The House Of Rothschild Part 7

-ROBERT OWEN TO HANNAH ROTHSCHILD, JULY 1828.1

In July 1830 the French King Charles X was overthrown by a combination of parliamentary opposition and popular violence in Paris. In something like a political chain-reaction, comparable changes of regime occurred or were attempted (with varying degrees of violence) in Brussels, Warsaw, Modena and Bologna, as well as in a number of German states, notably Brunswick, Hesse-Ka.s.sel and Saxony, and in Portugal. In Belgium, Italy and Poland, the revolutionaries were as much concerned to free themselves from foreign rule as to achieve const.i.tutional reforms. Elsewhere, const.i.tutional reforms were enacted without the deposition of a monarch. This was the case not only in England, Scotland and Ireland-sometimes neglected in accounts of the 1830 revolution-but also in Hanover, where the change of monarch was the result of George IV's not untimely death in June 1830. In Baden, Wurttemberg and Bavaria, rulers felt constrained to make concessions to liberals. Nor did political instability end in 1832, by which time the revolts in Poland and Italy had been crushed and Holland had been obliged to accept the secession of Belgium. Uncertainty about the stability of new political arrangements persisted throughout Europe until the middle of the decade and beyond.

The fact that the Rothschilds were able to survive these political upheavals led many observers to conclude that, as Byron and others had earlier suspected, their power was actually as great as, if not greater than, that of the kings to whom they lent money. In November 1931, in his tenth bulletin from Paris, Ludwig Borne explicitly "equated Rothschild . . . with kings": [T]hat should certainly not annoy him, even if he should not wish to belong in their ranks, because he should know best how far below par a king stands in Paris today. But he is the great dealer in all state bonds, who gives monarchs the power to spite freedom and deprives peoples of the courage to resist violence. Rothschild is the high priest of fear, the G.o.ddess on whose altar liberty, patriotism, honour and all civic virtues are sacrificed. Rothschild should sell off all his paper in one hour on the stock exchange, so that they crash into the deepest abyss; then he should rush into my arms and feel how strongly I press him to my heart.

The new French King Louis Philippe would, suggested Borne sarcastically in his bulletin of January 1832, have himself crowned if he is still king in a year's time; not at St Remy at Rheims, but at Notre Dame de la Bourse at Paris, and Rothschild will officiate as archbishop. After the coronation, pigeons will be sent out, as usual, and one of them . . . will fly to St Helena, settle on Napoleon's grave, and laughingly inform his remains that they saw his successor anointed yesterday, not by the Pope but by a Jew; and that the present ruler of France has taken the t.i.tle, "Emperor of the five per cents, King of the three per cents, Protector of bankers and exchange agents."

In both letters, to be sure, Borne continued to harp on the familiar theme that the Rothschilds were the supporters of reaction: It is always the same game that these Rothschilds play, in order to enrich themselves at the cost of the land they exploit . . . The financiers are the nation's worst enemies. They have done more than any to undermine the foundations of freedom, and it is unquestionable that most of the peoples of Europe would by this time be in full possession of liberty if such men as Rothschild . . . did not lend the autocrats the support of their capital.

But it was rather harder to make this argument stick when the Rothschilds had so quickly lent their support to Louis Philippe's regime, which was plainly the product of a liberal revolution, even if it was not liberal enough for Borne. Moreover, the Rothschilds were also, as Borne said, lending money to establish Greece as an independent monarchy, which had been another liberal goal of the 1820s. Indeed, they even appeared to be in a position to influence the decision as to which prince would become the new Greek king. ("M. de Rothschild finds that all the princes of Europe are in his credit book except Prince Frederick of the Netherlands, and he concludes that the prince who has never asked him for credit is the most worthy of it.") It therefore made more sense to argue that the Rothschilds were beginning to supplant supplant rather than merely sh.o.r.e up the European monarchies: rather than merely sh.o.r.e up the European monarchies: Would it not be a good thing for the world if the crowns were placed on their [the Rothschilds'] heads instead of lying at their feet as they do now? . . . Although the Rothschilds do not yet occupy thrones, they are at all events asked their advice as to the choice of a ruler when a throne falls vacant . . . Would it not be a great blessing for the world if all the kings were dismissed and the Rothschild family put on their thrones? Think of the advantages. The new dynasty would never contract a loan, as it would know better than anybody how dear such things are, and on this account alone the burden on their subjects would be alleviated by several millions a year.

Born Low Baruch in the Frankfurt Judenga.s.se, a convert not only to Christianity but to German nationalism, Borne had his own complex personal reasons for disliking the Rothschilds. For a rather more nuanced a.s.sessment of Rothschild power in the age of revolution, we need to turn to Borne's friend, the poet and journalist Heinrich Heine. Before 1830 Heine thought of the Rothschilds in much the same way as other liberally inclined writers. In his "Travel Sketches," for example, "Rothschild I" appears alongside Wellington, Metternich and the Pope as a bulwark of reaction. Even at this stage, however, Heine had an awareness of the ambivalent nature of the relationship between the Rothschilds and the established monarchies. In "The Baths of Lucca," the Jewish Figaro-figure Hirsch-Hyacinth recalls cutting Nathan Rothschild's corns: This happened in his inner sanctum while he sat on his green armchair as though it were a throne. He spoke like a king, with courtiers all around him; he ordered them about and sent messages to all the kings of the world; and while I was cutting his corns, I thought to myself: what you now have in your hand is the foot of the man whose own hands hold the whole world. Now you are somebody too: if you cut too deep down below he'll lose his temper up above and he'll cut the kings more sharply. That was the greatest moment of my life.

For Heine, Nathan already has the power to "cut" the kings to whom he lends. Yet his Rothschilds have not lost sight of their own lowly and Jewish origins. Nathan's bank in London is a glorified "p.a.w.nshop" and when Hirsch-Hyacinth is introduced to Salomon as a former seller of lottery tickets, he invites him to dine with him, saying: "I am something like that myself, I am the chief agent of the Rothschild lottery." "He treated me," says Hirsch-Hyacinth, "like his equal, quite famillionaire" (ganz famillionar). That much a.n.a.lysed pun hints at an idea to which Heine later returned: that, despite their enormous wealth, the Rothschilds were far from being mere props of the traditional social hierarchy.

The same point underlies the memorable allegory in which Hirsch-Hyacinth describes a children's fancy-dress ball given by Salomon: The children wore lovely fancy dress, and they played at making loans. They were dressed up like kings, with crowns on their heads, but there was one of the bigger lads who was dressed exactly like old Nathan Rothschild. He played his part very well, kept both hands in his trouser-pockets, rattled his money and shook with bad temper when one of the little kings wanted to borrow off him-only a little lad with the white coat and red trousers [Austria] got a kindly pat on the cheek and was praised: "You're my boy, my pet, I'm proud of you; but your cousin Michel [probably Germany] had better keep away from me, I'll give nothing to a fool like that who expends more in a day than he has coming in a year; he'll make some trouble yet in the world and spoil my business." As true as the Lord shall help me, the boy played his part wonderfully well, especially when he helped a fat child dressed in white satin with real silver lilies [France] in its effort to walk and said to it occasionally: "Now, you, behave yourself, make an honest living, and see that they don't chase you out again, or I'll lose my money." I a.s.sure you, Herr Doktor, it was a pleasure to listen to that lad; and the other children too-dear sweet children they all were-played their parts extremely well-until the cake was brought in and they all started fighting for the best piece [and] tore the crowns off one another's heads . . ."

Once again, Heine's Nathan feels contempt for the various rulers who approach him for loans: it is he who is their master. In an unpublished pa.s.sage, Heine made it clear that he shared that contempt for "stupid princes," "but before Nathan Rothschild I tremble with fear. Before you can say Jack Robinson, he could send a few kings, stockbrokers, and policemen to my rooms and have me carried to the fortress prison."

In an unpublished pa.s.sage of "The Baths of Lucca," Heine sought to a.n.a.lyse the nature of the Rothschilds' power more precisely. Here he acknowledges that in the short term it served to sh.o.r.e up the reactionary regimes: When I think about political economy in these our latter days it becomes ever clearer to me that without the Rothschilds' help the financial embarra.s.sment of most states would have been exploited by subversives wanting to mislead the populace into upsetting whatever order or disorder const.i.tuted the status quo. Revolutions are generally triggered off by deficiency of money; by preventing such deficiencies, the Rothschild system may serve to preserve peace in Europe. This system, or rather, Nathan Rothschild, its inventor, is still providing firm foundations for such peace: it does not inhibit one state from making war on another exactly as before, but it does make it difficult for the people to overthrow established authority . . . Religion is no longer able to guarantee the governments that the people will remain peaceful; the Rothschild system of loans can perform the task much better.

However, the Rothschild "system" is also potentially revolutionary in itself: [I]t possesses the moral force or power which religion has lost, it can act as a surrogate for religion-indeed, it is is a new religion, and when the old religion finally goes under it will provide subst.i.tutes for its practical blessings. Strangely enough, it is once again the Jews who invented this new religion . . . Murdered Judaea was as cunning as the dying Nessus, and its poisoned robe-poisoned with its own blood-consumed the strength of the Roman Hercules so effectively that his mighty limbs grew weary, armour and helmet fell away from his withered body, and his voice, once so mighty in battle, dwindled to a prayerful whine. Miserably, in a death-agony that dragged on through a thousand years, Rome dies by the Judaic poison. a new religion, and when the old religion finally goes under it will provide subst.i.tutes for its practical blessings. Strangely enough, it is once again the Jews who invented this new religion . . . Murdered Judaea was as cunning as the dying Nessus, and its poisoned robe-poisoned with its own blood-consumed the strength of the Roman Hercules so effectively that his mighty limbs grew weary, armour and helmet fell away from his withered body, and his voice, once so mighty in battle, dwindled to a prayerful whine. Miserably, in a death-agony that dragged on through a thousand years, Rome dies by the Judaic poison.

Of course, this extraordinary pa.s.sage says a good deal about Heine's own highly ambivalent att.i.tude towards Judaism (like Borne, he had converted to Christianity); but it also antic.i.p.ates his later and more coherent reflections in his "Memorandum on Ludwig Borne" (1840) on the Rothschilds as revolutionaries rather than counter-revolutionaries.

Here, in perhaps the most perceptive of any contemporary commentary, Heine confronts the reader with a striking paradox: No one does more to further the revolution than the Rothschilds themselves . . . and, though it may sound even more strange, these Rothschilds, the bankers of kings, these princely pursestring-holders, whose existence might be placed in the gravest danger by a collapse of the European state system, nevertheless carry in their minds a consciousness of their revolutionary mission. No one does more to further the revolution than the Rothschilds themselves . . . and, though it may sound even more strange, these Rothschilds, the bankers of kings, these princely pursestring-holders, whose existence might be placed in the gravest danger by a collapse of the European state system, nevertheless carry in their minds a consciousness of their revolutionary mission.

James, he suggests, is the "Nero of finance," "reigning as absolute emperor over the stock exchanges of the world"; but, like his predecessor, the Roman Nero, he is "ultimately a powerful destroyer of patrician privilege, and the founder of a new democracy."

The explanation which follows purports to be based on a genuine conversation Heine had with James-while "sauntering arm in arm through the streets of Paris"-and though it is possible that Heine was putting his own words in someone else's mouth, it is sufficiently different from his earlier flights of fancy to be worth taking seriously. According to Heine, James explained how "he himself, through his system of government bonds, had created the first conditions for, and at the same time paved the way towards, social progress" and the "foundation of a new order of things." For it was the development of mobile property in the form of the rente and other government bonds which severed the link between wealth and land, allowing the propertied cla.s.ses to converge on Paris. "The importance has long been recognised of such a [common] residence for the most diverse of forces, of such a centralisation of intelligentsia and social authorities. For, without Paris, France would never have had its revolution . . . Through the system of rentes, Paris became Paris much more rapidly." This prompts Heine to go further: I see in Rothschild one of the greatest revolutionaries who have founded modern democracy. Richelieu, Robespierre and Rothschild are for me three terroristic names, and they signify the gradual annihilation of the old aristocracy. Richelieu, Robespierre and Rothschild are Europe's three most fearful levellers. Richelieu destroyed the sovereignty of the feudal n.o.bility, and subjected it to that royal despotism, which either relegated it to court service, or let it rot in b.u.mpkin-like inactivity in the provinces. Robespierre decapitated this subjugated and idle n.o.bility. But the land remained, and its new master, the new landowner, quickly became another aristocrat just like his predecessor, whose pretensions he continued under another name. Then came Rothschild and destroyed the predominance of land, by raising the system of state bonds to supreme power, thereby mobilising property and income and at the same time endowing money with the previous privileges of the land. He thereby created a new aristocracy, it is true, but this, resting as it does on the most unreliable of elements, on money, can never play as enduringly regressive a role as the former aristocracy, which was rooted in the land, in the earth itself. For money is more fluid than water, more elusive than the air, and one can gladly forgive the impertinences of the new n.o.bility in consideration of its ephemerality. In the twinkling of an eye, it will dissolve and evaporate.

Heine returned again and again during the 1840s to the subject of Rothschild power. In the journal of 1840-41 later published as Lutezia Lutezia, for example, he caricatured the relationship between James's state of health or mood and the price of rentes, and coined the famous pun: "[M]oney is the G.o.d of our time and Rothschild is his prophet." The Rothschilds also crop up in the poems "Romanzero," "Germany" and "Simplicissimus."2 But he never wrote with such penetrating insight as he did in "Ludwig Borne"-partly because his personal and financial relations with the family grew somewhat closer after 1840. As we shall see, Heine was singularly perceptive in identifying the Rothschilds as agents as much of social revolution as of reaction, even if their revolutionary role was less conscious than he suggested. Nor was he alone in making this point, though no one expressed it better. A lesser writer declared that "the Rothschild brothers [had] become the hierophants of the new religion," the founders of a new "Moneycracy." Brooding in Venice after the fall of the Bourbon regime, the arch-conservative Chateaubriand remarked bleakly that "the Kings [had] become the chamberlains of Salomon, Baron de Rothschild." But he never wrote with such penetrating insight as he did in "Ludwig Borne"-partly because his personal and financial relations with the family grew somewhat closer after 1840. As we shall see, Heine was singularly perceptive in identifying the Rothschilds as agents as much of social revolution as of reaction, even if their revolutionary role was less conscious than he suggested. Nor was he alone in making this point, though no one expressed it better. A lesser writer declared that "the Rothschild brothers [had] become the hierophants of the new religion," the founders of a new "Moneycracy." Brooding in Venice after the fall of the Bourbon regime, the arch-conservative Chateaubriand remarked bleakly that "the Kings [had] become the chamberlains of Salomon, Baron de Rothschild."

The Revolution and the Rente.

It is always easy, with the benefit of hindsight, to find fault with historical figures who fail to foresee revolutions. But revolutions are not necessarily the products of predictable forces (as the case of Eastern Europe in 1989 well ill.u.s.trates), much as historians may like to discover these after the fact. The accession of Charles X in 1824 and the fall of Villele three years later following the conversion fiasco should not be seen as harbingers of crisis in France. For the government of the vicomte de Martignac formed in January 1828 seemed to be successfully steering a course between the liberal forces represented in the Chamber of Deputies and the conservative, clerical tendencies of the court. When Nathan's daughter Charlotte was in Paris in 1829 she found James giving "a dinner party for the liberals & the Ministers, [as] it is best to keep friends with all parties." Although the April parliamentary session was every bit as "stormy" as Charlotte had been warned to expect, James remained optimistic. There were periods of stagnation on the bourse and occasional reports of bread riots in the wake of poor harvests, but the vital barometer of financial confidence, the rente, suggested that the regime was in good health. In May 1829, the price of 3 per cent rentes stood at 76.6; a year later it was above 84, having reached a peak of 86 in December. Even the dismissal of Martignac and the appointment of the ultra-conservative Jules de Polignac in his place on August 9, 1829, did not obviously herald a crisis. Rentes actually rose when the new ministry was announced, and continued to rise with only minor dips until May 1830.

Under these circ.u.mstances, it was hardly rash of James to outbid the intense compet.i.tion for a relatively modest government loan in early 1830, needed to finance a popularity-boosting military adventure in Algeria. As he saw it, there was a contradiction between the anti-government rhetoric of the Parisian press and the reality of financial stability: "On the one hand the whole world is screaming that the Ministry is bringing about a revolution in France and on the other hand all the various consortiums are seen to be fighting among themselves to lay their hands on a lousy 4 million rentes." The government might well face "some very stormy times" when the Chamber met in March; but the bourse remained "very good." As a banker, James naturally put his money on the market's view. By the time fear of a major const.i.tutional crisis began to manifest itself at the bourse, he was committed to the new loan-and hence to the regime.

The crisis of 1830 provides a cla.s.sic ill.u.s.tration of the difficulty bankers (and investors) always have when trying to choose between selling a falling security at a loss or holding on to it in the hope of a rise-but at the risk of a further fall. Contrary to Corti's suggestion that he was blind to the impending crisis, James had been given a clear warning as early as February, when the Finance Minister outlined to him yet another conversion scheme. When James expressed doubts as to whether the government would command the necessary parliamentary majority to enact such a measure, he was left in no doubt what would happen: "If . . . the Chamber should be totally opposed to the Government then they are determined to dissolve the Chamber and to pa.s.s a law calling for fresh elections and thus engineer the formation of a new Chamber." But James hesitated: You know very well, my dear Nathan, what chambers and ministers are like. Whether the King will have the necessary courage to follow the above plan when the time comes to do so, and whether the Chamber will allow this to happen, I don't know. It is a diabolical situation . . . and if I can manage to extricate myself I would dearly like to do so, for I am not at all enamoured of this situation where a Minister pits himself against the public.3 Instead of trying to "extricate" himself, he therefore opted to sit tight-and was encouraged to do so by Nathan, who advised him only to sell "at a profit" (that is, to hang on in the hope of better prices). Partly, James made the mistake of trusting too much in the a.s.surances of Polignac, who seemed to have "the courage of the devil" when he saw him in February. "There is only one thing that can be done over here," he told Nathan shortly before the Chamber convened at the beginning of March, "and that is to remain quiet for the time being and to observe things from the sidelines because the devil is not as black as he appears to be." On this basis, Nathan blithely a.s.sured Charles Greville that "Polignac's Government will stand by the King's support and Polignac's own courage."4 The problem was that he and his brother now held a substantial amount of 4 per cent rentes-to a nominal value of around 25 million francs (1 million)-which they had intended gradually to sell on to brokers and investors at a profit. If they began to accelerate their sales at a time when the 4 per cents already were worth slightly less than they had paid for them, prices would very probably fall further. It is no wonder James called Polignac a devil: he had made an authentically Faustian pact with him. The problem was that he and his brother now held a substantial amount of 4 per cent rentes-to a nominal value of around 25 million francs (1 million)-which they had intended gradually to sell on to brokers and investors at a profit. If they began to accelerate their sales at a time when the 4 per cents already were worth slightly less than they had paid for them, prices would very probably fall further. It is no wonder James called Polignac a devil: he had made an authentically Faustian pact with him.

