The History of Minnesota and Tales of the Frontier Part 11

The officers were all held as prisoners of war, and the men paroled on condition of not fighting against the Confederacy during the continuance of the war. The Indian war of 1862 broke out in Minnesota very shortly after the surrender, and the men of the Third were brought to the state for service against the Indians. They partic.i.p.ated in the campaign of 1862 and following expeditions. For a full and detailed account of the surrender of the Third, consult the history of that regiment in the volume issued by the state, called "Minnesota in the Civil and Indian Wars."

It would please the historian to omit this subject entirely, did truth permit; but he finds ample solace in the fact that this is the only blot to be found in the long record of brilliant and glorious deeds that compose the military history of Minnesota.

A general summary will show that Minnesota did her whole duty in the Civil War, and that her extreme youth was in no way a drawback to her performance. She furnished to the war, in all her military organizations, a grand total of 22,970 men. Of this number, 607 were killed in battle and 1,647 died of disease, making a contribution of 2,254 lives to the cause of the Union on the part of Minnesota.

Our state was honored by the promotion from her various organizations of the following officers:

C. P. Adams, Brevet Brigadier General.

C. C. Andrews, Brigadier and Brevet Major General.

John T. Averill, Brevet Brigadier General.

James H. Baker, Brevet Brigadier General.

Theodore E. Barret, Brevet Brigadier General.

Judson W. Bishop, Brevet Brigadier General.

William Colville, Brevet Brigadier General.

Napoleon J. T. Dana, Major General.

Alonzo J. Edgerton, Brevet Brigadier General.

Willis A. Gorman, Brigadier General.

Lucius F. Hubbard, Brevet Brigadier General.

Samuel P. Jennison, Brevet Brigadier General.

William G. Le Duc, Brevet Brigadier General.

William R. Marshall, Brevet Brigadier General.

Robert B. McLaren, Brevet Brigadier General.

Stephen Miller, Brigadier General.

John B. Sanborn, Brigadier and Brevet Major General.

Henry H. Sibley, Brigadier and Brevet Major General.

Minor T. Thomas, Brevet Brigadier General.

John E. Tourtellotte, Brevet Brigadier General.

Horatio P. Van Cleve, Brevet Brigadier General.

George N. Morgan, Brevet Brigadier General.

THE INDIAN WAR OF 1862 AND FOLLOWING YEARS.

In 1862 there were in the State of Minnesota four princ.i.p.al bands of Sioux Indians--the M'day-wa-kon-tons, Wak-pa-koo-tas, Si-si-tons and Wak-pay-tons. The first two bands were known as the Lower Sioux and the last two bands as the Upper Sioux. These designations arose from the fact that, in the sale of their lands to the United States by the treaties of 1851, the lands of the Lower Sioux were situate in the southern part of the state, and those of the upper bands in the more northern part, and when a reservation was set apart for their future occupation on the upper waters of the Minnesota river they were similarly located thereon. Their reservation consisted of a strip of land, ten miles wide, on each side of the Minnesota river, beginning at a point a few miles below Fort Ridgely and extending to the headwaters of the river. The reservation of the lower bands extended up to the Yellow Medicine river; that of the upper bands included all above the last named river. An agent was appointed to administer the affairs of these Indians, whose agencies were established at Redwood for the lower and at Yellow Medicine for the upper bands. At these agencies the annuities were paid to the Indians, and so continued from the making of the treaties to the year 1862. These bands were wild, very little progress having been made in their civilization, the very nature of the situation preventing very much advance in that line. The whole country to the north and west of their reservation was an open, wild region, extending to the Rocky Mountains, inhabited only by the buffalo, which animals ranged in vast herds from British Columbia to Texas. The buffalo was the chief subsistence of the Indians, who naturally frequented their ranges, and only came to the agencies when expecting their payments.

When they did come, and the money and goods were not ready for them, which was frequently the case, they suffered great inconvenience, and were forced to incur debt with the white traders for their subsistence, all of which tended to create bad feelings between them and the whites.

The Indian saw that he had yielded a splendid domain to the whites, and that they were rapidly occupying it. They could not help seeing that the whites were pushing them gradually--I may say rapidly--out of their ancestral possessions and towards the West, which knowledge naturally created a hostile feeling towards them. The Sioux were a brave people, and the young fighting men were always making comparisons between themselves and the whites, and bantering each other as to whether they were or were not afraid of them. I made a study of these people for several years, having had them in charge as their agent, and I think understood their feelings and standing towards the whites as well as any one. Much has been said and written about the immediate cause of the outbreak of 1862, but I do not believe that anything can be a.s.signed out of the general course of events that will account for the trouble.

Delay, as usual, had occurred in the arrival of the money for the payment, which was due in July, 1862. The war was in full force with the South, and the Indians saw that Minnesota was sending thousands of men out of the state to fight the battles of the Union. Major Thomas Galbraith was their agent in the summer of 1862, and being desirous of contributing to the volunteer forces of the government, he raised a company of half-breeds on the reservation and started with them for Fort Snelling, the general rendezvous, to have them mustered into service. It was very natural that the Indians who were seeking for trouble should look upon this movement as a sign of weakness on the part of the government, and reason that, if the United States could not conquer its enemy without their a.s.sistance, it must be in serious difficulties.

Various things of similar character contributed to create a feeling among the Indians that it was a good time to recover their country, redress all their grievances, and reestablish themselves as lords of the land. They had ambitious leaders. Little Crow was the princ.i.p.al instigator of war on the whites. He was a man of greater parts than any Indian in the tribe. I had used him on many trying occasions, as the captain of my bodyguard, and my amba.s.sador to negotiate with other tribes, and always found him equal to any emergency; but on this occasion his ambition ran away with his judgment, and led him to fatal results. With all these influences at work, it took but a spark to fire the magazine, and that spark was struck on the seventeenth day of August, 1862.

A small party of Indians were at Acton, on August 17th, and got into a petty controversy about some eggs with a settler, which created a difference of opinion among them as to what they should do, some advocating one course and some another. The controversy led to one Indian saying that the other was afraid of the white man, to resent which, and to prove his bravery, he killed the settler, and the whole family was ma.s.sacred. When these Indians reached the agency, and related their b.l.o.o.d.y work, those who wanted trouble seized upon the opportunity, and insisted that the only way out of the difficulty was to kill all the whites, and on the morning of the 18th of August the b.l.o.o.d.y work began.

It is proper to say here that some of the Indians who were connected with the missionaries, conspicuously An-pay-tu-tok-a-cha, or John Otherday, and Paul Ma-za-ku-ta-ma-ni, the president of the Hazelwood Republic, of which I have spoken, having learned of the intention of the Indians, informed the missionaries on the night of the 17th, who, to the number of about sixty, fled eastward to Hutchinson, in McLeod county, and escaped. The next morning, being the 18th of August, the Indians commenced the ma.s.sacre of the whites, and made clean work of all at the agencies. They then separated into small squads of from five to ten and spread over the country to the south, east and southeast, attacking the settlers in detail at their homes and continued this work during all of the 18th and part of the 19th of August, until they had murdered in cold blood quite one thousand people--men, women and children. The way the work was conducted, was as follows: The party of Indians would call at the house, and, being well known, would cause no alarm. They would await a good opportunity, and shoot the man of the family; then butcher the women and children, and, after carrying off everything that they thought valuable to them, they would burn the house and proceed to the next homestead and repeat the performance.

Occasionally some one would escape, and spread the news of the ma.s.sacre to the neighbors, and all who could would escape to some place of refuge.

The news of the outbreak reached Fort Ridgely (which was situated about thirteen miles down the Minnesota river) from the agencies about eight o'clock on the morning of the 18th, by means of the arrival of a team from the Lower Agency, bringing a badly wounded man; but no details could be obtained. The fort was in command of Capt. John Marsh, of Company "B," Fifth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry. He had eighty-five men in his company, from which he selected forty-five, leaving the balance, under Lieut. T. F. Gere, to defend the fort. This little squad, under command of Captain Marsh, with a full supply of ammunition, provisions, blankets, etc., accompanied by a six-mule team, left the fort at 9:00 a. m., on the 18th of August, for the Lower Sioux Agency, which was on the west side of the Minnesota river, the fort being on the east, which necessitated the crossing of the river by a ferry near the agency.

On the march up the command pa.s.sed nine or ten dead bodies, all bearing evidence of having been murdered by the Indians, one of which was Dr.

Humphrey, surgeon at the agency. On reaching the vicinity of the ferry no Indians were in sight, except one on the opposite side of the river, who tried to induce them to cross over. A dense chaparral bordered the river on the agency side, and tall gra.s.s covered the bottom on the side where the troops were. Suspicion of the presence of Indians was aroused by the disturbed condition of the water of the river, which was muddy and contained floating gra.s.s. Then a group of ponies was seen. At this point, and without any notice whatever, Indians in great numbers sprang up on all sides of the troops, and opened upon them a deadly fire. About half of the men were killed instantly. Finding themselves surrounded, it became with the survivors a question of _sauve qui peut_. Several desperate hand-to-hand encounters occurred, with varying results, when the remnant of the command made a point down the river, about two miles from the ferry, Captain Marsh being of the number. Here they attempted to cross, but the captain was drowned in the effort. Only from thirteen to fifteen of the command reached the fort alive. Among those killed was Peter Quinn, the United States interpreter, an Irishman, who had been in the Indian territory for many years. He had married into the Chippewa tribe. He was a man much esteemed by the army and all old settlers.

Much criticism has been indulged in as to whether Captain Marsh, when he became convinced of the general outbreak, should not have retreated to the fort. Of course, forty-five men could do nothing against five or six hundred warriors, who were known to be at or about the agency. The Duke of Wellington, when asked as to what was the best test of a general, said, "To know when to retreat, and to dare to do it." Captain Marsh cannot be justly judged by any such criterion. He was not an experienced general. He was a young, brave, and enthusiastic soldier. He knew little of Indians. The country knows that he thought he was doing his duty in advancing. I am confident, whether this judgment is intelligent or not, posterity will hold in warmer esteem the memory of Captain Marsh and his gallant little band than if he had adopted the more prudent course of retracing his steps. Gen. George Custer was led into an ambush of almost the exact character, which was prepared for him by many of the same Indians who attacked Marsh, and he lost five companies of the Seventh United States Cavalry, one of the best fighting regiments in the service, not a man escaping.

Immediately previous to the outbreak Lieut. Timothy J. Sheehan, of Company "C," Fifth Minnesota, had been sent, with about fifty men of his company, to the Yellow Medicine Agency, on account of some disorder prevailing among the Indians; but having performed his duty, he had been ordered to Fort Ripley, and had on the 17th left Fort Ridgley, and on the 18th had reached a point near Glencoe, distant from Fort Ridgley about forty miles. As soon as Captain Marsh became aware of the outbreak, he sent the following dispatch to Lieutenant Sheehan, which reached him on the evening of the 18th:

"_Lieutenant Sheehan:_

"It is absolutely necessary that you should return with your command immediately to this post. The Indians are raising h.e.l.l at the Lower Agency. Return as soon as possible."

Lieutenant Sheehan was then a young Irishman, of about the age of twenty-five years, with immense physical vigor, and corresponding enthusiasm. He immediately broke camp and returned to the fort, arriving there on the 19th of August, having made a forced march of forty-two miles in nine and one-half hours. He did not arrive a moment too soon.

Being the ranking officer after the death of Captain Marsh, he took command of the post. The garrison then consisted of the remnant of Marsh's Company "B," fifty-one men, Sheehan's Company "C," fifty men, and the Renville Rangers, fifty men. This latter company was the one raised by Major Galbraith, the Sioux agent at the agencies, and was composed princ.i.p.ally of half-breeds. It was commanded by Capt. James Gorman. On reaching St. Peter, on its way down to Snelling to be mustered into the service of the United States, it learned of the outbreak, and at once returned to Ridgley, having appropriated the arms of a militia company at St. Peter. There was also at Ridgley, Sergeant Jones of the regular artillery, who had been left there in charge of the military stores. He was quite an expert gunner, and there were several field-pieces at the fort. Besides this garrison, a large number of people from the surrounding country had sought safety at the fort, and there was also a party of gentlemen, who had brought up the annuity money to pay the Indians, who, learning of the troubles, had stopped with the money, amounting to some $70,000 in specie. I will here leave the fort for the present, and turn to other points that became prominent in the approaching war.

On the night of the 18th of August, the day of the outbreak, the news reached St. Peter, and, as I have before stated, induced the Renville Rangers to retrace their steps. Great excitement prevailed, as no one could tell at what moment the Indians might dash into the town, and ma.s.sacre the inhabitants.

The people at New Ulm, which was situated about sixteen miles below Fort Ridgely, on the Minnesota river, dispatched a courier to St. Peter as soon as they became aware of the trouble. He arrived at 4 o'clock a. m.

on the 19th, and came immediately to my house, which was about one mile below the town, and informed me that the Indians were killing people all over the country. Having lived among the Indians for several years, and at one time had charge of them as their agent, I thoroughly understood the danger of the situation, and knowing that, whether the story was true or false, the frontier was no place at such a time for women and children, I told him to wake up the people at St. Peter, and that I would be there quickly. I immediately placed my family in a wagon, and told them to flee down the river, and taking all the guns, powder and lead I could find in my house, I arrived at St. Peter about 6 a. m. The men of the town were soon a.s.sembled at the court-house, and in a very short time a company was formed of 116 men, of which I was chosen as captain, William B. Dodd as first, and Wolf H. Meyer as second lieutenant. Before noon two men, Henry A. Swift, afterwards governor of the state, and William C. Hayden, were dispatched to the front in a buggy to scout, and locate the enemy if he was near, and about noon sixteen mounted men under L. M. Boardman, sheriff of the county, were started on a similar errand. Both these squads kept moving until they reached New Ulm, at about 5 p. m.

Great activity was displayed in equipping the main body of the company for service. All the guns of the place were seized, and put into the hands of the men. There not being any large game in this part of the country, rifles were scarce, but shot-guns were abundant. All the blacksmith shops and gun shops were set at work moulding bullets, and we soon had a gun in every man's hand, and he was supplied with a powder horn or a whiskey flask full of powder, a box of caps and a pocket-full of bullets. We impressed all the wagons we needed for transportation, and all the blankets and provisions that were necessary for subsistence and comfort. While these preparations were going on a large squad from Le Sueur, ten miles further down the river, under the command of Captain Tousley, sheriff of Le Sueur county, joined us. Early in the day a squad from Swan lake, under an old settler named Samuel Coffin, had gone to New Ulm to see what was the matter.

Our advance guard reached New Ulm just in time to partic.i.p.ate in its defense against an attack of about one hundred Indians who had been murdering the settlers on the west side of the river, between the town and Fort Ridgely. The inhabitants of New Ulm were almost exclusively German, there being only a few English-speaking citizens among them, and they were not familiar with the character of the Indians, but the instinct of self-preservation had impelled them to fortify the town with barricades to keep the enemy out. The town was built in the usual way of western towns, the princ.i.p.al settlement being along the main street, and the largest and best houses occupying a s.p.a.ce of about three blocks.

Some of these houses were of brick and stone, so with a strong barricade around them, the town was quite defensible. Several of the people were killed in this first attack, but the Indians, knowing of the coming reinforcements, withdrew, after firing five or six buildings.

The main body of my company, together with the squad from Le Sueur, reached the ferry about two miles below the settled part of New Ulm, about 8 p. m., having made thirty-two miles in seven hours, in a drenching rainstorm. The blazing houses in the distance gave a very threatening aspect to the situation, but we crossed the ferry successfully, and made the town without accident. The next day we were reinforced by a full company from Mankato under Capt. William Bierbauer.

Several companies were formed from the citizens of the town. A full company from South Bend arrived on the 20th or 21st, and various other squads, greater or less in numbers, came in during the week, before Sat.u.r.day, the 23d, swelling our forces to about three hundred men, but nearly all very poorly armed. We improved the barricades and sent out daily scouting parties who succeeded in bringing in many people who were in hiding in swamps, and who would have undoubtedly been lost without this succor. It soon became apparent that, to maintain any discipline or order in the town, some one man must be placed in command of the entire force. The officers of the various companies a.s.sembled to choose a commander-in-chief, and the selection fell to me. A provost guard was at once established, order inaugurated, and we awaited events.

I have been thus particular in my description of the movements at this point because it gives an idea of the defenseless condition in which the outbreak found the people of the country, and also because it shows the intense energy with which the settlers met the emergency, at its very inception, from which I will deduce the conclusion at the proper time that this prompt initial action saved the state from a calamity, the magnitude of which is unrecorded in the history of Indian wars.

Having described the defensive condition of Fort Ridgely and New Ulm, the two extreme frontier posts, the former being on the Indian reservation and the latter only a few miles southeast of it, I will take up the subject at the capital of the state. The news reached Governor Ramsey, at St. Paul, on the 19th of August, the second day of the outbreak. He at once hastened to Mendota, at the mouth of the Minnesota river, and requested ex-Governor Sibley to accept the command of such forces as could be put in the field, to check the advance of and punish the Indians. Governor Sibley had a large experience with the Sioux, perhaps more than any man in the state, having traded and lived with them since 1834, and besides that, was a distinguished citizen of the state, having been its first governor. He accepted the position, with the rank of colonel in the state militia. The Sixth Regiment was being recruited at Fort Snelling for the Civil War, and, on the 20th of August, Colonel Sibley started up the valley of the Minnesota with four companies of that regiment, and arrived at St. Peter on Friday, the 22d.

Capt. A. D. Nelson of the regular army had been appointed colonel of the Sixth, and William Crooks had been appointed lieutenant colonel of the Seventh. Colonel Crooks conveyed the orders of the governor to Colonel Nelson, overtaking him at Bloomington Ferry. On receipt of his orders, finding he was to report to Colonel Sibley, he made the point of military etiquette, that an officer of the regular army could not report to an officer of militia of the same rank, and turning over his command to Colonel Crooks, he returned to St. Paul and handed in his resignation. It was accepted, and Colonel Crooks was appointed colonel of the Sixth. Not knowing much about military etiquette, I will not venture an opinion on the action of Colonel Nelson in this instance, but it always seemed to me that, in the face of the enemy, and especially considering the high standing of Colonel Sibley, and the intimate friendship that existed between the two men, it would have been better to have waived this point, and unitedly fought the enemy, settling all such matters afterwards.

On Sunday, the 24th, Colonel Sibley's force at St. Peter, was augmented by the arrival of about two hundred mounted men, under the command of William J. Cullen, formerly superintendent of Indian affairs, called the Cullen Guard. On the same day six more companies of the Sixth arrived, making up the full regiment, and also about one hundred more mounted men, and several squads of volunteer militia. The mounted men were placed under the command of Col. Samuel McPhail. By these acquisitions Colonel Sibley's command numbered about 1,400 men. Although the numerical strength was considerable, the command was practically useless. The ammunition did not fit the guns of the Sixth Regiment, and had to be all made over. The horses of the mounted men, were raw and undisciplined, and the men themselves were inexperienced and practically unarmed. It was the best the country afforded, but was probably about as poorly equipped an army as ever entered the field--and to face what I regard as the best warriors to be found on the North American continent; but fortunately the officers and men were all that could be desired. The leaders of this army were the best of men, and being seconded by intelligent and enthusiastic subordinates, they soon overcame their physical difficulties; but they knew nothing of the strength, position or previous movements of the enemy, no news having reached them from either Fort Ridgely or New Ulm. Any mistake made by this force, resulting in defeat, would have been fatal. No such mistake was made.

Having now shown the princ.i.p.al forces in the field, we will turn to the movements of the enemy. The Indians felt that it would be necessary to carry Fort Ridgely and New Ulm, before they extended their depredations further down the valley of the Minnesota, and concentrated their forces for an attack on the fort. Ridgely was in no sense a fort. It was simply a collection of buildings, princ.i.p.ally frame structures, facing in towards the parade ground. On one side was a long stone barrack and a stone commissary building, which was the only defensible part of it.

THE ATTACK ON FORT RIDGELY.

On the 20th of August, at about 3 p. m., an attack was made upon the fort by a large body of Indians. The first intimation the garrison had of the a.s.sault was a volley poured through one of the openings between the buildings. Considerable confusion ensued, but order was soon restored. Sergeant Jones attempted to use his cannon, but to his utter dismay, he found them disabled. This was the work of some of the half-breeds belonging to the Renville Rangers, who had deserted to the enemy. They had been spiked by ramming old rags into them. The sergeant soon rectified this difficulty, and brought his pieces into action. The attack lasted three hours, when it ceased, with a loss to the garrison of three killed and eight wounded.

On Thursday, the 21st, two further attacks were made on the fort, one in the morning and one in the afternoon, but with a reduced force, less earnestness, and little damage. On Friday, the 22d, the savages seemed determined to carry the fort. About eight hundred or more, under the leadership of Little Crow, came down from the agency. Concentrating themselves in the ravines which lay on several sides of the fort, they made a feint, by sending about twenty warriors out on the prairie for the purpose of drawing out the garrison from the fort, and cutting them off. Such a movement, if successful, would have been fatal to the defenders; but fortunately there were men among them of much experience in Indian warfare, who saw through the scheme, and prevented the success of the maneuver. Then followed a shower of bullets on the fort from all directions. The attack was continued for nearly five hours. It was bitterly fought, and courageously and intelligently resisted. Sergeant Jones and other artillerists handled the guns with effective skill, exploding sh.e.l.ls in the outlying buildings, and burning them over the heads of the Indians, while the enemy endeavored to burn the wooden buildings composing the fort, by shooting fire arrows on their roofs.

One of the most exposed and dangerous duties to be performed was covering the wooden roofs with earth to prevent fire. One white man was killed and seven wounded in this engagement. Lieutenant Sheehan, who commanded the post through all these trying occurrences, Lieutenant Gorman, of the Renville Rangers, Lieutenant Whipple, and Sergeants Jones and McGrew, all did their duty in a manner becoming veterans, and the men seconded their efforts handsomely. The Indians, after this effort, being convinced that they could not take the fort, and antic.i.p.ating the coming of reinforcements, withdrew, and, concentrating all their available forces, descended upon New Ulm the next morning, August 23d, for a final struggle. In the official history (written for the state) of this battle at Fort Ridgely, I place the force of the Indians as 450, but have learned since from reliable sources that it was as above stated.

BATTLE OF NEW ULM.