The Life Of Thomas Paine Volume I Part 8

A letter was written by Paine to Hon. Richard Henry Lee, dated at "Headquarters, fourteen miles from Philadelphia," October 30th, 1777.

"I wrote you last Tuesday 21st Inst., including a Copy of the King's speech, since which nothing material has happened at Camp. Genl.

McDougal was sent last Wednesday night 22d. to attack a Party of the Enemy who lay over the Schuylkill at Grey's Ferry where they have a Bridge. Genls. Greene & Sullivan went down to make a diversion below German Town at the same Time. I was with this last Party, but as the Enemy withdrew their Detachment We had only our Labor for our Pains.

"No Particulars of the Northern Affair have yet come to head Qrs., the want of which has caused much Speculation. A copy, said to be the Articles of Capitulation was recd. 3 or 4 days ago, but they rather appear to be some proposals made by Burgoyne, than the Capitulation itself. By those Articles it appears to me that Burgoyne has capitulated upon Terms, which we have a right to doubt the full performance of, Vizt., 'That the Offrs. and Men shall be Transported to England and not serve in or against North America during the present War'--or words to this effect.

"I remark, that this Capitulation, if true, has the air of a National treaty; it is binding, not only on Burgoyne as a General, but on England as a Nation; because the Troops are to be subject to the conditions of the Treaty after they return to England and are out of his Command. It regards England and America as Separate Sovereign States, and puts them on an equal footing by staking the faith and honor of the former for the performance of a Contract entered into with the latter.

"What in the Capitulation is stiled the '_Present War_' England affects to call a '_Rebellion_,' and while she holds this Idea and denies any knowledge of America as a Separate Sovereign Power, she will not conceive herself bound by any Capitulation or Treaty entered into by her Generals which is to bind her as a _Nation_, and more especially in those Cases where both Pride and present Advantage tempt her to a Violation. She will deny Burgoyne's Right and Authority for making such a Treaty, and will, very possibly, show her insult by first censuring him for entering into it, and then immediately sending the Troops back.

"I think we ought to be exceedingly cautious how we trust her with the power of abusing our Credulity. We have no authority for believing she will perform that part of the Contract which subjects her not to send the Troops to America during the War. The insolent Answer given to the Commissrs. by Ld. Stormont, '_that the King's Amba.s.sadors reed, no Letters from Rebels but when they came to crave Mercy?_ sufficiently instructs us not to entrust them with the power of insulting Treaties of Capitulation.

"Query, Whether it wd. not be proper to detain the Troops at Boston & direct the Commissioners at Paris to present the Treaty of Capitulation to the English Court thro' the hands of Ld. Stormont, to know whether it be the intention of that Court to abide strictly by the Conditions and Obligations thereof, and if no a.s.surance be obtained to keep the Troops until they can be exchanged here.

"Tho' we have no immediate knowledge of any alliance formed by our Commissioners with France or Spain, yet we have no a.s.surance there is not, and our immediate release of those prisoners, by sending them to England, may operate to the injury of such Allied Powers, and be perhaps directly contrary to some contract subsisting between us and them prior to the Capitulation. I think we ought to know this first.--Query, ought we not (knowing the infidelity they have already acted) to suspect they will evade the Treaty by putting back into New York under pretence of distress.--I would not trust them an inch farther than I could see them in the present state of things.

"The Army was to have marched yesterday about 2 or 3 Miles but the weather has been so exceedingly bad for three days past as to prevent any kind of movement, the waters are so much out and the rivulets so high there is no pa.s.sing from one part of ye Camp to another.

"I wish the Northern Army was down here. I am apt to think that nothing materially offensive will take place on our part at present. Some Means must be taken to fill up the Army this winter. I look upon the recruiting service at an end and that some other plan must be adopted.

Suppose the Service be by draft--and that those who are not drawn should contribute a Dollar or two Dollars a Man to him on whom the lot falls.--something of this kind would proportion the Burthen, and those who are drawn would have something either to encourage them to go, or to provide a subst.i.tute with--After closing this Letter I shall go again to Fort Mifflin; all was safe there on the 27th, but from some preparations of the Enemy they expect another attack somewhere.

"The enclosed return of provision and Stores is taken from an account signed by Burgoyne and sent to Ld. George Germain. I have not time to Copy the whole. Burgoyne closes his Letter as follows, 'By a written account found in the Commissary's House at Ticonderoga Six thousand odd hundred Persons were fed from the Magazine the day before the evacuation.'

"I am Dear Sir, Yr. Affectionate Hble. Servt.

"T. Paine. "Respectful Compts. to Friends.

"If the Congress has the Capitulation and Particulars of ye Surrender, they do an exceeding wrong thing by not publishing ym. because they subject the whole Affair to Suspicion."'

* I am indebted for this letter to Dr. John S. H. Fogg of Boston. It bears the superscription: "Honbl. Richd. Henry Lee Esq. (in Congress) York Town. Forwarded by yr humble Servt. T. Matlack, Nov. 1, 1777." Endorsed in handwriting of Lee: "Oct: 1777. Mr. Paine, Author of 'Common Sense.'"

Had this proposal of Paine, with regard to Bur-goyne's capitulation, been followed at once, a blot on the history of our Revolution might have been prevented. The time required to march the prisoners to Boston and prepare the transports would have given England opportunity to ratify the articles of capitulation. Washington, with characteristic inability to see injustice in anything advantageous to America, desired Congress to delay in every possible way the return of the prisoners to England, "since the most virtuous adhesion to the articles would not prevent their replacing in garrison an equal number of soldiers who might be sent against us." The troops were therefore delayed on one pretext and another until Burgoyne declared that "the publick faith is broke." Congress seized on this remark to resolve that the embarkation should be suspended until an "explicit ratification of the Convention of Saratoga shall be properly ratified by the Court of Great Britain." This resolution, pa.s.sed January 8, 1778, was not communicated to Burgoyne until February 4th. If any one should have suffered because of a remark made in a moment of irritation it should have been Burgoyne himself; but he was presently allowed to proceed to England, while his troops were retained,--a confession that Burgoyne's casual complaint was a mere pretext for further delay. It may be added that the English government behaved to its surrendered soldiers worse than Congress. The question of ratifying the Saratoga Convention was involved in a partisan conflict in Parliament, the suffering prisoners in America were forgotten, and they were not released until the peace,--five years after they had marched "with the honours of war," under a pledge of departure conceded by Gen.

Gates in reply to a declaration that unless conceded they would "to a man proceed to any act of desperation sooner than submit."

Concerning this ugly business there is a significant silence in Paine's public writings. He would not have failed to discuss the matter in his _Crisis_ had he felt that anything honorable to the American name or cause could be made out of it.*

* Professor Fiske ("Am. Revolution," i., p. 341) has a ferocious attack on Congress for breaking faith in this matter, but no doubt he has by this time read, in Ford's "Writings of Washington," (vol. vi.) the letters which bring his attack on the great commander's own haloed head.

In his letter to Hon. R. H. Lee (October 30, 1777) Paine mentions that he is about leaving the head-quarters near Philadelphia for Fort Mifflin. Mr. Asa Bird Gardener, of New York, who has closely studied Paine's military career, writes me some account of it.

"Major-Gen. Greene was charged with the defence of the Delaware, and part of Brig.-Gen. Varnum's brigade was placed in garrison at Fort Mercer, Red Bank, and at Fort Mifflin, Mud Island. A b.l.o.o.d.y and unsuccessful a.s.sault was made by Count Donop and 1,200 Hessians on Fort Mercer, defended by the 1 st and 2d Reg'ts. R. I. Continental Inf'y. The entire British fleet was then brought up opposite Fort Mifflin, and the most furious cannonade, and most desperate but finally unsuccessful defence of the place was made. The entire works were demolished, and most of the garrison killed and wounded. Major-Gen. Greene being anxious for the garrison and desirous of knowing its ability to resist sent Mr.

Paine to ascertain. He accordingly went to Fort Mercer, and from thence, on Nov. 9 (1777) went with Col. Christopher Greene, commanding Fort Mercer, in an open boat to Fort Mifflin, during the cannonade, and were there when the enemy opened with two-gun batteries and a mortar battery.

This _very_ gallant act shows what a fearless man Mr. Paine was, and ent.i.tles him to the same credit for service in the Revolution as any Continental could claim."

{1778}

The succession of mistakes, surprises, panics, which occasioned the defeats before Philadelphia and ended in the occupation of that city by the British general, seriously affected the reputation of Washington.

Though Paine believed that Washington's generalship had been at fault (as Washington himself probably did*), he could utter nothing that might injure the great cause. He mistrusted the singleness of purpose of Washington's opponents, and knew that the commander-in-chief was as devoted as himself to the American cause, and would never surrender it whatever should befall. While, therefore, the intrigues were going on at Yorktown, Pennsylvania, whither Congress had retreated, and Washington with his ill-fed and ill-clad army were suffering at Valley Forge, Paine was writing his fifth _Crisis_, which had the most happy effect. It was dated at Lancaster, March 121, 1778. Before that time (February 19th) General Gates had made his peace with Washington, and the intrigue was breaking up, but gloom and dissatisfaction remained. The contrast between the luxurious "Tories" surrounding Howe in Philadelphia, and Washington's wretched five thousand at Valley Forge, was demoralizing the country. The first part of this _Crisis_, addressed "to General Sir William Howe," pointed wrangling patriots to the common enemy; the second, addressed "to the inhabitants of America," sounded a note of courage, and gave good reasons for it. Never was aid more artistic than that Paine's pen now gave Washington. The allusions to him are incidental, there is no accent of advocacy. While mentioning "the unabated fort.i.tude of a Washington," he lays a laurel on the brow of Gates, on that of Herkimer, and even on the defeated. While belittling all that Howe had gained, telling him that in reaching Philadelphia, he "mistook a trap for a conquest," he reunites Washington and Gates, in the public mind, by showing the manoeuvres of the one near Philadelphia part of the other's victory at Saratoga. It is easy for modern eulogists of Washington to see this, but when Paine said it,--apparently aiming only to humiliate Howe,--the sentence was a sunbeam parting a black cloud. Coming from a member of Greene's staff, from an author whose daring at Fort Mifflin had made him doubly a hero; from the military correspondent of the Pennsylvania Council, and the Secretary of the Congressional Committee of Foreign Affairs,--Paine's optimistic view of the situation had immense effect. He hints his official knowledge that Britain's "reduced strength and exhausted coffers in a three years' war with America hath given a powerful superiority to France and Spain,"

and advises Americans to leave wrangling to the enemy. "We never had so small an army to fight against, nor so fair an opportunity of final success as _now_."

* See his letter to the President of Congress. Ford's, "Writings of Washington," vol. vi., p. 82.

This fifth _Crisis_ was written mainly at Lancaster, Pa., at the house of William Henry, Jr., where he several times found shelter while dividing his time between Washington's head-quarters and York.* Every number of the _Crisis_ was thus written with full information from both the military and political leaders. This _Crisis_ was finished and printed at York, and there Paine begins No. VI. The "stone house on the banks of the Cadorus," at York, is still pointed out by a trustworthy tradition as that to which he bore the chest of congressional papers with which he had fled to Trenton, when Howe entered Philadelphia.** It is a pleasant abode in a picturesque country, and no doubt Paine would have been glad to remain there in repose. But whoever slept on his watch during the Revolution Paine did not. The fifth _Crisis_ printed, he goes to forward the crisis he will publish next. In April he is again at Lancaster, and on the 11th writes thence to his friend Henry Laurens, President of Congress.***

* This I learn by a note from Mr. Henry's descendant, John W. Jordan. At this time Paine laid before Henry his scheme for steam-navigation.

** The house is marked "B. by J. B. Cookis in the year 1761." It is probable that Congress deemed it prudent to keep important doc.u.ments a little way from the edifice in the centre of the town where it met, a building which no longer stands.

*** I am indebted to Mr. Simon Gratz, of Philadelphia, for this and several other letters of Paine to Laurens.

"Lancaster, April 11th, 1778. Sir,--I take the liberty of mentioning an affair to you which I think deserves the attention of Congress. The persons who came from Philadelphia some time ago with, or in company with, a flag from the Enemy, and were taken up and committed to Lancaster Jail for attempting to put off counterfeit Contl. money, were yesterday brought to Tryal and are likely to escape by means of an artful and partial Construction of an Act of this State for punishing such offences. The Act makes it felony to counterfeit the money _emitted_ by Congress, or to circulate such counterfeits knowing them to be so. The offenders' Council explained the word 'emitted' to have only a retrospect meaning by supplying the Idea of '_which have been_'

'emitted by Congress.' Therefore say they the Act cannot be applied to any money emitted after the date of the Act. I believe the words 'emitted by Congress' means only, and should be understood, to distinguish Continental Money from other Money, and not one Time from another Time. It has, as I conceive, no referrence to any Particular Time, but only to the particular authority which distinguishes Money so emitted from Money emitted by the State. It is meant only as a discription of the Money, and not of the Time of striking it, but includes the Idea of all Time as inseparable from the Continuance of the authority of Congress. But be this as it may; the offence is Continental and the consequences of the same extent. I can have no Idea of any particular State pardoning an offence against all, or even their letting an offender slip legally who is accountable to all and every State alike for his crime. The place where he commits it is the least circ.u.mstance of it. It is a mere accident and has nothing or very little to do with the crime itself. I write this hoping the Information will point out the necessity of the Congress supporting their emissions by claiming every offender in this line where the present deficiency of the Law or the Partial Interpretation of it operates to the Injustice and Injury of the whole Continent.

"I beg leave to trouble you with another hint. Congress I learn has something to propose thro' the Commissrs. on the Cartel respecting the admission and stability of the Continental Currency. As Forgery is a Sin against all men alike, and reprobated by all civil nations, Query, would it not be right to require of General Howe the Persons of Smithers and others in Philadelphia suspected of this crime; and if He, or any other Commander, continues to conceal or protect them in such practices, that, in such case, the Congress will consider the crime as the Act of the Commander-in-Chief. Howe affects not to know the Congress--he ought to be made to know them; and the apprehension of Personal Consequences may have some effect on his Conduct. I am, Dear Sir,

"Your obt. and humble Servt.,

"T. Paine.

"Since writing the foregoing the Prisoners have had their Tryal, the one is acquitted and the other convicted only of a Fraud; for as the law now stands, or rather as it is explained, the counterfeiting--or circulating counterfeits--is only a fraud. I do not believe it was the intention of the Act to make it so, and I think it misapplied Lenity in the Court to suffer such an Explanation, because it has a tendency to invite and encourage a Species of Treason, the most prejudicial to us of any or all the other kinds. I am aware how very difficult it is to make a law so very perfect at first as not to be subject to false or perplexed conclusions. There never was but one Act (said a Member of the House of Commons) which a man might not creep out of, _i. e._ the Act which obliges a man to be buried in woollen. T. P."

The active author and secretary had remained in Philadelphia two days after Howe had crossed the Schuylkill, namely, until September 21st.

The events of that time, and of the winter, are related in a letter to Franklin, in Paris, which is of too much historical importance for any part of it to be omitted. It is dated Yorktown, May 16, 1778.

"Your favor of Oct 7th did not come to me till March. I was at Camp when Capt Folger, arrived with the Blank Packet The private Letters were, I believe, all safe. Mr. Laurens forwarded yours to York Town where I afterwards recd. it.

"The last winter has been rather barren of military events, but for your amus.e.m.e.nt I send you a little history how I have pa.s.sed away part of the time.

"The 11th of Sepr. last I was preparing Dispatches for you when the report of cannon at Brandywine interrupted my proceeding. The event of that day you have doubtless been informed of, which, excepting the Enemy keeping the ground, may be deemed a drawn battle. Genl. Washington collected his Army at Chester, and the Enemy's not moving towards him next day must be attributed to the disability they sustained and the burthen of their wounded. On the 16th of the same month, the two Armies were drawn up in order of battle near the White horse on the Lancaster road, when a most violent and incessant storm of rain prevented an action. Our Army sustained a heavy loss in their Ammunition, the Cartouch Boxes, especially as they were not of the most seasoned leather, being no proof agst. the almost incredible fury of the weather, which obliged Genl. Washn. to draw his Army up into the country till those injuries could be repaired, and a new supply of ammunition procured. The Enemy in the mean time kept on the West Side of Schuylkill. On Fryday the 19th about one in the morning the first alarm of their crossing was given, and the confusion, as you may suppose, was very great. It was a beautiful still moonlight morning and the streets as full of men women and children as on a market day. On the eveng.

before I was fully persuaded that unless something was done the City would be lost; and under that anxiety I went to Col. Bayard, speaker of the house of a.s.sembly, and represented, as I very particularly knew it, the situation we were in, and the probability of saving the City if proper efforts were made for that purpose. I reasoned thus--Genl. Washn.

was about 30 Miles up the Schuylkill with an Army properly collected waiting for Ammunition, besides which, a reinforcement of 1500 men were marching from the North River to join him; and if only an appearance of defence be made in the City by throwing up works at the heads of streets, it will make the Enemy very suspicious how they throw themselves between the City and Genl. Washington, and between two Rivers, which must have been the case; for notwithstanding the knowledge which military gentlemen are supposed to have, I observe they move exceedingly cautiously on new ground, are exceedingly suspicious of Villages and Towns, and more perplexed at seemingly little things which they cannot clearly understand than at great ones which they are fully acquainted with. And I think it very probable that Genl. Howe would have mistaken our necessity for a deep laid scheme and not have ventured himself in the middle of it But admitting that he had, he must either have brought his whole Army down, or a part of it. If the whole. Gen. W.

would have followed him, perhaps the same day, in two or three days at most, and our a.s.sistance in the City would have been material. If only a part of it, we should have been a match for them, and Gen. W. superior to those which remained above. The chief thing was, whether the cityzens would turn out to defend the City. My proposal to Cols. Bayard and Bradford was to call them together the next morning, make them fully acquainted with the situation and the means and prospect of preserving themselves, and that the City had better voluntarily a.s.sess itself 50,000 for its defence than suffer an Enemy to come into it. Cols.

Bayard and Bradford were in my opinion, and as Genl. Mifflin was then in town, I next went to him, acquainted him with our design, and mentioned likewise that if two or three thousand men could be mustered up whether we might depend on him to command them, for without some one to lead, nothing could be done. He declined that part, not being then very well, but promised what a.s.sistance he could.--A few hours after this the alarm happened. I went directly to Genl. Mifflin but he had sett off, and nothing was done. I cannot help being of opinion that the City might have been saved, but perhaps it is better otherwise.

"I staid in the City till Sunday [Sep. 21st], having sent my Chest and everything belonging to the foreign Committee to Trenton in a Shallop.

The Enemy did not cross the river till the Wednesday following. Hearing on the Sunday that Genl. Washn. had moved to Swederford I set off for that place but learning on the road that it was a mistake and that he was six or seven miles above that place, I crossed over to South-field and the next Morning to Trenton, to see after my Chest On the Wednesday Morning I intended returning to Philadelphia, but was informed at Bristol of the Enemy's crossing the Schuylkill. At this place I met Col.

Kirkbride of Pennsburg Manor, who invited me home with him. On Fryday the 26th a Party of the Enemy about 1500 took possession of the City, and the same day an account arrived that Col. Brown had taken 300 of the Enemy at the old french lines at Ticonderoga and destroyed all their Water Craft, being about 200 boats of different kinds.

"On the 29th Sept I sett off for Camp without well knowing where to find it, every day occasioning some movement I kept pretty high up the country, and being unwilling to ask questions, not knowing what company I might be in, I was three days before I fell in with it The Army had moved about three miles lower down that morning. The next day they made a movement about the same distance, to the 21 Mile Stone on the Skippach Road--Head Quarters at John Wince's. On the 3d Octr. in the morning they began to fortify the Camp, as a deception; and about 9 at Night marched for German Town. The Number of Continental Troops was between 8 and 9000, besides Militia, the rest remaining as Guards for the security of Camp. Genl. Greene, whose Quarters I was at, desired me to remain there till Morning. I set off for German Town about 5 next morning.

The Skirmishing with the Pickets began soon after. I met no person for several miles riding, which I concluded to be a good sign; after this I met a man on horseback who told me he was going to hasten on a supply of ammunition, that the Enemy were broken and retreating fast, which was true. I saw several country people with arms in their hands running cross a field towards German Town, within about five or six miles, at which I met several of the wounded on waggons, horseback, and on foot.

I pa.s.sed Genl. Nash on a litter made of poles, but did not know him.

I felt unwilling to ask questions lest the information should not be agreeable, and kept on. About two miles after this I pa.s.sed a promiscuous crowd of wounded and otherwise who were halted at a house to refresh. Col: Biddle D.Q.N.G. was among them, who called after me, that if I went farther on that road I should be taken, for that the firing which I heard ahead was the Enemy's. I never could, and cannot now learn, and I believe no man can inform truly the cause of that day's miscarriage.

"The retreat was as extraordinary. n.o.body hurried themselves. Every one marched his own pace. The Enemy kept a civil distance behind, sending every now and then a Shot after us, and receiving the same from us. That part of the Army which I was with collected and formed on the Hill on the side of the road near White Marsh Church; the Enemy came within three quarters of a mile and halted. The orders on Retreat were to a.s.semble that night on the back of Perki-ominy Creek, about 7 miles above Camp, which had orders to move. The Army had marched the preceding night 14 miles and having full 20 to march back were exceedingly fatigued. They appeared to me to be only sensible of a disappointment, not a defeat, and to be more displeased at their retreating from German Town, than anxious to get to their rendezvous. I was so lucky that night to get to a little house about 4 miles wide of Perkiominy, towards which place in the morning I heard a considerable firing, which distressed me exceedingly, knowing that our army was much hara.s.sed and not collected.

However, I soon relieved myself by going to see. They were discharging their pieces, wch. tho' necessary, prevented several Parties going till next day. I breakfasted next morning at Genl. W. Quarters, who was at the same loss with every other to account for the accidents of the day.