This became painfully obvious when the parliamentary session began. James saw at once "that the King will have to choose between the Chambers and the Ministry." But, he reasoned, "I don't want to do anything, because as long as I remain firm, the people will not have the courage to set about depressing the rentes and I will thus ride out the storm." By 221 votes to 181, the deputies pa.s.sed an address to the King stating that "concord between the political views of your government and the wishes of your people . . . does not exist today," whereupon (as James had been warned to expect) the King dissolved the Chamber and called for new elections. Far from selling rentes, however, James found himself having to buy them to sh.o.r.e up the market-and his friend the "devil": Well, Polignac promised me that he will not instigate a coup d'etat, that is, he will not make any move that is illegal and that he will remain faithful with his Ministers, so I went ahead and bought 100,000 francs of rentes [3.3 million nominal] because I had told him, "If you remain within the law then I promise you that there will be a rise," and I kept my word for the [3 per cent] rentes now stand at 82.40 when they had opened at 81.40 . . . Well, while we don't have any Chambers the Ministry may well get some new Ministers and matters will then be sorted out. If we manage to gain three months then everything will be resolved.

James was right to think that a financial collapse could be averted for a time, though not for three months: in fact, the price of 3 per cents rallied and remained above 84 until May 3. However, he was not in a position simultaneously to support the market and to sell worthwhile amounts of rentes (though he did try to sell some "without anyone getting wind of what I am doing"). This meant that, when the market began to slide even before the new Chamber convened, the brothers still held not only 25 million francs of 4 per cents but also some 1.5 million francs of 5 per cents and 4.5 million of 3 per cents. The prices paid for the 5 and 4.5 per cents had been, respectively, 106.25 and 83.70. From May onwards, the losses on these accounts began to mount. Yet neither James nor Nathan could bear to write them off by selling. James continued to clutch at straws, refusing to face the possibility that the political situation might go on deteriorating. At the same time, the government put its faith in him: "If you do not succeed in preventing the fall in values," a minister told him, "everyone will believe that a coup d'etat coup d'etat will occur such as you so rightly fear." And indeed, prices did rally slightly between June 10 and July 12. But the truth was that the limits of Rothschild power over the market had been reached. Ouvrard and others were now beginning an unstoppable bear run. will occur such as you so rightly fear." And indeed, prices did rally slightly between June 10 and July 12. But the truth was that the limits of Rothschild power over the market had been reached. Ouvrard and others were now beginning an unstoppable bear run.

The news that the government's Algerian expedition had been successful-which reached Paris in the first week of July-was completely swamped by the results of the elections, which were a resounding victory for the Opposition. Now the only hope-expressed by Salomon, who rushed to Paris to lend his a.s.sistance-was that the King might compromise with the Chamber and abandon Polignac. As James realised, however, this was unlikely: Vitrolles [one of Polignac's ministers] has just arrived and says that during the coming month the King will take very firm measures as a result of which the life of the Chamber will be prolonged . . . but there are one hundred Deputies more on the side of the opposition than there are supporting the Ministry. Well, what can the Chamber do in such a situation? Is it not the case that in England, if a Ministry does not have the support of a majority, they then have to resign? But here the King declares: "I will hold on to my Ministry." So what can one do? Believe me, my dear Nathan, I am . . . losing my courage.

Twelve days later his courage had gone completely: "The whole world is selling rentes . . . and all the Ministers, including the Finance Minister and the Minister for Internal Affairs tell me, 'Rothschild, be careful.' . . . My dear Nathan, you are an old warrior. Tell me truthfully, do you not also fear what might happen in the end?"

Before Nathan could even reply, the end arrived. On July 26 Charles X invoked his exceptional powers under article 14 of the 1814 Charter and published three ordinances which ended freedom of the press, dissolved the Chamber and introduced yet another change to the electoral system, the aim of which was to produce a more pliant set of deputies. It was in fact the first of these which triggered the revolution: few deputies had yet arrived in Paris, but liberal journalists like Adolphe Thiers of the National National lost no time in denouncing the government's coup. When attempts were made to close down the three leading opposition newspapers, crowds took to the streets. Nathan's eldest son Lionel arrived just in time to witness the ensuing confusion, and his letter perfectly captures the uncertainty of the moment: lost no time in denouncing the government's coup. When attempts were made to close down the three leading opposition newspapers, crowds took to the streets. Nathan's eldest son Lionel arrived just in time to witness the ensuing confusion, and his letter perfectly captures the uncertainty of the moment: One moment one thinks oneself on the eve of seeing a revolution, the next, that every thing in a short time will be again in order . . . [T]oday all the newspapers appeared as usual which has created a little noise, before all the newspaper offices there are soldiers & the gens d'armes who have seized all the papers & taken the Editors before the police, this alone is enough to make a disturbance in any free country: all the shops in those streets are of course closed: in the Palais Royal there was a man selling some of these papers. He was immediately seized, some of the Boys, & of the common people took his part, but in a few minutes everything was quiet again, the gates in the Palais Royal & the shops are all closed, this cirumstance in itself is trifling, but when it comes to London they make a great story of it; Before all the Ministers' Houses there are also gens d'armes. All these things make people speak, but in the end I do not think it will come to any thing very bad . . . [T]o day there is to be a meeting of all the members of the late parliament what they will do, it is not possible to say, but the report is, that they will declare themselves the only & true representatives of the people & without their sanction nothing is legal, that is done by the ministers & that after the 1st Jan[uar]y. no taxes need to be paid . . . this is the opinion of the opposition who think that we shall see very dreadful times again, but the other party, the ministerial, who have completely the command of the army, think that with force they shall be able to carry everything, the only thing papa is that the King before long will see the Danger. One moment one thinks oneself on the eve of seeing a revolution, the next, that every thing in a short time will be again in order . . . [T]oday all the newspapers appeared as usual which has created a little noise, before all the newspaper offices there are soldiers & the gens d'armes who have seized all the papers & taken the Editors before the police, this alone is enough to make a disturbance in any free country: all the shops in those streets are of course closed: in the Palais Royal there was a man selling some of these papers. He was immediately seized, some of the Boys, & of the common people took his part, but in a few minutes everything was quiet again, the gates in the Palais Royal & the shops are all closed, this cirumstance in itself is trifling, but when it comes to London they make a great story of it; Before all the Ministers' Houses there are also gens d'armes. All these things make people speak, but in the end I do not think it will come to any thing very bad . . . [T]o day there is to be a meeting of all the members of the late parliament what they will do, it is not possible to say, but the report is, that they will declare themselves the only & true representatives of the people & without their sanction nothing is legal, that is done by the ministers & that after the 1st Jan[uar]y. no taxes need to be paid . . . this is the opinion of the opposition who think that we shall see very dreadful times again, but the other party, the ministerial, who have completely the command of the army, think that with force they shall be able to carry everything, the only thing papa is that the King before long will see the Danger.

By the time he did see the danger, however, it was too late. In two days of intense fighting which cost the lives of 800 protesters and 200 soldiers, the troops loyal to Charles X were driven out of Paris. Talk of mediation by moderate liberals like the bankers Jacques Laffitte and Casimir Perier was suddenly redundant, as was the King's belated offer to withdraw the ordinances. With the capital on the verge of anarchy, new inst.i.tutions redolent of the 1790s were hastily improvised: a munic.i.p.al committee and a national guard led by that old republican warhorse Lafayette. As Salomon uneasily reported to Metternich on July 30, "the tricolour flag is flying on all public buildings." Lionel described a euphorically insurgent Paris: The streets are crowded with persons, all laughing and as gay as if they had come from some Dance, in the squares & open places all the Garde Nationale & Royal Troops who had delivered up their arms, marching & being cheered by the people, in every corner the three coloured flags & every person with a red, blue & white c.o.c.kade, in the Boulevard & streets every hundred yards the fine large trees cut down and the pavement taken up & piled up against them & broken doors &c so that nothing can pa.s.s . . . these barricades, as they call them, are not only in the princ.i.p.al streets, but in all the small ones, so that it was impossible for the soldiers & artillery to pa.s.s anywhere.

Small wonder James was beetle-browed when the historian Jules Michelet glimpsed him in his carriage. Small wonder he took the precaution of burying his bonds in the grounds of Salomon's house at Suresnes.

Yet James survived. The traditional explanation for this is that he was a skilful turncoat, but the reality is more complex. It is undeniable that he switched sides in July 1830 with alacrity and relief. Apart from the offer of a rural hiding place to Vitrolles, he did nothing of substance to a.s.sist the outgoing regime, rejecting all requests from the ousted monarch for money until it was clear that he was leaving the country. Indeed, his nephew exulted in Charles's overthrow: "Never was there a more glorious week for France, this people have [sic] behaved in a way that will be admired by every person, and will make them be reckoned now amongst the first of nations . . . It will be a good lesson for other governm[en]ts." When Polignac was put on trial later in the year, James shed no tears: "I a.s.sure you that, as far as I am concerned, for all the good that Polignac has done for us, he might as well be d.a.m.ned." James was also quick to broadcast his support for the new regime, ostentatiously donating 15,000 francs for the care of those wounded in the street-fighting. Not only did Anselm do his bit in the national guard (a bourgeois defence force of which the family strongly approved); James even dressed up his three-year-old son Alphonse in a miniature guard's uniform. It is also true that the liberals' decision to offer first the office of lieutenant general and then the crown to the duc d'Orleans was a stroke of good luck for James; as we have seen, he had already made the new King a "good friend" in the 1820s. From the Rothschild point of view, a const.i.tutional monarchy was preferable to an absolute regime, and far better than a republic: as Salomon characteristically put it after watching Louis Philippe take the coronation oath to uphold the slightly revised charter: "Thank G.o.d that we have come so far that the matter has ended so well, for otherwise the Rentes would not have stood at 79 but would have fallen to 39 G.o.d forbid." James's relations with some of the key figures in the new government-notably the two bankers Laffitte and Perier-were also relatively good, though the extent of genuine amity among such business rivals should not be exaggerated. Talleyrand, who was the linchpin of Louis Philippe's diplomacy in London, was persuaded to bank with Nathan. Sebastiani, the Foreign Minister from late 1830, was "on the most friendly terms" with James, who called on him "every morning"; relations with his successor de Broglie were also close.

Heine was ultimately right, then, when he said that James "appreciated the political capacities of Louis Philippe from the first, and . . . always stayed on an intimate footing with that grand master of politics." Indeed, even the later anti-Semitic writer Drumont was not far wrong when he later spoke of an "affinity" between James and Louis Philippe based on their common "adoration of money": we know that James gave Louis Philippe a personal loan of over 2 million francs in April 1840 and Heine attributed the "great attentions paid to [Rothschild] at court" to the King's "financial plight." Although Stendhal's witty and well-connected "Monsieur Leuwen" can hardly have been modelled on James, as has sometimes been claimed-he is not Jewish, for example, and his French is much too elegant-his political influence as portrayed by Stendhal closely corresponds to that wielded by James at the time the novel was written (1836).5 "The newspapers write so much about the ministers speculating with us," reported Lionel in 1834, "that they don't like to receive us every day." The Rothschilds' private correspondence reveals the truth of such press reports, and suggests that it was only a slight exaggeration to claim, as one Austrian source did, that "in all Ministries and in all the Departments [Rothschild] has his creatures of all ranks to bring him every kind of information." At the same time, the social barriers which had still existed under the Restoration all but disappeared in the reign of the "Citizen King": members of the royal family as well as ministers and amba.s.sadors were happy to accept James's invitations to dinners, b.a.l.l.s and hunting parties. "The newspapers write so much about the ministers speculating with us," reported Lionel in 1834, "that they don't like to receive us every day." The Rothschilds' private correspondence reveals the truth of such press reports, and suggests that it was only a slight exaggeration to claim, as one Austrian source did, that "in all Ministries and in all the Departments [Rothschild] has his creatures of all ranks to bring him every kind of information." At the same time, the social barriers which had still existed under the Restoration all but disappeared in the reign of the "Citizen King": members of the royal family as well as ministers and amba.s.sadors were happy to accept James's invitations to dinners, b.a.l.l.s and hunting parties.

Nevertheless, the cosiness of the relationship which developed between James and Louis Philippe's regime in the course of the 1830s should not blind us to the fact that, at least until 1833, the Rothschilds were far from convinced that the regime would endure. And with good reason. The example of Spain suggested the possibility of a protracted civil war between rival claimants to the throne. More important, recent French history gave little encouragement to proponents of a const.i.tutional monarchy. Every time crowds took to the streets of Paris-calling for the execution of Polignac in October 1830, for example-the fear recurred that the monarchy would be swept aside by the supporters of a republic. In December "precautions" had to be taken when James received warnings "that they [republicans] intend attacking the house tonight & taking everything." Lionel's a.s.sessment was not unrealistic: "This party although not so very large makes itself appear considerably more so, by their active conduct, they make use of all the nonsense of the first revolution & wish to make this one resemble it in every respect: this frightens many persons."

More pessimistic observers like the Prussian amba.s.sador Werther warned James that Louis Philippe would "go the same way as Louis XVI." "The old revolution started in a similar manner," James's dinner guests told him, "and the situation now is beginning to look ominously alike. We can't see how anyone here can feel secure and we are surprised that you, who are so wealthy, are prepared to remain in such a country, when, at any one time, one has no idea what the next day might bring." Nor was a new republic all that James had to fear. There was also the more recent memory of imperial glory, which a smaller number of Bonapartists sought to rekindle. Finally, there was the newer phenomenon of working cla.s.s unrest, which flared up periodically not only in Paris but in Lyon and other industrial centres about which the Rothschilds at this stage knew little.

Contemporaries were impressed by the way James quickly resumed the lavish entertaining for which he was already famous, throwing a "crowded and brilliant" ball as early as January 15, 1831. But this was only the day after a violent anti-clerical riot, and, as the Austrian amba.s.sador described it, the city was still echoing to the Ma.r.s.eillaise as the Rothschilds' guests danced. Louis Philippe's son the duc d'Orleans relayed his apologies through an aide-de-camp, who explained that he was at the head of his regiment and that the republic was being proclaimed in the streets: Mme de Rothschild was dying of fear, imagining the pillage of her house; despite that, we kept on dancing. When I engaged Mlle de Laborde for a galop, her mother told me that a glow that could be seen in the sky was none other than the bishop's house at Conflans, which the rioters had set on fire."It's terrifying, yes, it's frightful," said the young lady. "But let's dance while we can today. If it is true that we are going to have the republic tomorrow, that will mean the end of feasts and b.a.l.l.s for ages." . . . The ball lasted until four in the morning and there was no trouble. M. de Rothschild, despite his great desire to appear gay, is sad in his soul, for his money is melting in his vaults like an icicle in the heat.

The combination of outward bravado and inner caution continued as long as there was such violence in the streets of Paris. But the mood at these events was always tense. In January 1832 the duc d'Orleans was affronted when he heard himself referred to by his nickname ("le grand poulot") by a Legitimist guest at one of James's parties-though it is not the case that he subsequently refused invitations to the rue Laffitte.

Even in periods of relative political tranquillity, French politics seemed volatile (especially to Rothschilds raised in London), with more frequent changes of ministry than in England, and more friction between crown and parliament. All these intricate political shifts had to be followed closely, for, as James put it, "a lot depends on what sort of Ministry we get." In February 1831, for example, an anxious James sought rea.s.surance from Louis Philippe that the crumbling Laffitte ministry would not be replaced by a more liberally inclined administration. He and Lionel were "consoled" to hear that the most likely successor would be another banker, Perier, and that Perier intended to reduce the King's direct influence over policy. As we shall see, this was one of the most important changes of government of the period-and one which James claimed to have personally brought about. However, Perier's hold on power was always tenuous. July 1831-when elections unfortunately coincided with the anniversary of revolution-was a time of renewed political unsteadiness, with Laffitte failing by only a handful of votes to secure election as president of the Chamber. When Perier nevertheless resigned, James was appalled. Rothschild relief when he returned to office after a matter of days was considerable. Throughout 1831, the Paris letters monitored the health of his ministry-particularly its difficulties over reform of the House of Peers-with the obsessive anxiety of relatives around a loved one's bedside. The cartoonist Delaporte vividly caught the volatile mood of French politics in June 1831 when he depicted it as a funfair. To the left James and Ouvrard vie for control of a see-saw; in the centre Perier struggles to register on the "Dynamometer or Test of Strength for the use and instruction of ministers"; to the right Louis Philippe slumps unconscious (see ill.u.s.tration 8.i).

The metaphor of an ailing government, unfortunately, became a reality in the spring of 1832-just when Lionel began to sense a real stabilisation of the domestic political situation. As Salomon fretted, it was "unpleasant to admit" that stability depended "entirely upon a single individual." The full significance of this dependence suddenly became clear when Paris was struck by the cholera epidemic which swept westwards from Russia in 1831-2, claiming the lives of 18,000 people. Not only did the epidemic cause new riots in the city and "complete paralysis" on the bourse; it also afflicted Perier himself. Once again James was obliged to put on a public show of confidence, staying in Paris while thousands of wealthy Parisians fled to the countryside. But the combination of the premier's death (on May 16) and the landing of the Bourbon d.u.c.h.esse de Berry in the south of the country was yet another blow to political stability. It was not until November that the threat of a "Carlist" civil war was entirely dispelled by the d.u.c.h.esse's arrest. Meanwhile Paris continued to be subjected to republican demonstrations and riots, such as those occasioned by the funeral of General Lamarque, another cholera victim.

Although James and Lionel grew increasingly confident that the regime was secure after 1832-warmly welcoming every legal restriction imposed on republican activities-there were political crises of varying degrees of intensity throughout the 1830s. Quite apart from periodic ministerial crises, there were a number of attempts on the King's life, working cla.s.s unrest in Lyon in 1834, an abortive republican coup in 1839 and an equally abortive Bonapartist invasion in 1840. On closer inspection, relations between the Rothschilds and the July Monarchy were only superficially intimate; as James's private correspondence makes clear, he regarded Louis Philippe and most of his ministers as incompetent. The King was "duplicitous"; the Finance Minister Humann "an a.s.s"; Thiers "a little man," and so on. "Well, my dear Amschel," wrote James dismissively as yet another government fell in early 1839, "I can a.s.sure you that within two years these old Ministers will be back again in their old posts because our French Ministers are just like serviettes: after a period of time they require the attention of a washerwoman, and once they have had a rest they are as good [as new] again."

8.i: H. Delaporte, James de Rothschild and Louis Philippe, La Caricature James de Rothschild and Louis Philippe, La Caricature, No. 67 (June 23, 1831).

James's contempt was rooted in his own traumatic economic experience during the revolution. Between May 1830 and April 1831 the price of 3 and 4 per cent rentes slid inexorably downwards to reach a nadir of 46 and 75 respectively, a fall of 30-40 per cent (see ill.u.s.tration 8.ii). This was despite the closing of the bourse during the July days and the injection of 50 million francs by the Banque de France in August. It was not until the end of 1831 that prices showed any sign of stabilising. Given that on the eve of the crisis James and Nathan had held a total of 6 million francs "nominal" of the two kinds of security, for which they had paid 5.36 million francs, their losses could have been as much as 2.1 million francs (86,000) on the rente account alone. James sold at least some of these rentes before the nadir was reached, but as before he was reluctant to cut his losses. "We are sitting in a bowl of soup and we must now wait for it to be cooked," he told Nathan in late August. "Every day there are so many rentes for sale but there are no buyers to be found . . . I hope that they will go up, G.o.d willing, and then one must get out of these. I no longer have the confidence which I had previously, and it will be a long time yet before the old feeling of trust returns once more."

8.ii: The price of 3 per cent and 4 per cent rentes, May 1830-May 1831.

He, Lionel and even Hannah-who was in Paris for her daughter's accouche ment-watched hypnotised by the hourly fluctuations of the market, waiting in vain for the crisis to "blow over."6 Indeed, James began to buy new rentes in the hope of stabilising the market: by November 1830 his total holding may have amounted to as much as 30 million francs (nominal). But still the prices fell. "We have," he lamented, "too many rentes hanging round our neck and are unable to compete with the speculators on the same level." Five months later Lionel confessed to his father: "We have been all the time so misled by the abundancy of money and scarcity of stock, & by the peaceable a.s.surances of the King, that we never could make up our minds to sell." Writing from Berlin, Anselm urged a final liquidation before rentes sank any further. After much prevarication-"I cannot decide to accept a loss of 40 per cent"-James was ultimately forced to sell heavily at the bottom of the market in March 1831. "Unfortunately," he told Nathan, echoing Apponyi, "my fortune has melted away because I have been realising [that is, selling]." He had "so depleted" his capital "that I do not wish to look at the balance." Indeed, James began to buy new rentes in the hope of stabilising the market: by November 1830 his total holding may have amounted to as much as 30 million francs (nominal). But still the prices fell. "We have," he lamented, "too many rentes hanging round our neck and are unable to compete with the speculators on the same level." Five months later Lionel confessed to his father: "We have been all the time so misled by the abundancy of money and scarcity of stock, & by the peaceable a.s.surances of the King, that we never could make up our minds to sell." Writing from Berlin, Anselm urged a final liquidation before rentes sank any further. After much prevarication-"I cannot decide to accept a loss of 40 per cent"-James was ultimately forced to sell heavily at the bottom of the market in March 1831. "Unfortunately," he told Nathan, echoing Apponyi, "my fortune has melted away because I have been realising [that is, selling]." He had "so depleted" his capital "that I do not wish to look at the balance."

Moreover, the French crash affected other bonds. A German cartoon of 1830 or 1831 shows four of the Rothschilds ("the Krahwinkler," after the imaginary German town of Krahwinkel) vainly struggling to keep some falling bonds in the air with the aid of bellows (see ill.u.s.tration 8.iii). It is impossible to quantify exactly the extent of the losses suffered by the Paris house at this time, as the relevant accounts have not survived; but for the London house total losses in 1830 were more than 56,000, 5 per cent of the house's capital, and it seems safe to a.s.sume that the damage was worse across the Channel. Comparable losses bankrupted Laffitte, whose firm collapsed even as he reached the zenith of his political influence.

8.iii: Anon., Die Krahwinkler suchen die Papiere in die Hohe zu treiben Die Krahwinkler suchen die Papiere in die Hohe zu treiben (1830-31). (1830-31).

As it was, James had to endure a measure of embarra.s.sment. In November 1830 he was forced to suspend payments due to the government for the pre-Revolution loan. Nor could he deny that "that d.a.m.ned Ouvrard" had supplanted him as the dominant figure on the bourse: "For the past six months, the man has had a lot of good fortune and so the whole world follows whatever he does . . . Whatever move he makes the whole stock exchange will follow suit." When James sought to partic.i.p.ate in a new government loan in March 1831, another old rival was brutally frank. "For several months now," Hottinguer told him, "your establishment no longer makes the same positive impression [as in the past] on public opinion."7 James felt obliged to speak to the other bankers "in a stiff tone and to 'show them my teeth' as they must appreciate that we are not to be treated off-handedly." But it was some time before he was able to restore his credibility in the French financial world. Indeed, Lionel began to detect in his uncle something close to a loss of nerve. "Uncle James is so much shaken by this revolution," he confided in his father, "that I a.s.sure you he is no more what he was, if he sees things looking well, he says, we must go to the old prices, and if the contrary is the case and the r[ente]s fall, then he gets immediately frightened and sells at the lowest price." James felt obliged to speak to the other bankers "in a stiff tone and to 'show them my teeth' as they must appreciate that we are not to be treated off-handedly." But it was some time before he was able to restore his credibility in the French financial world. Indeed, Lionel began to detect in his uncle something close to a loss of nerve. "Uncle James is so much shaken by this revolution," he confided in his father, "that I a.s.sure you he is no more what he was, if he sees things looking well, he says, we must go to the old prices, and if the contrary is the case and the r[ente]s fall, then he gets immediately frightened and sells at the lowest price."

James himself became increasingly fatalistic in 1831. "We can now expect many years of unrest here in France," he told Nathan gloomily in July, "and regrettably, I fear we will lose our fortune here, and have no hope of preventing this from happening, because the people never know what they want." "For some time now, I have been very sick," he wrote a month later, requesting that Salomon's son Anselm return to Paris to a.s.sist him: Every day we have new scares, and every day new surprises. .h.i.t us. Good news is followed by a fall, and bad news brings a rise in its wake. At night one goes to sleep, and is then awoken by a drum making a terrible din in the street. "Please hide all your securities without delay." . . . I promise you, so help me G.o.d, my arms are trembling, as things have gone badly wrong for me. I did some buying, so prices fell. When I sell, prices go up. It is absolutely disgusting.

By October he was feeling "half frantic," "nervous" and isolated: "The world is speculating against me, and I am speculating against the world." It was not until early 1832 that James began to recover his confidence. Curiously, he seems to have rather relished riding out the cholera epidemic, and was pleasantly surprised when Perier's death caused only a minor fall. Only when matters began to improve in the summer was he able to retreat to his house at Boulogne, where he took to bed in a state of complete exhaustion.

Consols and the Const.i.tution.

The princ.i.p.al reason for James's financial survival was the role played by the other Rothschild houses in bailing him out. Here, not for the last time, the bank's multinational character proved an invaluable source of strength. Nathan's first reaction to the news of the events in Paris was to purchase and borrow large quant.i.ties of silver and gold from the Bank of England-he bought gold alone worth 779,000-and send it at once to his brother. This is what James meant when he repeatedly praised Nathan's "decency," for it allowed him to continue paying the money due to the French Treasury under the terms of the loan agreement concluded earlier in the year-a vital show of financial strength. As Hannah told her husband proudly, "Your exertion in sending so much money gives great pleasure . . . You have dear Rothschild behaved uncommonly well and every one is quite satisfied with you." One reason Nathan was able to bail his brother out was that, as The Times The Times later said, he had managed to sell a substantial proportion of his own 4 per cent rentes before the revolution broke out. later said, he had managed to sell a substantial proportion of his own 4 per cent rentes before the revolution broke out.8 The London house was again a source of support in March 1831, when James was seeking to partic.i.p.ate in a new French loan: access to the London market remained James's trump card in Paris. The Naples house also seems to have a.s.sisted by sending silver; its surviving accounts show that half-yearly profits were unaffected by the revolution. Indirectly, the fact that the Frankfurt and Vienna houses remained on a sound footing also helped. The London house was again a source of support in March 1831, when James was seeking to partic.i.p.ate in a new French loan: access to the London market remained James's trump card in Paris. The Naples house also seems to have a.s.sisted by sending silver; its surviving accounts show that half-yearly profits were unaffected by the revolution. Indirectly, the fact that the Frankfurt and Vienna houses remained on a sound footing also helped.

Of course, this would not have been the case if the revolutionary wave of 1830-32 had affected the other Rothschild houses as directly as it affected the French house. It is important to note that it could have. There were widespread fears in 1830 that Naples would succ.u.mb once again to revolution as well as the Papal states, and the German reverberations might have been felt more strongly than they were in Vienna. As it was, Salomon confided in Gentz in November 1830 that he was "10 million [gulden] poorer than he had been six months before." In Frankfurt too there were grounds for anxiety, not least because of events in neighbouring Hesse-Ka.s.sel. The Elector William II (who had succeeded his father in 1821) was one of those rulers who came unstuck in 1830, when citizens' a.s.semblies in Ka.s.sel, Hanau and Fulda demanded the summoning of a parliament (Landtag). Initially, the main bone of contention was William's overt cohabitation with his mistress; but the looting of customs houses on the state border suggests that economic grievances also played a part. Since 1823 the Elector had not had recourse to the Rothschilds for financial a.s.sistance. But in the crisis of 1830 his officials appealed to Amschel for a small advance of 150,000 gulden. As his chief minister put it: "Your most humble servants are not in a position to propose a way of obtaining the advance which is most urgently needed other than through the house of Rothschild." They were not the only ones: requests were also received from hard-pressed governments in Hanover, Wurttemberg and Oldenburg. Given the growing risk of German revolutions on the French model, however, Amschel was prepared to lend the Elector only 100,000 gulden.

Yet when the Elector's son Frederick William was installed as co-regent and accepted a const.i.tution which was the most liberal yet seen in Germany, Amschel's att.i.tude changed. In 1831 he arranged two loans to the new regime totalling 1.35 million gulden. In many ways, this was a.n.a.logous to James's defection from Charles X to Louis Philippe in Paris. And, as in France, it did not take long for the more advanced liberals to become dissillusioned with the new ruler. Amschel nevertheless stuck to the new ruler even as his popularity declined, just as James stuck to Louis Philippe. He continued to act as banker to Frederick William and his unpopular wife9 even after the Hessian government resumed a course (under the firmly anti-liberal Ludwig Ha.s.senpflug) which led inevitably to a messy const.i.tutional crisis. In short, Amschel blew with the wind. He and his brothers evidently had little respect for the various German princes endeavouring to retain their traditional authority. Salomon advised him "not to pay attention to the declamations and discussions" of the King of Wurttemberg "as I know this prince better than you: his views are always wrong and his opinions are always changing, and whether he is courageous or cowardly makes no odds, [as] I have more confidence in the opinion of a child than in that of this prince." But once Metternich's influence began to make itself felt in Germany after the revolutionary high-water mark of the Ham bach festival, the Frankfurt house wept no tears. Even this very modest German revolution had cost Amschel money, as Anthony found when he visited Frankfurt. The failure of the even after the Hessian government resumed a course (under the firmly anti-liberal Ludwig Ha.s.senpflug) which led inevitably to a messy const.i.tutional crisis. In short, Amschel blew with the wind. He and his brothers evidently had little respect for the various German princes endeavouring to retain their traditional authority. Salomon advised him "not to pay attention to the declamations and discussions" of the King of Wurttemberg "as I know this prince better than you: his views are always wrong and his opinions are always changing, and whether he is courageous or cowardly makes no odds, [as] I have more confidence in the opinion of a child than in that of this prince." But once Metternich's influence began to make itself felt in Germany after the revolutionary high-water mark of the Ham bach festival, the Frankfurt house wept no tears. Even this very modest German revolution had cost Amschel money, as Anthony found when he visited Frankfurt. The failure of the putsch putsch in Frankfurt attempted by a small and incompetent group of radicals in April 1833 was a welcome sign that the political tide was ebbing. in Frankfurt attempted by a small and incompetent group of radicals in April 1833 was a welcome sign that the political tide was ebbing.

Nathan in London also experienced his share of political turbulence. Of course, events in Britain were less violent than those on the continent. It would nevertheless be a mistake to overlook the close parallels between British reform on the one hand and French revolution on the other, not least because contemporaries were so conscious of these, and had no way of being sure that the former would avert the latter. The issues at stake were not so different: the freedom of the press; the reduction of religious disabilities in political life (which had already caused a serious political crisis in 1829); the extension of the electoral franchise; the const.i.tutional position of the crown relative to ministers and that of the upper house of parliament relative to the lower. The cholera came to London too.10 More importantly, the financial consequences of political crisis were very similar, if less dramatic in London. Had the Reform crisis in Britain been even slightly more serious, then James might have found his brother much less free to lend a.s.sistance. More importantly, the financial consequences of political crisis were very similar, if less dramatic in London. Had the Reform crisis in Britain been even slightly more serious, then James might have found his brother much less free to lend a.s.sistance.

From the vantage point of Paris, it seemed at first unlikely that the Whig ministry of Earl Grey would survive. Indeed, as late as March 5, 1831-four days after Lord John Russell introduced the Reform Bill-James wrote to Salomon a.s.suring him that "Peel, Palmerston and Wellington are coming to power." But this was wishful thinking on the part of his old Tory friends (Herries was his source for this tip). For his part, James was more inclined to think that an English revolution was in preparation, similar to the one he himself had experienced the year before, "because should the Bill be pa.s.sed, then this will be seen as a fatal blow to England, and if on the other hand the Bill is not pa.s.sed then one can expect a great deal of unrest." When Parliament was dissolved in April, James had a sense of deja vu deja vu. As he put it to Lionel: "If the Reform Bill pa.s.ses, it will bring the same results as the revolution did here, the King wanted to take away from the people all their rights, which brought the revolution. In England the King gives the people more than their rights, which will have consequences as bad as the contrary has had." He made the same point directly to Nathan: I might be mistaken, but the initial impression that the dissolution of Parliament in England has made on me is the same as . . . our dissolution made when, to start with, no one viewed the matter as giving cause for concern but then we fell some 30 per cent and I hope to G.o.d this will not be repeated this time in England. But I am very anxious . . . Let us get down to the nitty gritty. I am not at all pleased with the situation in England.

As James saw it, "a lot of antagonism has been generated against the wealthier cla.s.ses, and England has only been strong until now precisely because they [the government] had the support of the wealthy cla.s.s." The Reform Bill might seem moderate, but "the supporters of . . . Reform will almost certainly make further d