The New Germany Part 11

Public opinion was too much occupied with the Revolution in its effect on private life and property, on food and peace, to consider it in its character as another chapter in the history of German unity. The result of the election, however, temporarily settled the issue against centralisation by splitting the Socialist party, and making the moderate Socialist Government dependent on the support of clerical and sectional interests. The constructive impetus of the Revolution was lost and Const.i.tution-making became once more, as on previous occasions, a complicated negotiation with the lesser States.

But the Revolution had at least succeeded in giving the Const.i.tution a good start towards centralisation by having a draft prepared, by a Committee under Dr. Preuss, then Secretary of State for the Interior in the provisional Government. This first draft--a shapeless makeshift affair--nevertheless established certain principles of national unity which eventually survived all attacks on them. And a tactical success was scored at once by publishing this draft simultaneously with the decision of the Const.i.tuent a.s.sembly, on the 21st of January. But that was as far as the matter could be carried without calling the States into consultation, and a conference of their representatives met in Berlin on January 24th. At this Conference, or rather in the special train on the way to it, the particularist opposition declared itself.

And this, not only where it might have been expected, in the clerical, liberal and conservative parties, but among socialists themselves.

This opposition of southern socialists followed the line of an old factious schism in the Social Democratic party that had declared itself at the Nurnberg Conference, and was headed by Kurt Eisner, the leading revolutionary and real ruler of Bavaria. Kurt Eisner was not only opposed to Prussia on political but on personal grounds, having shaken the dust of Berlin off his feet some years before. Under his leadership the centralised Republic of Preuss was gradually remodelled into a decentralised Federation of Republics. And it looked, at one time, as though the failure of the Paulskirche a.s.sembly was to be repeated, and a movement towards German unity and social liberty was to relapse and recoil into reaction. Fortunately there has been to-day no Bismarck to profit by the opportunity given by the Southern particularists.[K]

It is curious to note how the resignation of the Const.i.tuent States changes in the successive drafts of the Const.i.tution. First they appear as "Member States" (_glied Staaten_), then as "Free States,"

finally as "Countries" (_Lander_). Again, we find the Federal Body or Senate, representing these States, as States, appearing first as a State Committee (_Staaten Auschuss_), then as a State House (_Staaten Haus_) sharing sovereignty with a _Volks Haus_ or Commons and combining with it to form the Reichstag, and finally as a Council of the Realm (_Reichsrat_) with merely a suspensory veto over the Reichstag. These changes of nomenclature suggest a reaction into decentralisation followed by a recoil back into centralisation. The successive drafts of this Const.i.tution are indeed doc.u.ments of intense interest to a student of German political development and of revolution in general. They mark stages in a historic movement that is scarcely elsewhere recorded; if only because its course was so rapid that it accomplished in weeks what would normally have taken years, and because post-war conditions cut it off from competent observation.

But, by comparing the various drafts of the Const.i.tution, we see how a proletarian revolution starting in Prussia in favour of a centralised consolidated Republic gradually yielded to a reaction favouring Southern particularism, which converted the Const.i.tution into a decentralised federation of Republics. Then, with the capture of the Saxon and Bavarian States, by the revolutionary Council movement and their collapse under Prussian military occupation, came the final phase in which centralisation recovered most of its lost ground. The question is whether this ground has been recovered for reaction or for revolution.

This raises the question, all important for our purpose, as to the position of Prussian reaction under the new Const.i.tution. Prussia as a political Power stands to us for Prussianism, and Prussianism represents the political point of view that we have been fighting in this war.

In the past Prussia dominated Germany through the Dynasty and the ruling cla.s.s. Prussia was a force making for reaction, owing to its antiquated suffrage and const.i.tution and to the activities of its upper and middle cla.s.ses. Prussia still dominates the German Republic much as England would dominate in a British Federation. But it is not the same Prussia. If Prussia is still the citadel of reaction it is also the centre of revolution. The fight between the two is not yet fought out, but if, as seems probable, neither wins, the result will be that the Prussian influence in new Germany will be a somewhat colourless compromise, what we should call Liberalism.

If this is so, and the course of recent events tends to confirm a conjecture made soon after my arrival in Germany, then a centralisation that tends to maintain Prussian hegemony in Germany is not in principle objectionable. It remains to be seen whether the Const.i.tution as now recentralised offers opportunities to a recrudescence of Prussianism in the bad sense.

The position of Prussia, having four-sevenths of the population, an even larger proportion of the ruling cla.s.s and of the military caste, also the capital and the civil service, was the main difficulty of the Const.i.tution-makers. The revolutionary solution was at first the part.i.tion of Prussia, and it seemed feasible enough. Prussian unity had centred more than that of any other German State in the Crown; and as the Prussian Revolution had three main distinct regions, not very different from the old racial divisions, a division of the State into three seemed as easy as expedient. Dr. Preuss and const.i.tutional jurists of all parties stood in favour of such part.i.tion. At the same time, if Prussia were to be part.i.tioned, obviously a rearrangement of the other States might be attempted, so as to give the new German Const.i.tution that uniformity and precision so precious to the German mind.

Accordingly, all manner of fancy schemes were put forward by which the Reich was divided geographically, racially, religiously, economically, and even industrially. But all the time the Revolution, that alone could have carried through any such reconstruction, was being thwarted and throttled, so that none of these schemes became practical politics.

The revolutionary impetus that the Const.i.tution-makers could use for the realisation of their reconstructive ideals proved far too weak. There were, however, plenty of interested efforts to abolish the anomalies and absurdities of the old dynastic frontiers. Thus Hamburg merchants wished to annex Bremen; Brunswick revolutionaries wished to annex Anhalt; Coburg councils declared their independence of Gotha councils; Waldeck burghers clamoured for release from the tyranny of Pyrmont. But when it came to effecting any such change, in no case was there sufficient support. It would indeed have been easier to redivide Germany on altogether new lines than to part.i.tion up and patch together the old States. Dr. Preuss was, at a very early stage, obliged to restrict himself to laying down principles for procedure which should make subsequent rearrangements as easy as possible; and he was eventually obliged to content himself with putting, as he himself said, the least possible obstacle in the way of change.

The whole policy of part.i.tioning Prussia very soon broke down before a Prussian, national unity that was the growth of centuries. This national sentiment expressed itself in violent opposition not only from the Prussian ruling cla.s.s, to whom Prussian unity was a necessary condition for a monarchical and militarist reaction, but also to the Prussian proletariat, who considered it a necessary condition for the success of the Revolution. Nor, oddly enough, was it favoured even by the Southern and Catholic interest who in the past had been most jealous of Prussia. For they argued that if Prussia were reduced to provincial departments, their own State rights would not remain unrestricted. And State right had become all the more precious to the clerical parties since revolution had threatened them both from above and below, from a Socialist Central Government above and from Communist Council Governments below. Part.i.tion had therefore to be abandoned and the difficulty of Prussian preponderance was solved by an arbitrary reduction of Prussian representation, as in the Const.i.tution of 1871. In the old Bundesrat Prussia was represented by 17 votes out of 61 (counting Alsace-Lorraine). Art. 61 of the present Const.i.tution restricts Prussia to two-fifths of the total votes, having raised the proportion from one-third in the previous drafts.

That is, Prussia used to have rather more than a quarter, and now has rather more than a third of the votes in the Federal body.

This might look like a reaction into Prussianism; but only until the functions of this Federal Body are examined. Sovereignty, under the old Const.i.tution, resided in the dynasties, and the old Bundesrat was a council of diplomatic delegates, comparable to the Supreme Council at Paris. These delegates, as representatives of the Crown, intervened, not only in legislative but even in administrative matters, such as appointments. Moreover, in this Council, the Prussian representatives had a privileged position, as they received their instructions from the Prussian Government in which the Imperial Chancellor was Premier. In the first drafts of the Const.i.tution we find the sovereignty divided between representatives of the State and representatives of the people. Thus the Staatenhaus and Volkshaus combine to make the sovereign Reichstag. But in the present Const.i.tution, all sovereignty expressly resides in the popular Chamber, the Reichstag. The Reichsrat becomes no more than a sort of Imperial Conference with defined and carefully delimited const.i.tutional powers; and, in the Reichsrat, Prussia has no privileged position whatever.

The great strength of Prussianism was in the Prussian Const.i.tution and in the Crown. But Art. 17 now prescribes that every State must have a Const.i.tution as a Free State of a democratic character. And as to the Crown, Prussia has not the same relations to the President as it had to the Emperor. The Kaiser was primarily King of Prussia by right divine, the President is primarily executive of Germany by popular election.[L] Moreover, under the old _regime_, the Kaiser's Chancellor was also Prussian Premier. The Republic's Chancellor has nothing to say to Prussia; he and the Ministers form a Federal Cabinet responsible to the Reichstag.

And, if we carry this comparison into other political regions, we find the same result; that Prussianism and Junkerism have lost their vantage grounds and have been put under democratic control.

In Foreign Affairs the influence of Prussia was, as we have cause to know, especially fatal to Germany and to Europe. But that is now at an end. The German Const.i.tution not only affords the usual guarantees of Parliamentary Government for a democratic foreign policy, but guards the nation against defects in those guarantees that have been found dangerous even in our own Const.i.tution. Two innovations have for years been urged by reformers in our own country, the inst.i.tution of a permanent parliamentary committee on foreign affairs, and the submission of important treaties, as well as of declaration of war, to Parliament. Had Germany had these safeguards at the time of the war there would have been no war. Had we had them then we should now have peace. Articles 35 and 45 of the German Const.i.tution are worthy of our careful consideration.

The financial relationship between States and the Central Government is always a difficult matter to arrange. If the Federal Government is dependent on subsidies from the States, it can have no strength, nor even any real democratic basis. If the States depend on the Central Government, they have no vitality and become in time mere administrative departments. Under the old Const.i.tution there was no clear principle, but the fiscal authority resided nominally in the States, while the Reich really by all manner of devices encroached on this autonomy. Now there is a clear general principle that the States must content themselves with such sources of revenue as are left to them by the Reich. And we certainly cannot criticise a centralisation which is indispensable to Germany in the enormous effort it must make to meet the financial obligations imposed on it by the Treaty of Versailles. Moreover, Prussia can no longer dominate Germany financially and economically as before. Prussia's economic preponderance has been greatly reduced by the loss of Lorraine, the Saar, and Silesia. In communications, too, Prussia can no longer give the lead and lay down the law to the lesser States; for communications come under federal control. Within two years railroads, posts and telegraphs and ca.n.a.ls are transferred to the Reich.

In the region of public welfare we find that the new German Const.i.tution is more satisfactory than might have been expected from the conditions of its genesis. It meets adequately two main requisites for progress; the formulation of the general principles inspiring the practical provisions of recent progressive legislation, and the attribution of responsibility for further legislative development of such principles. Thus, besides establishment of equality of s.e.xes, we find such principles as that "Marriage is established on the equality of the s.e.xes." "Families with numerous children are ent.i.tled to equitable and equalising treatment." "Motherhood is ent.i.tled to protection of and provision by the State" (Art. 19). Illegitimate children are to have "similar conditions for their corporal, spiritual and social development" (Art. 121), "Childhood is to be protected against exploitation" (Art. 122), and so forth. While all these questions are attributed to the Reichstag (Art. 7, -- 7).

The same approbation can safely be accorded to the chapter on public work. The economic purpose of society is to "guarantee to all an existence proper to men." "Property has its obligations, and its use must also serve the common good." While these _voeux pieux_ are given more definite application in provisions for housing and contributory insurance, and in recognition of "nationalisation" in Art. 156.

Moreover, these principles are, to some extent, guaranteed by the previously discussed recognition of Industrial Councils in Art. 165, which provides a measure of "socialisation," and by the specific recognition of socialisation as a principle in Art. 7, -- 13.

When we come to the all-important region of education, the conditions of compromise in which the Const.i.tution took shape have prevented the establishment of any very clear principle or very cut and dried procedure. This was indeed one of the most contentious chapters of which 'clericalism' contested every inch. The Democrats and Dr. Preuss had originally introduced a uniform and secular system; but they and the Social-Democrats, in the abstention of the Independents, were unable to carry this through against the Clerical Centrum. The resultant compromise is not unlike that now prevailing in England. It may work but it satisfies n.o.body.

And finally coming to the army the effect of the success secured by the centralising party is even more questionable. The Revolution originally contemplated merely a militia on the Swiss model, under Federal control. The first result of reaction was to subst.i.tute a professional and highly paid force, the Frei-Corps, under Prussian command and control. The consequence of this was that the Southern States insisted on retaining their separate military systems, and these were duly recognised in the early drafts of the Const.i.tution, to the great disgust of nationalists and militarists. But then came the proclamation of Rate-Republics in Saxony and Bavaria, and their suppression by Prussian Frei-Corps with some a.s.sistance from Wurtemberg and Baden. This re-established, _de facto_, a military predominance of Prussia which enabled the Prussian jurists to replace military matters under the Federal Government. Art. 79 now gives complete authority to the Minister of Defence; and the special military autonomies of Bavaria and other States, reserved in previous drafts, disappear. But, so long as the Frei-Corps continue, with their Prussian organisation and officers, a Federal army is, for the present, at least, nothing else than a Prussian army. Though Noske is the Minister of Defence, not Minister of War, as he is sometimes called, and is a member of a Federal Cabinet and not, as before, a Prussian Minister, and though the Eden Hotel clique has been transferred to the Ministry of Defence--yet the armed forces of the Republic are, for the present, the armed forces of Prussia.

This is, however, a transition stage. The Prussian officer is the creation of conditions that no longer exist to-day, and the Frei-Corps a creation of conditions that will not exist to-morrow. When Germany again gets peace, Prussia will lose a predominance that it owes to past conditions, but not to the Const.i.tution.

It is indeed in its efficiency as a bond between the past and the future that the Const.i.tution must be judged; as a bond that will reduce revolution to rapid evolution. Dr. Preuss, its author, claims no more for it than that it will not act as a bar to any normal and natural growth. But it will have to do more than this. It must serve as a bridge by which Germany can safely pa.s.s over the immense gulf that separates the Germany of yesterday from the Germany of to-morrow; the Germany of the Courts of Potsdam and of Pumpernickel, from the Germany of the Executive Councils of Berlin and Brunswick. It is a formidable span for any bridge, and, when we look at this Const.i.tution and find one abutment of it in Article 65 consecrating an ultra-mediaeval particularism, and the other abutment in Article 165 "anchoring" the ultra-modern forms of industrial councils, we may wonder whether the intervening structure will ever stand the strain.

Can the const.i.tutional compromise of Dr. Preuss ever safely convey seventy million people from government by the divine right of princes to government by industrial representation? Even if it does not, and this Const.i.tution is swept away by a second flood-tide of revolution, it will have served a purpose. It will have finally exorcised the const.i.tutional incubus of northern Prussianism and southern particularism. The vague and dangerous powers of Prussian imperial sovereignty and the less dangerous but equally disabling national sovereignties of the Princ.i.p.alities have been swept away. Art. 11 of the Const.i.tution establishes the Commonwealth as a Republic and a.s.signs its sovereignty to the people.[M] Moreover, Art. 178 repeals the Const.i.tution of 1871, while Art. 181 puts the Const.i.tution in force on the authority of the National a.s.sembly alone, thereby finally ending the claim put forward at first by Bavaria that it should be ratified by the Landtag.

The difference between the Const.i.tution of 1919 and that of 1871 can indeed best be seen at a glance by comparing their preambles. Here is that of 1871. "H.M. the King of Prussia in the name of the North German Confederation, H.M. the King of Bavaria, H.M. the King of Wurtemberg, H.R.H. the Grand Duke of Baden and H.R.H. the Grand Duke of Hesse and by Rhine, for those parts of the Grand Dukedom of Hesse South of the Rhine, conclude a perpetual confederation."

Compare that with the preamble of this Const.i.tution. "The German people, united in its races, and inspired by the will to restore and reinforce its Realm in liberty and equity, to ensure peace, both inward and outward, and to further social progress, has accorded itself this Const.i.tution."

It only remains therefore, for Europe and England to recognise this new departure and to ratify it by admitting Germany to the League of Nations. And even if this new Const.i.tution be held to be no more than new wine in old bottles and new patches on an old garment, that is no reason why Germany should not be included in the League as at present conceived and const.i.tuted.

FOOTNOTES:

[K] Delbruck, the leader of the Right, who defended Bismarck's Const.i.tution in the a.s.sembly against the supporters of the present Const.i.tution, ignored the fundamental difference caused by the fall of the dynasties. Even Bismarck could not have succeeded had he not had the King of Prussia, the Emperor of Austria and the Princes of Germany on which to build his structure.

[L] It was at first proposed, when decentralisation was at its strongest, that each State should have its own President, and that the Reichs President and Prussian President should be kept separate. But there is as yet no Prussian President, nor does there seem likely to be one.

[M] The sovereignty of the Southern States was always a danger to German unity, as in the last crisis when great efforts were made by France to start secession movements in the South and West. The diplomatic right of representation was also an embarra.s.sment in every crisis; as when a Bavarian representative suddenly appeared at Brest-Litovsk in the high tide of reaction, or again at Berne in the height of the Revolution.

APPENDIX

THE GERMAN CONSt.i.tUTION

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

Before the revolution of 9 November, 1918, the Const.i.tution in force was that of 16 April, 1871--the "Const.i.tution of the German Reich,"

which had replaced the "Const.i.tution of the German Bund" of November, 1870. But the following Const.i.tution has less in common with these later Const.i.tutions, based on alliances between Sovereign Princes, than with the abortive "Const.i.tution of the German Reich" of 28 March, 1849, which embodied the nationalist and democratic revolution of 1848.

The November revolution brought to power a provisional Government--the Council of People's Commissaries--which in its first proclamation of 12 November, 1918, announced that the future Const.i.tution would be framed by a National a.s.sembly elected by universal suffrage and proportional representation. Under electoral regulations of 30 November, 1918, elections were held on 19 January, 1919.

The National a.s.sembly met in Weimar on 6 February, 1919, and on 10 February voted the Provisional Const.i.tution; whereupon the Council of Commissaries resigned their authority to the a.s.sembly. This Const.i.tution gave the a.s.sembly sole power to vote the Const.i.tution; but its provisions could only be submitted with consent of a "State Committee" of representatives of the "Free States." This provisional Const.i.tution was supplemented by an "Interim Act" of 4 March, which maintained in force previous legislation of the Reich and decrees of the Provisional Government.

The drafting of the Const.i.tution was entrusted to Dr. Hugo Preuss, Professor of Public Law in the Commercial University of Berlin, Secretary of the Interior in the Provisional Government, and Minister of the Interior in the first Coalition Government. The Democratic Party, of which he is a member, having left the Coalition on the question of signature of the Treaty of Versailles, Dr. Preuss retained responsibility for the pa.s.sage of the Const.i.tution as Special Commissioner.

The first draft of the Const.i.tution was published in January and was submitted to the a.s.sembly on 21 February. It was introduced by Preuss with lengthy expositions in sessions on 28 February and 3 and 4 March, and thereafter submitted to a Committee of twenty-eight under the Presidency of the deputy Conrad Haussmann. After being completely recast in Committee it was debated in second reading 2-22 July; when the status of the Free States, the education question, and the recognition of industrial Councils were especially contested and eventually compromised. The third reading, 29-31 July, ended in its being voted by 262 to 75, the minority consisting of the Conservatives and the Independent Socialists.

CONSt.i.tUTION OF THE GERMAN REALM

The German people united in its every branch and inspired by the determination to renew and establish the Realm in liberty and justice, to ensure peace at home and abroad, and to further social progress, has given itself this Const.i.tution.

FIRST PART

THE REALM: ITS ORGANISATION AND FUNCTIONS

SECTION I

REALM AND LANDS

ARTICLE 1.