The Orations of Marcus Tullius Cicero Part 32

But inquiries which are definite are all of them furnished with appropriate topics, as if they belonged to themselves, being divided into accusation and defence. And in them there are these kinds of argumentation. The accuser accuses a person of an act; the advocate for the defence opposes one of these excuses: either that the thing imputed has not been done; or that, if it has been done, it deserves to be called by a different name; or that it was done lawfully and rightly. Therefore, the first is called a defence either by way of denial or by way of conjecture; the second is called a defence by definition; the third, although it is an unpopular name, is called the judicial one.

XXV. The arguments proper to these excuses, being derived from the topics which we have already set forth, have been explained in our oratorical rules. But the refutation of an accusation, in which there is a repelling of a charge, which is called in Greek [Greek: stasis], is in Latin called _status_. On which there is founded, in the first place, such a defence as may effectually resist the attack. And also, in the deliberations and panegyrics the same refutations often have place. For it is often denied that those things are likely to happen which have been stated by some or other in his speech as sure to take place; if it can be shown either that they are actually impossible, or that they cannot be brought about without extreme difficulty. And in this kind of argumentation the conjectural refutation takes place. But when there is any discussion about utility, or honour, or equity, and about those things which are contrary to one another, then come in denials, either of the law or of the name of the action. And the same is the case in panegyrics. For one may either deny that that has been done which the person is praised for; or else that it ought to bear that name which the praiser has conferred on it, or else one may altogether deny that it deserves any praise at all, as not having been done rightly or lawfully. And Caesar employed all these different kinds of denial with exceeding impudence when speaking against my friend Cato. But the contest which arises from a denial is called by the Greeks [Greek: krinomenon]; I, while writing to you, prefer calling it "the precise point in dispute." But for the parts within which this discussion on the point in dispute is contained, they may be called the containing parts; being as it were the foundations of the defence; and if they are taken away there would be no defence at all. But since in arguing controversies there ought to be nothing which has more weight than the law itself, we must take pains to have the law as our a.s.sistant and witness. And in this there are, as it were, other new denials, which are called legitimate subjects of discussion. For then it is urged in defence, that the law does not say what the adversary states it to say, but something else. And that happens when the terms of the law are ambiguous, so that they can be understood in two different senses. Then the intention of the framer is opposed to the letter of the law; so that the question is, whether the words or the intention ought to have the greatest validity? Then again, another law is adduced contrary to this law. So there are three kinds of doubts which can give rise to a dispute with respect to every written doc.u.ment; ambiguity of expression, discrepancy between the expression and the intention, and also written doc.u.ments opposed to the one in question. For this is evident; that these kinds of disputes are no more incidental to laws than to wills, or covenants, or to anything else which is contained in writing. And the way to treat these topics is explained in other books.

XXVI. Nor is it only entire pleadings which are a.s.sisted by these topics, but the same are useful in the separate parts of an orator; being partly peculiar and partly general. As in the opening of a speech, in which the orator must employ peculiar topics in order to render his hearers well disposed to him, and docile, and attentive.

And also he must attend to his relations of facts, so that they may have a bearing on his object, that is to say, that they may be plain, and brief, and intelligible, and credible, and respectable, and dignified: for although these qualities ought to be apparent throughout the whole speech, still they are peculiarly necessary in any narration. But since the belief which is given to a narration is engendered by persuasiveness, we have already, in the treatises which we have written on the general subject of oratory, explained what topics they are which have the greatest power to persuade the hearers.

But the peroration has other points to attend to, and especially amplification; the effect of which ought to be, that the mind of the hearer is agitated or tranquillized by it; and if it has already been affected in that way, that the whole speech shall either increase its agitation, or calm it more completely.

For this kind of peroration, by which pity, and anger, and hatred, and envy, and similar feelings of the mind are excited, rules are furnished in those books, which you may read over with me whenever you like. But as to the point on which I have known you to be anxious, your desires ought now to be abundantly satisfied. For, in order not to pa.s.s over anything which had reference to the discovery of arguments in every sort of discussion, I have embraced more topics than were desired by you; and I have done as liberal sellers often do, when they have sold a house or a farm, the movables being all excepted from the sale, still give some of them to the purchaser, which appear to be well placed as ornaments or conveniences. And so we have chosen to throw in some ornaments that were not strictly your due, in addition to that with which we had bound ourselves to furnish you.

A DIALOGUE CONCERNING ORATORICAL PARt.i.tIONS.

BY MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO.

The persons introduced in this dialogue are Cicero and his son. It is not known when, or under what circ.u.mstances it was written.

I. _Cicero Fil._ I wish, my father, to hear from you in Latin the rules which you have already given me in Greek, concerning the principles of speaking, if at least you have leisure and inclination to instruct me in them.

_Cicero Pat._ Is there anything, my Cicero, which I can be more desirous of than that you should be as learned as possible? And in the first place, I have the greatest possible leisure, since I have been able to leave Rome for a time; and in the next place, I would willingly postpone even my own most important occupations to the furthering of your studies.

_C. F._ Will you allow me, then, to ask you questions in my turn, in Latin, about the same subjects on which you are accustomed to put questions to me in regular order in Greek?

_C. P._ Certainly, if you like; for by that means I shall perceive that you recollect what you have been told, and you will hear in regular order all that you desire.

_C. F._ Into how many parts is the whole system of speaking divided?

_C. P._ Into three.

_C. F._ What are they?

_C. P._ First of all, the power of the orator; secondly, the speech; thirdly, the subject of the speech.

_C. F._ In what does the power of the orator consist?

_C. P._ In ideas and words. But both ideas and words have to be discovered and arranged. But properly the expression "to discover"

applies to the ideas, and the expression "to be eloquent" to the language; but the arranging, though that is common to both, still is usually referred rather to the discovery. Voice, gesture, expression of countenance, and all action, are companions of eloquence; and the guardian of all these things is memory.

_C. F._ What? How many parts of an oration are there?

_C. P._ Four: two of them relate to explaining any subject,--namely, relation and confirmation; two to exciting the minds of the hearers,--the opening and the peroration.

_C. F._ What? Has the manner of inquiry any divisions?

_C. P._ It is divided into the infinite, which I term consultation; and the definite, which I call the cause.

II. _C. F._ Since, then, the first business of the orator is discovery, what is he to look for?

_C. P._ He is to seek to find out how to inspire those men whom he is desirous to persuade, with belief in his words; and how to affect their minds with such and such feelings.

_C. F._ By what means is belief produced?

_C. P._ By arguments, which are derived from topics either existing in the subject itself, or a.s.sumed.

_C. F._ What do you mean by topics?

_C. P._ Things in which arguments are concealed.

_C. F._ What is an argument?

_C. P._ Something discovered which has a probable influence in producing belief.

_C. F._ How, then, do you divide these two heads?

_C. P._ Those things which come into the mind without art I call remote arguments, such as testimony.

_C. F._ What do you mean by those topics which exist in the thing itself?

_C. P._ I cannot give a clearer explanation of them.

_C. F._ What are the different kinds of testimony?

_C. P._ Divine and human. Divine,--such as oracles, auspices, prophecies, the answers of priests, soothsayers, and diviners: human,--which is derived from authority, from inclination, and from speech either voluntary or extorted; and under this head come written doc.u.ments, covenants, promises, oaths, inquiries.

_C. F._ What are the arguments which you say belong to the cause?

_C. P._ Those which are fixed in the things themselves, as definition, as a contrary, as those things which are like or unlike, or which correspond to or differ from the thing itself or its contrary, as those things which have as it were united, or those which are as it were inconsistent with one another, or the causes of those things which are under discussion, or the results of causes, that is to say, those things which are produced by causes, as distributions, and the genera of parts, or the parts of genera, as the beginnings and as it were outriders of things, in which there is some argument, as the comparisons between things, as to which is greater, which is equal, which is less, in which either the natures or the qualities of things are compared together.

III. _C. F._ Are we then to derive arguments from all these topics?

_C. P._ Certainly we must examine into them all, and seek them from all, but we must exercise our judgment in order at all times to reject what is trivial, and sometimes pa.s.s over even common topics, and those which are not necessary.

_C. F._ Since you have now answered me as to belief, I wish to hear your account of how one is to raise feelings.

_C. P._ It is a very reasonable question, but what you wish to know will be explained more clearly when I come to the system of orations and inquiries themselves.

_C. F._ What, then, comes next?

_C. P._ When, you have discovered your arguments, to arrange them properly, and in an extensive inquiry the order of the topics is very nearly that which I have set forth, but in a definite one, we must use those topics also which relate to exciting the required feelings in the minds of the hearers.

_C. F._ How, then, do you explain them?