The History of England Part 30

If it be unreasonable to think that the va.s.sals of a barony, though their tenure was military, and n.o.ble, and honourable, were ever summoned to give their opinion in national councils, much less can it be supposed, that the tradesmen or inhabitants of boroughs, whose condition was so much inferior, would be admitted to that privilege.

It appears from Doomsday, that the greatest boroughs were, at the time of the Conquest, scarcely more than country villages; and that the inhabitants lived in entire dependence on the king or great lords, and were of a station little better than servile [u]. They were not then so much as incorporated; they formed no community; were not regarded as a body politic; and being really nothing but a number of low dependent tradesmen, living, without any particular civil tie, in neighbourhood together, they were incapable of being represented in the states of the kingdom. Even in France, a country which made more early advances in arts and civility than England, the first corporation is sixty years posterior to the Conquest under the Duke of Normandy; and the erecting of these communities was an invention of Lewis the Gross, in order to free the people from slavery under the lords, and to give them protection, by means of certain privileges and a separate jurisdiction [w]. An ancient French writer calls them a new and wicked device, to procure liberty to slaves, and encourage them in shaking off the dominion of their masters [x]. The famous charter, as it is called, of the Conqueror to the city of London, though granted at a time when he a.s.sumed the appearance of gentleness and lenity, is nothing but a letter of protection, and a declaration that the citizens should not be treated as slaves [y]. By the English feudal law, the superior lord was prohibited from marrying his female ward to a burgess or a villain [z]; so near were these two ranks esteemed to each other, and so much inferior to the n.o.bility and gentry. Besides possessing the advantages of birth, riches, civil powers, and privileges, the n.o.bles and gentlemen alone were armed; a circ.u.mstance which gave them a mighty superiority, in an age when nothing but the military profession was honourable, and when the loose execution of laws gave so much encouragement to open violence, and rendered it so decisive in all disputes and controversies [a].

[FN [u] LIBER h.o.m.o anciently signified a gentleman; for scarce any one beside was entirely free. Spellm. Gloss. in verbo. [w] Du Cange?s Gloss in verb. COMMUNE, COMMUNITAS. [x] Guibertus, de vita sua, lib. 2. cap. 7. [y] Stat. of Merton, 1235. cap. 6. [z]

Hollingshed, vol. iii. p. 15. [a] Madox's Baron. Angl. p. 19.]

The great similarity among the feudal governments of Europe is well known to every man that has any acquaintance with ancient history; and the antiquaries of all foreign countries, where the question was never embarra.s.sed by party disputes, have allowed, that the Commons came very late to be admitted to a share in the legislative power. In Normandy particularly, whose const.i.tution was most likely to be William's model in raising his new fabric of English government, the states were entirely composed of the clergy and n.o.bility; and the first incorporated boroughs or communities of that duchy were Rouen and Falaise, which enjoyed their privileges by a grant of Philip Augustus in the year 1207 [b]. All the ancient English historians, when they mention the great council of the nation, call it an a.s.sembly of the baronage, n.o.bility, or great men; and none of their expressions, though several hundred pa.s.sages might be produced, can, without the utmost violence, be tortured to a meaning, which will admit the Commons to be const.i.tuent members of that body [c]. If in the long period of two hundred years, which elapsed between the Conquest and the latter end of Henry III., and which abounded in factions, revolutions, and convulsions of all kinds, the House of Commons never performed one single legislative act, so considerable as to be once mentioned by any of the numerous historians of that age, they must have been totally insignificant: and, in that case, what reason can be a.s.signed for their ever being a.s.sembled? Can it be supposed that men of so little weight or importance possessed a negative voice against the king and the barons? Every page of the subsequent histories discovers their existence; though these histories are not written with greater accuracy than the preceding ones, and indeed scarcely equal them in that particular. The MAGNA CHARTA of King John provides, that no scutage or aid should be imposed, either on the land or towns, but by consent of the great council; and for more security, it enumerates the persons ent.i.tled to a seat in that a.s.sembly, the prelates and immediate tenants of the crown, without any mention of the Commons: an authority so full, certain, and explicit, that nothing but the zeal of party could ever have procured credit to any contrary hypothesis.

[FN [b] Norman. Du Chesnii, p. 1066. Du Cange, Gloss, in verb.

COMMUNE. [c] Sometimes the historians mention the people, POPULUS, as part of the Parliament; but they always mean the laity, in opposition to the clergy. Sometimes the word COMMUNITAS is found; but it always means COMMUNITAS BARONAGII. These points are clearly proved by Dr.

Brady. There is also mention sometimes made of a crowd or mult.i.tude that thronged into the great council on particular interesting occasions; but as deputies from boroughs are never once spoken of, the proof that they had not then any existence becomes the more certain and undeniable. These never could make a crowd, as they must have had a regular place a.s.signed them, if they had made a regular part of the legislative body. There were only one hundred and thirty boroughs who received writs of summons from Edward I. It is expressly said in Gesta. Reg. Steph. p. 932, that it was usual for the populace, VULGUS, to crowd into the great councils; where they were plainly mere spectators, and could only gratify their curiosity.]

It was probably the example of the French barons which first emboldened the English to require greater independence from their sovereign: it is also probable, that the boroughs and corporations of England were established in imitation of those of France. It may, therefore, be proposed as no unlikely conjecture, that both the chief privileges of the Peers in England and the liberty of the Commons were originally the growth of that foreign country.

In ancient times, men were little solicitous to obtain a place in the legislative a.s.semblies; and rather regarded their attendance as a burden, which was not compensated by any return of profit or honour proportionate to the trouble and expense. The only reason for inst.i.tuting those public councils was, on the part of the subject, that they desired some security from the attempts of arbitrary power; and on the part of the sovereign, that he despaired of governing men of such independent spirits without their own consent and concurrence.

But the Commons, or the inhabitants of boroughs, had not as yet reached such a degree of consideration as to desire SECURITY against their prince, or to imagine that, even if they were a.s.sembled in a representative body, they had power or rank sufficient to enforce it.

The only protection which they aspired to, was against the immediate violence and injustice of their fellow-citizens; and this advantage each of them looked for, from the courts of justice, or from the authority of some great lord, to whom, by law or his own choice, he was attached. On the other hand, the sovereign was sufficiently a.s.sured of obedience in the whole community, if he procured the concurrence of the n.o.bles; nor had he reason to apprehend, that any order of the state could resist his and their united authority. The military sub-va.s.sals could entertain no idea of opposing both their prince and their superiors: the burgesses and tradesmen could much less aspire to such a thought: and thus, even if history were silent on the head, we have reason to conclude, from the known situation of society during those ages, that the Commons were never admitted as members of the legislative body.

The EXECUTIVE power of the Anglo-Norman government was lodged in the king. Besides the stated meetings of the national council at the three great festivals of Christmas, Easter, and Whitsuntide [d], he was accustomed, on any sudden exigence, to summon them together. He could at his pleasure command the attendance of his barons and their va.s.sals, in which consisted the military force of the kingdom; and could employ them, during forty days, either in resisting a foreign enemy, or reducing his rebellious subjects. And what was of great importance, the whole JUDICIAL power was ultimately in his hands, and was exercised by officers and ministers of his appointment.

[FN [d] Dugd. Orig. Jurid. p. 15. Spellm. Gloss. In verbo PARLIAMENTUM.]

[MN Judicial power.]

The general plan of the Anglo-Norman government was, that the court of barony was appointed to decide such controversies as arose between the several va.s.sals or subjects of the same barony; the hundred court and county court, which were still continued as during the Saxon times [e], to judge between the subjects of different baronies [f]; and the CURIA REGIS, or king's court, to give sentence among the barons themselves [g]. But this plan, though simple, was attended with some circ.u.mstances which, being derived from a very extensive authority a.s.sumed by the Conqueror, contributed to increase the royal prerogative: and, as long as the state was not disturbed by arms, reduced every order of the community to some degree of dependence and subordination.

[FN [e] Ang. Sacra, vol. i. p. 334, &c. Dugd. Orig. Jurid. p. 27, 29.

Madox, Hist. of Exch. p. 75, 76. Spellm. Gloss. in verbo HUNDRED.

[f] None of the feudal governments in Europe had such inst.i.tutions as the county courts, which the great authority of the Conqueror still retained from the Saxon customs. All the freeholders of the county, even the greatest barons, were obliged to attend the sheriffs in these courts, and to a.s.sist them in the administration of justice. By these means they received frequent and sensible admonitions of their dependence on the king or supreme magistrate: they formed a kind of community with their fellow barons and freeholders: they were often drawn from their individual and independent state, peculiar to the feudal system, and were made members of a political body: and, perhaps, this inst.i.tution of county courts in England has had greater effects on the government than has yet been distinctly pointed out by historians, or traced by antiquaries. The barons were never able to free themselves from this attendance on the sheriffs and itinerant justices till the reign of Henry III. [g] Brady, Pref. p. 143.]

The king himself often sat in his court, which always attended his person [h]: he there heard causes and p.r.o.nounced judgment [i]; and though he was a.s.sisted by the advice of the other members, it is not to be imagined that a decision could easily be obtained contrary to his inclination or opinion. In his absence the chief justiciary presided, who was the first magistrate in the state, and a kind of viceroy, on whom depended all the civil affairs of the kingdom [k]

The other chief officers of the crown, the constable, mareschal, seneschal, chamberlain, treasurer, and chancellor [l], were members, together with such feudal barons as thought proper to attend, and the barons of the exchequer, who at first were also feudal barons, appointed by the king [m]. This court, which was sometimes called the king's court, sometimes the court of exchequer, judged in all causes, civil and criminal, and comprehended the whole business which is now shared out among four courts, the chancery, the king's-bench, the common-pleas, and the exchequer [n].

[FN [h] Madox, Hist. of Exch. p. 103. [i] Bracton, lib. 3. cap. 9.

Sec. 1. cap. 10. Sec. 1. [k] Spellm. Gloss. in verbo JUSTICIARII.

[l] Madox, Hist. Exch. p. 27, 29, 33, 38, 41, 54. The Normans introduced the practice of sealing charters; and the chancellor's office was to keep the great seal. Ingulph. Dugd. p. 33, 34. [m]

Madox, Hist. of the Exch. p. 134, 135. Gerv. Dorob. p. 1387. [n]

Madox, Hist. of the Exch. p. 56, 70.]

Such an acc.u.mulation of powers was itself a great source of authority, and rendered the jurisdiction of the court formidable to all the subjects; but the turn which judicial trials took soon after the Conquest served still more to increase its authority, and to augment the royal prerogatives. William, among the other violent changes which he attempted and effected, had introduced the Norman law into England [o], had ordered all the pleadings to be in that tongue, and had interwoven, with the English jurisprudence, all the maxims and principles, which the Normans, more advanced in cultivation, and naturally litigious, were accustomed to observe in the distribution of justice. Law now became a science, which at first fell entirely into the hands of the Normans; and which, even after it was communicated to the English, required so much study and application, that the laity, in those ignorant ages, were incapable of attaining it, and it was a mystery almost solely confined to the clergy, and chiefly to the monks [p]. The great officers of the crown, and the feudal barons, who were military men, found themselves unfit to penetrate into those obscurities; and though they were ent.i.tled to a seat in the supreme judicature, the business of the court was wholly managed by the chief justiciary and the law barons, who were men appointed by the king and entirely at his disposal [q]. This natural course of things was forwarded by the multiplicity of business which flowed into that court, and which daily augmented by the appeals from all the subordinate judicatures of the kingdom.

[FN [o] Dial. de Scac. p. 30. apud Madox, Hist. of the Exchequer. [p]

Malmes. lib. 4. p. 123. [q] Dugd. Orig. Jurid. p. 25.]

In the Saxon times, no appeal was received in the king's court, except upon the denial or delay of justice by the inferior courts; and the same practice was still observed in most of the feudal kingdoms of Europe. But the great power of the Conqueror established, at first, in England, an authority, which the monarchs in France were not able to attain till the reign of St. Lewis, who lived near two centuries after: he empowered his court to receive appeals both from the courts of barony and the county courts, and by that means brought the administration of justice ultimately into the hands of the sovereign [r]. And lest the expense or trouble of a journey to courts should discourage suitors, and make them acquiesce in the decision of the inferior judicatures, itinerant judges were afterwards established, who made their circuits throughout the kingdom, and tried all causes that were brought before them [s]. By this expedient the courts of barony were kept in awe; and if they still preserved some influence, it was only from the apprehensions which the va.s.sals might entertain of disobliging their superior, by appealing from his jurisdiction.

But the county courts were much discredited; and as the freeholders were found ignorant of the intricate principles and forms of the new law, the lawyers gradually brought all business before the king's judges, and abandoned the ancient simple and popular judicature.

After this manner, the formalities of justice, which, though they appear tedious and c.u.mbersome, are found requisite to the support of liberty in all monarchical governments, proved at first, by a combination of causes, very advantageous to royal authority in England.

[FN [r] Madox, Hist. of the Exch. p. 65. Glanv. lib. 12. cap. 1. 7.

LL. Hen. I. Sec. 31, apud Wilkins, p. 248. Fitz-Stephens, p. 36.

c.o.ke's Comment. on the statute of Marlbridge, cap. 20. [s] Madox, Hist. of the Exch. p. 83, 84, 100. Gerv. Dorob. p. 1410. What made the Anglo-Norman barons more readily submit to appeals from their court to the king's court of exchequer, was their being accustomed to like appeals in Normandy to the ducal court of exchequer. See Gilbert's History of the Exchequer, p. 1, 2; though the author thinks it doubtful, whether the Norman court was not rather copied from the English, p. 6.]

[MN Revenue of the crown.]

The power of the Norman kings was also much supported by a great revenue; and by a revenue that was fixed, perpetual, and independent of the subject. The people, without betaking themselves to arms, had no check upon the king, and no regular security for the due administration of justice. In those days of violence, many instances of oppression pa.s.sed unheeded; and soon after were openly pleaded as precedents, which it was unlawful to dispute or control. Princes and ministers were too ignorant to be themselves sensible of the advantages attending an equitable administration; and there was no established council or a.s.sembly which could protect the people, and, by withdrawing supplies, regularly and peaceably admonish the king of his duty, and ensure the execution of the laws.

The first branch of the king's stated revenue was the royal demesnes or crown lands, which were very extensive, and comprehended, besides a great number of manors, most of the chief cities of the kingdom. It was established by law, that the king could alienate no part of his demesne, and that he himself, or his successor, could at any time resume such donations [t]: but this law was never regularly observed; which happily rendered in time the crown somewhat more dependent. The rent of the crown lands, considered merely as so much riches, was a source of power: the influence of the king over his tenants and the inhabitants of his towns increased this power: but the other numerous branches of his revenue, besides supplying his treasury, gave, by their very nature, a great lat.i.tude to arbitrary authority, and were a support of the prerogative; as will appear from an enumeration of them.

[FN [t] Fleta, lib. 1. cap. 8. Sec. 17. lib. 3. cap. 6. Sec. 3.

Bracton, lib. 2. cap. 5.]

The king was never content with the stated rents, but levied heavy talliages at pleasure on the inhabitants both of town and country, who lived within his demesne. All bargains of sale, in order to prevent theft, being prohibited, except in boroughs and public markets [u], he pretended to exact tolls, on all goods which were there sold [w]. He seized two hogsheads, one before and one behind the mast, from every vessel that imported wine. All goods paid to his customs a proportionable part of their value [x]: pa.s.sage over bridges and on rivers was loaded with tolls at pleasure [y]: and though the boroughs by degrees bought the liberty of farming these impositions, yet the revenue profited by these bargains: new sums were often exacted for the renewal and confirmation of their charters [z] and the people were thus held in perpetual dependence.

[FN [u] LL. Will. I. cap. 61. [w] Madox, p. 530. [x] Ibid. p. 529.

This author says a fifteenth. But it is not easy to reconcile this account to other authorities. [y] Madox, p. 529. [z] Madox's Hist.

of the Exch. p. 275, 276, 277, &c.]

Such was the situation of the inhabitants within the royal demesnes.

But the possessors of land, or the military tenants, though they were better protected both by law, and by the great privilege of carrying arms, were, from the nature of their tenures, much exposed to the inroads of power, and possessed not what we should esteem, in our age, a very durable security. The Conqueror ordained, that the barons should be obliged to pay nothing beyond their stated services [a], except a reasonable aid to ransom his person if he were taken in war, to make his eldest son a knight, and to marry his eldest daughter.

What should, on these occasions, be deemed a reasonable aid, was not determined; and the demands of the crown were so far discretionary.

[FN [a] LL. Will. Conq. Sec. 55.]

The king could require in war the personal attendance of his va.s.sals, that is, of almost all the landed proprietors; and if they declined the service, they were obliged to pay him a composition in money, which was called a scutage. The sum was, during some reigns, precarious and uncertain; it was sometimes levied without allowing the va.s.sal the liberty of personal service [b]; and it was an usual artifice of the king, to pretend an expedition, that he might be ent.i.tled to levy the scutage from his military tenants. Danegelt was another species of land-tax levied by the early Norman kings, arbitrarily, and contrary to the laws of the Conqueror [c]. Moneyage was also a general land-tax of the same nature, levied by the two first Norman kings, and abolished by the charter of Henry I. [d]. It was a shilling paid every three years by each hearth, to induce the king not to use his prerogative in debasing the coin. Indeed it appears from that charter, that though the Conqueror had granted his military tenants an immunity from all taxes and talliages, he and his son William had never thought themselves bound to observe that rule, but had levied impositions at pleasure on all the landed estates of the kingdom. The utmost that Henry grants, is, that the land cultivated by the military tenant himself shall not be so burdened; but he reserves the power of taxing the farmers; and as it is known that Henry's charter was never observed in any one article, we may be a.s.sured that this prince and his successors retracted even this small indulgence, and levied arbitrary impositions on all the lands of all their subjects. These taxes were sometimes very heavy; since Malmesbury tells us, that in the reign of William Rufus, the farmers, on account of them, abandoned tillage, and a famine ensued [e].

[FN [b] Gervase de Tilbury, p. 25. [c] Madox's Hist of the Exch. p.

475. [d] Matth. Paris, p. 38. [e] So also Chron. Abb. St. Petri de Burgo, p. 55. Knyghton, p. 2366.]

The escheats were a great branch both of power and of revenue, especially during the first reigns after the Conquest. In default of posterity from the first baron, his land reverted to the crown, and continually augmented the king's possessions. The prince had indeed by law a power of alienating these escheats; but by this means he had an opportunity of establishing the fortunes of his friends and servants, and thereby enlarging his authority. Sometimes he retained them in his own hands; and they were gradually confounded with the royal demesnes, and became difficult to be distinguished from them.

This confusion is probably the reason why the king acquired the right of alienating his demesnes.

But besides escheats from default of heirs, those which ensued from crimes, or breach of duty towards the superior lord, were frequent in ancient times. If the va.s.sal, being thrice summoned to attend his superior?s court, and do fealty, neglected or refused obedience, he forfeited all t.i.tle to his land [f]. If he denied his tenure, or refused his service, he was exposed to the same penalty [g]. If he sold his estate without licence from his lord [h], or if he sold it upon any other tenure or t.i.tle than that by which he himself held it [i], he lost all right to it. The adhering to his lord's enemies [k], deserting him in war [l], betraying his secrets [m], debauching his wife, or his near relations [n], or even using indecent freedoms with them [o], might be punished by forfeiture. The higher crimes, rapes, robbery, murder, arson, &c., were called felony; and being interpreted want of fidelity to his lord, made him lose his fief [p]. Even where the felon was va.s.sal to a baron, though his immediate lord enjoyed the forfeiture, the king might retain possession of his estate during a twelvemonth, and had the right of spoiling and destroying it, unless the baron paid him a reasonable composition [q]. We have not here enumerated all the species of felonies, or of crimes by which forfeiture was incurred: we have said enough to prove, that the possession of feudal property was anciently somewhat precarious, and that the primary idea was never lost, of its being a kind of FEE or BENEFICE.

[FN [f] Hottom. de Feud. Disp. cap. 38. col. 886. [g] Lib. Feud. lib.

3. t.i.t. 1; lib. 4. t.i.t. 21, 39. [h] Id. lib. 1. t.i.t. 21. [i] Id.

lib. 4. t.i.t. 44. [k] Id. lib. 3. t.i.t. 1. [l] Id. lib. 4. t.i.t. 14, 21. [m] Id. lib. 4. t.i.t. 14. [n] Id. lib. 1. t.i.t. 14, 23. [o] Id.

lib. 1. t.i.t. 1. [p] Spellm. Gloss. in verb. FELONIA. [q] Ibid.

Glanville, lib. 7 cap. 17.]

When a baron died, the king immediately took possession of the estate; and the heir, before he recovered his right, was obliged to make application to the crown, and desire that he might be admitted to do homage for his land, and pay a composition to the king. This composition was not at first fixed by law, at least by practice: the king was often exorbitant in his demands, and kept possession of the land till they were complied with.

If the heir were a minor, the king retained the whole profit of the estate till his majority; and might grant what sum he thought proper for the education and maintenance of the young baron. This practice was also founded on the notion, that a fief was a benefice, and that while the heir could not perform his military services, the revenue devolved to the superior, who employed another in his stead. It is obvious, that a great proportion of the landed property must, by means of this device, be continually in the hands of the prince, and that all the n.o.ble families were thereby held in perpetual dependence.

When the king granted the wardship of a rich heir to any one, he had the opportunity of enriching a favourite or minister: if he sold it, he thereby levied a considerable sum of money. Simon de Mountfort paid Henry III. ten thousand marks, an immense sum in those days, for the wardship of Gilbert de Umfreville [r]. Geoffrey de Mandeville paid to the same prince the sum of twenty thousand marks, that he might marry Isabel, Countess of Gloucester, and possess all her lands and knights' fees. This sum would be equivalent to three hundred thousand, perhaps four hundred thousand pounds in our time [s].

[FN [r] Madox's Hist. of the Exch. p. 223. [s] Madox?s Hist. of the Exch. p. 322.]

If the heir were a female, the king was ent.i.tled to offer her any husband of her rank he thought proper; and if she refused him, she forfeited her land. Even a male heir could not marry without the royal consent; and it was usual for men to pay large sums for the liberty of making their own choice in marriage [t]. No man could dispose of his land, either by sale or will, without the consent of his superior. The possessor was never considered as full proprietor: he was still a kind of beneficiary; and could not oblige his superior to accept of any va.s.sal that was not agreeable to him.

[FN [t] Ibid. p. 320.]

Fines, amerciaments, and oblatas, as they were called, were another considerable branch of the royal power and revenue. The ancient records of the exchequer, which are still preserved, give surprising accounts of the numerous fines and amerciaments levied in those days [u] and of the strange inventions fallen upon to exact money from the subject. It appears that the ancient kings of England put themselves entirely on the footing of the barbarous eastern princes, whom no man must approach without a present, who sell all their good offices, and who intrude themselves into every business that they may have a pretence for extorting money. Even justice was avowedly bought and sold; the king's court itself, though the supreme judicature of the kingdom, was open to none that brought not presents to the king; the bribes given for the expedition, delay [w], suspension, and, doubtless for the perversion of justice, were entered in the public registers of the royal revenue, and remain as monuments of the perpetual iniquity and tyranny of the times. The barons of the exchequer, for instance, the first n.o.bility of the kingdom, were not ashamed to insert, as an article in their records, that the county of Norfolk paid a sum that they might be fairly dealt with [x]; the borough of Yarmouth, that the king's charters, which they have for their liberties, might not be violated [y]; Richard, son of Gilbert, for the king's helping him to recover his debt from the Jews [z]; Serlo, son of Terlavaston, that he might be permitted to make his defence in case he were accused of a certain homicide [a]; Walter de Burton, for free law, if accused of wounding another [b]; Robert de Essart, for having an inquest to find whether Roger the Butcher, and Wace and Humphrey, accused him of robbery and theft out of envy and ill-will or not [c]; William Buhurst, for having an inquest to find whether he were accused of the death of one G.o.dwin out of ill-will, or for just cause [d]. I have selected these few instances from a great number of a like kind, which Madox had selected from a still greater number, preserved in the ancient rolls of the exchequer [e].

[FN [u] Id. p. 272. [w] Id. p. 274, 309. [x] Id. p. 295. [y] Id.

ibid. [z] Madox?s Hist. of the Exch. p. 296. He paid two hundred marks, great sum in those days. [a] Id. p. 296. [b] Id. ibid. [c]

Id. p. 298. [d] Id. p. 302. [e] Id. chap. 12.]

Sometimes the party litigant offered the king a certain portion, a half, a third, a fourth, payable out of the debts, which he, as the executor of justice, should a.s.sist him in recovering [f]. Theophania de Westland agreed to pay the half of two hundred and twelve marks, that she might recover that sum against James de Fughleston [g]; Solomon, the Jew, engaged to pay one mark out of every seven that he should recover against Hugh de la Hose [h]; Nicholas Morrel promised to pay sixty pounds, that the Earl of Flanders might be distrained to pay him three hundred and forty-three pounds, which the earl had taken from him; and these sixty pounds were to be paid out of the first money that Nicholas should recover from the earl [i].

[FN [f] Id. p. 311. [g] Id. ibid. [h] Id. p. 79, 312. [i] Id. p.

312.]

As the king a.s.sumed the entire power over trade, he was to be paid for a permission to exercise commerce or industry of any kind [k]. Hugh Oisel paid four hundred marks for liberty to trade in England [l]; Nigel de Havene gave fifty marks for the partnership in merchandize which he had with Gervase de Hanton [m]; the men of Worcester paid one hundred shillings, that they might have the liberty of selling and buying dyed cloth as formerly [n]; several other towns paid for a like liberty [o]. The commerce indeed of the kingdom was so much under the control of the king, that he erected guilds, corporations, and monopolies, wherever he pleased; and levied sums for these exclusive privileges [p].

[FN [k] Id. p. 323. [l] Id. ibid. [m] Id. ibid. [n] Id. p. 324.

[o] Id. ibid. [p] Madox's Hist. of the Exch. p. 232, 233, &c.]

There were no profits so small as to be below the king's attention.

Henry, son of Arthur, gave ten dogs to have a recognition against the Countess of Copland for one knight's fee [q]. Roger, son of Nicholas, gave twenty lampreys and twenty shads for an inquest to find, whether Gilbert, son of Alured, gave to Roger two hundred muttons to obtain his confirmation for certain lands, or whether Roger took them from him by violence [r]; Geoffrey Fitz-Pierre, the chief justiciary, gave two good Norway hawks, that Walter le Madine might have leave to export a hundred weight of cheese out of the king's dominions [s].

[FN [q] Id. p. 298. [r] Id. p. 305. [s] Id. p. 325.]