The History of Woman Suffrage Volume II Part 69

[Ill.u.s.tration: Ellen Clark Sargent.]

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

Now, I maintain in the first place that we must put a reasonable construction on those words. Plainly, to my mind, all men are created equal in point of natural rights, certainly not equal in point of civil rights, not equal in point of political rights. By nature man has no civil or political rights. Natural rights are one sort of rights; civil rights are another sort of rights; and political rights are a third sort of rights. Every human being has a natural right to life and liberty; but every human being has not a natural right to government. He has not a natural right to the civil rights conferred and defined by a system of government. When he becomes subject to civil government he surrenders a part of his natural rights--agrees that civil government may regulate these and then enjoys the benefit of civil rights conferred by civil government; but then he does not thereby necessarily become ent.i.tled to political rights. He can not become ent.i.tled to political rights until they shall be conferred upon him by government.

Mr. MORTON.--Will the Senator cite what follows?

Mr. MERRIMON.--When our fathers adopted the Declaration of Independence, and declared these general truths, they had reference to the natural rights of man, and only to those rights.

They well knew the distinctions to which I have adverted, had them in view and acted upon them, as I shall now proceed to show.

Mr. MORTON.--It says that "to secure these rights" referred to, the right of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, "governments were inst.i.tuted which derive their just powers from the consent of the governed." Now, I ask if women are a part of "the governed?"

Mr. MERRIMON.--Yes, sir; they are a part of "the governed," and I say that they have not only a.s.sented, but they have consented to this system of government.

Mr. MORTON.--How?

Mr. MERRIMON.--I say so, because they have never raised their voice in opposition to it; they have given for nearly a century their highest moral sanction to it; we have had a moral expression from the American women with a degree of unanimity and cordiality that is striking. I am warranted in saying that nine hundred and ninety-nine out of every thousand have given their moral a.s.sent, in as full a measure as it was possible for them to do, to our system of government. They have sustained it under all circ.u.mstances with their love, their hands, and their hearts, with their smiles and their tears, educated their children to love it and to die for it. They have manifested their love for it in every form, it has never appeared, be it said to their honor, that they disliked or disapproved it. They have had the right under the bill of rights of every State in the Union, they have had the right under the Const.i.tution of the Union at all times to memorialize the States and to memorialize Congress, protesting against any abridgment of their natural or civil rights, if they deemed there was any abridgment of those rights. But I repeat what I said a while ago, the number who have thus memorialized Congress and the State governments, compared with those who have not opened their mouths on this subject, is as a drop in the sea compared to the waste of waters. They have yielded their a.s.sent to this system of government; they have ratified it by every means in their power outside of exercising the political right to vote. I know that there are a few women in the country who complain, but those who complain, compared with those who do not complain, are as one to a million.

But to get back to the point. Those who established the Declaration of Independence gave an exposition to their view of it in the formation and administration of the several State governments they adopted. For years in those State governments they provided civil and political distinctions and discriminations; they provided that certain cla.s.ses of white men should enjoy certain cla.s.ses of rights, that certain other men should not enjoy the same rights. They provided that the male population should enjoy rights that the female should not enjoy.

They provided that the white race should be free and that the black race should be slaves. They did that, and according to their action and the organic laws which they adopted, they said in the most solemn manner they could, that that system of government carried out the purposes they meant to declare and define in the Declaration of Independence. They not only did that, but they had a right to do it, nor was it inconsistent with the declaration, for it referred only to natural rights, and when they inst.i.tuted governments they provided civil and political rights, and therefore there was no contradiction and no practical absurdity as is suggested. Their theory was practical and adapted to the comprehension and protection of human rights. They were not visionary theorists but practical statesmen. They were not radical but conservative in their notions of government. Not only the State governments did at first what I have indicated, but when the American people came to establish the Const.i.tution of the United States they again provided in the Const.i.tution a distinction and discrimination between the male and the female portion of the American people; they provided that the males should hold the offices, that the males should have the right to vote; and not only that, but by way of further exposition of their views of the nature, purposes, and meaning of the Declaration, they provided that the black race should be slaves.

That Const.i.tution recognizes negro slavery in three several provisions.

Mr. MORTON.--Does the Senator speak of the Const.i.tution of the United States?

Mr. MERRIMON.--Yes, sir. In the matter of representation, slavery was expressly provided for; it was recognized in another provision relative to prohibiting the importation of certain persons until after the year 1808; and in another provision which provided that those held to labor, escaping to another State, should be surrendered to their masters on demand. The Const.i.tution of the Union, made in pursuance of this very Declaration of Independence and conforming to it, recognized a distinction between the white race and the black race, and recognized and provided distinctions between the male and the female portions of the people of the American Union, and thereby in the most absolute manner drew the civil and political distinctions that have been kept up in one way or another from that day to this, and which I contend, with a view to good government, so far as the male and female portions of the American people go, ought to be kept up and perpetuated. It seems to me that any one who will take into consideration the facts to which I have called attention must see that the broad, radical construction which the Senator puts on the Declaration of Independence can not be sustained by reason, authority, or practice.

But, sir, I want now to refer to the position taken by the Senator from California [Mr. Sargent]. He says that under the Const.i.tution by the XIII., XIV. and XV. articles of Amendment, Congress has no power to deprive the females of this country of the right of suffrage. That I deny as emphatically as I can. I read from Paschal's Annotated Const.i.tution, p. 65:

18. But citizenship of the United States, or of a State, does not of itself give the right to vote; nor, _e converso_, does the want of it prevent a State from conferring the right of suffrage. (Scott _vs._ Sandford, 19 Howard, 422.)

The right of suffrage is the right to choose officers of the Government, and it does not carry along the right of citizenship. (Bates on Citizenship, 4, 5.) Our laws make no provision for the loss or deprivation of citizenship.

(_Id._)

The word "citizen" is not mentioned in this clause, and its idea is excluded in the qualifications for suffrage in all the State const.i.tutions. (_Id._, 5, 6.)

Mr. SARGENT.--What clause is he commenting on?

Mr. MERRIMON.--He is commenting on section 2 of article 1. He says further:

American citizenship does not necessarily depend upon nor co-exist with the legal capacity to hold office or the right of suffrage, either or both of them.

No person in the United States did ever exercise the right of suffrage in virtue of the naked, una.s.sisted fact of citizenship. (_Id._)

There is a distinction between political rights and political powers. The former belong to all citizens alike, and cohere in the very name and nature of citizenship. The latter (voting and holding office) does not belong to all citizens alike, nor to any citizen merely in virtue of citizenship. His power always depends upon extraneous facts and superadded qualifications; which facts and qualifications are common to both citizens and aliens.

(Bates on Citizenship.)

I read these hasty citations of authority which happen to be convenient to show that there is a distinction between political power and political rights, and in further support of the distinction between citizenship, or civil rights, and political rights.

Mr. SARGENT.--Will my friend allow me a moment?

Mr. MERRIMON.--Yes, sir.

Mr. SARGENT.--The author there is commenting on the second section of the first article of the Const.i.tution, and I think his reasoning on that upon general principles may be correct, at any rate it is in consonance with the authority that he cites. But it will be observed that by the XIV. article, section 1, it is provided that--

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.

And then it says:

No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens,

Covering the whole broad ground. Whatever may be the privileges and immunities of citizens are covered and protected by this clause. This is subsequent to the article commented on there and changes the spirit of the old Const.i.tution, is inconsistent with it, repeals it, or modifies it _pro tanto_; or else there would be no object in the adoption of the XIV. article.

Mr. MERRIMON.--I was just coming to the discussion of that Amendment. The XIV. Amendment applies to civil rights. As I have shown, a citizen merely by virtue of citizenship does not enjoy political rights; neither the right to vote nor the right to hold office. The manifest object and purpose of the XIV. Amendment was to secure to all the American people equality of right in the States, equality of right under the United States, civilly, not politically; and that is made more manifest when we consider the second section of the XIV. Amendment. It is in these words:

Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the executive and judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for partic.i.p.ation in rebellion or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

Thus it appears the amendments recognized the right of the State itself to regulate the political right to vote. The XV. article of Amendment still further confirms my view. It provides that "the right of citizens of the United States to vote"--and that word "vote" is material there--"the right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State." Note what follows: "On account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." The right of a citizen of the United States in the first place to vote shall not be abridged on account of three considerations, to-wit: race, color, or previous condition of servitude. Why was it limited to those three causes? Manifestly because the framers of this article saw that Congress had the power to abridge the rights of the colored race--indeed, any race--in the matter of voting and in the matter of holding office as well. Can it be contended that the United States would not have the power to-day to provide that a negro or an Indian or a Chinese or a Mongolian, if naturalized, and a citizen, should not hold office under the United States Government? It is plain they would have such power. But they can not act upon the ground of race, color, or previous condition as to the matter of voting, and the restriction is to that alone.

This clause provides expressly that as to voting the right of no human being shall be abridged because of his race, or his color, or his previous condition of servitude, but such right may be abridged for any other cause or consideration. This amendment did not impose a restriction simply on the power of the United States. In order to protect the colored race in the Southern States, and indeed I may say throughout the whole Union, this provision embraces the States as well as the United States, and provides that the States shall not have power to abridge the right to vote on any one of three accounts--race, color, or previous condition of servitude. But that does not imply that the States shall not have the power to abridge this right for other causes. Each State has the power to-day to abridge the right to vote because a man can not read, because he can not write, or for any similar cause. The States have power to provide that a man shall not be allowed to hold office or to vote because he can not read or because he can not write, or for any cause whatever. That is not only so according to the plain construction to be given to the XV. Amendment, but some of the States exercise such power in this country to-day.

Mr. SARGENT.--Will the Senator allow me to direct his mind to one consideration?

Mr. MERRIMON.--I will.

Mr. SARGENT.--The XV. Amendment to the Const.i.tution which the Senator refers to, reads: "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged:" It does not create a right, it says "the right"; it speaks of something existing which shall not be denied. The right, then, to vote is the right of a citizen of the United States; the right exists. In other words, the right which exists of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged.

Mr. MERRIMON.--There is no affirmative provision or principle in the Const.i.tution that confers such a right, and my friend arrives at his conclusion by a simple inference; that is all. And I apprehend that a right of so much moment, contravening the whole policy of the Government, heretofore, can not be established by a simple inference; and especially in the strength and in the face of the fact, however it might be as to other matters, that the United States shall not have the power to abridge the right for the cause mentioned. Besides this, if I concede what the honorable Senator says, he must acknowledge that it is within the power of the United States to abridge the right to vote for other causes than those stated. The const.i.tution of Connecticut prescribes these qualifications: Every white male citizen of the United States; one year's residence; freehold of the yearly value of six dollars; good moral character; able to read any article of the Const.i.tution or any section of the statutes of the State. But if that State had undertaken to restrict the right to vote because a man was black or because he belonged to a particular race, or because heretofore he had been subject to a condition of servitude, that would be absolutely null and void; or if they had put in that he should not vote because he was white it would be null and void.

Next, by the const.i.tution of Ma.s.sachusetts, the right to vote is limited to "male citizens (excepting persons or paupers under guardianship); residence in the State one year; in the town or district six months; having paid all required taxes." That const.i.tution has existed since 1780. It was provided further in that const.i.tution that "no person shall have the right to vote or to be eligible to office under this Commonwealth who shall not be able to read the const.i.tution in the English language and write his name. So that the power which I insist belongs to the United States, and I think I have shown belongs to the States, not only exists, but is actually exercised by States, at least two States of the Union, at this moment; and indeed in nearly or quite all the States there are more or less restrictions of the right to vote; and the State and the Union have absolute power to abridge the political right to vote except for three causes only, and those three causes are race, color, or previous condition of servitude.

Mr. STEWART.--I hope that the Senate will not suppose that there is any const.i.tutional question here involved. It is simply a question of regulating the suffrage in a Territory, exclusively under the jurisdiction of the Congress of the United States.

There is no doubt of the power of Congress to allow women to vote in the Territories, and I hope there will not be a great deal of time spent on that matter.

Mr. MERRIMON.--Why do you want to go into a remote, spa.r.s.ely settled Territory to make the experiment?

Mr. STEWART.--Why not try it everywhere? Why not try it in North Carolina? Because we can not.

Mr. MERRIMON.--Why not try it in this city?

Mr. STEWART.--Because we have not the power to do it.

Mr. MERRIMON.--You have in the District of Columbia.

Mr. SARGENT.--We tried the question of negro suffrage in Nebraska first.

Mr. STEWART.--Negro suffrage was opened in a Territory when there were less people in it than there are here, and see how that has spread.

Mr. MERRIMON.--My friend did not hear my question. Why not confer suffrage on the women of the District of Columbia.