the feigned purpose of resisting a possible attack on the place by the Americans, who were described to the people as cannibals and ferocious monsters more terrible than the dreaded Moros. Naturally the real object of the military preparations was the Spaniards'

justifiable endeavour to be ready to defend themselves against open rebellion when the true situation should ooze out. Nor was their misrepresentation of the Americans mere spiteful calumny; the Spaniards were in great jeopardy, and they instinctively wished to destroy any feeling of welcome which the natives might have for the new-comers for fear it might operate against themselves at the supreme moment of danger. Indeed, each party--native and Spanish--was seeking to outwit the other; hence, when the Zamboanguenos were promised a supply of arms for the ostensible purpose of resisting invasion, they pretended to co-operate heartily with the Spaniards' defensive measures, with the secret design of dispossessing the Spaniards of their arms in order to use them against them. The Zamboanguenos therefore became so persistent in their demand upon Montero to fulfil his predecessor's promise that at last he had frankly to confess that peace had been signed between Spain and America, whereby the Islands were surrendered to the United States, and that very shortly the Spaniards would evacuate the Archipelago. But the conflicting versions of the situation, published severally by Jaramillo and Montero, sorely puzzled the natives. The Spaniards were still in undisturbed possession of Zamboanga for over four months after Montero's arrival, notwithstanding the fact that the American warship _Boston_ called at the port and left the same day and that an officer came ash.o.r.e without the least objection or consternation on the part of the Spaniards. The orange-and-red flag still floated over the Fortress del Pilar, and, so far as the Zamboanguenos could ascertain, it looked as if the Spaniards were going to remain. They therefore clamoured more loudly than ever for the distribution of arms, which this time Montero positively refused, for the Spaniards had never for a moment been deceived as to the real intentions of the Zamboanguenos. On the other hand, by this time, their inoffensive delusion of the people had lost its virtue, and natives and Spaniards thenceforth became open enemies. After the visit of the _Boston_ the fighting population, no longer able to conceal their disappointment, threw off the mask, quitted the town, cut off the water-supply which came from the mountains, in collusion with the mutinied crews seized the firearms on board the Spanish gunboats lying in the harbour, and prepared for war against their old masters. The Spaniards immediately compelled the non-combatant townspeople and the Chinese to throw up earthworks for mounting artillery and dig trenches for defence against the rebels. The gunboat _Alava_ co-operated by firing sh.e.l.ls into the rebel camp situated just outside the town. The rebels made two unsuccessful a.s.saults, and in the second attack General Montero was mortally wounded by a rifle-shot. On May 23 the S.S. _Leon XIII._ arrived; the Spaniards silently embarked for Manila with their dying general, who succ.u.mbed during the voyage, and Zamboanga, one-fourth of which the defenders had destroyed by fire, was occupied by the rebels. During the siege the Filipinos, true to their instincts, had split up into two rival factions headed by Vicente Alvarez and Isidoro Midel respectively, and in the interval between the first and second a.s.sault on the town these party chiefs had fought out their own quarrel, Midel claiming to have been the victor. Nevertheless, the popular favourite was Vicente Alvarez, known as the _Tamagun Datto_ (high chief), who became the chosen president of the Zamboanga revolutionary government established immediately after the Spanish evacuation. Party spirit ran high; life was held in little esteem; a lifeless body found on the highway startled no one; a.s.sa.s.sination was an occurrence of small moment; cattle-shooting was practised for amus.e.m.e.nt, and the five-and-a-half months' essay of christian Philippine autonomy was so signalized by jealous self-interest, bitter rivalry, rapacity, and bloodshed as to make one doubt whether the christian Zamboangueno is one whit superior to his Mahometan neighbour in moral character.

The arrival of an American expedition in the waters of Zamboanga on November 15, 1899, produced a sanguinary crisis in these faction feuds. Vicente Alvarez at once took measures to oppose the invaders'

landing, whilst his rival, Isidoro Midel, resolved to side with the Americans. _Divide et impera._ The want of unity amongst the natives themselves was a great help to the Americans' plans. By this time there appeared a third aspirant to local fame in the person of Melanio Sanson, a native marine engineer, until recently in the Spanish service, who pretended to co-operate with Alvarez, styling himself colonel of artillery in charge of the guns abandoned by his former masters. Each of these three individuals sought to rid himself of his two rivals. On the night of November 15 Isidoro Midel ended Melanio Sanson's rivalry for ever, and the Americans took peaceful possession of the town the next day. Subsequently Midel arranged a transfer to the Americans of the artillery which had, during the conflict, been under Sanson's control. Vicente Alvarez immediately fled to Mercedes, and thence to Basilan Island, where, aided by Datto Pedro Cuevas, he organized a brigand band, crossed over to Mindanao Island again, and made a raid on Oriquieta. Chased from place to place by American troops, he was finally captured and sent to Bilibid prison in Manila, but was subsequently pardoned on his taking the oath of allegiance, and sent back to Zamboanga, where he earns his living peacefully. Meanwhile, Isidoro Midel had been further rewarded for his services to the Americans with the office of munic.i.p.al president, which he held for about 16 months in defiance of public opinion. The feeling which prompted public opposition to Midel's appointment was at least as much anti-American as it was dislike for the nominee. In March, 1901, munic.i.p.al elections were held, and Mariano Arquiza succeeded, by popular vote, to the presidency, which he held for two years. Some weeks before Arquiza vacated office two American miners were murdered by the natives a few miles up the province. The murderers, when caught, sought to justify their deed by alleging that a munic.i.p.al councillor named Eduardo Alvarez (no relation to the Vicente Alvarez already mentioned) had persuaded them that the miners were secretly engaged in poisoning the local wells. The whole munic.i.p.al council was therefore cited to appear before the American Governor, who severely reprimanded Alvarez, whereupon this man withdrew from the audience-chamber, and his fellow-councillors volunteered such information against him that the Governor instantly issued a warrant for his apprehension. But the native police who went to his house to execute the warrant let him escape on horseback to the mountains, where he organized a band of outlaws and lived for about four months by robbery and violence. Under these circ.u.mstances the American Governor summarily dismissed Mariano Arquiza from the munic.i.p.al presidency in the spring of 1903, and, much to the public chagrin, re-appointed Midel to the vacancy. The offer of $1,000 for the capture of Eduardo Alvarez spurred Midel into further activity, and under his direction the bandit was discovered hiding in a canoe in a swamp. On the approach of his pursuers the outlaw threw up his hands in sign of surrender, which was responded to by a volley of gunshots, for it was Alvarez's corpse which was wanted in Zamboanga. Isidoro Midel is an interesting character, apparently about forty-eight years of age. Brought up as a Roman Catholic, he a.s.sured me that he was a Protestant, with the strongest sympathy, however, for the Aglipayan movement (_vide_ Chap. x.x.x.).

Another interesting man, closely a.s.sociated with recent events in Zamboanga, is the Mahometan Spanish-Moro half-caste Datto Mandi, the _Rajahmudah_ or heir-apparent to the _Manguiguin_ or Sultan of Mindanao (_vide_ p. 131). Born about the year 1860, he and his tribe of Samals lived on friendly terms with the Spaniards, who in 1887 sent him and a number of his people to the Philippine Exhibition held in Madrid in that year. His exploits in aid of the Spaniards in Cebu are recorded at page 406. He speaks Spanish fluently, and can just write his name. He is very affable and hospitable to visitors. The whole family professes the Mahometan religion. He has a beautiful daughter Gafas (which in Moro language signifies "cotton," and in Spanish "spectacles"), who attended the American School. His young son Facundo also goes to the American School, and his other son Pelayo went to the Catholic School in Zamboanga before he was sent to Manila. I was much struck with the intelligence of this handsome boy Pelayo. In the stirring events which immediately followed the Spanish evacuation, Datto Mandi remained neutral, his old antagonism to Alvarez being counterpoised by the conviction that a Zamboanga republic must end in a fiasco. He at once accepted the new situation under American dominion, and is headman of the Samal tribal ward of Magay, a suburb of Zamboanga. He told me in 1904 that he held under his control 9,600 persons, from 1,700 of whom he collected capitation tax for the American authorities. At the instance of the Americans, Datto Mandi issued a proclamation to his tribe, dated April 19, 1900, abolishing their traditional custom of slavery. His position is not at all an easy one, and it needs much tact to maintain an even balance of goodwill between his Samal subordinates and his American superiors. But Datto Mandi had a grievance which rankled in his breast. In the year 1868 the Spanish Government conceded to a christian native family named Fuentebella some 600 acres of land at Buluan, about 40 miles up the Zamboanga coast, which in time they converted into a prosperous plantation well stocked with cattle. During the anarchy which succeeded the Spanish evacuation, a band of about 600 Moros raided the property, murdered seven of the christian residents, and stole all they could possibly carry away from the plantation and well-furnished estate-house. When Datto Mandi heard of it he went there in person and rescued the women held in captivity and brought them to Zamboanga, where they lived in perfect security under his protection until the American advent. Then, in return for his kindness, these women accused the _Datto_ of having been the instigator of the crime, or, at least, a partic.i.p.ator in the proceeds thereof, in the hope that, through the Americans, they would be able to exact an indemnity. The _Datto_ was mulcted in the sum of 5,000 pesos, although he declared to me that neither before nor after the crime was he in any way concerned in it; and this was the honest belief of many American officials in Zamboanga.

