The Life of Napoleon I Part 73

[Footnote 248: Tatischeff, p. 555.]

[Footnote 249: Vandal, vol. ii., p. 535, admits that we had no hand in it. But the Czar naturally became more favourable to us, and at the close of 1811 secretly gave entry to our goods.]

[Footnote 250: Quoted by Garden, vol. xiii., p. 171.]

[Footnote 251: Bernhardi's "Denkwurdigkeiten des Grafen von Toll,"

vol. i. p. 223.]

[Footnote 252: Czartoryski, vol. ii., ch. xvii. At Dresden, in May, 1812, Napoleon admitted to De Pradt, his envoy at Warsaw that Russia's lapse from the Continental System was the chief cause of war; "Without Russia, the Continental System is absurdity."]

[Footnote 253: For the overtures of Russia and Sweden to us and their exorbitant requests for loans, see Mr. Hereford George's account in his careful and systematic study, "Napoleon's Invasion of Russia," ch.

iv. It was not till July, 1812, that we formally made peace with Russia and Sweden, and sent them pecuniary aid. We may note here that Napoleon, in April, 1812, sent us overtures for peace, if we would acknowledge Joseph as King of Spain and Murat as King of Naples, and withdraw our troops from the Peninsula and Sicily: Napoleon would then evacuate Spain. Castlereagh at once refused an offer which would have left Napoleon free to throw his whole strength against Russia (Garden, vol. xiii., pp. 215, 254).]

[Footnote 254: Garden, vol. xiii., p. 329.]

[Footnote 255: Hereford George, _op. cit._, pp. 34-37. Metternich ("Memoirs," vol. ii., p. 517, Eng. ed.) shows that Napoleon had also been holding out to Austria the hope of gaining Servia, Wallachia and Moldavia (the latter of which were then overrun by Russian troops), if she would furnish 60,000 troops: but Metternich resisted successfully.]

[Footnote 256: See his words to Metternich at Dresden, Metternich's "Mems.," vol. i., p. 152; as also that he would not advance beyond Smolensk in 1812.]

[Footnote 257: Bernhardi's "Toll," vol. i., p. 226; Stern, "Abhandlungen," pp. 350-366; m.u.f.fling, "Aus meinem Leben"; L'Abbe de Pradt, "L'histoire de l'Amba.s.sade de Varsovie."]

[Footnote 258: "Erinnerungen des Gen. von Boyen," vol. ii., p. 254.

This, and other facts that will later be set forth, explode the story foisted by the Prussian General von dem Knesebeck in his old age on m.u.f.fling. Knesebeck declared that his mission early in 1812 to the Czar, which was to persuade him to a peaceful compromise with Napoleon, was directly controverted by the secret instructions which he bore from Frederick William to Alexander. He described several midnight interviews with the Czar at the Winter Palace, in which he convinced him that by war with Napoleon, and by enticing him into the heart of Russia, Europe would be saved. Lehmann has shown ("Knesebeck und Schon") that this story is contradicted by all the doc.u.mentary evidence. It may be dismissed as the offspring of senile vanity.]

[Footnote 259: "Toll," vol. i., pp. 256 _et seq._ m.u.f.fling was a.s.sured by Phull in 1819 that the Drissa plan was only part of a grander design which had never had a fair[*Scanner's note: fair is correct]

chance!]

[Footnote 260: Bernhardi's "Toll" (vol. i., p. 231) gives Barclay's chief "army of the west" as really mustering only 127,000 strong, along with 9,000 Cossacks; Bagration, with the second "army of the west," numbered at first only 35,000, with 4,000 Cossacks; while Tormasov's corps observing Galicia was about as strong. Clausewitz gives rather higher estimates.]

[Footnote 261: Labaume, "Narrative of 1812," and Segur.]

[Footnote 262: See the long letter of May 28th, 1812, to De Pradt; also the Duc de Broglie's "Memoirs" (vol. i., ch. iv.) for the hollowness of Napoleon's Polish policy. Bignon, "Souvenirs d'un Diplomate" (ch. xx.), errs in saying that Napoleon charged De Pradt--"Tout agiter, tout enflammer." At St. Helena, Napoleon said to Montholon ("Captivity," vol. iii., ch. iii.): "Poland and its resources were but poetry in the first months of the year 1812."]

[Footnote 263: "Toll," vol. i., p. 239; Wilson, "Invasion of Russia,"

p. 384.]

[Footnote 264: We may here also clear aside the statements of some writers who aver that Napoleon intended to strike at St. Petersburg.

Perhaps he did so for a time. On July 9th he wrote at Vilna that he proposed to march _both on Moscow and St. Petersburg_. But that was while he still hoped that Davoust would entrap Bagration, and while Barclay's retreat on Drissa seemed likely to carry the war into the north. Napoleon always aimed first at the enemy's army; and Barclay's retreat from Drissa to Vitepsk, and thence to Smolensk, finally decided Napoleon's move towards Moscow. If he had any preconceived scheme--and he always regulated his moves by events rather than by a cast-iron plan--it was to strike at Moscow. At Dresden he said to De Pradt: "I must finish the war by the end of September.... I am going to Moscow: one or two battles will settle the business. I will burn Tula, and Russia will be at my feet. Moscow is the heart of that Empire. I will wage war with Polish blood." De Pradt's evidence is not wholly to be trusted; but I am convinced that Napoleon never seriously thought of taking 200,000 men to the barren tracts of North Russia late in the summer, while the English, Swedish, and Russian fleets were ready to worry his flank and stop supplies.]

[Footnote 265: Letter of August 24th to Maret; so too Labaume's "Narrative," and Garden, vol. xiii., p. 418. Mr. George thinks that Napoleon decided on August 21st to strike at Moscow on grounds of general policy.]

[Footnote 266: Labaume, "Narrative"; Lejeune's "Mems.," vol. ii., ch.

vi.]

[Footnote 267: Marbot's "Mems." Bausset, a devoted servant to Napoleon, refutes the oft-told story that he was ill at Borodino. He had nothing worse than a bad cold. It is curious that such stories are told about Napoleon after every battle when his genius did not shine.

In this case, it rests on the frothy narrative of Segur, and is out of harmony with those of Gourgaud and Pelet. Clausewitz justifies Napoleon's caution in withholding his Guard.]

[Footnote 268: Bausset, "Cour de Napoleon." Tolstoi ("War and Liberty") a.s.serts that the fires were the work of tipsy pillagers. So too Arndt, "Mems.," p. 204. Dr. Tzenoff, in a scholarly monograph (Berlin, 1900), comes to the same conclusion. Lejeune and Bourgogne admit both causes.]

[Footnote 269: Garden, vol. xiii., p. 452; vol. xiv., pp. 17-19.]

[Footnote 270: Cathcart, p. 41; see too the Czar's letters in Sir Byam Martin's "Despatches," vol. ii., p. 311. This fact shows the frothiness of the talk indulged in by Russians in 1807 as to "our rapacity and perfidy" in seizing the Danish fleet.]

[Footnote 271: _E.g._, the migration of Rostopchin's serfs _en ma.s.se_ from their village, near Moscow, rather than come under French dominion (Wilson, "French Invasion of Russia," p. 179).]

[Footnote 272: Letter of October 16th; see too his undated notes ("Corresp.," No. 19237). Bausset and many others thought the best plan would be to winter at Moscow. He also says that the Emperor's favourite book while at Moscow was Voltaire's "History of Charles XII."]

[Footnote 273: Lejeune, vol. ii., chap. vi. As it chanced, Kutusoff had resolved on retreat, if Napoleon attacked him. This is perhaps the only time when Napoleon erred through excess of prudence. Fezensac noted at Moscow that he would not see or hear the truth.]

[Footnote 274: It has been constantly stated by Napoleon, and by most French historians of this campaign, that his losses were mainly due to an exceptionally severe and early winter. The statement will not bear examination. Sharp cold usually sets in before November 6th in Russia at lat.i.tude 55; the severe weather which he then suffered was succeeded by alternate thaws and slighter frosts until the beginning of December, when intense cold is always expected. Moreover, the bulk of the losses occurred before the first snowstorm. The Grand Army which marched on Smolensk and Moscow may be estimated at 400,000 (including reinforcements). At Viasma, _before severe cold set in_, it had dwindled to 55,000. We may note here the curious fact, substantiated by Alison, that the French troops stood the cold better than the Poles and North Germans. See too N. Senior's "Conversations,"

vol. i., p. 239.]

[Footnote 275: Bausset, "Cour de Napoleon"; Wilson, pp. 271-277.]

[Footnote 276: Oudinot, "Memoires."]

[Footnote 277: Hereford George, pp. 349-350.]

[Footnote 278: Bourgogne, ch. viii.]

[Footnote 279: Pasquier, vol. ii., _ad init._]

[Footnote 280: Colonel Desprez, who accompanied the retreat, thus described to King Joseph its closing scenes: "The truth is best expressed by saying that _the army is dead_. The Young Guard was 8,000 strong when we left Moscow: at Vilna it scarcely numbered 400.... The corps of Victor and Oudinot numbered 30,000 men when they crossed the Beresina: two days afterwards they had melted away like the rest of the army. Sending reinforcements only increased the losses."

The following French official report, a copy of which I have found in our F.O. Records (Russia, No. 84), shows how frightful were the losses after Smolensk. But it should be noted that the rank and file in this case numbered only 300 at Smolensk, and had therefore lost more than half their numbers--and this in a regiment of the Guard.

GARDE IMPeRIALE: 6eme ReGIMENT DE TIRAILLEURS.

_lere Division. Situation a l'epoque du 19 Decembre, 1812_.

|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | Perte depuis le depart de Smolensk | | |------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|---------|--------| |Presents sous|Restes sur |Blesses qui|Morts de |Restes en |Total des|Reste | |les armes au |le champ |n'ont pu |froid ou de|en arriere |Pertes |presents| |depart de |de bataille |suivre, |misere |geles, ou | |sous les| |Smolensk | |restes au | |pour cause | |armes | | | |pouvoir de | |de maladie | | | | | |l'ennemi | |au pouvoir | | | | | | | |de l'ennemi| | | |-----|-------|------------|------|--- |------|----|------|----|-----|---|----|---| | Off.|Tr. | Off. |Tr. | Off. |Tr. | Off. |Tr. | Off. |Tr. | Off.|Tr.|Off.|Tr.| | 31 |300 | -- |13 | 4 | 52 | -- | 24 | 13 |201 | 17 |290| 14 |10 | |-----|-------|------|-----|------|----|------|----|------|----|-----|---|----|---| _Signe_ le Colonel Major Commandant le dit Regiment. CARRe.

Les autres regiments sont plus ou moins dans le meme etat.]

[Footnote 281: "Corresp.," December 20th, 1812. For the so-called Concordat of 1813, concluded with the captive Pius VII. at Fontainebleau, see "Corresp." of January 25th, 1813. The Pope repudiated it at the first opportunity. Napoleon wanted him to settle at Avignon as a docile subject of the Empire.]

[Footnote 282: Mollien, vol. iii., _ad fin._ For his vague offers to mitigate the harsh terms of Tilsit for Prussia, and to grant her a political existence if she would fight for him, see Hardenberg, "Mems.," vol. iv., p. 350.]

[Footnote 283: Walpole reports (December 19th and 22nd, 1812) Metternich's envy of the Russian successes and of their occupation of the left bank of the Danube. Walpole said he believed Alexander would grant Austria a set-off against this; but Metternich seemed entirely Bonapartist ("F.O.," Russia, No. 84). See too the full account, based on doc.u.mentary evidence, in Luckwaldt's "Oesterreich und die Anfange des Befreiungskrieges" (Berlin, 1898).]

[Footnote 284: Hardenberg, "Mems.," vol. iv., p. 366.]

[Footnote 285: Oncken, "Oesterreich und Preussen," vol. ii.; Garden, vol. xiv., p. 167; Seeley's "Stein," vol. ii., ch. iii.]

[Footnote 286: Arndt, "Wanderungen"; Steffens, "Was ich erlebte."]

[Footnote 287: At this time she had only 61,500 men ready for the fighting line; but she had 28,000 in garrison and 32,000 in Pomerania and Prussia (Proper), according to Scharnhorst's report contained in "F.O.," Russia, No. 85.]

[Footnote 288: Letters of March 2nd and 11th.]