The History of Rome Volume III Part 7

16. Philip acted with a spirit more becoming a king; for, though he had found himself unequal to the forces of Attalus and the Rhodians, yet he was not dismayed, even by the Roman war with which he was threatened. Sending Philocles, one of his generals, with two thousand foot and two hundred horse, to ravage the lands of the Athenians, he gave the command of his fleet to Heraclides, to make for Maronea, and marched thither himself by land, with two thousand foot lightly equipped, and two hundred horse. Maronea he took at the first a.s.sault; and afterwards, with a good deal of trouble, got possession of Aenus, which was at last betrayed to him by Ganymede, the lieutenant of Ptolemy. He then seized on other forts, Cypselus, Doriscos, and Serrheus; and, advancing from thence to the Chersonesus, received Elaeus and Alopeconnesus, which were surrendered by the inhabitants.

Callipolis also, and Madytos, were given up to him, with several forts of but little consequence. The people of Abydus shut their gates against him, not admitting the amba.s.sadors. This siege detained Philip a long time; and it might have been relieved, had not Attalus and the Rhodians been dilatory. The king sent only three hundred men for a garrison, and the Rhodians one quadrireme from their fleet, although it was lying idle at Tenedos: and afterwards, when the besieged could with difficulty hold out any longer, Attalus, going over in person, did nothing more than show them some hope of relief being near, giving no a.s.sistance to these his allies either by land or sea.

17. At first the people of Abydus, by means of engines placed along the walls, not only prevented the approaches by land, but annoyed the enemy's ships in their station. Afterwards a part of the wall being thrown down, and the a.s.sailants having penetrated by mines to an inner wall, which had been hastily raised to oppose their entrance, they sent amba.s.sadors to the king about the conditions of the surrender of the city. They demanded permission to send away the Rhodian quadrireme, with the crew, and the troops of Attalus in the garrison; and that they themselves might depart from the city, each with one suit of apparel. When Philip's answer afforded no hopes of accommodation, unless they surrendered at discretion, this repudiation of their emba.s.sy so exasperated them, at once through indignation and despair, that, seized with the same kind of fury which had possessed the Saguntines, they ordered all the matrons to be shut up in the temple of Diana, and the free-born youths and virgins, and even the infants with their nurses, in the place of exercise; the gold and silver to be carried into the forum; their valuable garments to be put on board the Rhodian ship, and another from Cyzic.u.m, which lay in the harbour; the priests and victims to be brought, and altars to be erected in the midst. There they appointed a select number, who, as soon as they should see the army of their friends cut off in defending the breach, were instantly to slay their wives and children; to throw into the sea the gold, silver, and apparel that was on board the ships, and to set fire to the buildings, public and private: and to the performance of this deed they were bound by an oath, the priests repeating before them the verses of execration. Those who were of an age capable of fighting then swore that they would not leave their ranks alive unless victorious. These, regardful of the G.o.ds, (by whom they had sworn,) maintained their ground with such obstinacy, that although the night would soon have put a stop to the fight, yet the king, terrified by their fury, first desisted from the fight. The chief inhabitants, to whom the more shocking part of the plan had been given in charge, seeing that few survived the battle, and that these were exhausted by fatigue and wounds, sent the priests (having their heads bound with the fillets of suppliants) at the dawn of the next day to surrender the city to Philip.

18. Before the surrender, one of the Roman amba.s.sadors, who had been sent to Alexandria, Marcus Aemilius, being the youngest of them, on the joint resolution of the three, on hearing of the present siege, came to Philip, and complained of his having made war on Attalus and the Rhodians; and particularly that he was then besieging Abydus; and on Philip's saying that he had been forced into the war by Attalus and the Rhodians commencing hostilities against him,--"Did the people of Abydus, too," said he, "commence hostilities against you?" To him, who was unaccustomed to hear truth, this language seemed too arrogant to be used to a king, and he answered,--"Your youth, the beauty of your form, and, above all, the name of Roman, render you too presumptuous.

However, my first desire is, that you would observe the treaties, and continue in peace with me; but if you begin an attack, I am, on my part, determined to prove that the kingdom and name of the Macedonians is not less formidable in war than that of the Romans." Having dismissed the amba.s.sador in this manner, Philip got possession of the gold and silver which had been thrown together in a heap, but lost his booty with respect to prisoners: for such violent frenzy had seized the mult.i.tude, that, on a sudden, taking up a persuasion that those who had fallen in the battle had been treacherously sacrificed, and upbraiding one another with perjury, especially the priests, who would surrender alive to the enemy those persons whom they themselves had devoted, they all at once ran different ways to put their wives and children to death; and then they put an end to their own lives by every possible method. The king, astonished at their madness, restrained the violence of his soldiers, and said, "that he would allow the people of Abydus three days to die in;" and, during this s.p.a.ce, the vanquished perpetrated more deeds of cruelty on themselves than the enraged conquerors would have committed; nor did any one of them come into his hands alive, except such as chains, or some other insuperable restraint, forbade to die. Philip, leaving a garrison in Abydus, returned to his kingdom; and, just when he had been encouraged by the destruction of the people of Abydus to proceed in the war against Rome, as Hannibal had been by the destruction of Saguntum, he was met by couriers, with intelligence that the consul was already in Epirus, and had drawn his land forces to Apollonia, and his fleet to Corcyra, into winter quarters.

19. In the mean time, the amba.s.sadors who had been sent into Africa, on the affair of Hamilcar, the leader of the Gallic army, received from the Carthaginians this answer: that "it was not in their power to do more than to inflict on him the punishment of exile, and to confiscate his effects; that they had delivered up all the deserters and fugitives, whom, on a diligent inquiry, they had been able to discover, and would send amba.s.sadors to Rome, to satisfy the senate on that head." They sent two hundred thousand measures of wheat to Rome, and the same quant.i.ty to the army in Macedonia. From thence the amba.s.sadors proceeded into Numidia, to the king; delivered to Masinissa the presents and the message according to their instructions, and out of two thousand Numidian hors.e.m.e.n, which he offered, accepted one thousand. Masinissa superintended in person the embarkation of these, and sent them, with two hundred thousand measures of wheat, and the same quant.i.ty of barley, into Macedonia.

Their third commission was with Vermina. He advanced to meet them as far as the utmost limits of his kingdom, and left it to themselves to prescribe such conditions of peace as they thought proper, declaring, that "he should consider any peace with the Roman people as just and advantageous." The terms were then settled, and he was ordered to send amba.s.sadors to Rome to procure a ratification of the treaty.

20. About the same time, Lucius Cornelius Lentulus, proconsul, came home from Spain; and having laid before the senate an account of his brave and successful conduct, during the course of many years, demanded that he might be allowed to enter the city in triumph. The senate gave their opinion that "his services were, indeed, deserving of a triumph; but that they had no precedent left them by their ancestors of any person enjoying a triumph, who had not performed the service either of dictator, consul, or praetor; that he had held the province of Spain in quality of proconsul, and not of consul, or praetor." They determined, however, that he might enter the city in ovation. Against this, Tiberius Semp.r.o.nius Longus, tribune of the people, protested, alleging, that such proceedings would be no more in accordance with the custom of their ancestors, or with any precedent, than the other; but, overcome at length by the unanimous desire of the senate, the tribune withdrew his opposition, and Lucius Lentulus entered the city in ovation. He carried to the treasury forty-four thousand pounds weight of silver, and two thousand four hundred pounds weight of gold. To each of the soldiers he distributed, of the spoil, one hundred and twenty _a.s.ses_.[1]

[Footnote 1: 7s. 9d.]

21. The consular army had, by this time, been conducted from Arretium to Ariminum, and the five thousand Latin confederates had crossed from Gaul into Etruria. Lucius Furius, therefore, advanced from Ariminum, by forced marches, against the Gauls, who were then besieging Cremona, and pitched his camp at the distance of one mile and a half from the enemy. Furius had an opportunity of performing a splendid exploit, had he, without halting, led his troops directly to attack their camp; scattered hither and thither, they were wandering through the country; and the guard, which they had left, was not sufficiently strong; but he was apprehensive that his men were too much fatigued by their hasty march. The Gauls, recalled from the fields by the shouts of their party, returned to the camp without seizing the booty within their reach, and, next day, marched out to offer battle. The Roman did not decline the combat, but had scarcely time to draw up his forces, so rapidly did the enemy advance to the fight. The right brigade (for he had the troops of the allies divided into brigades) was placed in the first line, the two Roman legions in reserve. Marcus Furius was at the head of the right brigade, Marcus Caecilius of the legions, and Lucius Valerius Flaccus of the cavalry; these were all lieutenant-generals.

Two other lieutenant-generals, Cneius Laetorius and Publius t.i.tinnius, the praetor kept near himself, that, with their a.s.sistance, he might observe and take proper measures against all sudden attempts of the enemy. At first, the Gauls, bending their whole force to one point, were in hopes of being able to overwhelm, and trample under foot, the right brigade, which was in the van; but not succeeding, they endeavoured to turn round the flanks, and to surround their enemy's line, which, considering the mult.i.tude of their forces, and the small number of the others, seemed easy to be done. On observing this, the praetor, in order to extend his own line, brought up the two legions from the reserve, and placed them on the right and left of the brigade which was engaged in the van; vowing a temple to Jupiter, if he should rout the enemy on that day. To Lucius Valerius he gave orders, to make the hors.e.m.e.n of the two legions on one flank, and the cavalry of the allies on the other, charge the wings of the enemy, and not suffer them to come round to his rear. At the same time, observing that the centre of the line of the Gauls was weakened, from having extended the wings, he directed his men to make an attack there in close order, and to break through their ranks. The wings were routed by the cavalry, and, at the same time, the centre by the foot; and suddenly, being worsted in all parts with great slaughter, the Gauls turned their backs, and fled to their camp in hurry and confusion. The cavalry pursued them as they fled; and the legions, coming up in a short time after, a.s.saulted the camp, from whence there did not escape so many as six thousand men. There were slain and taken above thirty-five thousand, with seventy standards, and above two hundred Gallic waggons laden with much booty. Hamilcar, the Carthaginian general, fell in that battle, and three distinguished generals of the Gauls. The prisoners taken at Placentia, to the number of two thousand freemen, were restored to the colony.

22. This was an important victory, and caused great joy at Rome. On receipt of the praetor's letter, a supplication for three days was decreed. In that battle, there fell of the Romans and allies two thousand, most of them in the right brigade, against which, in the first onset, the most violent efforts of the enemy had been directed.

Although the praetor had brought the war almost to a conclusion, yet the consul, Cneius Aurelius, having finished the business which was necessary to be done at Rome, set out for Gaul, and received the victorious army from the praetor. The other consul, arriving in his province towards the end of autumn, pa.s.sed the winter in the neighbourhood of Apollonia. Caius Claudius, and the Roman triremes which had been sent to Athens from the fleet that was laid up at Corcyra, as was mentioned above, arriving at Piraeeus, greatly revived the hopes of their allies, who were beginning to give way to despair.

For not only did those inroads by land cease, which used to be made from Corinth through Megara, but the ships of the pirates from Chalcis, who had been accustomed to infest both the Athenian sea and coast, were afraid not only to venture round the promontory of Sunium, but even to trust themselves out of the straits of the Euripus. In addition to these came three quadriremes from Rhodes, the Athenians having three open ships, which they had equipped for the protection of their lands on the coast. While Claudius thought, that if he were able with his fleet to give security to the Athenians it was as much as could be expected at present, a fortunate opportunity was thrown in his way of accomplishing a much more important enterprise.

23. Some exiles driven from Chalcis, by ill treatment received from the king's party, brought intelligence, that the place might be taken without even a contest; for that both the Macedonians, being under no immediate apprehension from an enemy, were straying idly about the country; and that the townsmen, depending on the Macedonian garrison, neglected the guard of the city. Claudius, on this authority, set out and though he arrived at Sunium early enough to have sailed forward to the entrance of the strait of Euboea, yet fearing that, on doubling the promontory, he might be descried by the enemy, he lay by with the fleet until night. As soon as it grew dark he began to move, and, favoured by a calm, arrived at Chalcis a little before day; and then, approaching the city, on a side where it was thinly inhabited, with a small party of soldiers, and by means of scaling ladders, he got possession of the nearest tower, and the wall on each side; the guards being asleep in some places, and in others no one being on the watch.

Thence they advanced to the more populous parts of the town, and having slain the sentinels, and broke open a gate, they gave an entrance to the main body of the troops. These immediately spread themselves throughout the whole city, and increased the tumult by setting fire to the buildings round the forum, by which means both the granaries belonging to the king, and his armoury, with a vast store of machines and engines, were reduced to ashes. Then commenced a general slaughter of those who fled, as well as of those who made resistance; and after having either put to the sword or driven out every one who was of an age fit to bear arms, (Sopater also, the Acarnanian, who commanded the garrison, being slain,) they first collected all the spoils in the forum, and then carried it on board the ships. The prison, too, was forced open by the Rhodians, and those prisoners whom Philip had shut up there, as in the safest custody, were set at liberty. They next pulled down and mutilated the statues of the king; and then, on a signal being given for a retreat, re-embarked and returned to Piraeeus, from whence they had set out. If there had been so large a force of Roman soldiers that Chalcis might have been retained and the protection of Athens not neglected, Chalcis and Euripus might have been taken from the king;--a most important advantage at the commencement of the war. For as the pa.s.s of Thermopylae is the princ.i.p.al barrier of Greece by land, so is the strait of the Euripus by sea.

24. Philip was then at Demetrias, and as soon as the news arrived there of the calamity which had befallen the city of his allies, although it was too late to carry a.s.sistance to those who were already ruined, yet anxious to accomplish what was next to a.s.sistance, revenge, he set out instantly with five thousand foot lightly equipped, and three hundred horse. With a speed almost equal to that of racing, he hastened to Chalcis, not doubting but that he should be able to surprise the Romans. Being disappointed in this expectation, and having arrived, with no other result than a melancholy view of the smoking ruins of that friendly city, (so few being left, that they were scarcely sufficient to bury those who had fallen in the conflict,) with the same rapid haste which he had used in coming, he crossed the Euripus by the bridge, and led his troops through Boeotia to Athens, in hopes that a similar issue would correspond to a similar attempt. And it would have corresponded, had not a scout, (one of those whom the Greeks call day-runners,[1] because they run through a journey of great length in one day,) descrying from his post of observation the king's army in its march, set out at midnight and arrived before them at Athens. The same sleep, and the same negligence, prevailed there which had proved the ruin of Chalcis a few days before. Roused, however, by the alarming intelligence, the praetor of the Athenians, and Dioxippus, commander of a cohort of mercenary auxiliaries, called the soldiers together in the forum, and ordered the trumpets to sound an alarm from the citadel, that all might be informed of the approach of the enemy. On which the people ran from all quarters to the gates, and afterwards to the walls. In a few hours after, and still some time before day, Philip approached the city, and observing a great number of lights, and hearing the noise of the men hurrying to and fro, as usual on such an alarm, he halted his troops, and ordered them to sit down and take some rest; resolving to use open force, since his stratagem had not succeeded. Accordingly he advanced on the side of Dipylos. This gate, being situated in the princ.i.p.al approach of the city, is somewhat larger and wider than the rest. Both within and without the streets are wide, so that the townsmen could form their troops from the forum to the gate, while on the outside a road of about a mile in length, leading to the school of the academy, afforded open room to the foot and horse of the enemy.

The Athenians, who had formed their troops within the gate, marched out with Attalus's garrison, and the cohort of Dioxippus, along that road. Which, when Philip observed, thinking that he had the enemy in his power, and was now about to sate himself with their long wished for destruction, (being more incensed against them than any of the Grecian states,) he exhorted his men to keep their eyes on him during the fight, and to take notice, that wherever the king was, there the standards and the army ought to be. He then spurred on his horse against the enemy, animated not only with resentment, but with a desire of gaining honour, for he reckoned it a glorious thing to be beheld fighting from the walls, which were filled with an immense mult.i.tude, for the purpose of witnessing the engagement. Advancing far before the line, and with a small body of horse, rushing into the midst of the enemy, he inspired his men with great ardour, and the Athenians equally with terror. Having wounded many with his own hand, both in close fight and with missive weapons, and driven them back within the gate, he still pursued them closely; and having made greater slaughter among them while embarra.s.sed in the narrow pa.s.s, rash as the attempt was, he yet had an unmolested retreat, because those who were in the towers withheld their weapons lest they should hit their friends, who were mingled in confusion among their enemies.

The Athenians, after this, confining their troops within the walls, Philip sounded a retreat, and pitched his camp at Cynosarges, a temple of Hercules, and a school surrounded by a grove. But Cynosarges, and Lycaeum, and whatever was sacred or pleasant in the neighbourhood of the city, he burned to the ground, and levelled not only the houses, but sepulchres, nor was any thing either in divine or human possession preserved amidst the violence of his rage.

[Footnote 1: Hemerodromoi.]

25. Next day, the gates having at first been shut, and afterwards suddenly thrown open, in consequence of a body of Attalus's troops from Aegina, and the Romans from Piraeeus, having entered the city, the king removed his camp to the distance of about three miles. From thence he proceeded to Eleusis, in hopes of surprising the temple, and a fort which overlooks and surrounds it; but, finding that the watches had not been neglected, and that the fleet was coming from Piraeeus to support them, he laid aside the design, and led his troops, first to Megara, and then to Corinth; where, on hearing that the council of the Achaeans was then sitting at Argos, he went and joined the a.s.sembly, unexpected by the Achaeans. They were at the time consulting about a war against Nabis, tyrant of the Lacedaemonians; who, on the command being transferred from Philopoemen to Cycliades, a general by no means his equal, perceiving that the confederates of the Achaeans were falling off, had renewed the war, was ravaging the territories of his neighbours, and had become formidable even to the cities. While they were deliberating what number of men should be raised out of each of the states to oppose this enemy, Philip promised that he would relieve them of that care, as far as concerned Nabis and the Lacedaemonians; and that he would not only secure the lands of their allies from devastation, but transfer the whole terror of the war on Laconia itself, by leading his army thither instantly. This discourse being received with general approbation, he added,--"It is but reasonable, however, that while I am employed in protecting your property by my arms, my own should not be deprived of protection; therefore, if you think proper, provide such a number of troops as will be sufficient to secure Orcus, Chalcis, and Corinth; that my affairs being in a state of safety behind me, I may without anxiety make war on Nabis and the Lacedaemonians." The Achaeans were not ignorant of the tendency of this so kind promise, and of his proffered a.s.sistance against the Lacedaemonians; that his purpose was to draw the Achaean youth out of Peloponnesus as hostages, in order to implicate the nation in a war with the Romans. Cycliades, the Achaean praetor, thinking that it was irrelevant to develope the matter by argument, said nothing more than that it was not allowable, according to the laws of the Achaeans, to take any matters into consideration except those on which they had been called together: and the decree for levying an army against Nabis being pa.s.sed, he dismissed the a.s.sembly, after having presided in it with much resolution and public spirit, and until that day having been reckoned among the partisans of the king. Philip, disappointed in a high expectation, after having collected a few voluntary soldiers, returned to Corinth, and from thence into the territories of Athens.

26. In those days in which Philip was in Achaia, Philocles, one of the king's generals, marching from Euboea with two thousand Thracians and Macedonians, in order to lay waste the territories of the Athenians, crossed the forest of Cithaeron opposite to Eleusis. Despatching half of his troops, make depredations in all parts of the country, he himself lay concealed with the remainder in a place convenient for an ambush; in order that, if any attack should be made from the fort at Eleusis on his men employed in plundering, he might suddenly fall upon the enemy unawares, and while they were in disorder. His stratagem did not escape discovery: wherefore calling back the soldiers, who had gone different ways in pursuit of booty, and drawing them up in order, he advanced to a.s.sault the fort at Eleusis; but being repulsed from thence with many wounds, he formed a junction with Philip on his return from Achaia. The storming of this fort was also attempted by the king in person: but the Roman ships coming from Piraeeus, and a body of forces thrown into the fort, compelled him to relinquish the design. On this the king, dividing his army, sent Philocles with one part to Athens, and went himself with the other to Piraeeus; that, while his general, by advancing to the walls and threatening an a.s.sault, might keep the Athenians within the city, he might be able to make himself master of the harbour, when left with only a slight garrison. But he found the attack of Piraeeus no less difficult than that of Eleusis, the same persons for the most part acting in its defence. He therefore hastily led his troops to Athens, and being repulsed by a sudden sally of both foot and horse, who engaged him in the narrow ground, enclosed by the half-ruined wall, which, with two arms, joins Piraeus to Athens, he desisted from the a.s.sault of the city, and, dividing his forces again with Philocles, set out to complete the devastation of the country. As, in his former ravages, he had employed himself in levelling the sepulchres round the city, so now, not to leave any thing unviolated, he ordered the temples of the G.o.ds, of which they had one consecrated in every village, to be demolished and burned. The country of Attica afforded ample matter for the exercise of this barbarous rage: being highly embellished with works of that kind, having plenty of indigenous marble, and abounding with artists of exquisite ingenuity. Nor was he satisfied with merely destroying the temples themselves, and overthrowing the images, but he ordered even the stones to be broken, lest, remaining whole, they should give stateliness to the ruins; and then, his rage not being satiated, but no object remaining on which it could be exercised, he retired from the country of the enemy into Boeotia, without having performed in Greece any thing else worth mention.

27. The consul, Sulpicius, who was at that time encamped; on the river Apsus, between Apollonia and Dyrrachium, having ordered Lucius Apustius, lieutenant-general, thither, sent him with part of the forces to lay waste the enemy's territory. Apustius, after ravaging the frontiers of Macedonia, and having, at the first a.s.sault, taken the forts of Corragos, Gerrunios, and Orgessos, came to Antipatria, a city situated in a narrow gorge; where, at first inviting the leading men to a conference, he endeavoured to entice them to commit themselves to the good faith of the Romans; but finding that from confidence in the size, fortifications, and situation of their city, they paid no regard to his discourse, he attacked the place by force of arms, and took it by a.s.sault: then, putting all the young men to death, and giving up the entire spoil to his soldiers, he razed the walls and burned the city. This proceeding spread such terror, that Codrion, a strong and well-fortified town, surrendered to the Romans without a struggle. Leaving a garrison there, he took Ilion by force, a name better known than the town, on account of that of the same name in Asia. As the lieutenant-general was returning to the consul with a great quant.i.ty of spoil, Athenagoras, one of the king's generals, falling on his extreme rear, in its pa.s.sage over a river, threw the hindmost into disorder. On hearing the shouting and tumult, Apustius rode back in full speed, ordered the troops to face about, and drew them up in order, arranging the baggage in the centre. The king's troops could not support the onset of the Roman soldiers, many of them were slain, and more made prisoners. The lieutenant-general, having brought back the army without loss to the consul, was despatched immediately to the fleet.

28. The war commencing thus brilliantly with this successful expedition, several petty kings and princes, neighbours of the Macedonians, came to the Roman camp: Pleuratus, son of Scerdilaedus, and Amynander, king of the Athamanians; and from the Dardanians, Bato, son of Longarus. This Longarus had, in his own quarrel, supported a war against Demetrius, father of Philip. To their offers of aid, the consul answered, that he would make use of the a.s.sistance of the Dardanians, and of Pleuratus, when he should lead his troops into Macedonia. To Amynander he allotted the part of exciting the Aetolians to war. To the amba.s.sadors of Attalus, (for they also had come at the same time,) he gave directions that the king should wait at Aegina, where he wintered, for the arrival of the Roman fleet; and when joined by that, he should, as before, hara.s.s Philip with attacks by sea. To the Rhodians, also, an emba.s.sy was sent, to engage them to contribute their share towards carrying on the war. Nor was Philip, who had by this time arrived in Macedonia, remiss in his preparations for the campaign. He sent his son Perseus, then very young, with part of his forces to block up the pa.s.s near Pelagonia, appointing persons out of the number of his friends to direct his inexperienced age. Sciathus and Peparethus, no inconsiderable cities, he demolished, lest they should become a prey and prize to the enemy's fleet; despatching at the same time amba.s.sadors to the Aetolians, lest that restless nation might change sides on the arrival of the Romans.

29. The a.s.sembly of the Aetolians, which they call Panaetolium, was to meet on a certain day. In order to be present at this, the king's amba.s.sadors hastened their journey, and Lucius Furius Purpureo also arrived, deputed by the consul. Amba.s.sadors from the Athenians, likewise, came to this a.s.sembly. The Macedonians were first heard, as with them the latest treaty had been made; and they declared, that as no change of circ.u.mstances had occurred, they had nothing new to introduce: for the same reasons which had induced them to make peace with Philip, after experiencing the unprofitableness of an alliance with the Romans, should engage them to preserve it now that it was established. "Do you rather choose," said one of the amba.s.sadors, "to imitate the inconsistency, or levity, shall I call it, of the Romans, who ordered this answer to be given to your amba.s.sadors at Rome: 'Why, Aetolians, do you apply to us, when, without our approbation, you have made peace with Philip?' Yet these same people now require that you should, in conjunction with them, wage war against Philip. Formerly, too, they pretended that they took arms on your account, and in your defence against Philip: now they do not allow you to continue at peace with him. To a.s.sist Messana, they first embarked for Sicily; and a second time, that they might redeem Syracuse to freedom when oppressed by the Carthaginians. Both Messana and Syracuse, and all Sicily, they hold in their own possession, and have reduced it into a tributary province under their axes and rods. You imagine, perhaps, that in the same manner as you hold an a.s.sembly at Naupactus, according to your own laws, under magistrates created by yourselves, at liberty to choose allies and enemies, and to have peace or war at your own option, so the a.s.sembly of the states of Sicily is summoned, to Syracuse, or Messana, or Lilybaeum. No, a Roman praetor presides at the meeting; summoned by his command they a.s.semble; they behold him, attended by his lictors seated on a lofty throne, issuing his haughty edicts. His rods are ready for their backs, his axes for their necks, and every year they are allotted a different master. Neither ought they nor can they, wonder at this, when they see all the cities of Italy bending under the same yoke,--Rhegium, Tarentum Capua, not to mention those in their own neighbourhood, out of the ruins of which their city of Rome grew into power. Capua indeed subsists, the grave and monument of the Campanian people, that entire people having been either cut off or driven into banishment; the mutilated carca.s.s of a city, without senate, without commons, without magistrates; a sort of prodigy, the leaving which to be inhabited, showed more cruelty than if it had been utterly destroyed. If foreigners who are separated from us to a greater distance by their language, manners, and laws, than by the distance by sea and land, are allowed to get footing here, it is madness to hope that any thing will continue in its present state.