In January, 1905, Datto Mandi's daughter was married at a little town a few miles from Yligan (north Mindanao). Several American officers were present on the occasion, accompanied by a Spanish half-caste who acted as their interpreter. The a.s.sembled guests were having a merry time when suddenly the festivities were interrupted by the intrusion of a _juramentado_ Moro fanatic, who sprang forward with his _campilan_ and at one blow almost severed the interpreter's head from his body. Then he turned his attention to the other natives, mortally wounded two, and cut gashes in several others before he fell dead from the revolver-shots fired by the American officers. After the dead and wounded were carried away and the pools of blood were mopped up, the wedding ceremony was proceeded with and the hymeneal festival was resumed without further untoward incident.

Zamboanga is a clean, pleasant town, and what was left of it after the Spanish evacution is well built, with many substantial houses and public offices, a church administered by the Jesuits, one large and one small jetty, a pretty esplanade facing the sea, and other open s.p.a.ces. A ca.n.a.l running through the town adds to its picturesqueness. At the eastern extremity is the old fortress, called the _Fuerza del Pilar_, a fine historical monument reminding one of the Spaniards' many vicissitudes in this region, alluded to in the preceding pages. Many of the natives concerned, or alleged to have been concerned, in the Cavite Rising of 1872 (_vide_ p. 106) were confined in this fortress. They overcame their jailors and obtained possession of the guns and ammunition. The Spaniards were consequently in great straits, for possibly their existence depended on which side the townspeople took. The Zamboanguenos, however, helped the Spaniards against the revolted convicts, who were finally subdued; and as a reward for this proof of loyalty Zamboanga received the t.i.tle of _Muy leal y valiente Villa_ (very loyal and heroic town). Many years ago a Moro attack was made on Zamboanga, and the Christian natives joined with the Spaniards in repelling it. It would have gone rather badly with them if they had not done so, for a Philippine Christian was just as good fish for the Moro net as a Spaniard. However, their co-operation was gratefully acknowledged by declaring the Zamboanguenos to be Spaniards of the first cla.s.s.

I have never been able to discern clearly what material advantage this brought them, although I have discussed the question on the spot. The disadvantage of this pompous distinction to the town arose from the ridiculous popular notion that whereas Spaniards in Spain are all cavaliers, they too, as Spaniards of the first water, ought to regard work as a degradation. Hence they are a remarkably indolent and effete community, and on landing from a ship there is seldom a porter to be seen to carry one's luggage. Their speech is a dialect called _Chabucano_--a mixture of very corrupt Spanish and native tongues.

The environment of Zamboanga is very beautiful, with islands to the south and mountain scenery on the land sides. The climate is healthy, and with the frequent delightful breezes wafted across the Celebes Sea is not at all oppressive for a tropical region, and is cooler than Manila, which is 425 miles north.

The people of _Samar Island_ for a long time tenaciously opposed the American occupation, under several leaders, notably Vicente Lucban and his right-hand man, Guevara; but neither here, nor in _Marinduque Island_ can it be said that native civil government was established. In the latter Island the insurgent chief was the t.i.tular Colonel Abad, who overran the villages with about 150 followers armed with rifles. In 1901 Abad surrendered, and hostilities, with real political aim, definitely ended in these Islands thirteen months after the capture of Aguinaldo in Luzon. Although in Samar Island the war was, as elsewhere, a succession of petty encounters, there were incidents in its prosecution which attracted much public attention from time to time. At the town of Balangiga, on September 28, 1901, the local headman and the native parish priest conspired with about 450 armed natives to attack the American camp. The garrison stationed there was Company "C," 9th Infantry. The headman had represented to the Americans that he was busy with an important capture of about 90 brigands, and on this pretext some 45 cut-throats were brought into the town and lodged in the church. Three officers of the garrison were quartered in the parish-house, and whilst the rank-and-file were at breakfast in a bamboo building, some distance away from their quarters where they had left their weapons, another 45 supposed brigands were led through the town to the church, but naturally the soldiers took little notice of this expected event. The town is surrounded on one side by the open valley and on three sides by almost perpendicular mountains, with defiles between them leading to the interior of the Island. As soon as the last batch of supposed brigands was brought in, the church bells were rung as a signal for a mob of natives, armed with bowie-knives, to creep silently through the defiles on two sides. The troopers were just then suddenly alarmed by the noise of a conflict in the parish-house. The 90 so-called brigands having been pa.s.sed through from the church into this house, fired at the three officers and then killed them with their bowie-knives. Simultaneously the soldiers' quarters were attacked. Whilst the troops made a rush forward to secure their weapons they were intercepted by an armed crowd, through which a small party of Americans finally cut their way and beat off the howling mob, which had already slaughtered many soldiers, set fire to the quarters, and possessed themselves of over 50 rifles and several thousand rounds of ammunition. A large number of hostile natives, including the headman, were killed; 28 Americans effected their escape, but the loss amounted to three officers and about 70 men killed and several more men wounded. General Hughes, in command of the Visayas District, was operating in Cebu Island at the time of this disaster. Public excitement was intense when the news of this serious reverse was published. The general who was sent to Samar to pursue the insurgents, or bandits, is alleged to have issued, in a moment of uncontrollable wrath, an order to "slay all over ten years and make Samar a howling wilderness." Consequently a great cry of public protest was raised, and the general and his executive officer in the affair were cited before a court-martial in April, 1902; but the court having found that the general was justified in the measures he took, both officers were acquitted. Since the capture of Lucban (April 27, 1902), lawless agitation has been persistently rife all over the Island of Samar; but this is the work of brigands (_vide_ p. 551) and has no political signification.

CHAPTER XXVI

The Spanish Prisoners

Extreme interest was naturally taken by all Europeans in the miserable fate of the thousands of Spanish soldiers and civilians who had fallen into the rebels hands up to the capitulation of Manila. [227] Held captive in groups at different places in the Island of Luzon, many of them pa.s.sed a wretched existence, with bad food, scant clothing, and deprived of every pleasure in life beyond the hope of one day seeing their native land. Many of them died, either from natural causes or the effect of their privations (some of starvation in Tayabas), or as a result of brutal treatment. A minority of them received as good treatment as possible under the circ.u.mstances. The fate of the majority depended chiefly upon the temperament of the native commander of the district. There were semi-savage native chiefs, and there were others, like Aguinaldo himself, with humane instincts. Amongst the former, for instance, there was Major Francis...o...b..aganza, who, on February 28, 1900, in Camarines Sur, ordered one hundred and three Spanish soldiers to be tied up to trees and cut and stabbed to death with bowie-knifes and their bodies stripped and left without burial. He was tried by court-martial and sentenced to be hanged, September 26, 1901, and the sentence was carried out at Nueva Caceres (Camarines Sur) on November 15 following. Many prisoners managed to escape, no doubt with the aid or connivance of natives, until Aguinaldo issued a decree, dated Malolos, November 5, 1898, imposing a penalty of twenty years' imprisonment on whomsoever should give such aid. Aguinaldo told me he was personally inclined to liberate these prisoners, or, at least, those civilians accustomed to an easy office life who, if they went free, would have had no inclination whatever to fight, but would have done their best to embark for Spain. The few who might have broken their _parole_ would have been easily caught again "for the last time in their lives," and the women and children were an obstacle to military operations. Indeed, from time to time, Aguinaldo did liberate small groups of civilians, amongst whom were some of my old friends whom I afterwards met in Spain. Aguinaldo's Prime Minister, Apolinario Mabini (_vide_ p. 546), was, however, strongly in favour of retaining the Spaniards as hostages until the Spanish Government should officially recognize the Philippine Republic. It will be clearly seen from the negotiations entered into between the respective parties that this recognition was the condition which the rebels most pertinaciously insisted upon, whilst the Spaniards'

offers of millions of dollars were always met by much larger demands, which practically implied a refusal to treat on a money basis. The facts in the negotiations certainly support Aguinaldo's statement to me that the rebels never sought money, but political advantage, by the retention of the prisoners.

The intense excitement in Spain over the prisoners' doom called into existence meetings, liberation societies, frequent discussions in and out of Parliament, and continual protests against the apparent Ministerial lethargy. In reality, the Spanish Government, fearful of a rupture with America, could take no official action in the matter, further than appeal, indirectly, to the generosity of the captors, and remind America of her undertaking under Article 6 of the treaty. In January, 1899, the Colonial Minister cabled to several people in Manila, begging them to use their influence--but they themselves were already in the rebel camp. No form of compensation in money or armament for the captives' liberty could be officially made without involving Spain in a _casus belli_ with America. Recognition of a Philippine Republic would have been in direct opposition to the spirit of the treaty of peace. In September, 1898, the Superiors of the regular clergy in Manila appealed to Rome; the Vatican communicated with President McKinley, and the President sent an inquiry to Maj.-General E. S. Otis concerning the captive friars. General Otis, after investigation, reported that these prisoners were fairly well treated. In the following month, whilst the Treaty of Paris was under discussion, the Spanish Government appealed to the United States Government to aid them in the rescue of the prisoners, and orders to do so were transmitted to General Otis. The Filipinos and the Americans were ostensibly on good terms at that period, and General Otis suggested to Aguinaldo that the friars and civilian Spaniards should be set free. On the subject of this request, Aguinaldo replied to General Otis by letter dated Malolos, November 3, 1898, as follows, viz:--"The Philippine people wish to retain the Spanish civil functionaries in order to obtain the liberty of the Filipinos who are banished and under arrest, and the friars in order to obtain from the Vatican a recognition of the rights of the Philippine secular clergy.... It is not hatred or vengeance which inspires the Filipinos to retain the Spanish civil and religious functionaries, but political expediency, and the tranquillity of the Philippine people demands this measure."

At this date there were hundreds of Philippine prisoners held by the Spanish Government in different places, some of them under worse conditions than the Spanish prisoners. For instance, 218 were deported to the fever-stricken colony of Fernando Po, and only 94 of them came out alive. The treaty of peace was still being discussed, and on its conclusion, Article 6 stipulated a release of "all persons detained or imprisoned for political offences in connection with the insurrections in Cuba and the Philippines," and that the United States would "undertake to obtain the release of all Spanish prisoners in the hands of the insurgents"; but there was no proviso that the release of the Philippine prisoners should depend on that of the Spanish prisoners, and after the treaty was signed, Spain showed no particular haste immediately to carry out her undertaking to return the Philippine prisoners to their islands.

When General Diego de los Rios evacuated the Visayas Islands and brought his Spanish troops to Manila, _en route_ for Spain, January, 1899, he himself remained in Manila as a Spanish Government Agent to obtain the release of the prisoners. For the special purpose, by courtesy of the American authorities, he held a kind of semi-official position; but he did not care to risk his person within the rebel lines. A Spanish merchant, Don Antonio Fuset, president of the Spanish Club, undertook the negotiations, and succeeded in inducing Apolinario Mabini to issue a decree signed by Aguinaldo and himself, dated January 22, 1899, giving liberty to all invalid civilians and soldiers. Simultaneously the Spanish Press in Manila was abusing Aguinaldo and his officers, calling them monkeys and using epithets which brought down their vengeance on the captives themselves.

The outbreak of the War of Independence (February 4, 1899) precluded direct American intervention in favour of the Spanish prisoners. General Rios, whose importance was being overshadowed by Senor Fuset's productive activity, cabled to Madrid that he would attend to the matter himself. But the didactic tone of his letters to Aguinaldo was not conducive to a happy result, and having frankly confessed his failure, the general made an appeal to the consuls and foreign merchants to exercise conjointly their influence. A letter of appeal from them was therefore drawn up and confided for delivery in the insurgent camp to my late friend Baron Du Marais. [228] This chivalrous gentleman, well known as the personification of integrity and honour, had resided many years in the Islands and spoke Tagalog fluently. On reaching the insurgent camp he was imprisoned on the charge of being a spy, but was shortly afterwards released, and on his way back to the capital he was waylaid by the natives, who foully murdered him. Senor Fuset then resumed his labours, and, as a result of his appeal to the generosity of his countrymen, he was able to set out for Boac and Batangas in the little steamer _Castellano_ to carry supplies to the prisoners detained in those localities. On his journey he distributed to them 500 cotton suits, 290 pairs of shoes, 100 pairs of _alpargatas_ (a sort of hempen shoe or sandal made in Spain), 14,375 packets of cigarettes, and P1,287. Several subsequent expeditions carried supplies to the prisoners, the total amount of material aid furnished to them, in goods and money, being estimated at P60,000.

After five months of fruitless effort General Diego de los Rios left Manila for Spain on June 3, 1899, and was succeeded by General Nicolas Jaramillo as the negotiator representing Spain. Moreover, it was desirable to recall General Rios, whose cablegrams commenting on the Americans' military operations were making him a _persona non grata_ in official circles.

With the requisite pa.s.ses procured from Aguinaldo, two Spanish envoys, Senores Toral and Rio, and the Filipino Enrique Marcaida set out for the insurgent seat of government, which was then at Tarlac. On their arrival there (June 23) Aguinaldo appointed three commissioners to meet them. At the first meeting the Filipinos agreed to liberate all except the friars, because these might raise trouble. At the next meeting they offered liberty to all on the following terms, impossible of acceptance by the Spanish commissioners, viz.:--

(1) Spain is to recognize the Independence of the Philippines and repudiate the cession of the Islands to America.

(2) After the recognition and repudiation stipulated in Clause 1, the Philippine Republic will liberate all the prisoners, without exception, and will pay their expenses back to Spain. If Spain cannot possibly accede to the conditions of Clause 1, the Philippine Republic will accept, in lieu thereof, arms, munitions and provisions, or their money equivalent.

(3) The Spanish Government is to exchange the receipts given for money subscribed to the Philippine loan for the certificates of that loan. [229]

The Filipinos declined to say what sum they would consider an equivalent, as per Clause 2, and invited the Spaniards to make an offer. The Spaniards then proposed P1,000,000.

On June 29, at the third conference, the Filipinos refused to accept less than P6,000,000. This demand stupefied the Spaniards, who said they would return to consult General Jaramillo; but they were reluctant to leave the matter unsettled, and a last conference was held the next day, when the Spaniards raised their offer to P2,000,000. The Filipinos then reduced their demand to P3,000,000, which the Spaniards objected to; but they were successful in obtaining the liberty of the Baler garrison and 22 invalids, with all of whom they returned to Manila (_vide_ Baler garrison, p. 494).

On July 5 a decree was issued from Tarlac, signed by Emilio Aguinaldo and countersigned by his minister, Pedro A. Paterno, to the effect that all invalid prisoners would be at liberty to embark at certain ports designated, if vessels were sent for them flying only the Spanish flag and a white one bearing the Red Cross. Difficulties, however, arose with the American authorities which impeded the execution of this plan. General Jaramillo was preparing to send his commissioners again to Tarlac when he received a cablegram from Madrid telling him to suspend further overtures to the insurgents because international complications were threatened. It appears that America objected to the proposal to pay to the insurgents a large sum of money.

On August 9 General Jaramillo wished to send the Spanish warship _General Alava_, or a Spanish merchant vessel with the Red Cross flag, to San Fernando de la Union with provisions for the prisoners, but General E. S. Otis objected to the proposed proceeding on the ground that it would compromise the dignity of America. But General Jaramillo still persisted in his project, and after a lapse of three days he again addressed a note on the subject to General E. S. Otis, from whom he received another negative reply. On September 5 General Jaramillo informed General Otis that the prisoners were concentrated in the ports named in the insurgents' decree, and solicited permission to send a vessel flying the Red Cross flag to receive them. Three days afterwards General Otis replied that a recognition of Aguinaldo's pretension to designate certain ports for the Spaniards' embarkation would be not only humiliating but ridiculous. Furthermore, he was expecting reinforcements shortly, with which peace would be a.s.sured and all the ports re-opened, and then America would co-operate for the liberty of the prisoners. General Jaramillo replied to this communication by addressing to General Otis a lengthy philosophical epistle on the principles involved in the question, but as General Otis did not care to continue the correspondence, General Jaramillo sought to bring pressure on him by notifying him that the s.s. _P. de Satrustegui_ would be detained 48 hours in order to learn his decision as to whether that vessel could call for the prisoners. As General Otis did not reply within the prescribed period General Jaramillo went to see him personally and ineffectually opened his heart to him in very energetic terms, which General Otis complacently tolerated but persisted in his negative resolution, and the interview ended with the suggestion that General Jaramillo should obtain Aguinaldo's consent for a vessel carrying the American flag to enter the ports and bring away the prisoners.

About this time an incident occurred which, but for the graciousness of General Otis, might have operated very adversely to the interests of those concerned. In September, 1899, a Spanish lady arrived in Manila saying that she was the representative of a Society of Barcelona Ladies formed to negotiate the liberation of the prisoners. She brought with her a pet.i.tion addressed to Aguinaldo, said to bear about 3,000 signatures. But unfortunately the doc.u.ment contained so many offensive allusions to the Americans that General Jaramillo declined to be a.s.sociated with it in any way. No obstacle was placed in the way of the lady if she wished to present her pet.i.tion privately to Aguinaldo; but, apparently out of spite, she had a large number of copies printed and published broadcast in Manila. General Jaramillo felt it his duty to apologize to General Otis and repudiate all connexion with this offensive proceeding, which General Otis very affably excused as an eccentricity not worthy of serious notice.

On September 29 the Spanish commissioners, Toral and Rio, again started for the insurgent capital, Tarlac. The proposal for vessels to enter the ports under the American flag was rejected by Aguinaldo's advisers, Pedro A. Paterno and Felipe Buencamino, and negotiations were resumed on the money indemnity basis. The Aguinaldo party had already had sore experience of the worth of an agreement made with Spanish officials, and during the discussion they raised the question of the validity of their powers and the guarantee for their proposed undertakings. The real difficulty was that America might object to Spain officially making any compact whatsoever which must necessarily involve a recognition of the Philippine Republic; and even as it was, the renewed suggestion of a payment of millions of dollars was a secret negotiation. The Spanish commissioners started by proposing that Aguinaldo should give up 80 per cent. of the prisoners on certain conditions _to be agreed upon thereafter_, and retain the 20 per cent. as guarantee for the fulfilment of these hypothetical terms; moreover, even the 20 per cent. were to be concentrated at a place to be _mutually agreed upon,_ etc. The artfulness of the commissioners'

scheme was too apparent for Paterno and Buencamino to accept it. The commissioners then presented the Insurgent Government with a voluminous philosophical dissertation on the subject, whilst the Filipinos sought brief facts and tangible conditions. The Filipinos then offered to address a note to the Spanish Consul in Manila to the effect that the prisoners who were infirm would be delivered at certain ports as already stated, and that he could send ships for them on certain terms. Still the commissioners lingered in Tarlac, and on October 23 the Filipinos made the following proposals, which were practically an intimation to close the debate.

1. Recognition of the Philippine Republic as soon as the difficulties with America should be overcome.

2. The payment of seven millions of pesos.

These conditions having been rejected by the commissioners, Aguinaldo's advisers drew up a doc.u.ment stating the reasons why the negotiations had fallen through, with special reference to the insufficiency of the commissioners' powers and the inadmissibility of their att.i.tude in desiring to treat with Aguinaldo individually instead of with his Government, for which reasons the Philippine Republic formally declared its resolution definitely to cease all negotiations with the Spanish commissioners, preferring to deal directly with the Spanish Government. Not satisfied with this formal intimation the commissioners asked that the conditions of the liberation already granted since January to the invalid prisoners should be modified, and that they should be handed over to them--the very persons already declared to be insufficiently authorized. In response to this importunity the requisite pa.s.sports were immediately sent to the commissioners to enable them to quit the Philippine Republic's seat of government and territory forthwith.

Apart from the moral aspect of the case, and regarded only in the light of a business transaction, it does not appear that the Filipinos were ever offered a solid guarantee for the fulfilment of any of the proposed conditions. But the insuperable difficulty was Spain's inability to comply with the Filipinos' essential condition of recognition of the Philippine Republic.

Finally, in the prosecution of the War of Independence, the American troops drove the insurgents so hard, capturing town after town, that they were constrained to abandon the custody of the Spanish survivors, who flocked in groups to the American posts, and eventually embarked for their native land. On May 20, 1900, the Spanish Commission received a letter from the insurgent General Trias stating that orders had been issued to liberate all the prisoners.

In due course the Spanish warships sunk at the Battle of Cavite were raised by the Americans, and the dead bodies of Spain's defenders on that memorable day were handed over to a Spanish Commission. The same organization also took charge of the bodies recovered from Baler (east coast of Luzon), and after a _Requiem_ ma.s.s was said at the Cathedral these mortal remains were conducted with appropriate solemnity on board the s.s. _Isla de Panay_, which left Manila for Barcelona on February 14, 1904.

CHAPTER XXVII

End of the War of Independence and After