The Life of Napoleon I Part 60

[Footnote 28: A letter of Lord Mulgrave to Mr. Trevor, at Turin ("F.

O. Records, Sardinia," No. 13), states that he had the greatest difficulty in getting on with the French royalists: "You must not send us one _emigre_ of any sort--they would be a nuisance: they are all so various and so violent, whether for despotism, const.i.tution, or republic, that we should be distracted with their quarrels; and they are so a.s.suming, forward, dictatorial, and full of complaints, that no business could go on with them. Lord Hood is averse to receiving any of them."

NOTE TO THE THIRD EDITION.--From the information which Mr. Spenser Wilkinson has recently supplied in his article in "The Owens College Hist. Essays" (1902), it would seem that Buonaparte's share in deciding the fate of Toulon was somewhat larger than has here been stated; for though the Commissioners saw the supreme need of attacking the fleet, they do not seem, as far as we know, to have perceived that the hill behind Fort L'Eguillette was the key of the position.

Buonaparte's skill and tenacity certainly led to the capture of this height.]

[Footnote 29: Jung, "Bonaparte et son Temps," vol. ii., p. 430.]

[Footnote 30: "Memorial," ch. ii., November, 1815. See also Thibaudeau, "Memoires sur le Consulat," vol. i., p. 59.]

[Footnote 31: Marmont (1774-1852) became sub-lieutenant in 1789, served with Buonaparte in Italy, Egypt, etc., received the t.i.tle Duc de Ragusa in 1808, Marshal in 1809; was defeated by Wellington at Salamanca in 1812, deserted to the allies in 1814. Junot (1771-1813) entered the army in 1791; was famed as a cavalry general in the wars 1796-1807; conquered Portugal in 1808, and received the t.i.tle Duc d'Abrantes; died mad.]

[Footnote 32: M. Zivy, "Le treize Vendemiaire," pp.60-62, quotes the decree a.s.signing the different commands. A MS. written by Buonaparte, now in the French War Office Archives, proves also that it was Barras who gave the order to fetch the cannon from the Sablons camp.]

[Footnote 33: Buonaparte afterwards a.s.serted that it was he who had given the order to fire, and certainly delay was all in favour of his opponents.]

[Footnote 34: I caution readers against accepting the statement of Carlyle ("French Revolution," vol. iii. _ad fin_.) that "the thing we specifically call French Revolution is blown into s.p.a.ce by the whiff of grapeshot." On the contrary, it was perpetuated, though in a more organic and more orderly governmental form.]

[Footnote 35: Chaptal, "Mes Souvenirs sur Napoleon," p. 198.]

[Footntoe 36: Koch, "Memoires de Ma.s.sena," vol. ii., p. 13, credits the French with only 37,775 men present with the colours, the Austrians with 32,000, and the Sardinians with 20,000. All these figures omit the troops in garrison or guarding communications.]

[Footnote 37: Napoleon's "Correspondence," March 28th, 1796.]

[Footnote 38: See my articles on Colonel Graham's despatches from Italy in the "Eng. Hist. Review" of January and April, 1899.]

[Footnote 39: Thus Mr. Sargent ("Bonaparte's First Campaign") says that Bonaparte was expecting Beaulieu to move on Genoa, and saw herein a chance of crushing the Austrian centre. But Bonaparte, in his despatch of April 6th to the Directory, referring to the French advance towards Genoa, writes: "J'ai ete tres fache et extremement mecontent de ce mouvement sur Genes, d'autant plus deplace qu'il a oblige cette republique a prendre une att.i.tude hostile, et a reveille l'ennemi que j'aurais pris tranquille: ce sont des hommes de plus qu'il nous en coutera." For the question how far Napoleon was indebted to Marshal Maillebois' campaign of 1745 for his general design, see the brochure of M. Pierron. His indebtedness has been proved by M.

Bouvier ("Bonaparte en Italie," p. 197) and by Mr. Wilkinson ("Owens Coll. Hist. Essays").]

[Footnote 40: Nelson was then endeavouring to cut off the vessels conveying stores from Toulon to the French forces. The following extracts from his despatches are noteworthy. January 6th, 1796: "If the French mean to carry on the war, they must penetrate into Italy.

Holland and Flanders, with their own country, they have entirely stripped: Italy is the gold mine, and if once entered, is without the means of resistance." Then on April 28th, after Piedmont was overpowered by the French: "We English have to regret that we cannot always decide the fate of Empires on the Sea." Again, on May 16th: "I very much believe that England, who commenced the war with all Europe for her allies, will finish it by having nearly all Europe for her enemies."]

[Footnote 41: The picturesque story of the commander (who was not Rampon, but Fornesy) summoning the defenders of the central redoubt to swear on their colours and on the cannon that they would defend it to the death has been endlessly repeated by historians. But the doc.u.ments which furnish the only authentic details show that there was in the redoubt no cannon and no flag. Fornesy's words simply were: "C'est ici, mes amis, qu'il faut vaincre ou mourir"--surely much grander than the histrionic oath. (See "Memoires de Ma.s.sena," Vol. ii.;" Pieces Just.," No. 3; also Bouvier, _op. cit._)]

[Footnote 42: Jomini, vol. viii., p. 340; "Pieces Justifs."]

[Footnote 43: "Un Homme d'autrefois," par Costa de Beauregard.]

[Footnote 44: These were General Beaulieu's words to Colonel Graham on May 22nd.]

[Footnote 45: Periods of ten days, which, in the revolutionary calendar, superseded the week.]

[Footnote 46: I have followed the accounts given by Jomini, vol.

viii., pp. 120-130; that by Schels in the "Oest. Milit. Zeitschrift"

for 1825, vol. ii.; also Bouvier "Bonaparte en Italie," ch. xiii.; and J.G.'s "Etudes sur la Campagne de 1796-97." Most French accounts, being based on Napoleon's "Memoires," vol. iii., p. 212 _et seq_., are a tissue of inaccuracies. Bonaparte affected to believe that at Lodi he defeated an army of sixteen thousand men. Thiers states that the French cavalry, after fording the river at Montana.s.so, influenced the result: but the official report of May 11th, 1796, expressly states that the French horse could not cross the river at that place till the fight was over. See too Desvernois, "Mems.," ch, vii.]

[Footnote 47: Bouvier (p. 533) traces this story to Las Cases and discredits it.]

[Footnote: 48 Directorial despatch of May 7th, 1796. The date rebuts the statement of M. Aulard, in M. Lavisse's recent volume, "La Revolution Francaise," p. 435, that Bonaparte suggested to the Directory the pillage of Lombardy.]

[Footnote 49: "Corresp.," June 6th, 1797.]

[Footnote 50: "Corresp.," June 1st, 1796.]

[Footnote 51: Gaffarel, "Bonaparte et les Republiques Italiennes," p.

22.]

[Footnote 52: "Corresp.," May 17th, 1796.]

[Footnote 53: Virgil, Aeneid, x. 200.]

[Footnote 54: Colonel Graham's despatches.]

[Footnote 55: "Corresp.," June 26th, 1796.]

[Footnote 56: Despatch of Francis to Wurmser, July 14th, 1796.]

[Footnote 57: Jomini (vol. viii., p. 305) blames Weyrother, the chief of Wurmser's staff, for the plan. Jomini gives the precise figures of the French on July 25th: Ma.s.sena had 15,000 men on the upper Adige; Augereau, 5,000 near Legnago; Sauret, 4,000 at Salo; Serurier, 10,500 near Mantua; and with others at and near Peschiera the total fighting strength was 45,000. So "J.G.," p. 103.]

[Footnote 58: See Thiebault's amusing account ("Memoirs," vol. i., ch.

xvi.) of Bonaparte's contempt for any officer who could not give him definite information, and of the devices by which his orderlies played on this foible. See too Bourrienne for Bonaparte's dislike of new faces.]

[Footnote 59: Marbot, "Memoires," ch. xvi. J.G., in his recent work, "Etudes sur la Campagne de 1796-97," p. 115, also defends Augereau.]

[Footnote 60: Jomini, vol. viii., p. 321.]

[Footnote 61: "English Hist. Review," January, 1899]

[Footnote 62: Such is the judgment of Clausewitz ("Werke," vol. iv.), and it is partly endorsed by J.G. in his "Etudes sur la Campagne de 1796-97." St. Cyr, in his "Memoirs" on the Rhenish campaigns, also blames Bonaparte for not having _earlier_ sent away his siege-train to a place of safety. Its loss made the resumed siege of Mantua little more than a blockade.]

[Footnote 63: Koch, "Memoires de Ma.s.sena," vol. i., p. 199.]

[Footnote 64: "Corresp.," October 21st, 1796.]

[Footnote 65: "Corresp.," October 24th, 1796. The same policy was employed towards Genoa. This republic was to be lulled into security until it could easily be overthrown or absorbed.]

[Footnote 66: "Ordre du Jour," November 7th, 1796.]

[Footnote 67: Marmont, "Memoires," vol. i., p. 237. I have followed Marmont's narrative, as that of the chief actor in this strange scene.

It is less dramatic than the usual account, as found in Thiers, and therefore is more probable. The incident ill.u.s.trates the folly of a commander doing the work of a sergeant. Marmont points out that the best tactics would have been to send one division to cross the Adige at Albaredo, and so take Arcola in the rear. Thiers' criticism, that this would have involved too great a diffusion of the French line, is refuted by the fact that on the third day a move on that side induced the Austrians to evacuate Arcola.]

[Footnote 68: Koch, "Memoires de Ma.s.sena," vol. i., p. 255, in his very complete account of the battle, gives the enemy's losses as upwards of 2,000 killed or wounded, and 4,000 prisoners with 11 cannon. Thiers gives 40,000 as Alvintzy's force before the battle--an impossible number. See _ante_.]

[Footnote 69: The Austrian official figures for the loss in the three days at Arcola give 2,046 killed and wounded, 4,090 prisoners, and 11 cannon. Napoleon put it down as 13,000 in all! See Schels in "Oest.

Milit. Zeitschrift" for 1829.]

[Footnote 70: A forecast of the plan realized in 1801-2, whereby Bonaparte gained Louisiana for a time.]

[Footnote 71: Estimates of the Austrian force differ widely. Bonaparte guessed it at 45,000, which is accepted by Thiers; Alison says 40,000; Thiebault opines that it was 75,000; Marmont gives the total as 26,217. The Austrian official figures are 28,022 _before_ the fighting north of Monte Baldo. See my article in the "Eng. Hist. Review" for April, 1899. I have largely followed the despatches of Colonel Graham, who was present at this battle. As "J.G." points out (_op.cit. _, p.

237), the French had 1,500 horse and some forty cannon, which gave them a great advantage over foes who could make no effective use of these arms.]