Does the sovereignty of Philip seem in any degree incompatible with your freedom, who, at a time when he was justly incensed against you, demanded nothing more of you than peace; and at present requires no more than the observance of the peace which he agreed to? Accustom foreign legions to these countries, and receive the yoke; too late, and in vain, will you look for Philip as an ally, when you shall have the Roman as a master. Trifling causes occasionally unite and disunite the Aetolians, Acarnanians, and Macedonians, men speaking the same language. With foreigners, with barbarians, all Greeks have, and ever will have, eternal war: because they are enemies by nature, which is always the same, and not from causes which change with the times. My discourse shall conclude with the same argument with which it began.

Three years since, the same persons, a.s.sembled in this same place, determined on peace with the same Philip, contrary to the inclinations of the same Romans, who now wish that the peace should be broken, after it has been adjusted and ratified. In the subject of your deliberation, fortune has made no change; why you should make any, I do not see."

30. Next, after the Macedonians, with the consent and at the desire of the Romans, the Athenians were introduced; who, having suffered grievously, could, with the greater justice, inveigh against the cruelty and inhumanity of the king. They represented, in a deplorable light, the miserable devastation and spoliation of their fields; adding, that "they did not complain on account of having, from an enemy, suffered hostile treatment; for there were certain rights of war, according to which, as it was just to act, so it was just to endure. Their crops being burned, their houses demolished, their men and cattle carried off as spoil, were to be considered rather as misfortunes to the sufferer than as ill-treatment. But of this they had good reason to complain, that he who called the Romans foreigners and barbarians, had himself so atrociously violated all rights, both divine and human, as, in his former inroad, to have waged an impious war against the infernal G.o.ds, in the latter, against those above.

That the sepulchres and monuments of all within their country had been demolished, the graves laid open, and the bones left unprotected by the soil. There had been several temples, which, in former times, when their ancestors dwelt in the country in their separate districts, had been consecrated in each of their little forts and villages, and which, even after they were incorporated into one city, they did not neglect or forsake. That around all these temples Philip had scattered his destructive flames, and left the images of the G.o.ds lying scorched and mutilated among the prostrated pillars of their fanes. Such as he had rendered the country of Attica, formerly opulent and adorned, such, if he were suffered, would he render Aetolia and the whole of Greece. That the mutilation of their own city, also, would have been similar, if the Romans had not come to its relief: for he had shown the same wicked rage against the G.o.ds who are the guardians of the city, and Minerva who presides over the citadel; the same against the temple of Ceres at Eleusis; the same against Jupiter and Minerva at Piraeeus. In a word, having been repelled by force of arms not only from their temples, but even from their walls, he had vented his fury on those sacred edifices which were protected by religion alone. They therefore entreated and besought the Aetolians, that, compa.s.sionating the Athenians, and with the immortal G.o.ds for their leaders, and, under them, the Romans, who, next to the G.o.ds, possessed the greatest power they would take part in the war."

31. The Roman amba.s.sador then replied: "The Macedonians first, and afterwards the Athenians, have obliged me to change entirely the method of my discourse. For, on the one hand, the Macedonians, by aggressively introducing charges against the Romans, when I had come prepared to make complaint of the injuries committed by Philip against so many cities in alliance with us, have obliged me to think of defence rather than accusation; and, on the other hand, what have the Athenians, after relating his inhuman and impious crimes against the G.o.ds both celestial and infernal, left for me, or any one else, which I can further urge against him. You are to suppose, that the same complaints are made by the Cianians, Abydenians, Aeneans, Maronites, Thasians, Parians, Samians, Larissenians, Messenians, on the side of Achaia; and complaints, still heavier and more grievous, by those whom he had it more in his power to injure. For as to those proceedings which he censures in us, if they are not deserving of honour, I will admit that they cannot be defended at all. He has objected to us, Rhegium, and Capua, and Syracuse. As to Rhegium, during the war with Pyrrhus, a legion which, at the earnest request of the Rhegians themselves, we had sent thither as a garrison, wickedly possessed themselves of the city which they had been sent to defend. Did we then approve of that deed? or did we exert the force of our arms against that guilty legion, until we reduced them under our power; and then, after making them give satisfaction to the allies, by their stripes and the loss of their heads, restore to the Rhegians their city, their lands, and all their effects, together with their liberty and laws? To the Syracusans, when oppressed, and that by foreign tyrants, which was a still greater indignity, we lent a.s.sistance; and after enduring great fatigues in carrying on the siege of so strong a city, both by land and sea, for almost three years, (although the Syracusans themselves chose to continue in slavery to the tyrants rather than be taken to us,) yet, becoming masters of the place, and by exertion of the same force setting it at liberty, we restored it to the inhabitants. At the same time, we do not deny that Sicily is our province, and that the states which sided with the Carthaginians, and, in conjunction with them, waged war against us, pay us tribute and taxes; on the contrary, we wish that you and all nations should know, that the condition of each is such as it has deserved at our hands: and ought we to repent of the punishment inflicted on the Campanians, of which even they themselves cannot complain? These men, after we had on their account carried on war against the Samnites for near seventy years, with great loss on our side; had united them to ourselves, first by treaty, and then by intermarriages, and the relationships arising thence; and lastly, by the right of citizenship; yet, in the time of our adversity, were the first of all the states of Italy which revolted to Hannibal, after basely putting our garrison to death, and afterwards, through resentment at being besieged by us, sent Hannibal to attack Rome. If neither their city nor one man of them had been left remaining, who could take offence, or consider them as treated with more severity than they had deserved? From consciousness of guilt, greater numbers of them perished by their own hands, than by the punishments inflicted by us. And while from the rest we took away the town and the lands, still we left them a place to dwell in, we suffered the city which partook not of the guilt to stand uninjured; so that he who should see it this day would find no trace of its having been besieged or taken. But why do I speak of Capua, when even to vanquished Carthage we granted peace and liberty? The greatest danger is, that, by our too great readiness to pardon the conquered, we may encourage others to try the fortune of war against us. Let so much suffice in our defence, and against Philip, whose domestic crimes, whose parricides and murders of his relations and friends, and whose l.u.s.t, more disgraceful to human nature, if possible, than his cruelty, you, as being nearer to Macedonia, are better acquainted with. As to what concerns yourselves, Aetolians, we entered into a war with Philip on your account: you made peace with him without consulting us. Perhaps you will say, that while we were occupied in the Punic war, you were constrained by fear to accept terms of pacification, from him who at that time possessed superior power; and that on our side, pressed by more urgent affairs we suspended our operations in a war which you had laid aside. At present, as we, having, by the favour of the G.o.ds brought the Punic war to a conclusion, have fallen on Macedonia with the whole weight of our power, so you have an opportunity offered you of regaining a place in our friendship and alliance, unless you choose to perish with Philip, rather than to conquer with the Romans."

32. When these things had been said by the amba.s.sador the minds of all leaning towards the Romans, Damocritus, praetor of the Aetolians, (who, it was reported, had received money from the king,) a.s.senting in no degree to one party or the other, said,--that "in consultations of great and critical importance, nothing was so injurious as haste. That repentance, indeed, generally followed, and that quickly but yet too late and unavailing; because designs carried on with precipitation could not be recalled, nor matters brought back to their original state. The time, however, for determining the point under consideration, which, for his part, he thought should not be too early, might yet immediately be fixed in this manner. As it had been provided by the laws, that no determination should be made concerning peace or war, except in the Panaetolic or Pylaic councils; let them immediately pa.s.s a decree, that the praetor, when he chooses to treat respecting war and peace, may have full authority to summon a council, and that whatever shall be then debated and decreed, shall be, to all intents and purposes, legal and valid, as if it had been transacted in the Panaetolic or Pylaic a.s.sembly." And thus dismissing the amba.s.sadors, with the matter undetermined, he said, that therein he had acted most prudently for the interest of the state; for the Aetolians would have it in their power to join in alliance with whichever of the parties should be more successful in the war. Such were the proceedings in the council of the Aetolians.

33. Meanwhile Philip was making vigorous preparations for carrying on the war both by sea and land. His naval forces he drew together at Demetrias in Thessaly; supposing that Attalus, and the Roman fleet, would move from Aegina in the beginning of the spring. He gave the command of the fleet and of the sea-coast to Heraclides, to whom he had formerly intrusted it. The equipment of the land forces he took care of in person; considering that he had deprived the Romans of two powerful auxiliaries, the Aetolians on the one side and the Dardanians on the other, by making his son Perseus block up the pa.s.s at Pelagonia. The consul was employed, not in preparations, but in the operations of war. He led his army through the country of the Da.s.saretians, conveying the corn untouched which he had brought from his winter quarters, for the fields afforded supplies sufficient for the consumption of the troops. The towns and villages surrendered to him, some through inclination, others through fear; some were taken by a.s.sault, others were found deserted, the barbarians flying to the neighbouring mountains. He fixed a standing camp at Lycus near the river Bevus, and from thence sent to bring in corn from the magazines of the Da.s.saretians. Philip saw the whole country filled with consternation, and not knowing the designs of the consul, he sent a party of horse to discover whither he was directing his course. The same state of uncertainty possessed the consul; he knew that the king had moved from his winter quarters, but in what direction he had proceeded he knew not: he also had sent hors.e.m.e.n to gain intelligence.

These two parties, having set out from opposite quarters, after wandering a long time among the Da.s.saretians, through unknown roads, fell at length into the same track. Neither doubted, as soon as the noise of men and horses was heard at a distance, that the enemy was approaching, therefore, before they came within sight of each other, they got their arms in readiness, nor, when they saw their foe, was there any delay in engaging. As they happened to be nearly equal in number and valour, being picked men on both sides, they fought during several hours with vigour, until fatigue, both of men and horses, put an end to the fight, without deciding the victory. Of the Macedonians there fell forty hors.e.m.e.n; of the Romans thirty-five. Still, however, neither did the one party carry back to the king, nor the other to the consul, any certain information in what quarter the camp of his enemy lay. But this was soon made known to them by deserters, whom their recklessness of disposition supplies in all wars in sufficient number to discover the affairs of the contending parties.

34. Philip, judging that he should make some progress towards conciliating the affections of his men, and induce them to face danger more readily on his account, if he bestowed some pains on the burial of the hors.e.m.e.n who fell in that expedition, ordered them to be conveyed into the camp, in order that all might be spectators of the honours paid them at their funeral. Nothing is so uncertain, or so difficult to form a judgment of, as the minds of the mult.i.tude. That which seems calculated to increase their alacrity, in exertions of every sort, often creates in them fear and inactivity. Accordingly, those who, being always accustomed to fight with Greeks and Illyrians, had only seen wounds made with javelins and arrows, seldom even by lances, came to behold bodies dismembered by the Spanish sword, some with their arms lopped off, with the shoulder or the neck entirely cut through, heads severed from the trunk, and the bowels laid open, with other frightful exhibitions of wounds: they therefore perceived, with horror, against what weapons and what men they were to fight. Even the king himself was seized with apprehensions, having never yet engaged the Romans in a regular battle. Wherefore, recalling his son, and the guard posted at the pa.s.s of Pelagonia, in order to strengthen his army by the addition of those troops, he thereby opened a pa.s.sage into Macedonia for Pleuratus and the Dardanians. Then, taking deserters for guides, he marched towards the enemy with twenty thousand foot and four thousand horse, and at the distance of somewhat more than a thousand paces from the Roman camp, and near Ithacus, he fortified a hill with a trench and rampart. From this place, taking a view of the Roman station in the valley beneath, he is said to have been struck with admiration, both at the general appearance of the camp, and the regular disposition of each particular part; then with the disposition of the tents, and the intervals of the pa.s.sages; and to have declared, that, certainly, that could not be regarded by any as the camp of barbarians. For two days, the consul and the king, each waiting for the other's making some attempt, kept their troops within the ramparts. On the third day, the Roman led out all his forces, and offered battle.

35. But the king, not daring to risk so hastily a general engagement, sent four hundred Trallians, who are a tribe of the Illyrians, as we have said in another place, and three hundred Cretans; adding to this body of infantry an equal number of horse, under the command of Athenagoras, one of his n.o.bles honoured with the purple, to make an attack on the enemy's cavalry. When these troops arrived within a little more than five hundred paces, the Romans sent out the light infantry, and two cohorts of horse, that both cavalry and infantry might be equal in number to the Macedonians. The king's troops expected that the method of fighting would be such as they had been accustomed to; that the hors.e.m.e.n, pursuing and retreating alternately, would at one time use their weapons, at another time turn their backs; that the agility of the Illyrians would be serviceable for excursions and sudden attacks, and that the Cretans might discharge their arrows against the enemy, as they advanced eagerly to the charge. But the onset of the Romans, which was not more vigorous than persevering, entirely disconcerted this method of fighting: for the light infantry, as if they were fighting with their whole line of battle, after discharging their javelins, carried on a close fight with their swords; and the hors.e.m.e.n, when they had once made a charge, stopping their horses, fought, some on horseback, while others dismounted and intermixed themselves with the foot. By this means neither were the king's cavalry, who were unaccustomed to a steady fight, a match for the others; nor were the infantry, who were only skirmishing and irregular troops, and were besides but half covered with the kind of harness which they used, at all equal to the Roman infantry, who carried a sword and buckler, and were furnished with proper armour, both to defend themselves and to annoy the enemy: nor did they sustain the combat, but fled to their camp, trusting entirely to their speed for safety.

36. After an interval of one day, the king, resolving to make an attack with all his forces of cavalry and light-armed infantry, had, during the night, placed in ambush, in a convenient place between the two camps, a body of targeteers, whom they call Peltastae, and given orders to Athenagoras and the cavalry, if they found they had the advantage in the open fight, to pursue their success; if otherwise, that they should retreat leisurely, and by that means draw on the enemy to the place where the ambush lay. The cavalry accordingly did retreat; but the officers of the body of targeteers, by bringing forward their men before the time, and not waiting for the signal, as they ought, lost an opportunity of performing considerable service.

The Romans, having gained the victory in open fight, and also escaped the danger of the ambuscade, retired to their camp. Next day the consul marched out with all his forces, and offered battle, placing his elephants in the front of the foremost battalions. Of this resource the Romans then for the first time availed themselves; having a number of them which had been taken in the Punic war. Finding that the enemy kept himself quiet behind his intrenchments, he advanced close up to them, upbraiding him with cowardice; and as, notwithstanding, no opportunity of an engagement was afforded, the consul, considering how dangerous foraging must be while the camps lay so near each other, where the cavalry were ready at any moment to attack the soldiers, when dispersed through the country, removed his camp to a place called Ortholophus, distant about eight miles, where by reason of the intervening distance he could forage with more safety. While the Romans were collecting corn in the adjacent fields, the king kept his men within the trenches, in order to increase both the negligence and confidence of the enemy. But, when he saw them scattered, he set out with all his cavalry, and the auxiliary Cretans, and marching with such speed that the swiftest footmen could, by running, but just keep up with the horse, he planted his standards between the camp of the Romans and their foragers. Then, dividing the forces, he sent one part of them in quest of the marauders, with orders to leave not one alive; with the other, he himself halted, and placed guards on the roads through which the enemy seemed likely to fly back to their camp. And now carnage and flight prevailed in all directions, and no intelligence of the misfortune had yet reached the Roman camp, because those who fled towards the camp fell in with the guards, which the king had stationed to intercept them, and greater numbers were slain by those who were placed in the roads, than by those who had been sent out to attack them. At length, a few effected their escape, through the midst of the enemy's posts, but were so filled with terror, that they excited a general consternation in the camp, rather than brought intelligible information.

37. The consul, ordering the cavalry to carry aid to those who were in danger, in the best manner they could, drew out the legions from the camp, and led them drawn up in a square towards the enemy. The cavalry, taking different ways through the fields, missed the road, being deceived by the various shouts raised in several quarters. Some of them met with the enemy, and battles began in many places at once.

The hottest part of the action was at the station where the king commanded; for the guard there was, in numbers both of horse and foot, almost a complete army; and, as they were posted on the middle road, the greatest number of the Romans fell in with them. The Macedonians had also the advantage in this, that the king himself was present to encourage them; and the Cretan auxiliaries, fighting in good order, and in a state of preparation, against troops disordered and irregular, wounded many at a distance, where no such danger was apprehended. If they had acted with prudence in the pursuit, they would have secured an advantage of great importance, not only in regard to the glory of the present contest, but to the general interest of the war; but, greedy of slaughter, and following with too much eagerness, they fell in with the advanced cohorts of the Romans under the military tribunes. The hors.e.m.e.n who were flying, as soon as they saw the ensigns of their friends, faced about against the enemy, now in disorder; so that in a moment's time the fortune of the battle was changed, those now turning their backs who had lately been the pursuers. Many were slain in close fight, many in the pursuit; nor was it by the sword alone that they perished; several, being driven into mora.s.ses, were, together with their horses, swallowed up in the deep mud. The king himself was in danger; for his horse falling, in consequence of a wound, threw him headlong to the ground, and he very narrowly escaped being overpowered while prostrate. He owed his safety to a trooper, who instantly leaped down and mounted the affrighted king on his horse; himself, as he could not on foot keep up with the flying hors.e.m.e.n, was slain by the enemy, who had collected about the place where Philip fell. The king, in his desperate flight, rode about among the mora.s.ses, some of which were easily pa.s.sed, and others not; at length, when most men despaired of his ever escaping in safety, he arrived in safety at his camp. Two hundred Macedonian hors.e.m.e.n perished in that action; about one hundred were taken: eighty horses, richly caparisoned, were led off the field; at the same time the spoils of arms were also carried off.

38. There were some who found fault with the king, as guilty of rashness on that day; and with the consul, for want of energy. For Philip, they say, on his part, ought to have avoided coming to action, knowing that in a few days the enemy, having exhausted all the adjacent country, must be reduced to the extremity of want; and that the consul, after having routed the Macedonian cavalry and light infantry, and nearly taken the king himself, ought to have led on his troops directly to the enemy's camp, where, dismayed as they were, they would have made no stand, and that he might have finished the war in a moment's time. This, like most other matters, was easier to be talked about than to be done. For, if the king had brought the whole of his infantry into the engagement, then, indeed, during the tumult, and while, vanquished and struck with dismay, they fled from the field into their intrenchments, (and even continued their flight from thence on seeing the victorious enemy mounting the ramparts,) the king might have been deprived of his camp. But as some forces of infantry had remained in the camp, fresh and free from fatigue, with outposts before the gates, and guard properly disposed, what would he have done but imitated the rashness of which the king had just now been guilty, by pursuing the routed horse? On the other side, the king's first plan of an attack on the foragers, while dispersed through the fields, would not have been a subject of censure, could he have satisfied himself with a moderate degree of success: and it is the less surprising that he should have made a trial of fortune, as there was a report, that Pleuratus and the Dardanians had set out from home with very numerous forces, and had already pa.s.sed into Macedonia; so that if he should be surrounded on all sides by these forces, there was reason to think that the Roman might put an end to the war without stirring from his seat. Philip, however, considered, that after his cavalry had been defeated in two engagements, he could with much less safety continue in the same post; accordingly, wishing to remove from thence, and, at the same time, to keep the enemy in ignorance of his design, he sent a herald to the consul a little before sun-set, to demand a truce for the purpose of burying the hors.e.m.e.n; and thus imposing on him, he began his march in silence, about the second watch, leaving a number of fires in all parts of his camp.

39. The consul was now taking refreshment, when he was told that the herald had arrived, and on what business; he gave him no other answer, than that he should be admitted to an audience early the next morning: by which means Philip gained what he wanted--the length of that night, and part of the following day, during which he might get the start on his march. He directed his route towards the mountains, a road which he knew the Romans with their heavy baggage would not attempt. The consul, having, at the first light, dismissed the herald with a grant of a truce, in a short time after discovered that the enemy had gone off; but not knowing what course to take in pursuit of them, he remained in the same camp for several days, which he employed in collecting forage. He then marched to Stubera, and brought thither, from Pelagonia, the corn that was in the fields. From thence he advanced to Pluvina, not having yet discovered to what quarter the Macedonian had bent his course. Philip, having at first fixed his camp at Bryanium, marched thence through cross-roads, and gave a sudden alarm to the enemy. The Romans, on this, removed from Pluvina, and pitched their camp near the river Osphagus. The king also sat down at a small distance, forming his intrenchment on the bank of a river which the inhabitants call Erigonus. Having there received certain information that the Romans intended to proceed to Eordaea, he marched away before them, in order to take possession of the defiles, and prevent the enemy from making their way, where the roads are confined in narrow straits. There, with great haste, he fortified some places with a rampart, others with a trench, others with stones heaped up instead of walls, others with trees laid across, according as the situation required, or as materials lay convenient; and thus a road, in its own nature difficult, he rendered, as he imagined, impregnable by the works which he drew across every pa.s.s. The adjoining ground, being mostly covered with woods, was exceedingly incommodious to the phalanx of the Macedonians, which is of no manner of use, except when they extend their very long spears before their shields, forming as it were a palisade; to perform which, they require an open plain. The Thracians, too, were embarra.s.sed by their lances, which also are of a great length, and were entangled among the branches that stood in their way on every side. The body of Cretans alone was not unserviceable; and yet even these, though, in case of an attack made on them, they could to good purpose discharge their arrows against the horses or riders, where they were open to a wound, yet against the Roman shields they could do nothing, because they had neither strength sufficient to pierce through them, nor was there any part exposed at which they could aim. Perceiving, therefore, that kind of weapon to be useless, they annoyed the enemy with stones, which lay in plenty in all parts of the valley: the strokes made by these on their shields, with greater noise than injury, for a short time r.e.t.a.r.ded the advance of the Romans; but quickly disregarding these missiles also, some, closing their shields in form of a tortoise, forced their way through the enemy in front; others having, by a short circuit, gained the summit of the hill, dislodged the dismayed Macedonians from their guards and posts, and even slew the greater part of them, their retreat being embarra.s.sed by the difficulties of the ground.

40. Thus, with less opposition than they had expected to meet, the defiles were pa.s.sed, and they came to Eordaea; then, having laid waste the whole country, the consul withdrew into Elimea. From thence he made an irruption into Orestis, and attacked the city Celetrum, situated in a peninsula: a lake surrounds the walls; and there is but one entrance from the main land along a narrow isthmus. Relying on their situation, the townsmen at first shut the gates, and refused to submit; but afterwards, when they saw the troops in motion, and advancing in the tortoise method, and the isthmus covered by the enemy marching in, they surrendered in terror rather than hazard a struggle.

From Celetrum he advanced into the country of the Da.s.saretians, took the city Pelium by storm, carried off the slaves with the rest of the spoil, and discharging the freemen without ransom, restored the city to them, after placing a strong garrison in it, for it was very conveniently situated for making inroads into Macedonia. Having thus traversed the enemy's country, the consul led back his forces into those parts which were already reduced to obedience near Apollonia, from whence the campaign had commenced. Philip's attention had been drawn to other quarters by the Aetolians, Athamanians, and Dardanians: so many were the wars that started up on different sides of him.

Against the Dardanians, who were now retiring out of Macedonia, he sent Athenagoras with the light infantry and the greater part of the cavalry, and ordered him to hang on their rear as they retreated; and, by cutting off their hindmost troops, make them more cautious for the future of leading out their armies from home. As to the Aetolians, Damocritus, their praetor, the same who at Naupactum had persuaded them to defer pa.s.sing a decree concerning the war, had in the next meeting roused them to arms, after the report of the battle between the cavalry at Ortholophus; the irruption of the Dardanians and of Pleuratus, with the Illyrians, into Macedonia; of the arrival of the Roman fleet, too, at Oreus; and that Macedonia, besides being beset on all sides by so many nations, was in danger of being invested by sea also.

41. These reasons had brought back Damocritus and the Aetolians to the interest of the Romans. Marching out, therefore, in conjunction with Amynander, king of the Athamanians, they laid siege to Cercinium. The inhabitants here had shut their gates, whether of their own choice or by compulsion is unknown, as they had a garrison of the king's troops.

However, in a few days Cercinium was taken and burned; and after great slaughter had been made, those who survived, both freemen and slaves, were carried off amongst other spoil. This caused such terror, as made all those who dwelt round the lake Baebius abandon their cities and fly to the mountains: and the Aetolians, in the absence of booty, turned away from thence, and proceeded into Perrhaebia. There they took Cyretiae by storm and sacked it unmercifully. The inhabitants of Mallaea, making a voluntary submission, were received into alliance.

From Perrhaebia, Amyn