The Mormon Battalion Part 2

[19:v] Kane's Lecture "The Mormons", p. 80.

[20:w] Kane's Lecture "The Mormons", pp. 80, 81.

III.

ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES TO THE MORMONS ARISING FROM THE ENLISTMENT OF THE BATTALION.

The "call" for the Mormon Battalion was not an unfriendly act on the part of the United States' government towards the Mormon people.

A representative of the Church, as we have seen, had appealed most earnestly to the executive of the nation for aid in the western emigrations of that people; and when it was decided by the administration to "accept" the services of such a force of volunteers, the Mormon leaders received the decision as an answer to their appeal for aid.

=A Sacrifice Nevertheless.=--But notwithstanding the government service was asked for by the representative of the Mormon people, and the granting of it was regarded by the Mormon leaders at the time as a great advantage to their people, it brought to the volunteers and to the people generally much of sacrifice. For one thing the opportunity to avail themselves of their tendered service to the government came at an unexpected and a most inconvenient time. As explained afterwards by Col.

Kane, "The young and those who could best have been spared, were then away from the main body, either with pioneer companies in the van, or, their faith unannounced, seeking work and food about the northwest settlements, to support them till the return of the season for commencing emigration. The force was therefore to be recruited from among the fathers of families, and others whose presence it was most desirable to retain."[21:a] Practically five hundred wagons were left without teamsters, and as many families were left without their natural protectors and providers. The families of the Battalion, with the families of their friends, in whose care they must leave their loved ones, and upon whom they must depend for succor, were then scattered in a string of camps for some hundreds of miles between Nauvoo and Council Bluffs, with no certain abiding place designated, and no immediate prospect of being permanently settled. To volunteer for a "war-march" of two thousand miles, much of which was desert, under such circ.u.mstances, was doubly hard. Moreover the Mormon people, from their then point of view, had little to be grateful for to the government of the United States. Their appeals from what to them was the injustice of Missouri and Illinois had met with but cold reception at Washington. They did not and could not be expected to understand, much less sympathize with, the refinements employed by the national legislators in drawing nice distinctions about the division of sovereignty between the states and the general government. They were self-conscious of wrongs inflicted upon their community in the two states in which they had settled--Missouri and Illinois. They had appealed to the general government for a redress of those grievances without avail; and now they were asked by their leaders to go into the service of that government which might mean the sacrifice of life, and surely meant the abandonment of their families to the care of others under circ.u.mstances the most trying. To respond to the call made upon them--both as to the volunteers and the camped community whence they were mustered--was a manifestation of unselfishness not often paralleled in history.

=Advantages of the Enlistment.=--Notwithstanding all the sacrifices involved, Brigham Young and those a.s.sociated with him were too astute as leaders not to appreciate the advantages of having a considerable number of their people to enter the service of the United States. The charge of disloyalty to the American government had often been made against the Mormons, which not all their protests and denials could overcome. But to enter the service of the government in a time of war, involving such inconveniences as must be theirs, would be an evidence of loyalty that would stand forever, both unimpeached and unimpeachable.

That such was the understanding of Brigham Young is specifically expressed by him about a month after the departure of the Battalion.

"Let every one distinctly understand," said he, "that the Mormon Battalion was organized from our camp to allay the prejudices of the people, prove our loyalty to the government of the United States, and for the present and temporal salvation of Israel; that this act left near five hundred teams dest.i.tute of drivers and provisions for the winter, and nearly as many families without protection and help."[23:b]

=The Right to Settle on Indian Lands Secured.=--Another advantage appealed to the leaders: It had become evident before the call was made for the Battalion, that while it might be possible for a specially organized pioneer company to go over the mountains that season--preparations for which were being rapidly made--the very great majority of the camps would be under the necessity of spending a year or more in southern Iowa, princ.i.p.ally on Indian lands. The prospects of remaining upon such lands in peace would be much enhanced if it could be pleaded that five hundred of their men were in the service of the government of the United States; and subsequent events demonstrated the validity of such a plea; also it was the advantage sought to be secured by Brigham Young in his first conference with Captain Allen on the subject of the enlistment of the Battalion. Under these arrangements of occupancy, as the Indian t.i.tles in lands in Iowa expired, the Mormon occupants acquired valuable pre-emption rights up and down the Missouri river from Council Bluffs for a distance of between fifty and sixty miles, stretching back on the east side of said river some thirty or forty miles.[24:c]

=Money Value of the Enlistment.=--Another consideration of importance was the remuneration of these soldiers. A year's pay for their clothing in advance at the rate of $3.50 per man per month, would amount to $42.00 each; and to $21,000 for the Battalion. Deciding to make their march in the clothing they had when enlisting, part of their money for clothing was sent back from Fort Leavenworth to be used for the benefit of the families of the Battalion, and part of it to a.s.sist the Mormon leaders.

Subsequently agents were secretly sent to Santa Fe to bring back to the camps the pay of the soldiers that had accrued by the time they had arrived there. This amounted to three months' pay at the following rates: captain, $50.00 per month--rations 20 cents per day; first lieutenant, $30.00 per month--rations 20 cents per day; second lieutenant, $25.00 per month--rations 20 cents per day; first sergeant, $16.00 per month; sergeants, $13.00 per month; corporals, $9.00 per month; musicians, $8.00 per month; and privates, $7.00 per month.

The payment at Santa Fe was made in government checks--"not very available at Santa Fe"--i. e. not easily negotiable--writes Col.

Cooke.[25:d] It has often been claimed that the Battalion was paid a bounty--$42.00 per man--on entering the service. This was not the case.

The payment for clothing, one year in advance, at the rate of $3.50 per month has been mistaken for bounty.[25:e] It was only by foregoing the purchase of clothing that the Battalion could send the payment for it to their families and to the Mormon leaders. This source of revenue to the camps was accounted a very great blessing at the time. In official letters to the Battalion from the Mormon leaders, under date of August 16th and 21st, respectively, it was said, in the first, that the Battalion had been placed in circ.u.mstances which enabled them to control more means than all the rest of the Mormon people in the wilderness; in the second Brigham Young said: "We consider the money you have received, as compensation for your clothing, a peculiar manifestation of the kind providence of our Heavenly Father at this particular time, which is just the time for the purchasing of provisions and goods for the winter supply of the Camp."[25:f]

=The Equipment of the Battalion to be Retained.=--In addition to this payment for clothing, and the monthly pay, there was the five hundred stand of arms and camp equipment which were to become the personal property of the men when discharged in California. These several considerations led John Taylor--who became the successor to Brigham Young in Mormon leadership--in an address to the Mormons in England--to say:

"The President of the United States is favorably disposed to us. He has sent out orders to have five hundred of our brethren employed for one year in an expedition that was fitting out against California, with orders for them to be employed for one year, and when to be discharged in California, and to have their arms and implements of war given to them at the expiration of the term, and as there is no prospect of any opposition, it amounts to the same as paying them for going to the place where they were destined to go without."[26:g]

=Appreciation of Mormon Leaders.=--In a letter to President Polk, under date of August 9th, 1846, after reminding the President of the disadvantages the Mormon camps experienced in raising the Battalion, Brigham Young said:

"But in the midst of this we were cheered with the presence of our friend, Mr. Little, of New Hampshire, who a.s.sures us of the personal friendship of the President in the act before us; and this a.s.surance, though not doubted by us in the least, was soon made doubly sure by the testimony of Col. Kane, of Philadelphia."

FOOTNOTES:

[21:a] Transcriber's Note: Footnote missing in original.

[23:b] History of Brigham Young, August 14, 1846, Ms., Bk. 2, pp. 151-2.

[24:c] See Orson Pratt in Millennial Star, Vol. X, pp. 241-7.

[25:d] Conquest of New Mexico, p. 92.

[25:e] See History of the Mormon Church (Roberts), Americana, March, 1912, p. 308, for a letter from the United States War Department on this subject.

[25:f] History Mormon Church, Americana, March, 1912, p. 310.

[26:g] Mill. Star, Vol. VIII, p. 117.

IV.

THE MARCH OF THE BATTALION FROM FORT LEAVENWORTH.

At Fort Leavenworth the Battalion received its equipment of 100 tents, one for every 6 privates; also their arms and camp accoutrements. When drawing the checks for clothing, the paymaster expressed great surprise to find that every man was able to sign his own name to the pay roll.

=Death of Col. Allen. Question of a Successor.=--At Fort Leavenworth Col.

Allen was taken ill; but on the 12th of August he ordered the Battalion to start on its western march, while he would remain a few days, recuperate and overtake them. He died on the 23rd, much lamented by the Battalion, which had become warmly attached to him. Commenting upon his demise the author of the "Doniphan Expedition," William E. Connelly, says:

"Thus died Lieutenant-Colonel Allen, of the first U. S. dragoons, in the midst of a career of usefulness under the favoring smiles of fortune, beloved while living, regretted after death by all who knew him, both among the volunteers and the troops."

On the death of Col. Allen the question of succession in command was considered. It appears that this subject was mooted at the time the companies of the Battalion were enlisted; and "Col. Allen repeatedly stated to us," says Brigham Young, "that there would be no officer in the Battalion, except himself, only from among our people; that if he fell in battle, or was sick, or disabled by any means, the command would devolve on the ranking officer, which would be the Captain of Company 'A' and 'B', and so on according to letter." The Battalion appears to have had the same understanding, for at a council meeting of the officers it was agreed by them that Captain Jefferson Hunt, of Company "A", should a.s.sume command, which decision was afterwards sustained by the unanimous vote of the men. Meantime, however, Major Horton, in command at Fort Leavenworth, sent Lieutenant A. J. Smith, of the regular army, to take command of the Battalion. This led to a threatened complication; for an appeal to such written military authorities as were available to the officers of the Battalion, left them hopelessly divided in their conclusions. On the arrival of Lieutenant Smith a council of officers was held in which the Battalion officers demanded to know what reasons existed for their acceptance of him as commander rather than Captain Hunt. To which it was answered that the government property in possession of the Battalion was not yet receipted for, but that Lieutenant Smith could receipt for it, and being a commissioned officer of the regular army, he would be known at Washington, and his actions and orders recognized; whereas the officers of the Battalion had not yet received their commissions, and it would be doubtful if their selection of a commander would be approved. After this discussion Captain Hunt submitted the matter to the officers, and all but three voted in favor of accepting Lieutenant Smith as the commander of the Battalion.

=Complaints of the Volunteers.=--With Lieutenant Smith had come Dr. George B. Sanderson, whom Col. Allen, at Leavenworth, had appointed a surgeon in the U. S. army, to serve with the Mormon Battalion. According to the historian of the Battalion,[29:a] the volunteers suffered much because of the "arrogance, inefficiency and petty oppressions" of these two officers. This view of these officers, however, is to be accounted for by the Volunteers being suddenly brought under the enforced discipline of the U. S. army regulations. The heat of the season was excessive, the men had been already much exhausted by the strenuous labor and exposure during the journey through Iowa with their people earlier in the season, and as a result many of them fell a prey to the malaria prevalent in the country and at this season of the year. For this Dr. Sanderson prescribed calomel and a.r.s.enic, and as the men were averse to taking medicine, pleading even religious scruples against the drugs, the matter gave rise to much unpleasantness between the Battalion physician and the command, involving therein Lieutenant Smith, who, in the interest of what he no doubt regarded as discipline, sided with the physician.

=The Line of March.=--The Battalion's line of march, from Fort Leavenworth, after crossing the Kaw or Kansas river, followed that of the first Missouri Dragoons, led over the route that same year by Col.

Doniphan, via Council Grove, thence some distance up the Arkansas River to a little beyond Fort Mann, where they crossed that river in order to take what was known as the "Cimmeron Route"--because it crossed Cimmeron river and followed some distance up the south branch of the stream, called Cimmeron Creek. The last crossing of the Arkansas they reached on the 16th of September, and here the commanding officer insisted that most of the families--about twelve or fifteen in number, which had so far accompanied the Battalion--should be detached and sent under a guard of ten men up the Arkansas to Pueblo, which nestles at the east base of the Rocky mountain range. There were stout protests against this "division of the Battalion;" as it was held to be a violation of the promise that the Battalion would not be divided, also that these families should be permitted to travel with the Battalion to California.

Unquestionably, however, the arrangement was in the best interests both of the families and of the Battalion, and accordingly the detachment was made up as proposed, and marched to Pueblo under command of Captain Nelson Higgins.

=Arrival at Santa Fe; Condition of the Command.=--The main body of the command continued its march south-westward to San Miguel, thence turning the point of a mountain range marched north westward to Santa Fe, where they arrived in two detachments on the 9th and 12th of October, respectively. Upon the arrival of the first detachment the Battalion was received by a salute of one hundred guns by order of Col.

Doniphan,[30:b] then in command both as civil and military head of the department of New Mexico; but making ready for what was to be his great and historic march upon Chihuahua.

On the arrival of the Battalion at Santa Fe it was learned that General Kearny, previous to his departure for the west, had designated Col. P.

St. George Cooke[31:c] to take command of the Battalion and to follow on his trail with wagons to California.

Speaking of the condition of the Battalion, on its arrival in Santa Fe, and remarking on its physical unfitness to undertake the march to California, Col. Cooke, in his "Conquest of New Mexico," says:

"Everything conspired to discourage the extraordinary undertaking of marching this Battalion eleven hundred miles, for the much greater part through an unknown wilderness, without road or trail, and with a wagon train.

"It was enlisted too much by families; some were too old and feeble, and some too young; it was embarra.s.sed by many women; it was undisciplined; it was much worn by traveling on foot, and marching from Nauvoo, Illinois; their clothing was very scant; there was no money to pay them, or clothing to issue; their mules were utterly broken down; the quartermaster department was without funds, and its credit bad; and animals were scarce. Those procured were very inferior, and were deteriorating every hour for lack of forage or grazing."[31:d] "So every preparation must be pushed--hurried. A small party with families had been sent from Arkansas crossing up the river, to winter at a small settlement close to the mountains, called Pueblo. The Battalion was now inspected, and eighty-six men found inefficient were ordered, under two officers, with nearly all the women, to go to the same point; five wives of officers were reluctantly allowed to accompany the march, but furnished their own transportation. By special arrangement and consent, the Battalion was paid in checks--not very available at Santa Fe (i. e.

negotiable).

"With every effort, the quartermaster could only undertake to furnish rations for sixty days; and, in fact, full rations, of only flour, sugar, coffee and salt; salt pork only for thirty days, and soap for twenty. To venture without pack-saddles would be grossly imprudent, and so that burden was added."[32:e]

=Invalided Detachment Sent to Pueblo.=--It was understood that the men invalided and their escort, together with the women and children belonging to the Battalion, would have the privilege in the spring of intercepting the main body of their people moving to the west, and going with them "at government expense."[32:f] The above arrangement was the result of a council of the officers of the Battalion with Colonel Doniphan of Missouri, then in charge of military and civil affairs at Santa Fe, and with Col. Cooke who had been designated by Gen. Kearny to take command of the Battalion in its march to the Pacific, on his own departure from Santa Fe to California. Captain James Brown, of Company C., and St. Elam Luddington, of Company B, were the two officers above referred to as being placed in charge of the detachment. This company arrived at Pueblo on the 17th of November, and went into winter quarters near the encampment of Captain Higgins, who had preceded them to that point; and the next spring, according to the above arrangement, joined in the westward movement of their people, following so closely the pioneer company led by Brigham Young, that they entered Salt Lake Valley on the 29th of July, five days after the arrival of the first pioneer company. To the wife of one of the members of the Battalion, Mrs.

Catherine Campbell Steele, wife of John Steele, Company D, was born the first white child in "Utah," August 9th, 1847.

FOOTNOTES: