The History of Cuba Volume IV Part 20

It is not known whether the American Senator who had predicted that "That Flag will never be hauled down!" was there to see the sight.

Certain it is that the people of Cuba were almost--and most pardonably--wild with joy to see their own beautiful emblem at last float in token of sovereignty over their island's capital. The Cuban flag flying over the Palace and over the Morro Castle was the supreme consummation of their patriotic dreams and visions.

[Ill.u.s.tration: FLAG OF CUBA]

The red, white and blue flag of Cuba, though then first raised in unchallenged sovereignty, was then by no means a new thing. It was already more than half a century old, and had been the guidon of brave men in three b.l.o.o.d.y wars. It was designed by the first great Cuban revolutionist, Narciso Lopez, and by his comrade, Miguel Teurbe Tolon, of Matanzas, a gifted poet and ardent patriot, and it was first displayed by Lopez in his raid upon and capture of the city of Cardenas, on May 19, 1850. The five bars, alternately blue and white, represented the five provinces into which the island was at that time divided; the red triangle represented the blood of patriots which was being shed in the cause of liberty; and the white star was the star of Cuba's hope.

After the death of Lopez the flag disappeared. But when the Ten Years'

War began many flags of that same design were made, the workroom being in a house on Warren Street in the City of New York, and thereafter it remained familiar to every Cuban patriot.

[Ill.u.s.tration: COAT OF ARMS OF CUBA]

The coat of arms of the Republic of Cuba displays the colors of the flag, and by their side the Royal Palm, perhaps the most notable of the trees in Cuba. The tree springs from a gra.s.sy plain, at the back of which is a mountain range; agriculture and mining being thus typified.

Across the top of the shield extends a landscape-seascape, representing the ocean, with Florida at one side and Yucatan at the other, while between them lies the Key, Cuba. From the far horizon rises the sun.

Above all is the Cap of Liberty, while around the shield are twined branches of oak and laurel.

No more just and fitting estimate of the great work of intervention which thus, on May 20, 1902, was consummated, has ever been made than that which was uttered only a few weeks later by President Roosevelt, in speaking before a distinguished audience at Harvard University. He said:

"Four years ago Leonard Wood went down to Cuba, has served there ever since, has rendered her literally invaluable service; a man who through these four years thought of nothing else, did nothing else, save to try to bring up the standard of political and social life in that island, to clean it physically and morally, to make justice even and fair in it, to found a school system which should be akin to our own, to teach the people after four centuries of misrule that there were such things as government righteousness and honesty and fair play for all men on their merits as men."

That was the work which Leonard Wood did in Cuba; that was the work which the United States government did by and through him; the consummation of which was denoted in that unique act of withdrawing the American flag and raising the Cuban flag in its place. Fortunate was it, however, that the results of that work, the teachings of the American occupation, the meaning of the American flag, were not and could not be withdrawn when the Stars and Stripes came down. Just as the colors and indeed the essential pattern of the flag remained, in different arrangement, so the essential spirit of American republicanism remained, to be manifested not any longer by American interveners but by the Cuban people themselves.

It was a marvellous achievement, that of those four years. It was such as the world had not seen equalled, at any other time or in any other place. It was creditable in the highest degree to the Cuban people themselves. It was creditable to the United States, for its intervention at its own great cost and for its scrupulous keeping of its faith. It was creditable to many individual actors in the great drama, both insular and continental, who displayed unsurpa.s.sed fidelity, self-sacrifice and heroism in the cause of Cuban liberation. But the simple truth and justice of history would be impaired if the chief credit were not given, _primus inter pares_, to the great American administrator, conquering soldier and constructive statesman, who from first to last was the guiding genius of Cuban rehabilitation.

The works of Durham in Canada, and of Cromer in Egypt, form splendid pa.s.sages in the history of benevolent colonial administration. But there was a more difficult work performed not for a dependent colony which would return compensation to the Mother Country or to the suzerain power but for an alien land and people, presently to become entirely independent of their benefactor. He found the Pearl of the Antilles war-ravaged and faction-rent; her fields desolated, her industries destroyed; her women widowed and her children orphaned; her treasury empty and her debts heavy and pressing; her government abolished and her laws inadequate; with famine, pestilence and hopelessness stalking throughout the land. It was his work to heal the wounds of war and to unite the people of all cla.s.ses and parties for the common good; to a.s.sist the revival of agriculture and the rebuilding of industry; to care for the widowed and the orphaned; to replenish the public treasury and to discharge the debt of honor to the veterans of the War of Independence; to organize efficient government and out of his own constructive genius to conceive and to promulgate needed and beneficent laws; to feed the hungry until they could feed themselves, to banish pestilence until a lazar-house became a health resort, and to inspire with hope and faith triumphant a people who for a generation had striven with the demons of despair.

With such a labor successfully achieved, through the exercise of a tact, a perseverance, a resourcefulness and an administrative genius not surpa.s.sed in his day and generation, we may not wonder that he was universally beloved by all the Cuban people regardless of cla.s.s, of previous condition or of political predilections; that the only cloud resting upon the brilliance of the consummation of Cuban independence proceeded from the fact of his departure from the island and the people he had so greatly served; and that, not waiting for the slow tributes of remote posterity, the Cuban people of his own day hold in their supremest confidence, grat.i.tude, respect and enduring affection the name, the memory and the vital personality of Leonard Wood.

President Palma had already selected the members of his Cabinet on May 17, three days before the transfer. It contained six members, chosen without regard to party, for the President was not a partisan. As a matter of fact, however, it contained representatives of all three of the old parties, which were at this time in course of dissolution and reorganization into the two which have since divided the Cuban people between them. Diego Tamayo was the Secretary of Government, having charge of the postal service, the signal service, sanitation, and the Rural Guard. Carlos Zaldo was Secretary of State and of Justice. Emilio Terry was Secretary of Agriculture. Manual Luciano Diaz was Secretary of Public Works; Eduardo Yero was Secretary of Public Instruction; and Garcia Montes was Secretary of Finance.

The President presented his first message to Congress on May 28. He spoke with grat.i.tude of the disinterested intervention and services of the United States, and with confidence of Cuba's ability to fulfil her duties as a sovereign State. He recommended care in the preparation of the budget, and the formulation of measures for the encouragement of cattle-raising and the growing of sugar and tobacco. Just then, owing to the great increase of European beet sugar growing the Cuban sugar trade was in an unsatisfactory state, but he hoped to improve it by securing a reciprocity treaty with the United States which would admit Cuban sugar to the markets of that country free of tariff duty. He also promised to promote the building of much-needed railroads. He urged the cultivation of cordial relations and commercial intercourse with all nations, but especially with the United States. As a special act of grace, a number of Americans who had justly been sentenced to terms in Cuban prisons under the Government of Intervention received pardons.

These included three men, Rathbone, Neely and Reeves, who had been sentenced for ten years for frauds in the Cuban postoffice, the only serious scandal of the American administration.

Two of the items in the Platt Amendment were soon taken up by the United States government, and were settled in a way eminently satisfactory to Cuba. One was the disposition of the Isle of Pines. It was decided by the State Department at Washington that when the American government was withdrawn from Cuba, control of the Isle of Pines was transferred to the Cuban government, to be held and exercised by it unless and until some other disposition should subsequently be effected. In time Cuban ownership of the isle was definitively confirmed by the government of the United States.

The other point was that of American naval stations. A report was made by Rear-Admiral Bradford of the United States Navy, recommending the establishment of naval stations at Triscornia, in Havana Harbor; and at Guantanamo, east of Santiago; and the establishment of coaling stations at Nipe Bay and Cienfuegos. The Cubans were not inclined to object to any of these excepting the first-named, to which their objection was reasonable and convincing. It would not be agreeable, they thought, to have the flag of a foreign power flying right in front of their own capital and at the very gate of the harbor of that capital, so that foreign vessels would pa.s.s by it and salute it equally with the Cuban flag. This objection was recognized and respected by the United States government, which waived all claim to Triscornia, and on July 2, 1903, contented itself with land for naval stations at Guantanamo, one of the finest harbors in the world, on the south coast of Oriente, and Bahia Honda, another superb harbor, on the north coast of Pinar del Rio. Of these only Guantanamo has actually been utilized.

The matter of reciprocity between the United States and Cuba was taken up, but it was long before anything was effected. General Wood had urged that a reduction of at least 33-1/3 per cent. should be made in the sugar duty in favor of Cuba, as absolutely essential to the prosperity of the island, and President Roosevelt urged upon Congress in the strongest possible manner the desirability of some such action, partly for the sake of Cuban prosperity, and partly for the fulfilment of America's moral duty toward that island. Indeed, such commercial relations had been promised to Cuba, and it was bad faith to withhold them. Of course the commercial interests of Europe, both in sugar and all other wares, were earnestly opposed to any such arrangement, and they had their governments exert all possible influence to prevent its being made. There were also large beet sugar interests in the United States which strenuously opposed any reduction of the tariff on Cuban sugar. President Roosevelt had a long and desperate battle with Congress over the matter, before he finally prevailed upon it grudgingly and imperfectly to make a reciprocity agreement, from which the United States would profit much more than Cuba. This was on March 29, 1903.

Meantime, because of the American refusal to grant reciprocity, Cuba suffered acute economic depression approximating disaster. The insular treasury had scarcely enough money with which to pay current expenses, and the government was driven to the imposition of burden-some taxes upon many articles to save itself from bankruptcy.

The reciprocity treaty was finally ratified by the American Senate on March 29, 1903. But it did not at once go into effect. There was needed Congressional legislation to make it effective, and this was not supplied. After discreditable delay on the part of the lawmakers, President Roosevelt called Congress together in special session on November 10, 1903, for the express purpose of having it take the needed action for putting the treaty into operation. "I deem," he said, "such legislation demanded not only by our interest but by our honor.... When the acceptance of the Platt Amendment was required from Cuba by the action of the Congress of the United States, this government thereby definitely committed itself to the policy of treating Cuba as occupying a unique position as regards this country. It was provided that when the island became a free and independent republic she should stand in such close relations with us as in certain respects to come within our system of international policy; and it necessarily followed that she must also to a certain degree become included within the lines of our economic policy.... We gave her liberty. We are knit to her by the memories of the blood and courage of our soldiers who fought for her in war; by the memory of the wisdom and integrity of our administrators who served her in peace and who started so well on the difficult path of self-government. We must help her onward and upward; and in helping her we shall help ourselves.... A failure to enact such legislation would come perilously near a repudiation of the pledged faith of the nation."

Thus at last through such gallant urging a measure of justice was secured for Cuba. The unwillingness and delay of Congress formed the most discreditable chapter of the history of America's dealings with Cuba. But the real att.i.tude, the real purpose, the real spirit of the United States toward Cuba, were unmistakably set forth not in the paltering and tergiversation of a sordid Congress, but in the lofty and inspiring words of the great American President.

CHAPTER XIV

The result of the earnest and efficient work of all departments of the Palma administration, in spite of the fact that the employes had much to learn, and that mistakes were unavoidably made, was that Cuba began almost immediately to establish herself as a nation worthy of consideration, and respected among the other nations of the world. Her commerce and industries were started for the first time on a stable basis, and the general feeling of confidence, not only in the natural resources of the island, but in the protection that had been promised Cuba by her sister republic on the north, all tended to start the new republic along the right lines. In a very short time after reciprocity with the United States was secured funds began to acc.u.mulate in the treasury, and by the end of the first Palma administration over $20,000,000 had accrued to the credit of the country, and a large amount of constructive work had been undertaken in various parts of the island.

Yet more than $4,000,000 had been spent on public works, and every village with 25 children had a school.

It was the acc.u.mulation of this money in the treasury, and the rapid success along commercial and other lines that seemed to attend the republic during President Palma's administration, that served to excite desire and envy among the more or less restless and unscrupulous elements, who did not form a part of the Palma government. Some of these outsiders were men of much ability, and many of them were excellent orators. All of them were familiar with the methods in Latin American republics of securing control of the government through revolution, force and violence. It was then that parties began to be formed, although these were divided into many groups, each surrounding its own political hero, who, in these days, was necessarily a man with a supposed military record. They eventually resolved themselves into two groups, the Moderado, who were in many respects the parents of the present Conservative party now in power under President Menocal, and the Liberal, under the leadership of Dr. Alfredo Zayas, an able lawyer and a shrewd political leader.

During the Palma administration and especially at the beginning of the electoral campaign of 1905, another aspirant for presidential honors suddenly appeared in the person of General Jose Miguel Gomez, a man with no very brilliant record as a soldier, although he had taken part in the Ten Years' War, but who had a strong local following as Governor, under President Palma, of the Province of Santa Clara. General Gomez was an astute, clever, fa.r.s.eeing, active politician, with a considerable degree of originality and ability. Another man intimately connected with the history of Cuba was Gomez's chief clerk when Governor of the Province of Santa Clara, Orestes Ferrara, a gentleman of Italian birth, of somewhat reckless tendencies, who emerged from the War of Independence as a Cuban patriot, and was recognized as such by the Liberal party. Mr. Ferrara was a lawyer, a writer, a finely educated diplomat and an excellent speaker. All of these qualities succeeded in making him an important factor in influencing the destinies of the republic in its early days.

During the first years of the Palma administration, the Moderado and Liberal parties gradually shaped themselves into the present Conservative and Liberal parties; organizations which differ in political methods rather than in principles; if by principles we mean fundamental doctrines of political economy or statecraft, such as form the issues of division between parties in most other countries. They also differ largely in personnel. Throughout the agricultural regions the Conservatives prevail. That is because farmers, large and small, care little for office holding but do care a great deal for that tranquillity of the country which is essential to progress and prosperity. They have a material stake in the country's welfare, which is conserved by const.i.tutional order rather than by revolution. On the other hand, in the cities may be found the great strength of the Liberal party; composed of men who own no real estate, and many of whom have no business or steady occupation of any kind, who have nothing to lose from economic and social disturbance but on the contrary may gain something by getting into public employment through a change of government. Such men are numerous in all cities of all countries, and they become the facile followers of designing and unscrupulous politicians. In the United States such men are described as "feeding at the public crib." In Cuba the corresponding phrase, equally expressive, is "nursing at the public bottle"--epitomised in the one word, "botella."

It is not to be inferred that all Cuban Liberals are of this cla.s.s, or that Conservatives are universally men of substance; but the dominant elements of the two parties are such as we have described. The restless and irresponsible Liberal ma.s.ses have for leaders men of unquestioned ability, but unfortunately too often of more personal ambition of a sordid kind than sense of moral responsibility or sincere devotion to their country's best interests. It will thus be seen that on more than one occasion men who were intellectually qualified to serve the Republic in the most efficient manner prost.i.tuted their talents to catering to the pa.s.sions of the ignorant and idle, and made tools of them for their own selfish advancement, to the great detriment and greater menace of the Republic. In this deplorable state of affairs have been the main springs of most of the troubles which the young Republic has thus far suffered in its political and governmental affairs.

The Conservative party is confined very largely to the owners of property, men of good reputation and business standing. In other words, it consists of men who have nothing to gain through a revolution, and everything to lose during a period of upheaval which means destruction, not alone of actual property, but of the a.s.sets of the country, especially its credit and standing in the markets of the world. Small holders of property in the country districts, farmers, merchants, planters and stock raisers, are naturally allied with the Conservative party, or the party of law and order, as are the owners of the big sugar estates and the mills in which the staples are produced, since the cane fields become an immediate prey of those elements who wish to depose the government or bring about an intervention, through which they sometimes gain in the confusion that follows a change of government. To this party belong the majority of the professional men, the old Autonomistas, and those men who have a genuine interest in the welfare of Cuba, not only in her present, but in her future, and who realize that uprisings, strikes and all allied movements tend naturally to discourage investments in property, and to destroy credit and the good name of the island.

Such, then, in general terms, was the development of political parties in Cuba which occurred as soon as it was realized that it was worth while to have them. As long as Cuba was under Spanish domination, there was no use in parties. So long as there was doubt concerning the intentions of the United States in Cuba, there was little encouragement to their formation. But the moment the Stars and Stripes actually went down from the Palace and from the Morro, the great fact dawned upon the Cuban mind that what many had scarcely dared to expect or to hope for was actually achieved. Cuba was independent. For that reason her political controversies were thereafter to be domestic, and there was opportunity, even perhaps desirability, of division of the population into parties.

This indeed was well, in principle. There is nothing more stimulating to citizenship or more conducive to good government in a republic than a healthful and amicable division of the citizens into parties, on grounds of principle. In a monarchy, the opposition party is one of protest and revolt. In a republic both parties are devoted to the governmental system, and differ only as to the principles of economics or what not on which it should be conducted. The lamentable feature of the Cuban case was that--chiefly, no doubt, because of antecedent conditions, because of centuries of ruthless repression of all national or civic aspirations--there had been no development of theories and principles of government to serve as bases for party division. It could not be said, for example, that this party was for a protective tariff and that one was for free trade, that one was for state rights and the other for national sovereignty. Such distinctions did not exist, and party divisions without them were therefore on less creditable lines. We have said that there were no questions of principle. But there was one supreme question of principle, on which after all the division was made.

But that was a question to which there was only one side for a worthy political party to take.

At the beginning of Estrada Palma's administration, as we have indicated, he was not identified with any political party. He was broad-minded, and conceived himself to be not the leader of a party but the chief executive of the whole Cuban nation. He selected for his Cabinet the men whom he thought best fitted for the places, regardless of their political affiliations. He would probably have been glad to go through his entire administration as a non-partisan President, occupying in that respect a position similar to that of a const.i.tutional sovereign, who traditionally "has no politics." Indeed, he maintained this independent and impartial att.i.tude until the spring of 1905. Then he found it impossible to get measures pa.s.sed by Congress, which he wanted and which the country needed, unless he affiliated with party leaders. The result was that he practically a.s.sociated himself with the Moderados, or Conservatives as they are now known. This of course gave great umbrage to the Liberals, which was greatly increased when some of that party were removed from office because of their unsatisfactory service and their places were filled with Conservatives. And this was the beginning of the Liberal insurrection which led to the resignation and death of Estrada Palma.

In the last days of President Palma's first term of office it was discovered that Jose Miguel Gomez had Presidential aspirations. He not only stated to the Moderate or Conservative party that he wanted to be President of the Republic of Cuba, but he declared that he proposed to succeed President Palma as such. This privilege was refused him on the ground that the President, owing to his fair administration of the government during the four years of his service, was ent.i.tled to a second term. To this argument, General Gomez replied that if the Conservative party to which he had pretended to belong would not make him its Presidential nominee, he would go to the opposition and seek the nomination. This he at once proceeded to do, and with the a.s.sistance of Mr. Ferrara he persuaded the Liberals that, controlling the votes of the Province of Santa Clara, he held the balance of power. He also prevailed upon Dr. Alfredo Zayas to retire as a Presidential candidate, and to acquiesce in his running for election on the Liberal ticket; promising at the same time that, no matter what the result of the election might be, Dr. Zayas should have the nomination and his support four years afterward. It is interesting to observe that this promise was never fully kept, and that the two Liberal leaders have ever since been bitter enemies.

The Presidential nominees of the two parties, in November, 1906, on the part of the Conservatives, were Estrada Palma, the President of Cuba, and on the part of the Liberals, Jose Miguel Gomez, ex-leader of the Moderados of the Province of Santa Clara. The Liberals, a few days before the election, feeling apparently that it would go against them, began the old tactics so prevalent in some South American republics, and practised by Maso's followers in 1901, of proclaiming proposed election frauds on the part of their opponents, then in control of the government, and predicting all manner of illegal practices and intimidation.

At ten o'clock on the morning of election day, telegrams, announcements, and orders from Liberal leaders were posted at all voting places in the various cities and country districts, directing members of that party to keep away from the polls, on the ground that the election frauds which had been arranged by the Conservatives could not possibly be overcome, and that the correct thing to do was to refuse to vote, as a protest against the government in power. These were obviously issued with a view of discrediting in advance an election which the Liberals could not hope to win. The Conservatives, of course, voted, and, as might be expected under those circ.u.mstances, the Palma government succeeded itself, with a few changes in the Cabinet, and everything seemed to promise well for the future.

Within a year, however, threats of coming trouble, whispers of discontent, and reports of incipient uprisings could be heard in the cafes and public resorts throughout the island, and the agents of the secret service warned President Palma that a serious crisis was impending. This the President refused to credit, staging that there could be no possible reason for a revolution. The island was prosperous, work was plentiful for all who cared to labor; there were no conditions present to justify a revolution or uprising, and suspicions of anything of the kind must therefore be unjustified. In spite of President Palma's confidence, however, the plotting went on almost openly. His confidence in the people was known to all the Liberals, and they took advantage of it. The first real outbreak occurred before the slightest preparation had been made to deal with it. One night in the month of July, 1905, a group of thirty armed men suddenly appeared at the barracks of the Rural Guards, shot a dozen of them to death as they lay sleeping on their cots, seized their arms, ammunition and horses, and fled into the country, shouting the cry of "Revolution against the Palma government!"

General Alejandro Rodriguez, a tried veteran of the War of Independence, and chief of the Rural Guards, gave an immediate order that they should be captured, dead or alive, and before ten o'clock the next morning nearly all of them had been taken and confined in the jails of Havana, where afterwards they were tried and convicted. These men in their defense claimed that the president of the Senate, Senor Moru Delgado, a prominent Liberal leader, had promised to meet them at daylight, on the morning of the a.s.sa.s.sination, with a body of three hundred armed and mounted Liberals, who were to start a revolution against President Palma; but did not fulfill his promise. The men who had been convicted were permitted to remain in jail until, as is too often the custom in some Latin American countries, they were freed by a general amnesty bill which had been forced through Congress by the Liberal party. The tendency to revolt against the Palma government apparently subsided with the arrest of these first disturbers, but, during the following January, 1906, reports of trouble in the extreme western portion of the island came to the notice of the officials. The leader was Pino Guerra, who, through his popularity as an accordion player at country dances, had secured election to the House of Representatives; and who with his taste for games of chance, at which he was generally unlucky, had got into debt to the amount of $7,000. His creditors in these debts were persistent, and this fact was given by him in a letter to General Fernando Freyre de Andrade, President of the House of Representatives, as an excuse for the revolution which he started. Pino Guerra indeed intimated that if someone would extend to him a little personal loan of $7,000 he would refrain from causing any trouble to the government. General Freyre de Andrade, being a politician who believed in compromise and that even a poor end would justify the means, suggested to Guerra that he knew of $3,000 that had been appropriated for some purpose and not used, which might possibly be turned over, if his creditors would take it on account. "General"

Guerra, as he called himself, consulted with his creditors, and they concluded to accept the offer, if they could get the cash. So the embryo revolutionist was conducted to the presence of the President, where the whole matter was explained by General Freyre de Andrade. To their surprise, President Palma promptly refused to have any of the treasury funds used to buy--or to pay blackmail to--a revolutionist. So "General"

Guerra retired to nurse his resentment and to plan mischief; until some six weeks later when he started the uprising that was locally known as "Mr. Taft's picnic," because the leaders a.s.serted that the capturing of the Palma government would be nothing more than a picnic, and a.s.sured Mr. Taft on his arrival to straighten out affairs that they really had not intended to a.s.sa.s.sinate President Palma, although three or four distinct plots had been made for that purpose; that they only meant to capture him, put him on the government yacht, and carry him to some remote part of the country and give him just a "pleasant picnic."

[Ill.u.s.tration: THE PRESIDENT'S HOME

The new Presidential Palace, which replaces in its functions the old home of the Spanish Governors, is of striking architecture and impressive size, affording ample room for many other functions than the mere housing of the President and his family; and in completeness of its appointments and beauty of its furnishings and internal decorations must rank among the finest official residences in the world.]

President Palma was repeatedly warned by the secret service, of which Pepe Jerez Varona was the chief, that serious trouble was coming through the propaganda of the Liberal party whose leaders had taken the position that the late election had been fraudulent and that the Liberals had been prevented from casting their votes, which they said was sufficient excuse for the uprising that was imminent. Local bands of the so-called "Const.i.tutional Army" soon began to make their appearance throughout the central districts of the island. Each of these was headed by some prominent Liberal chieftain; among others, those at Havana by General Loinaz Castillo, in Pinar del Rio by Pino Guerra, and in Santa Clara by Orestes Ferrara, afterward President of the House of Representatives.

The real promoters, instigators, and chiefs of the movement were General Jose Miguel Gomez, afterward President of the Republic; Carlos Garcia, later Minister to England; and Juan Gualberto Gomez, the trusted agent of Alfredo Zayas and leader of the negro Liberals of the island.

Convincing proofs, in the form of doc.u.ments over the signatures of these men, were found showing their treason to the republic. They did not actually lead the insurgent bands, because they were arrested and imprisoned just as they were setting out to do so. President Palma was advised that they should be tried and executed, but he protested against the courts taking such action, on the ground that he could not bring himself to sanction the execution of men, some of whom had in former days been his companions in arms.

In the meantime, the revolutionary force swept through various parts of the island, seizing horses, mules, beef cattle and produce, breaking open groceries and general stores, helping themselves to anything that suited their fancy, occasionally giving in exchange what was known as _vale_, or a receipt, to the owner, and if the owner happened to be an able bodied man, they usually compelled him to join the so-called "Const.i.tutional Army." Congress at that time happened to have a Liberal majority, and it refused to consider or vote upon the budget of the coming year, thus practically compelling President Palma to use as the basis of expenditures the budget of the preceding year. The Liberals boasted that they had thus compelled the President technically to violate the Const.i.tution, and that they were therefore justified in calling themselves the Const.i.tutional Party and in forcing him out of the Presidency.

The Cuban republic at this time had an armed force of about two thousand men, scattered throughout the island. These were the Rural Guards, and they were efficient, and as a rule loyal to the Palma government; but they were not sufficient in number to protect the sugar estates, and other properties. As before, President Palma refused, until the last moment, to believe that a serious uprising or revolution against his government was possible, on the ground that Cuba, although a young republic, had been very prosperous, that money was plentiful, that work was abundant for any man who cared to occupy himself, and that there was no real reason that would justify or cause a revolution. He cited the history and motives of previous revolutions in Cuba, and of those that had occurred in many other countries, insisting that this uprising could not be serious, and that the people of Cuba would not support it.

Unfortunately he was not a politician. He had lived too many years in the safe and sane atmosphere of the United States, and did not realize the intense desire on the part of some of the people in Latin American countries to get into office, regardless of their qualifications or the means employed to accomplish their sordid purposes.

All of this resulted in a sad lack of preparation. President Palma's Secretary of Finance, Colonel Ernesto Fonts-Sterling, and General Rafael Montalvo, Secretary of Public Works, realized the threatening dangers and urged immediate action; and finally against the President's will, twenty machine guns were ordered from the United States, and shipped to Cuba, together with 1,000,000 rounds of ammunition. A call for volunteers was then issued, and in response numerous Americans from various parts of the island, and others from Texas, New Mexico and Arizona, in company with patriots of Cuba, came immediately to the side of the government. But the ma.s.ses of the Cubans were very tired of war, and manifested a peculiar reluctance to a.s.sume responsibility, and to act in line with their consciences and best judgment, wherefore the call was not highly successful. Fourteen hundred veterans of the War of Independence, under the command of General Pedro Betancourt, of Matanzas, made response, and presented themselves in Havana for orders.

A machine gun corps was formed, the gunners composed largely of Americans who had seen service in the war on the Mexican border, and who soon became excellent marksmen. Many of President Palma's counsellors urged immediate action to suppress the revolution with a firm hand. But he hesitated too long, hoping that some other way out of the difficulty would be discovered.

In this emergency the United States Consul General, Mr. Frank Steinhart, suggested to President Palma that he should request the a.s.sistance of the United States, and urged that a commission of military men be sent from Washington, backed by a certain display of naval or military force sufficient to discourage the revolution and to convince the Liberal leaders that further wanton destruction of property would not be tolerated. Mr. Steinhart also a.s.sured him that he would see to it that such a commission would come with a full understanding of the situation, and with the power and spirit to a.s.sist him in maintaining peace and order. President Palma made this request to which the United States promptly responded by sending the gunboat _Bancroft_, and a company of marines who immediately came ash.o.r.e at Havana. Following the _Bancroft_ came other steamers, one of which brought the Secretary of War, William H. Taft, Robert Bacon, a.s.sistant Secretary of State, and Major-General Frederick Funston, with several of his aides.

In fuller explanation of these circ.u.mstances some official correspondence may pertinently be cited. On September 8, 1906, Consul General Steinhart sent the following confidential telegram to the State Department: