The History of Cuba Volume IV Part 24

Reference being made to the menace of revolution, President Menocal said, with emphasis:

"There will be no revolution under my administration. There may be outbreaks headed by disappointed politicians or military adventurers, but they will be crushed and their leaders will be punished. The day is past when men of this cla.s.s can arrest the orderly processes of government. I shall have back of me not only a loyal army, but also a loyal people who are determined to show to the United States and to the world that Cuba realizes her responsibilities and is capable of self-government. I shall appoint honest men, and will guarantee that they honestly administer their duties. I shall urge the pa.s.sage of honest taxation laws, and have faith that the people will respond by electing men who will a.s.sist me to make Cuba worthy of the favors which G.o.d has lavished upon her."

With such purposes and with such expectations he entered upon his great work. Unfortunately there was not a majority upon which he could depend in Congress to enact the measures which were needed for the welfare of Cuba. Indeed, there was a hostile majority, as we shall see, which deliberately set itself to embarra.s.s and thwart him in his undertakings.

But that had merely the effect which obstacles usually have upon men who are really brave and strong. It indeed made his work more difficult, but it did not turn him from his purpose nor defeat his efforts. Rather did it give him all the greater credit and honor, to have achieved so much in the face of so much opposition.

General Mario G. Menocal became President and Senor Enrique Jose Varona became Vice-President of Cuba on May 20, 1913, the tenth anniversary of the establishment of the independent Cuban Government. The President delivered his first message to Congress on the following day. It was an eminently practical, statesman-like and businesslike doc.u.ment, in which he modestly promised a wise and prudent administration of his office, and especially an immediate reform of the finances of the Government, which was notoriously much needed. As a small beginning of this reform, he offered to do away with the usual appropriation of $25,000 for Presidential secret service. Many debts had been left over by the former administration and he purposed to address himself to the liquidation of these, so far as they had been honestly contracted. The notorious Dragado concession was repealed on August 4, and a commission was appointed to investigate the methods of the company. As a result of this and other investigations, the former Secretary of Public Works, and Auditor were indicted for misappropriation of public funds, and various other officers were prosecuted.

The President desired to obtain a loan of $15,000,000 with which to pay off the debts which had been left to him by his predecessor, and also for urgent road work, and the paving and sewering of the streets of Havana. This was, however, refused him by Congress, and that body, under the domination of the Liberals, refused to pa.s.s any budget whatever.

President Menocal was therefore compelled to declare the budget of the preceding year still in force, pending the adoption of new financial provisions. Hoping to persuade or to compel Congress to perform its const.i.tutional duty, he called that body together in special session in July and again in October, but on both occasions the Liberals all absented themselves and thus prevented the securing of a quorum. These, it will be observed, were similar to the tactics which the same party in Congress had employed against President Palma in their malignant campaign for the overthrow of his administration. But President Menocal was not thus to be overthrown. When the Liberals in October, a second time, refused to perform their duty he issued a manifesto in which he seriously criticized them and made it plain that no such methods would be permitted to interfere with the legitimate work of Government. Rumors were indeed current that he would resort to compulsion if persuasion failed. The Liberals attempted to reply with a countermanifesto protesting against his action as a usurpation of congressional authority, declaring their opposition to the making of the proposed loan, and pretending that it would be illegal to hold the special session which he had called for October.

The President exercised patience and waited until November 2, when the regular session of Congress opened, and the Liberals took their seats.

At this time the Liberals practically stultified themselves by agreeing to discuss and finally to approve the loan project which they had formerly opposed. After transacting this and some other business, Congress adjourned in December.

Among the reforms which President Menocal promptly undertook to effect was the abolition of the national lottery which had been established during the Gomez administration. In his messages and through the influence of all legitimate presidential influence he strove to abolish this form of legalized gambling. His arguments were that the low price of the tickets, only 25, and the appeal which was thus made to the poor and ignorant, to servants and working women as well as to men, had caused great injury and had brought about a certain degree of moral decline among the ma.s.ses of the people. It had induced many individuals to borrow money and even to steal in order to purchase lottery tickets, in the delusive hope of winning one of the large prizes, which ran up to $100,000, and thus exempting themselves from the necessity of work for the rest of their lives. The lottery, it is true, yielded a considerable revenue each year for the government, but General Menocal regarded this as far more than counter-balanced by the social and moral evil which it wrought, and by the reproach which it brought upon the good name of the Republic. He was unable, however, to persuade Congress to abolish it, partly because of the popular love of gambling which so largely pervades Latin American countries, and partly--perhaps chiefly--because the privilege of selling tickets at wholesale, at a handsome profit, was farmed out to many members of Congress.

At the beginning of his administration, President Menocal found all the Government offices crowded with the appointees of the former administration. A great many of them were entirely superfluous and a great many of them were also entirely incompetent to fill their places.

There was, therefore, a considerable clearing out of placeholders. There might have been, of course, what is known in America as a "clean sweep,"

and this was urged by a few of the President's friends. But General Menocal would listen to no such proposition. A Civil Service law had indeed been formulated by the Consulting Commission presided over by General Crowder, and had been in force since 1907, and while an unscrupulous executive might have evaded its provisions, General Menocal was a believer in the merit system, and in secure tenure of office for men who were doing their duty. He therefore refused positively to remove a single man merely because of his political affiliations. So far as placeholders were dismissed, they were dismissed because of incompetence or dishonesty, or because their services were superfluous. As a result of this enlightened policy, it is true, President Menocal was compelled to conduct his administration through the agency of a staff, the majority of which was composed of his political opponents. He even appointed two Liberals to his cabinet, while nearly all the foreign ministers and consuls and important officers of the various departments were members of that party, holding over from the Gomez administration.

It cannot be said that this policy was in all cases appreciated by those who personally profited from it, for some of these officeholders did not scruple to engage in intrigues against the President whose generosity retained them in their places.

The United States Government retained a certain supervision over some of the acts of the Cuban Government. Thus, as. .h.i.therto stated, in March, 1913, an amnesty bill had been pa.s.sed at the instance of the Gomez administration, which would have set at liberty several hundred political and other prisoners, but it was objected to by Mr. Bryan, the Secretary of State of the United States, and was accordingly vetoed. It was again posed in a modified form on April 25, and was again similarly vetoed. In November, 1913, it was once more taken up and revised so as to extend the pardon to those who had partic.i.p.ated in the negro insurrection, and to some former officeholders of the Gomez administration who had been indicted. It was also intended that it should extend amnesty to General Ernesto Asbert, Governor of the Province of Havana, to Senator Vidal Morales, and to Representative Arias, who had been indicted for the murder of the Chief of Police of Havana, General Armando Riva; a tragedy which occurred during a police raid on a club, on the evening of July 7. This attempt to extend amnesty to these men caused an acute and prolonged controversy. But on December 9, 1914, the bill was finally pa.s.sed in a form which granted amnesty to General Asbert, but not to Senator Arias. In this form the United States Government sanctioned its enactment because of the belief that the real burden of guilt rested upon the latter rather than upon the former.

This controversy over amnesty to General Asbert meanwhile had serious political effects in Cuba. For a time the so-called Asbert faction of the Liberal party allied itself with the Conservatives in Congress in support of President Menocal and thus gave him a majority in that body.

But in the summer of 1914 this faction became reunited with the rest of the Liberal party, and Conservative control of Congress was lost. The Speaker of the House of Representatives, Senor Gonzales Lanuza, a Conservative, resigned and was succeeded by Senor Urquiaga, a Liberal, on August 31. When at last in February, 1915, the act of amnesty for General Asbert was completed, and he was released and fully rehabilitated, there was a great popular celebration of the event in the City of Havana.

The first attempt at insurrection in President Menocal's administration occurred on November 9, 1913, when Crecencio Garcia, a mulatto, undertook to lead a revolt in the province of Santa Clara. It was promptly suppressed by the Rural Guard in a manner which augured well for the promise which the President had made, that there would be no revolutions during his administration; and there were no more such attempts until the great treason of ex-President Gomez.

CHAPTER XVIII

The fifth Presidential campaign of the Republic of Cuba occurred in 1916. The Conservative candidate for President was General Mario G.

Menocal, who was thus seeking reelection, and the candidate for Vice-President was General Emilio Nunez, of whom we have already heard as the leader of the Veterans' a.s.sociation in its legitimate and orderly resistance to the corruption and despotism of the Gomez administration, who had had a distinguished career in the Liberating Army in the War of Independence, and who was at this time serving as Secretary of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce in the cabinet of President Menocal.

[Ill.u.s.tration: GEN. D. EMILIO NUnEZ]

On the Liberal side, in accordance with the compact formerly made between him and Jose Miguel Gomez, the Presidential candidate was Dr.

Alfredo Zayas, and the Vice-Presidential candidate was Carlos Mendieta, a journalist and Representative in Congress, who had long been conspicuous in the practical management of the Liberal Party.

The general prosperity which Cuba had been enjoying under the administration of President Menocal excited the envy and cupidity of the Liberal place-seekers and roused them to extraordinary efforts to regain possession of the government. A shameless attempt was made to force a bill through Congress disqualifying a President for reelection unless he resigned his office at least sixty days before the election; but it failed of success. Long in advance of the actual contest a vigorous propaganda was started all over the island on lines similar to those which had been successful in causing the overthrow of Estrada Palma.

While few ventured to asperse the character of President Menocal himself, his administration was vilified as corrupt and inefficient. It was charged that he did not, like Gomez, "divide the spoils" with his party followers, that he was both selfish and weak, and that his fatal weakness in office had been more than amply demonstrated, and would justify them in overthrowing his government. The Liberal newspapers a.s.serted that at least three quarters of the inhabitants of the island were not in sympathy with the Conservative position and with the President, but had been deluded into voting for him; that they did not approve of his persistent acquiescence in every little hint and suggestion that might come from the United States; and that having been graduated from an American University, he was more American in his ideas and ideals than he was true Cuban, and deserved defeat at the next election.

This was largely for the purpose of preparing the public for the claim, which was made before the polls had been open two hours, that the Liberals were sweeping the country, and that the Conservatives could make no possible or effective showing in the election. In pursuance of this propaganda, it was so arranged that the local boards of the larger towns and cities, where there was an excess of the rank and file of the Liberal party, should rush in their returns. These records were sent in immediately and seemed to indicate a sweeping victory for the Liberal party. The country districts, where were registered the votes of the farmers, the sugar planters, and the people of property who believed in work and the maintenance of law and order, being remote from the capital, came in much later, and in many instances, owing to distance and the uncertainty of travel, reliable returns from these districts were delayed until the next day, so that at midnight it looked as though the election had been carried by the Liberal party. On the following day, however, as the returns began to arrive from the remote districts, a decided change in the aspect of the situation became apparent, and by that night it was seen that a very closely contested election had taken place, and that the result would probably be in doubt, as it was in the United States, for several days.

This delay gave occasion for charges and accusations of fraud on both sides, and each prepared itself for a hard struggle. It was discovered that the matter would have to be settled by electoral boards and courts established for that purpose. In the meantime, the Liberals demanded that General Menocal acknowledge his defeat and proclaimed the election of Dr. Zayas on all sides, and openly demanded to have the government immediately turned over to them, or there would be serious trouble in store for the Conservatives and the country. In the meantime, pressure was brought to bear on the United States government, and protection was asked by the Liberals against the manifest danger that they would be cheated of their success at the polls. Threats were also heard that a revolution would undoubtedly follow as a protest against the usurpation, as it was termed, of their legitimate right to take control of the government, and Dr. Alfredo Zayas, in a private conversation with the American minister, hinted at this, and predicted that if a revolution should become necessary, it would undoubtedly be successful, since he knew that two-thirds of the army was with him in sympathy, and would follow the Liberal command to overthrow the Menocal government if he should see fit to give such a command.

General Menocal stated very frankly that the determination of the contest must be left to the local boards and to the courts for decision, and whatever that might be, regardless of any injustice that might be imposed upon him and his party, he would acquiesce, and would be the first man to shake the hand of the successful candidate. A similar statement was never made by the Liberals. They continued the cry of fraud, and openly stated that if they did not succeed a revolution would follow. The judges of the courts, excepting the chief justice of the Supreme Court, Senor Pichardo, had been appointed by Gomez, and naturally great pressure was brought to bear on them to "save the const.i.tution," as it was called, for the Liberals. In the decisions that followed, the Conservatives stated frankly that they believed this pressure was producing manifestly unfair decisions, but made at no time any attempt to ignore them or set them aside.

The court decided that in two districts, Victoria de las Tunas, in the province of Oriente, and another town in Santa Clara, new elections must be held. In the first one the Liberals had, at four o'clock in the morning previous to the day of election, set fire to the town hall, burning all of the electoral lists, so that an election was absolutely impossible. This was probably due to the fact that Victoria de las Tunas held General Menocal in great esteem, since, owing to his personal valor in leading the charges against the Spanish army, when in command of that town, the Cubans had been victorious. In the city of Santa Clara province, the frauds claimed by both sides rendered it so impossible to determine the true result of the election that a second election was deemed necessary. According to the records of the Liberal party, the vote of these two towns, or possibly either one of them, would determine the election, and Dr. Alfredo Zayas felt quite confident that he would be the successor of General Menocal, and openly so stated.

The Conservatives, on the other hand, said, "We can only await and abide by the decisions of the courts, and will surrender nothing until such decisions are handed down." The supporters of Dr. Zayas stated that the soldiers, who had been sent there to maintain order, had been sent there for the sole purpose of preventing the Liberals from approaching the polls. At this General Nunez, the Vice Presidential candidate, invited Dr. Zayas, the Liberal leader, to accompany him thither and to point out any Liberal in that district who wished to vote, promising that he would furnish a machine and any protection that might be necessary to see that he and every Liberal in the district deposited his vote, and that they together would witness the count.

Dr. Zayas never had an opportunity to bring this matter to a decision, owing to the fact that General Gomez, who hated Dr. Zayas bitterly, and who had opposed him in public print more strongly than any other man, saw immediately the possibility of riding into power as the man of the hour, as the real, dominating force of the republic, and as the only man, as he expressed it, able to save the electoral campaign from becoming one of protracted discord and dispute. So he forbade Dr. Zayas to go to the town where the election was to be held, or to accept General Nunez's invitation, and stated that he was himself tired of the whole thing, and that he was going to take his yacht and go on a fishing trip, which he did, leaving at midnight with about thirty trusted friends, including all of the prominent Liberal leaders. Pa.s.sing around Cape San Antonio, the yacht anch.o.r.ed off the coast near Tunas de Zaza, and there met a group of men by previous arrangement, and started a revolution or a "popular uprising," as he termed it, against the Menocal government.

In the meantime, a carefully laid plot, that had been planned months before, for seizing control of the armed forces of the island was put into execution. On Sat.u.r.day night, February 14, 1917, without warning, two companies of men stationed at the Columbia barracks, at a previously arranged signal of two shots, jumped from their beds, grabbed their arms and ammunition, and started across the parade ground for the open country, of the west. Although the details of this plot were known, other loyal companies at the command of their officers were called into immediate action, charged the Liberals and captured more than half of them and killed a few of the remainder, who at first had succeeded in escaping. This was the only apparent disloyalty in the western end of the island. Matanzas, Pinar del Rio and Havana remained loyal to the government. Among the forces stationed at the City of Santiago, far removed from the immediate control of the commanding generals of the army, seeds of sedition, which consisted largely of promises of immediate promotion of all officers, were planted. Every sergeant was to be made a captain, every captain a colonel, every lieutenant a major, with promises of increased pay, and the incidental rewards that come to the successful revolutionist. This was also true of the Province of Camaguey, where, at almost the same hour that the uprising took place in Camp Columbia barracks, several companies of men seized control, made prisoners of their comrades who were loyal to the government or shot them dead, captured and imprisoned the civil governors, intimidated the police, or made them prisoners, and took charge of the customhouse and the acc.u.mulated funds, and all moneys deposited in banks, belonging to either the state or the federal government. Incidentally all moneys that were accessible were seized at the same time, which belonged to said banks, on the ground that there was no time to discriminate. In the City of Santiago several millions of dollars were thus seized by the three or four Liberal leaders in command. These men, when the failure of the revolution became apparent, escaped from the island, carrying some two or three millions in United States currency and Cuban gold with them, and landed in Santo Domingo, where some of them were afterward captured, while the others escaped to the United States.

Securing control of Santiago de Cuba, and having access to the cables, the rebels immediately wired to the revolutionary headquarters in New York, which had been established by Dr. Orestes Ferrara, one of the moving figures in the previous uprising of 1906, in company with Dr.

