The Life of Napoleon I Part 79

[Footnote 509: Wellington to Earl Bathurst, June 25th, 1815. The Earl of Ellesmere, who wrote under the Duke's influence, stated that not more than 7,000 of the British troops had seen a shot fired. This is incorrect. Picton's division, still 5,000 strong, was almost wholly composed of tried troops; and Lambert's brigade counted 2,200 veterans; many of the Guards had seen fire, and the 52nd was a seasoned regiment. Tomkinson (p. 296) reckons all the 5,220 British and 1,730 King's German troopers as "efficient," and Wellington himself, so Mercer affirms, told Blucher he had 6,000 of the finest cavalry in the world.]

[Footnote 510: "A British Rifleman," p. 367.]

[Footnote 511: I distrust the story told by Zenowicz, and given by Thiers, that Napoleon at 10 a.m. was awaiting Grouchy with impatience; also Marbot's letter referred to in his "Memoirs," _ad fin._, in which he says the Emperor bade him push on boldly towards Wavre, as the troops near St. Lambert "could be nothing else than the corps of Grouchy." Grouchy's despatch and the official reply show that Napoleon knew Grouchy to be somewhere between Gembloux and Wavre. Besides, Bulow's report (Ollech, p. 192) states that, while at St. Lambert, he sent out two strong patrols to the S.W., and was not observed by the French, "who appeared to have no idea of our existence." This completely disposes of Marbot's story.]

[Footnote 512: Houssaye, ch. vii. In the "Eng. Hist. Rev." for October, 1900, p. 815, Mr. H. George gives a proof of this, citing the time it took him to pace the roads by which Grouchy might have advanced.]

[Footnote 513 "Waterloo Letters," pp. 60-63, 70-77, 81-84, 383. The whole brigade was hardly 1,000 sabres strong. Sir E. Wood, pp.

126-146; Siborne, vol. ii., pp. 20-45.]

[Footnote 514: Houssaye, pp. 354, 499, admits the repulse.]

[Footnote 515 B. Jackson, p. 34. m.u.f.fling says the defaulters numbered 10,000! While sympathizing with the efforts of Dutch-Belgian writers on behalf of their kin, I must accept Jackson's evidence as conclusive here. See also Mr. Oman's article in "Nineteenth Century," Oct., 1900.]

[Footnote 516: B. Jackson, p. 35; "Waterloo Letters," pp. 129-144, 296; Cotton, p. 79.]

[Footnote 517: Houssaye, pp. 365, 371-376; Kennedy, pp. 117-120; Mercer, vol. i., pp. 311-324.]

[Footnote 518: Gourgaud (ch. vi.) states that the time of Lobau's move was 4.30, though he had reconnoitred on his right earlier. Napoleon's statements on this head at St. Helena are conflicting. One says that Lobau moved at 1.30, another at 4.30. Perhaps Janin's statement explains why Lobau did nothing definite till the later hour.]

[Footnote 519: Baring's account ("King's German Legion," App. xxi.) shows that the farm was taken about the time of the last great cavalry charge. Kennedy (p. 122) and Ompteda (_ad fin._) are equally explicit; and the evidence of the French archives adduced by Houssaye (p. 378) places the matter beyond doubt.]

[Footnote 520: Ollech, pp. 243-246. Reiche's exorbitant claims (vol.

ii., pp. 209-215) are refuted by "Waterloo Letters," p. 22.]

[Footnote 521: Lacoste (Decoster), Napoleon's Flemish guide, told this to Sir W. Scott, "Life of Napoleon," vol. viii., p. 496.]

[Footnote 522: See Boulger's "The Belgians at Waterloo" (1901), p.

33.]

[Footnote 523: The formation and force of the French Guards in this attack have been much discussed. Thiers omits all notice of the second column; Houssaye limits its force to a single battalion, but his account is not convincing. On p. 385 he says nine battalions of the Guard advanced into the valley, but, on p. 389, he accounts only for six. Other authorities agree that eight joined in the attack. As to their formation, Houssaye advances many proofs that it was in hollow squares. Here is one more. On the 19th Basil Jackson rode along the slope and ridge near the back of Hougoumont and talked with some of the wounded of the Imperial Guard. "As they lay they formed large squares, of which the centres were hollow" (p. 57). Maitland ("Waterloo Letters," p. 244.) says: "There was one great column at first, which separated into two parts." Gawler (p. 292) adds that: "The second column was subdivided in two parts, close together, and that _its whole flank was much longer than the front of our 52nd regiment_." It is difficult to reconcile all this with the attack in hollow squares; but probably the squares (or oblongs?) followed each other so closely as to seem like a serried column. None of our men could see whether the ma.s.ses were solid or hollow, but naturally a.s.sumed them to be solid, and hence greatly over-estimated their strength. A column made up of hollow squares is certainly an odd formation, but perhaps is not unsuitable to withstand cavalry and overthrow infantry.

I cannot accept Houssaye's statement (p. 393) that the French squares attacked our front at four different places, from the 52nd regiment on our right to the Brunswickers in our centre, a quarter of a mile to the east. The only evidence that favours this is Macready's ("Waterloo Letters," p. 330); he says that the men who attacked his square (30th and 73rd regiments) were of the Middle Guard; for their wounded said so; but Kelly, of the same square, thought they were Donzelot's men, who certainly attacked there. Siborne, seemingly on the strength of Macready's statement, says that part of the Guards' column diverged thither: but this is unlikely. Is it credible that the Guards, less than 4,000 strong, should have spread their attacks over a quarter of a mile of front? Was not the column the usual method of attack? I submit, then, that my explanation of the Guard attacking in hollow oblongs, formed in two chief columns, harmonizes the known facts. See Pet.i.t's "Relation" in "Eng. Hist. Rev.," April, 1903.]

[Footnote 524: Janin, p. 45.]

[Footnote 525: Bertrand at St. Helena said he _heard_ Michel utter these words (Montholon, vol. iii., ch. iv.).]

[Footnote 526: Maitland's "Narrative," p. 222. Basil Jackson, who knew Gourgaud well at St. Helena, learnt from him that he could not finish his account of Waterloo, "as Napoleon could never decide on the best way of ending the great battle: that he (Gourgaud) had suggested no less than six different ways, but none were satisfactory" ("Waterloo and St. Helena," p, 102). Gourgaud's "Journal" shows that Napoleon blamed in turn the rain, Ney, Grouchy, Vandamme, Guyot, and Soult; but he ends--"it was a fatality; for in spite of all, I should have won that battle."]

[Footnote 527: "Lettres inedites de Napoleon."]

[Footnote 528: Gourgaud, "Journal inedit de Ste. Helene," vol. ii., p.

321, small edit.]

[Footnote 529: Lucien, "Mems.," vol. iii., p. 327.]

[Footnote 530: Stuart's despatch of June 28th, "F.O.," France, No.

117; Gneisenau to m.u.f.fling, June 27th, "Pa.s.sages," App.]

[Footnote 531: Croker ("Papers," vol. iii., p. 67) had this account from Jaucourt, who had it from Becker.]

[Footnote 532: Ollech, pp. 350-360. The French cavalry success near Versailles was due to exceptional circ.u.mstances.]

[Footnote 533: Maitland's "Narrative," pp. 23-39, disproves Thiers'

a.s.sertion that Napoleon was not expected there. Maitland's letter of July 10th to Hotham ("F.O.," France, No. 126, not in the "Narrative") ends: "It appears to me from the anxiety the bearers express to get away, that they are very hard pressed by the Government at Paris."

Hotham's instructions of July 8th to Maitland were most stringent. See my Essay in "Napoleonic Studies" (1904).]

[Footnote 534: The date of the letter disproves Las Cases' statement that it was written _after_ his second interview with Maitland, and _in consequence of_ the offers Maitland had made!

Napoleon's reference to Themistocles has been much admired. But why?

The Athenian statesman was found to have intrigued with Persia against Athens in time of peace; he fled to the Persian monarch and was richly rewarded _as a renegade_. No simile could have been less felicitous.]

[Footnote 535: "Narrative," p. 244. [This work has been republished by Messrs. Blackwood, 1904.]]

[Footnote 536: "F.O.," France, No. 126; Allardyce, "Mems. of Lord Keith."]

[Footnote 537: Maitland, pp. 206, 239-242; Montholon, vol. i., ch.

iii.]

[Footnote 538: "Castlereagh Papers," 3rd series, vol. ii., pp.

434,438. Beatson's Mem. is in "F.O.," France, No. 123. This and other facts refute Lord Holland's statement ("Foreign Reminiscences," p.

196) that the Government was treating for the transfer of St. Helena from the East India Company _early in_ 1815.--Why does Lord Rosebery, "Napoleon: last Phase," p. 58, write that Lord Liverpool thought that Napoleon should either (1) be handed over to Louis XVIII. to be treated as a rebel; or (2) treated as vermin; or (3) that we would (regretfully) detain him? In his letters to Castlereagh at Paris, Liverpool expressly says it would be better for us, rather than any other Power, to detain him, and writes not a word about treating him as vermin. Lord Rosebery is surely aware that our Government and Wellington did their best _to preclude the possibility of the Prussians treating him as vermin_.]

[Footnote 539: Keith's letter of August 1st, in "F.O.," France, No.

123: "The General and many of his suite have an idea that if they could but put foot on sh.o.r.e, no power could remove them, and they are determined to make the attempt if at all possible: they are becoming most refractory."]

[Footnote 540: In our Colonial Office archives, St. Helena, No. 1, is a letter of August 2nd, 1815, from an Italian subject of Napoleon (addressed] to Mme. Bertrand, but really for him), stating that 16,000 had been placed in good hands for his service, one-fourth of which would be at once intrusted to firms at New York, Boston, "Philadelfi," and Charlestown, to provide means for effecting his escape, and claiming again "le plus beau trone de l'univers." It begs him to get his departure from Plymouth put off, for a plot had been formed by discontented British officers to get rid of the Premier and one other Minister. Napoleon must not build any hopes on the Prince Regent: "Le Silene de cette isle.... Je fonds donc mon espoir avant tout sur les navires marchands, Anglais comme autres, par l'apas du gain." The writer's name is illegible: so is the original postmark: the letter probably came from London: it missed Mme. Bertrand at Plymouth, followed her to St. Helena, and was opened by Sir G.

c.o.c.kburn, who sent it back to our Government. I have published it _in extenso_ in my volume, "Napoleonic Studies " (1904), as also an accompanying letter from Miss McKinnon of Binfield, Berks, to Napoleon, stating that her mother, still living, had known him and given him hospitality when a lieutenant at Valence.]

[Footnote 541: Las Cases, "Memorial," vol, i., pp. 55, 65.]

[Footnote 542: I wish I had s.p.a.ce to give a whole chapter to the relations between Napoleon and the Whigs, and to show how their championship of him worked mischief on both sides in 1803-21, enticing him on to many risky ventures, and ruining the cause of Reform in England for a generation.]

[Footnote 543: "F.O.," France, No. 123. Keith adds: "I accompanied him to look at the accommodation on board the 'Northumberland,' with which he appeared to be well satisfied, saying, 'the apartments are convenient, and you see I carry my little tent-bed with me.'" The volume also contains the letter of Maingaud, etc. Bertrand requested permission from our Government to return in a year; Gourgaud, when his duty to his aged mother recalled him; O'Meara stipulated that he should still be a British surgeon on full pay and active service.]

[Footnote 544: "Extract from a Diary of Sir G. c.o.c.kburn," pp. 21, 51, 94.]

[Footnote 545: "Napoleon's last Voyages," p. 163.]

[Footnote 546: I found this return in "Admiralty Secret Letters,"

1804-16.

Lord Rosebery, in his desire to apologize for our treatment of Napoleon at every point, says ("Nap.: last Phase," p. 64): "They [the exiles] were packed like herrings in a barrel. The 'Northumberland,'

it was said, had been arrested on her way back from India in order to convey Napoleon: all the water on board, it was alleged, had also been to India, was discoloured and tainted, as well as short in quant.i.ty."--On the contrary, the diary of Glover, in "Last Voyages of Nap.," p. 91, shows that the ship was in the Medway in July, and was fitted out at Portsmouth (where it was usual to keep supplies of water): also (p. 99) that Captain Ross gave up his cabin to the Bertrands, and Glover his to the Montholons: Gourgaud and Las Cases slept in the after cabin until cabins could be built for them. We have already seen (p. 529) that Napoleon was well satisfied with his own room. Water, wine, cattle, and fruit were taken in at Funchal in spite of the storm.]

[Footnote 547: Gourgaud, "Journal," vol. i., pp. 47, 59 (small edition); "Last Voyages of Nap.," p. 198.]

[Footnote 548: Sir G. Bingham's Diary in "Blackwood's Mag.," October, 1896, and "Cornhill," January, 1901.]