The 'Patriotes' of '37 Part 3

Soon after the fracas in the streets of Montreal between the Doric Club and the _Fils de la Liberte_, a priest named Quibilier waited on Papineau, and advised him, since his presence in Montreal had become a source of disturbance, to leave the city. Whether he came as an emissary from the ecclesiastical authorities or merely as a friend is not clear. At any rate, Papineau accepted his advice, {73} and immediately set out for St Hyacinthe. The result was most unfortunate.

The government, thinking that Papineau had left the city for the purpose of stirring up trouble in the Richelieu district, promptly issued warrants for the arrest of Papineau and some of his chief lieutenants, Dr Wolfred Nelson, Thomas Storrow Brown, Edmund Bailey O'Callaghan, and several others.

Meanwhile, on the day that these warrants for arrest were being issued (November 16), a skirmish took place between a small party of British troopers and a band of _Patriotes_ on the road between Chambly and Longueuil--a skirmish which may be described as the Lexington of the Lower Canada rebellion. The troopers, under Lieutenant Ermatinger, had been sent to St Johns to arrest two French Canadians, named Demaray and Davignon, who had been intimidating the magistrates. The arrest had been effected, and the party were on their way back to Montreal, when they were confronted by an armed company of _Patriotes_, under the command of Bonaventure Viger, who demanded the release of the prisoners. A brisk skirmish ensued, in which several on both sides were wounded. The troopers, outnumbered by at least five {74} to one, and having nothing but pistols with which to reply to the fire of muskets and fowling-pieces, were easily routed; and the two prisoners were liberated.

The news of this affair spread rapidly through the parishes, and greatly encouraged the _Patriotes_ to resist the arrest of Papineau and his lieutenants. Papineau, Nelson, Brown, and O'Callaghan had all evaded the sheriff's officer, and had taken refuge in the country about the Richelieu, the heart of the revolutionary district. In a day or two word came to Montreal that considerable numbers of armed habitants had gathered at the villages of St Denis and St Charles, evidently with the intention of preventing the arrest of their leaders. The force at St Denis was under the command of Wolfred Nelson, and that at St Charles was under the command of Thomas Storrow Brown. How these self-styled 'generals' came to be appointed is somewhat of a mystery.

Brown, at any rate, seems to have been chosen for the position on the spur of the moment. 'A mere accident took me to St Charles,' he wrote afterwards, 'and put me at the head of a revolting force.'

Sir John Colborne, who was in command of the British military forces, immediately {75} determined to disperse these gatherings by force and to arrest their leaders. His plan of campaign was as follows. A force consisting of one regiment of infantry, a troop of the Montreal Volunteer Cavalry, and two light field-guns, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Wetherall, had already been dispatched to Chambly by way of the road on which the rescue of Demaray and Davignon had taken place. This force would advance on St Charles. Another force, consisting of five companies of the 24th regiment, with a twelve-pounder, under Colonel Charles Gore, a Waterloo veteran, would proceed by boat to Sorel. There it was to be joined by one company of the 66th regiment, then in garrison at Sorel, and the combined force would march on St Denis. After having dispersed the rebels at St Denis, which was thought not to be strongly held, the little army was to proceed to St Charles, where it would be joined by the force under Wetherall.

At eight o'clock on the evening of November 22, Colonel Gore set out with his men from the barrack-square at Sorel for St Denis. The journey was one of eighteen miles; and in order to avoid St Ours, which was held by the _Patriotes_, Gore turned away from the main {76} road along the Richelieu to make a detour. This led his troops over very bad roads. The night was dark and rain poured down in torrents. 'I got a lantern,' wrote one of Gore's aides-de-camp afterwards, 'fastened it to the top of a pole, and had it carried in front of the column; but what with horses and men sinking in the mud, harness breaking, wading through water and winding through woods, the little force soon got separated, those in the rear lost sight of the light, and great delays and difficulties were experienced. Towards morning the rain changed to snow, it became very cold, and daybreak found the unfortunate column still floundering in the half-frozen mud four miles from St Denis.'

Meanwhile word had reached the rebels of the coming of the soldiers.

At daybreak Dr Wolfred Nelson had ridden out to reconnoitre, and had succeeded in destroying several bridges. As the soldiers approached St Denis they heard the church bells ringing the alarm; and it was not long before they found that the village was strongly defended. After capturing some of the houses on the outskirts of the village, they were halted by a stockade built across the road covered by a large brick house, well fortified on all sides. The commander of {77} the troops brought reinforcements up to the firing line, and the twelve-pounder came into action. But the a.s.sailants made very little impression on the defence. Although the engagement lasted for more than five hours, the troops succeeded in capturing nothing more than one of the flanking houses. The ammunition of the British was running low, and the numbers of the insurgents seemed to be increasing. Colonel Gore therefore deemed it advisable to retire. By some strange oversight the British were without any ambulance or transport of any kind; and they were compelled to leave their dead and wounded behind them. Their casualties were six killed and eighteen wounded. The wounded, it is a pleasure to be able to say, were well looked after by the victorious _Patriotes_.

The British effected their retreat with great steadiness, despite the fact that the men had had no food since the previous day and had been marching all night. They were compelled to abandon their twelve-pounder in the mud; but they reached St Ours that night without further loss. The next day they were back at Sorel.

The number of the insurgents at St Denis has never been accurately ascertained; {78} probably they were considerably in excess of the troops. Their position was one of great strength, and good judgment had been shown in fortifying it. On the other hand, with the exception of a few veterans of Major de Salaberry's Voltigeurs, they were untrained in war; and their muskets and fowling-pieces were much inferior to the rifles of the regulars. Their victory, it must be said, reflected great credit upon them; although their losses had been twice as great as those of the soldiers,[1] these peasants in homespun had stood their ground with a courage and steadiness which would have honoured old campaigners. The same, unfortunately, cannot be said about some of their leaders. Papineau and O'Callaghan were present in St Denis when the attack began; but before the morning was well advanced, they had departed for St Hyacinthe, whence they later fled to the United States. Papineau always declared that he had taken this action at the {79} solicitation of Wolfred Nelson, who had said to him: 'Do not expose yourself uselessly: you will be of more service to us after the fight than here.' In later days, however, when political differences had arisen between the two men, Nelson denied having given Papineau any such advice. It is very difficult to know the truth. But even if Nelson did advise Papineau to leave, it cannot be said that Papineau consulted his own reputation in accepting the advice. He was not a person without military experience: he had been a major in the militia, and was probably superior in rank to any one in the village.

His place was with the brave farmers who had taken up arms on his behalf.

An episode in connection with the attack on St Denis left a dark stain on the _Patriote_ escutcheon and embittered greatly the relations between the two races in Canada. This was the murder, on the morning of the fight, of Lieutenant Weir, a subaltern in the 32nd regiment, who had been sent with dispatches to Sorel by land. He had reached Sorel half an hour after Colonel Gore and his men had departed for St Denis.

In attempting to catch up with Gore's column he had taken the direct road to St Denis and had arrived there {80} in advance of the British troops. On approaching the village he was arrested, and by Wolfred Nelson's orders placed in detention. As the British attack developed, it was thought better by those who had him in charge to remove him to St Charles. They bound him tightly and placed him in a wagon. Hardly had they started when he made an attempt to escape. In this emergency his warders seem to have lost their heads. In spite of the fact that Weir was tightly bound and could do no harm, they fell upon him with swords and pistols, and in a short time dispatched him. Then, appalled at what they had done, they attempted to hide the body. When the British troops entered St Denis a week later, they found the body lying, weighted down with stones, in the Richelieu river under about two feet of water. The autopsy disclosed the brutality with which Weir had been murdered; and the sight of the body so infuriated the soldiers that they gave the greater part of the village of St Denis to the flames. In the later phases of the rebellion the slogan of the British soldiers was, 'Remember Jack Weir.'

Another atrocious murder even more unpardonable than that of Weir was perpetrated {81} a few days later. On November 28 some _Patriotes_ near St Johns captured a man by the name of Chartrand, who was enlisted in a loyal volunteer corps of the district. After a mock trial Chartrand was tied to a tree and shot by his own countrymen.

[1] According to a report twelve _Patriotes_ lost their lives during the engagement. Among them was Charles Ovide Perrault, member of the a.s.sembly for Vaudreuil, a young barrister of considerable promise. He seems to have been Papineau's closest follower and confidant During the last sessions of the Lower Canada legislature Perrault contributed many letters to _La Minerve_.

{82}

CHAPTER IX

_FORCE MAJEURE_

The check administered to Colonel Gore's column at St Denis, in the first engagement of the rebellion, was the only victory which fell to the rebel forces. In the meantime Lieutenant-Colonel Wetherall, with several companies of infantry, a troop of volunteer cavalry, and two field-guns, was marching on St Charles. On the evening of November 22 Major Gugy, the leader of the English party in the a.s.sembly, had brought to Wetherall at Chambly instructions to advance down the Richelieu and attack the rebel position at St Charles in the morning.

He set out accordingly at about the hour when Gore headed his forces up the river from Sorel. But, while Gore carried out his orders to the letter and reached St Denis on the morning of the 23rd, Wetherall allowed himself some lat.i.tude in interpreting his instructions. This was largely due to the advice of Gugy, if we are to believe {83} the account which Gugy has left us. 'In the first place,' it runs, 'not one of the force knew anything of the roads or people, nor do I believe that more than one spoke French.... The storm raged so fearfully, the rain poured in such torrents, and the frost set in afterwards so intensely, that ... men and horses were equally fatigued ... all so exhausted as to be unable to cope, on broken or woody ground, successfully with any resolute enemy.... I learned that we had marched without a dollar, without a loaf of bread, without a commissary, and without a spare cartridge--a pretty predicament in an enemy's country, surrounded by thousands of armed men.' It was apparent to Gugy that Sir John Colborne, in issuing his orders, had greatly underestimated the difficulty of the task he was setting for the troops. After crossing the river above the Chambly Basin, Gugy therefore induced Wetherall to halt until daylight; and, turning himself into a commissary, he billeted the men and horses in the neighbouring houses and stables.

The next day about noon the column reached St Hilaire, some seven miles from St Charles. Here Wetherall obtained information which led him to fear that Gore {84} had met with some kind of check; and he was persuaded to send back to Chambly for a reinforcement of one company which had been left in garrison there. His messenger reached Chambly at four o'clock on the morning of the 24th. Major Warde, the commandant at Chambly, at once embarked his company on a scow and dropped down the river to St Hilaire; but he arrived too late to allow of any further action that day, and it was not until the morning of the 25th that the column moved on St Charles.

Meanwhile, the rebels had been making preparations for defence. They had fortified the manor-house of Debartzch, who had fled to Montreal, and built round it a rampart of earth and tree-trunks--a rampart which, for some mysterious reason, was never completed. They appointed as commander Thomas Storrow Brown, a Montreal iron-merchant, for whose arrest a warrant had been issued and who had fled to St Charles with two or three other _Patriote_ politicians. But Brown had no military experience, and was still suffering so severely from injuries received in the rioting in Montreal that his proper place was a home for convalescents rather than a field of battle. His appointment can only be {85} explained by the non-appearance of the local _Patriote_ leaders. 'The chief men,' Brown testified afterwards, 'were, with two or three exceptions, absent or hiding.' It is evident that the British authorities expected to meet with the strongest opposition at St Charles, since that place had been the scene of the great demonstration earlier in the year. But, as a matter of fact, the rebel forces at St Charles were much less formidable than those at St Denis. Not only were they lacking in proper military leadership; they were also fewer in number and were, moreover, very inadequately armed. If Brown's statements are to be relied upon, there were not in the rebel camp two hundred men. 'Of ammunition,' wrote Brown, 'we had some half dozen kegs of gunpowder and a little lead, which was cast into bullets; but as the fire-arms were of every calibre, the cartridges made were too large for many, which were consequently useless. We had two small rusty field-pieces, but with neither carriages nor appointments they were as useless as two logs. There was one old musket, but not a bayonet. The fire-arms were common flintlocks, in all conditions of dilapidation, some tied together with string, and very many with {86} lock-springs so worn out that they could not be discharged.'

On the 24th Brown made a reconnaissance in the direction of St Hilaire.

He destroyed a bridge over a ravine some distance to the south of St Charles, and placed above it an outpost with orders to prevent a reconstruction of the bridge. But when the British troops appeared on the morning of the 25th, this and other outlying pickets fell back without making any resistance. They probably saw that they were so outnumbered that resistance would be hopeless. On the approach of the troops Brown at first a.s.sumed an att.i.tude of confidence. A messenger came from Wetherall, 'a respectable old habitant,' to tell the rebels that if they dispersed quietly, they would not be molested. Brown treated the message as a confession of weakness. 'I at once supposed,'

he said, 'that, followed in the rear by our friends from above, they were seeking a free pa.s.sage to Sorel, and determined to send a message, that _if they would lay down their arms, they should pa.s.s unmolested_.'

This message does not seem to have reached its destination. And hardly had the engagement opened when Brown quickly changed his tune. 'To go forward {87} was useless, as I could order nothing but a retreat--without it the people commenced retiring. I tried to rally the little squads, my only hope being in keeping together the fowling-pieces we had collected, but finding, after a long trial, my strength and authority insufficient, I considered my command gone, turned my horse, and rode to ... St Denis (seven or eight miles), where ... I arrived about nightfall.'

The engagement lasted less than an hour. The rebels, or at any rate those of them who were armed, seem to have been outnumbered by the soldiers, of whom there were between three and four hundred. But the fighting was apparently brisk while it lasted. The British lost three killed and eighteen wounded. The _Patriote_ losses are not known. The local tradition is that forty-two were killed and many more wounded.

We know that thirty were taken prisoners on the field.

The defeat of the rebels at St Charles really terminated the rebellion in the country about the Richelieu. When news of the defeat spread over the countryside, the _Patriote_ forces immediately disbanded, and their leaders sought safety in flight. Papineau and O'Callaghan, who had been at St Hyacinthe, {88} succeeded in getting across the Vermont border; but Wolfred Nelson was not so fortunate. After suffering great privations he was captured by some loyalist militia not far from the frontier, taken to Montreal, and there lodged in prison.

For some reason which it is difficult to discern, Wetherall did not march on from St Charles to effect a pacification of St Denis. On December 1, however, Colonel Gore once more set out from Sorel, and entered St Denis the same day. He found everything quiet. He recovered the howitzer and five of the wounded men he had left behind.

In spite of the absence of opposition, his men took advantage of the occasion to wreak an unfair and un-British vengeance on the helpless victors of yesterday. Goaded to fury by the sight of young Weir's mangled body, they set fire to a large part of the village. Colonel Gore afterwards repudiated the charge that he had ordered the burning of the houses of the insurgents; but that defence does not absolve him from blame. It is obvious, at any rate, that he did not take adequate measures to prevent such excesses; nor was any punishment ever administered to those who applied the torch.

{89}

But the end of rebellion was not yet in sight. Two more encounters remain to be described. The first of these occurred at a place known as Moore's Corners, near the Vermont border. After the collapse at St Charles a number of _Patriote_ refugees had gathered at the small town of Swanton, a few miles south of Missisquoi Bay, on the American side of the boundary-line. Among them were Dr Cyrile Cote and Edouard Rodier, both members of the Lower Canada a.s.sembly; Ludger Duvernay, a member of the a.s.sembly and editor of _La Minerve_; Dr Kimber, one of the ringleaders in the rescue of Demaray and Davignon; and Robert Sh.o.r.e Milnes Bouchette, the descendant of a French-Canadian family long conspicuous for its loyalty and its services to the state. Bouchette's grandfather had been instrumental in effecting the escape of Sir Guy Carleton from Montreal in 1775, when that place was threatened by the forces of Montgomery. The grandson's social tastes and affiliations might have led one to expect that he would have been found in the ranks of the loyalists; but the arbitrary policy of the Russell Resolutions had driven him into the arms of the extreme _Patriotes_. Arrested for disloyalty at the outbreak of {90} the rebellion, he had been admitted to bail and had escaped. These men, under the belief that the habitants would rise and join them, determined upon an armed invasion of Canada. Possibly they believed also that Wolfred Nelson was still holding out. Papineau, it was said, had reported that 'the victor of St Denis' was entrenched with a considerable force at St Cesaire on the Yamaska. They therefore collected arms and ammunition, sent emissaries through the parishes to the north to rouse the _Patriotes_, and on December 6, flying some colours which had been worked for them by the enthusiastic ladies of Swanton, they crossed the Canadian border, about two hundred strong. They had two field-pieces and a supply of muskets and ammunition for those whom they expected to join the party on Canadian soil.

Hardly had the invaders crossed the border when they encountered at Moore's Corners a body of the Missisquoi Volunteers, under the command of Captain Kemp, who were acting as escort to a convoy of arms and ammunition. Having received warning of the coming of the insurgents, Kemp had sent out messengers through the countryside to rouse the loyalist {91} population. To these as they arrived he served out the muskets in his wagons. And when the rebels appeared, about eight o'clock at night, he had a force at his disposal of at least three hundred men, all well armed.

There is reason for believing that Kemp might have succeeded in ambushing the advancing force, had not some of his men, untrained volunteers with muskets in their hands for the first time, opened fire prematurely. The rebels returned the fire, and a fusillade continued for ten or fifteen minutes. But the rebels, on perceiving that they had met a superior force, retired in great haste, leaving behind them one dead and two wounded. One of the wounded was Bouchette, who had been in command of the advance-guard. The rebels abandoned also their two field-pieces, about forty stand of arms, five kegs of gunpowder, and six boxes of ball-cartridge, as well as two standards. Among the loyalists there were no casualties whatever. Only three of the rebels were taken prisoner besides the two wounded, a fact which Kemp explained by several factors--the undisciplined state of the loyalists, the darkness of the night, the vicinity of woods, and the proximity of the boundary-line, {92} beyond which he did not allow the pursuit to go. The 'battle' of Moore's Corners was in truth an excellent farce; but there is no doubt that it prevented what might have been a more serious encounter had the rebel column reached the neighbourhood of St Johns, where many of the _Patriotes_ were in readiness to join them.

A few days later, in a part of the province some distance removed from the Richelieu river and the Vermont border, there occurred another collision, perhaps the most formidable of the whole rebellion. This was at the village of St Eustache, in the county of Two Mountains, about eighteen miles north-west of Montreal. The county of Two Mountains had long been known as a stronghold of the extreme _Patriotes_. The local member, W. H. Scott, was a supporter of Papineau, and had a large and enthusiastic following. He was not, however, a leader in the troubles that ensued. The chief organizer of revolt in St Eustache and the surrounding country was a mysterious adventurer named Amury Girod, who arrived in St Eustache toward the end of November with credentials, it would seem from Papineau, a.s.signing to him the task of superintending the _Patriote_ cause {93} in the north.

About Girod very little is known. He is variously described as having been a Swiss, an Alsatian, and a native of Louisiana. According to his own statement, he had been at one time a lieutenant-colonel of cavalry in Mexico. He was well educated, could speak fluently several languages, had a bold and plausible manner, and succeeded in imposing, not only upon the _Patriote_ leaders, but upon the people of St Eustache. He found a capable and dauntless supporter in Dr J. O.

Chenier, the young physician of the village. Chenier was one of the few leaders of the revolt whose courage challenges admiration; and it is fitting that to-day a monument, bearing the simple inscription CHeNIER, should stand in the Place Viger in Montreal, among the people for whom, though misguidedly and recklessly, he laid down his life.

To St Eustache, on Sunday, November 26, came the news of Wolfred Nelson's victory at St Denis. On Monday and Tuesday bands of _Patriotes_ went about the countryside, terrorizing and disarming the loyalists and compelling the faint-hearted to join in the rising. On Wednesday night the rebels gathered to the number of about four hundred {94} in St Eustache, and got noisily drunk (_s'y enivrerent bruyamment_). They then proceeded, under the command of Girod and Chenier, to the Indian mission settlement at the Lake of Two Mountains.

Here they broke into the government stores and possessed themselves of some guns and ammunition. They next made themselves unwelcome to the superior of the mission, the Abbe Dufresne, and, in spite of his protestations, carried off from the mission-house a three-pounder gun.

On their return to St Eustache they forcibly entered the convent which had been lately completed, though it was not yet occupied, and camped there.

The loyalists who were forced to flee from the village carried the news of these proceedings to Montreal; but Sir John Colborne was unwilling to take any steps to subdue the _Patriotes_ of St Eustache until the insurrection on the Richelieu had been thoroughly crushed. All he did was to send a detachment of volunteers to guard the Bord a Plouffe bridge at the northern end of the island of Montreal.

On Sunday, December 3, word reached St Eustache of the defeat of the insurgents at St Charles. This had a moderating influence on many of the _Patriotes_. All week the Abbe {95} Paquin, parish priest of St Eustache, had been urging the insurgents to go back quietly to their homes. He now renewed his exhortations. He begged Chenier to cease his revolutionary conduct. Chenier, however, was immovable. He refused to believe that the rebels at St Charles had been dispersed, and announced his determination to die with arms in his hands rather than surrender. 'You might as well try to seize the moon with your teeth,' he exclaimed, 'as to try to shake my resolve.'

The events of the days that followed cannot be chronicled in detail.

When the Abbe Paquin and his vicar Deseves sought to leave the parish, Girod and Chenier virtually placed them under arrest. The abbe did not mince matters with Chenier. 'I accuse you before G.o.d and man,' he said, 'of being the author of these misfortunes.' When some of the habitants came to him complaining that they had been forced against their will to join the rebels, he reminded them of the English proverb: 'You may lead a horse to the water, but you cannot make him drink.'

Unfortunately, the Abbe Paquin's good influence was counteracted by that of the Abbe Chartier, the cure of the neighbouring village of St {96} Benoit, a rare case of an ecclesiastic lending his support to the rebel movement, in direct contravention of the orders of his superiors.

On several occasions the Abbe Chartier came over to St Eustache and delivered inflammatory addresses to the rebel levies.

The vicar Deseves has left us a vivid picture of the life which the rebels led. No attempt was made to drill them or to exercise discipline. Time hung heavy on their hands. He continually saw them, he says, pa.s.sing through the village in knots of five or six, carrying rusty guns out of order, smoking short black pipes, and wearing blue _tuques_ which hung half-way down their backs, clothes of _etoffe du pays_, and leather mittens. They helped themselves to all the strong drink they could lay their hands on, and their gait showed the influence of their potations. Their chief aim in life seemed to be to steal, to drink, to eat, to dance, and to quarrel. With regard to the morrow, they lived in a fool's paradise. They seem to have believed that the troops would not dare to come out to meet them, and that when their leaders should give the word they would advance on Montreal and take it without difficulty. Their numbers during this period showed a good deal of {97} fluctuation. Ultimately Girod succeeded in gathering about him nearly a thousand men. Not all these, however, were armed; according to Deseves a great many of them had no weapons but sticks and stones.

By December 13 Sir John Colborne was ready to move. He had provided himself with a force strong enough to crush an enemy several times more numerous than the insurgents led by Girod and Chenier. His column was composed of the 1st Royals, the 32nd regiment, the 83rd regiment, the Montreal Volunteer Rifles, Globensky and Leclerc's Volunteers, a strong force of cavalry--in all, over two thousand men, supported by eight pieces of field artillery and well supplied with provision and ammunition transport.

The troops bivouacked for the night at St Martin, and advanced on the morning of the 14th. The main body crossed the Mille Isles river on the ice about four miles to the east of St Eustache, and then moved westward along the St Rose road. A detachment of Globensky's Volunteers, however, followed the direct road to St Eustache, and came out on the south side of the river opposite the village, in full view of the rebels. Chenier, at the head of a hundred and fifty men, crossed the {98} ice, and was on the point of coming to close quarters with the volunteers when the main body of the loyalists appeared to the east. Thereupon Chenier and his men beat a hasty retreat, and made hurried preparations for defending the village. The church, the convent, the presbytery, and the house of the member of the a.s.sembly, Scott, were all occupied and barricaded. It was about the church that the fiercest fighting took place. The artillery was brought to bear on the building; but the stout masonry resisted the battering of the cannon b.a.l.l.s, and is still standing, dinted and scarred. Some of the Royals then got into the presbytery and set fire to it. Under cover of the smoke the rest of the regiment then doubled up the street to the church door. Gaining access through the sacristy, they lit a fire behind the altar. 'The firing from the church windows then ceased,'

wrote one of the officers afterwards, 'and the rebels began running out from some low windows, apparently of a crypt or cellar. Our men formed up on one side of the church, and the 32nd and 83rd on the other. Some of the rebels ran out and fired at the troops, then threw down their arms and begged for quarter. Our officers tried to save the {99} Canadians, but the men shouted "Remember Jack Weir," and numbers of these poor deluded fellows were shot down.'

One of those shot down was Chenier. He had jumped from a window of the Blessed Virgin's chapel and was making for the cemetery. How many fell with him it is difficult to say. It was said that seventy rebels were killed, and a number of charred bodies were found afterwards in the ruins of the church. The casualties among the troops were slight, one killed and nine wounded. One of the wounded was Major Gugy, who here distinguished himself by his bravery and kind-heartedness, as he had done in the St Charles expedition. Many of the rebels escaped. A good many, indeed, had fled from the village on the first appearance of the troops. Among these were some who had played a conspicuous part in fomenting trouble. The Abbe Chartier of St Benoit, instead of waiting to administer the last rites to the dying, beat a feverish retreat and eventually escaped to the United States. The Church placed on him its interdict, and he never again set foot on Canadian soil. The behaviour of the adventurer Girod, the 'general' of the rebel force, was especially {100} reprehensible. When he had posted his men in the church and the surrounding buildings, he mounted a horse and fled toward St Benoit. At a tavern where he stopped to get a stiff draught of spirits he announced that the rebels had been victorious and that he was seeking reinforcements with which to crush the troops completely.

For four days he evaded capture. Then, finding that the cordon was tightening around him, he blew out his brains with a revolver. Thus ended a life which was not without its share of romance and mystery.

On the night of the 14th the troops encamped near the desolate village of St Eustache, a large part of which had unfortunately been given over to the flames during the engagement. In the morning the column set out for St Benoit. Sir John Colborne had threatened that if a single shot were fired from St Benoit the village would be given over to fire and pillage. But when the troops arrived there they found awaiting them about two hundred and fifty men bearing white flags. All the villagers laid down their arms and made an unqualified submission. And it is a matter for profound regret that, notwithstanding this, the greater part of the village {101} was burned to the ground. Sir John Colborne has been severely censured for this occurrence, and not without reason.

Nothing is more certain, of course, than that he did not order it. It seems to have been the work of the loyalist volunteers, who had without doubt suffered much at the hands of the rebels. 'The irregular troops employed,' wrote one of the British officers, 'were not to be controlled, and were in every case, I believe, the instrument of the infliction.' Far too much burning and pillaging went on, indeed, in the wake of the rebellion. 'You know,' wrote an inhabitant of St Benoit to a friend in Montreal, 'where the younger Arnoldi got his supply of b.u.t.ter, or where another got the guitar he carried back with him from the expedition about the neck.' And it is probable that the British officers, and perhaps Sir John Colborne himself, winked at some things which they could not officially recognize. At any rate, it is impossible to acquit Colborne of all responsibility for the unsoldierly conduct of the men under his command.

It is usual to regard the rebellion of 1837 in Lower Canada as no less a fiasco than its counterpart in Upper Canada. There is no doubt that it was hopeless from the outset. {102} It was an impromptu movement, based upon a sudden resolution rather than on a well-reasoned plan of action. Most of the leaders--Wolfred Nelson, Thomas Storrow Brown, Robert Bouchette, and Amury Girod--were strangers to the men under their command; and none of them, save Chenier, seemed disposed to fight to the last ditch. The movement at its inception fell under the official ban of the Church; and only two priests, the cures of St Charles and St Benoit, showed it any encouragement. The actual rebellion was confined to the county of Two Mountains and the valley of the Richelieu. The districts of Quebec and Three Rivers were quiet as the grave--with the exception, perhaps, of an occasional village like Montmagny, where etienne P. Tache, afterwards a colleague of Sir John Macdonald and prime minister of Canada, was the centre of a local agitation. Yet it is easy to see that the rebellion might have been much more serious. But for the loyal att.i.tude of the ecclesiastical authorities, and the efforts of many clear-headed parish priests like the Abbe Paquin of St Eustache, the revolutionary leaders might have been able to consummate their plans, and Sir John Colborne, with the small number of troops at {103} his disposal, might have found it difficult to keep the flag flying. The rebellion was easily snuffed out because the majority of the French-Canadian people, in obedience to the voice of their Church, set their faces against it.