Raimundo Cabrera, for the dissemination of news favorable to the Liberal side. Matter was issued, to be used in the American papers, for the purpose of preparing the United States for the usurpation of the government of Cuba by General Gomez, and defending such action on the ground that it was the only solution of a bad electoral muddle, and that the real choice of the people was General Gomez, who should have been, and was ultimately, the leader of their party. It was said that Dr.

Zayas, without justification, had usurped and endeavored to maintain the permanent control of the Liberal party, and that his lack of popularity had been indicated by his defeat four years before. The entire island was represented, and especially the army, as having voluntarily gone over to the side of the Liberals. General Gomez was pictured as having landed and by previous arrangement placed himself at the head of 12,000 men, who were marching upon the City of Havana; while the President of the republic was variously reported as having been shot, and afterward as having fled in abject fear from the palace, and as having at last found shelter in the home of the American minister, Mr. William E.

Gonzales. It was added that Havana was under the control of the Liberals, as was the remainder of the island, and that all that was necessary was the triumphant march of General Gomez into the capital, where he would a.s.sume authority as Liberal Dictator until the island should a.s.sume its normal and peaceful condition, when another election would be called, in which the people would have an opportunity to choose and place the power in the hands of the only real man of destiny, General Gomez.

In the Province of Camaguey, the insurgents followed the same program as did those in Oriente, intimidating the police, by firing two volleys into police headquarters and a.s.sa.s.sinating those men who were forming a council, the civil government and various other officers having been imprisoned. They took immediate control of the railroads, and the rolling stock, placed Liberal or disloyal troops on trains, and started them across the border to Santa Clara, where they joined General Gomez, who, with his men, was marching north to the railroad.

In the meantime, General Menocal and the loyal troops of the island, in the west, started a vigorous campaign to prevent the island from falling into the hands of the rebels. Officers whose loyalty was beyond question were placed in command of troops, and sent at once into Santa Clara, Camaguey and Oriente, and one of Cuba's gunboats, with a company of 300 men, was dispatched to the City of Santiago de Cuba, to drive the disloyal element from that place. Colonel Pujol was sent to take measures to restore order in Camaguey. Colonel Collazo and Lieutenant Colonel Lozama and other officials known for their courage, efficiency and valor were placed in command of three separate bodies of troops, with orders to surround Gomez, and give him and his supporters immediate battle, and capture or annihilate them. These men were equipped with machine guns, well armed and prepared for a campaign of extermination, if necessary. In the meantime, the Secretary of Government, Colonel Hevea, who, according to the Cuban law has control over and is responsible for order in the interior districts, traveled by locomotive and automobile, day and night, reporting to the President all that occurred, and giving those orders which seemed wise for suppressing the uprising. The American Minister, representing the sentiment of the United States, which seriously deprecated Cuba's falling into the revolutionary habit, visited the palace every day, with his military aide, then Major Wittemeyer, kept in close touch with Washington, and reported every change in the drama that was being presented in Cuba. In the meantime, one of the Cuban officials had effectively thwarted General Gomez in his proposed triumphant march into Havana, by blowing up the large bridge over the Zaza river, thus preventing the insurrectionists from gaining control of the railroads in the western half of the island.

Realizing the grave danger that threatened Cuba in the destruction of the cane through fire, which had already begun on a large scale, and in the stealing, and killing of both cattle and horses on the part of the insurrectionists, Major Wittemeyer, with the authority of the War Department in Washington, communicated to President Menocal the fact that the United States government would gladly land whatever force was deemed necessary to a.s.sist in the maintenance of order and the protection of property. This offer the President refused, stating that he believed that there was a sufficient force absolutely loyal to his government to control the situation, adding that he was thoroughly aware of the plans of the Liberals, that he was in close touch with his own command and was confident that his officers would succeed in quelling the insurrection in a comparatively short time. He added that he thought it wise for the government of Cuba to demonstrate its ability to maintain itself, and to suppress any uprising that might occur of that nature, and thus avoid the rather unpleasant task, on the part of the United States, of being compelled to interfere with the personal and political affairs of their sister republic.

That General Menocal's prediction was based on sound logic was demonstrated by the fact that within twenty-three days the forces of ex-President Gomez were surrounded, defeated and captured. The General, his son, his aides and his entire staff were taken prisoners and brought to Havana and placed in the penitentiary on Principe Hill. In General Gomez's saddle bags were found military orders instructing his chiefs to burn every sugar plantation on the Island not known to be the property of Liberals, and tear up every mile of railroad, together with information demonstrating that he was preparing to blow up every bridge through the island, thus attempting to prevent the government from sending forces against him. This work of destruction, in so far as possible before the capture, had been carried out to the letter. The railroads along which the revolutionists had control were out of commission for several months, and much valuable property was destroyed.

The disappointment in the Liberal ranks consequent upon the capture of General Gomez and his staff, and the inevitable failure of the movement, was general and profound, but the last desperate hope seemed to inspire them to continue the struggle under the leadership of Carlos Mendieta, who had been their candidate for Vice-President. The plan adopted by them was to revert to the desperate methods of some former wars. In brief, it was to divide into small bands, who were to carry on a reign of terror and destruction throughout the island, the purpose of which was solely to bring about another American intervention; the argument was used that they had succeeded in doing this in 1906, and thus had secured a tacit recognition of the Liberal party, and their ultimate control of the government. "We were successful," they argued, "and since the commercial, industrial and political relations between the two republics are so intimate and the Platt Amendment authorizes the United States to enter Cuba at any time when, in their estimation, the circ.u.mstances justify such action, if we continue long enough, burn enough, destroy enough, and succeed in keeping up this state of turmoil long enough, the American authorities will, sooner or later, be compelled to come here, and put an end to affairs that will undoubtedly bring about the resignation of Menocal. His life will be made intolerable and our several plans for his a.s.sa.s.sination, that have heretofore met with misfortune, if followed, will later bear fruit."

At the middle of March, Carlos Mendieta, as leader of this bushranging rebellion, issued a manifesto threatening the destruction of foreign property and declaring that there would be no guarantee for the safety of American lives unless the United States undertook the supervision of the elections in Santa Clara and Oriente provinces.

In their manifesto the rebels promised to lay down their arms if the government would hold new elections in Santa Clara Province. If the government refused to hold such elections the rebels threatened to continue the revolution and to proclaim Mendieta Provisional President.

The activities of the revolutionary conspirators and propagandists in the United States, under the direction of Orestes Ferrara in New York, meanwhile became so offensive that the United States government felt compelled to take action. Accordingly on March 25, the State Department at Washington warned Dr. Ferrara that unless he ceased his pernicious operations he and his a.s.sociate, Raimundo Cabrera, would be placed under arrest. This had the result of tempering somewhat the zeal of the conspirators, though their propaganda was still furtively maintained.

In pa.s.sing, it may be stated that a part of the general plan--indeed the first step in the proposed uprising--was to a.s.sa.s.sinate General Menocal, while on his way from the palace to his estate, eight miles distant, known as El Chico. The mayor of the suburb of Marianao, together with the chief of police of that village, and four soldiers, who had agreed for a consideration to take part in the a.s.sa.s.sination, were stationed at a point carefully selected, with orders to fire a charge of buckshot into the President's back from the step of his automobile, and then behind the screen of trees and underbrush which lined the roadside to make their escape. It was proposed to a.s.sa.s.sinate the chauffeurs and all others who might be in the car in order to prevent immediate pursuit.

Since General Menocal was in the habit of going to his country home every afternoon between five and six, the plan probably would have succeeded, had it not been for an attack of conscience on the part of one of the soldiers, who, after agreeing, lost heart, and a few hours before the departure of the machine hastened to the palace and insisted upon seeing the President, to whom he gave all the details of the plot.

The betrayal of the plot by the soldier, who was suspected when he did not make his appearance in company with the others, and the machine not leaving the palace at the usual hour, which was to have been telephoned to the plotters, convinced them that discovery was more than probable.

The mayor, with the chief of police, and the others, immediately fled from Marianao. Pursuit was given, in spite of which they resisted capture for several days. Exhausted and wounded, they were finally taken in an old sugar mill near Bahia Honda, in the Province of Pinar del Rio.

Not discouraged by this failure, numerous other plans for the a.s.sa.s.sination of the President were arranged, among others the manufacture of a highly explosive bomb, and an arrangement by which four Liberals agreed to attempt to place or throw it under the President's desk. In order to make this plan work, it was necessary to have some man who could gain access to the palace, and to the office of the President, and this could be done through the a.s.sistance of some one of the soldiers who had been stationed on guard duty on the upper floor of the executive mansion. After several months of careful study, one of these soldiers was selected, and after another conference, the matter was settled, and the man was intrusted with the bomb, which was delivered to him at the appointed hour, and with which he ascended the palace stairs and eventually succeeded in reaching the President, to whom he delivered the bomb, with his evidence and the whole story. Of course, this second betrayal of the plans of the conspirators brought about their capture, and they were tried and condemned to various terms in prison. Various other plots were formed, none of which was successful.

[Ill.u.s.tration: JOSe LUIS AZCARATA SECRETARY OF JUSTICE]

As a natural result of the revolution started a few days before, the two additional elections ordered by the Supreme Court, were necessarily postponed, since the island had been thrown into a turmoil by the action of General Gomez. They were, however, afterwards held, and resulted in decided Conservative majorities, which were carried by the electoral boards to the Central Electoral Junta, presided over by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Senor Pichardo, and justified that body in announcing the election of General Menocal to a second term as President. In spite of this decision of the courts, which General Menocal had previously agreed to abide by, the insurrectionary elements of the Liberal party still insisted that General Menocal's second term was secured through deliberate and carefully planned frauds and intimidation of the voters at the polls. The fact is that the election laws of Cuba forbid and prevent any soldier from standing even in the doorway of a polling place. He cannot approach nearer than the corner of the building in which the votes are being deposited, nor can he leave his post and come closer to the polls, unless some serious disturbance, where lives are threatened, occurs, with which the police of the district cannot cope. Since the minority is represented during the time of voting, and during the count by a man selected for that purpose, no fraud could well be perpetrated without the consent of someone responsible to the opposition.

The army officers who had been led by Jose Miguel Gomez to revolt, had been captured with arms in their hands, fighting to overthrow the const.i.tutional government of the island; a purpose of which they had made no secret. They were therefore guilty of sedition and treason, and were subject to trial by court martial and to capital punishment upon conviction of their crime. They were thus tried, and some were condemned to death and others to long terms of imprisonment; but the extreme sentence was never executed upon one of them, while many of the prison sentences were shortened and some of the men were pardoned outright.

This generous action of President Menocal's was performed through the same spirit of magnanimity that moved Estrada Palma to like clemency, years before; and it was as ill requited. Some of the men whom he had thus saved from the gallows or the firing squad promptly resumed criminal conspiracies against him; while the Liberal party as a whole demanded that the pardoned officers should be at once reinstated in the army with full rank and back pay for the time which they had spent in insurrection and in prison, and railed against President Menocal for not granting that additional act of grace!

The government of the United States is naturally always on the side of law and order among its neighbors, and while it of course scrupulously refrains from meddling in their affairs unless under intolerable provocation, as in the case of Cuba in 1898, it has always given and doubtless will always give its sympathy and moral support to those who are striving for peace and progress and the security of life and property. Toward Cuba its att.i.tude is more marked than toward other states, because of the special relations which exist between the two countries. We have seen how it intervened in Cuban affairs for what it supposed to be the restoration of tranquillity in 1906. While unfortunately its influence was on that occasion made to appear as though given to the revolutionary rather than the legitimate side, its intent was unmistakable. In spite of the advantage which they took of its intervention at that time, the Liberal leaders in Cuba have since felt much aggrieved at it for standing in the way of their designs on more than one occasion when they wished to revolt against const.i.tutional order.

The United States did not intervene in 1917. It was not, as President Menocal confidently a.s.sured it, necessary for it to do so. But it is pleasant to recall that it stood ready to do so, and there is of course no possible doubt as to what the purport of its intervention would have been. During that episode no fewer than five messages were addressed to the people of Cuba by the government of the United States, warning them against any attempt at forcible revolution. They breathed the spirit of the epigram of John Hay in 1903: "Revolutions have gone out of fashion in our neighborhood." Thus on February 19, 1917, the United States made it known to the Cuban government and through it to the Cuban people that--

"The American Government has in previous declarations defined its att.i.tude respecting the confidence and support it gives the const.i.tutional governments and the policy it has adopted toward any disturbers of the peace through revolutionary ventures. The American government again wishes to inform the Cuban people of the att.i.tude it has a.s.sumed in view of the present events: