The History of Company A, Second Illinois Cavalry Part 3

There was no further attempt at pursuit and the enemy was permitted to return to Corinth where ample time was given him to collect re-enforcements and to strengthen his position.

The battle of Shiloh was the bloodiest of all the western battles. It has been claimed by some that our army was not surprised; but to those who were there, the claim is no less surprising than the fact appeared to be then. The successes at Forts Henry and Donelson had made our men and their leaders over-confident. They counted too much upon the moral effect of those victories upon the enemy. Besides, it seemed incredible that an army so recently defeated and apparently so demoralized, should leave a strongly intrenched position and march twenty miles over ground rendered almost impa.s.sable by mud and rain, to meet one of substantially equal force in an open field. If it was a surprise, as those who were there at the first onset and saw the conditions, believed it to have been, it is not for me, it may not be for anyone, to fix the responsibility. Let him bear it who may,--the thousands of graves and the long lines of trenches filled with Union dead, will remain as a proof of the appalling price that it is possible to pay for indifference and over-confidence.

[Ill.u.s.tration: SAMUEL H. FLETCHER]

CHAPTER V.

THE CORINTH CAMPAIGN--BATTLE OF DAVIS' BRIDGE ON THE HATCHIE RIVER-- BOLIVAR--DEATH OF COL. HOGG--WATER VALLEY--FIGHT AT HOLLEY SPRINGS --COWARDICE OF COL. MURPHY--FORAGING.

"The brave make danger opportunity;-- The waverer, paltering with the chance sublime Dwarfs it to peril. * * *"

--_Lowell._

The severe losses at Shiloh resulted in a reorganization of a considerable portion of our army. Many fragmentary regiments were consolidated in order to make full ones. Much time was consumed in this process and we remained at Pittsburg Landing until its completion.

On the eleventh of April, four days after the battle, Major General Henry Wagner Halleck appeared and a.s.sumed command in person. This was the beginning of a campaign in extraordinary contrast to that which had been so brilliantly prosecuted by Grant, whose methods and plans were held in contempt by his superior.

Halleck was a man from whom the people had expected much. They believed, largely upon his own authority, that he was a great general, for his unqualified statement about anything was presumed to close discussion.

Halleck had written a book upon military science which was generally supposed to contain the last word upon that subject. He was self-centered and opinionated to a degree and his arrogance was only equaled by his excessive caution, which n.o.body at that time was presumptuous enough to hint might have been called by another name.

This general's policy, constantly impressed upon his officers, was to "do nothing to bring on an engagement." With an army of one hundred and twenty thousand men opposed to one whose effective force was considerably less than half that number, he instructed his generals that it was "better to retreat than to fight." This rule was strictly observed and upon different occasions important advantages were waived and reverse movements made in conformity to it. The result was an elaborate underground campaign in which the spade was the only aggressive factor. Except at the very outset, the army literally burrowed its way into Corinth. While the pioneer corps toiled beneath the surface, the others watched, not so much as guards but rather as sentinels to give the alarm. The vicinity of Corinth was a veritable labyrinth with complex runways such as might have been made by gigantic field-mice. This harmless procedure must have been quite as amusing to the Rebels as it was irksome to us. But even they grew tired of the farce and considerately exploded a magazine as a hint that they had marched out and would not hurt us if we had really set our hearts upon marching in.

[Ill.u.s.tration: ILLINOIS MONUMENT AT SHILOH TO SPECIAL COMMANDS THE FRONT TABLET IS TO COMPANIES A AND B.]

At last Corinth was "captured." The army did not start upon its advance until April 30th, when the men, burrowing through the ground like gophers, moved at an average rate of about 1700 feet per day. A month was consumed in this process. Trenches, rifle-pits and bomb-proofs were constructed to shelter one hundred thousand men; and all this to capture another lot of trenches, rifle-pits and bomb-proofs that were empty. It was a bloodless victory, and the countless hills and holes that cost so much labor and so many lives incident to the use of polluted surface-water and exposure under unsanitary conditions, will remain indefinitely as monuments to the caution and timidity of that unique general whose conception of prosecuting the war seemed to have been to treat the entire South as an immense garrison to be captured only after complete investment and a prolonged, careful and strictly methodical siege. Halleck's "caution" would appear to have been the result of a fevered imagination rather than the outgrowth of well considered military conditions which he should and might have known but did not; for, on the day following the evacuation of Corinth, when the Rebels were many miles away in full retreat, he caused his whole army to be drawn up in preparation for battle, announcing in orders that there was "every indication that our left was to be attacked that morning." The "indications" proved to be as humiliating as the preparations to meet them were preposterous; but their significance was entirely obscured by the cloud of egotism which seemed to envelop the personality of this overrated commander who might have been more successful had he possessed a sense of humor. In the light of Halleck's experience, it is refreshing to recall General Grant's opinion of what might have been:

"For myself, I am satisfied that Corinth could have been captured in a two days' campaign commenced promptly on the arrival of re-enforcements after the battle of Shiloh." Memoirs, V. 1, pg.

381.

During the Corinth campaign Companies A and B acted as escort to Brigadier General T. A. Davies. After the evacuation an order was issued directing them to report to the regiment but Captain Hotaling, who was originally responsible for their detachment, because he believed that he could do more effectual work with them separately, succeeded, through the influence of General Oglesby, in having the order changed to include Company B; whereupon Company A was, at the request of General O. A. C. Ord, who commanded the post at Corinth, a.s.signed to his staff.

I had previously been detailed to act as orderly to Colonel Baker of the Second Iowa regiment, who was then in command of a brigade. He was succeeded by General Thomas Sweeney and I was with the latter until he, in turn, was succeeded by General Hackelman with whom I remained until the battle of Iuca, just before the second fight at Corinth, when I returned to my company which was ordered to Jackson, Tennessee.

The time spent at Corinth was dull and monotonous but the monotony ceased upon our arrival at Jackson. We remained in camp about seven or eight days until the battle of Corinth, where General Hackelman, Colonel Baker and Lieutenant Brainard, all good friends of mine, were killed. After the battle, General Ord, in command of Logan's and Hurlbut's Divisions, the latter of which had been sent ahead from Bolivar, Tennessee, attempted to intercept Price and Van Dorn at Davis'

Bridge on the Hatchie River.

About six o'clock in the evening orders were given to pack haversacks with two days' rations and be in the saddle in forty minutes. We marched to the depot, loaded our horses in box-cars, mounted the deck with our saddles and were off. The road was rough and the cars swayed like ships in a storm. By lying down and holding fast to the deck we were enabled to stay in place until our arrival at Bolivar, which we reached at about half past twelve that night. As soon as possible we commenced our march for Davis' Bridge which was about twenty miles away. Just as the sky began to redden in the east we arrived at Hurlbut's headquarters and found his command in line of battle near the bridge. We were none too soon. The battle began soon after our arrival and raged until afternoon. The enemy fought persistently but was slowly driven back and finally retreated up the stream. One of our men captured a rebel officer upon one of General Van Dorn's horses. W. B.

c.u.mmins was in command of the company in the absence of Captain Hotaling who was upon staff duty.

General Ord was wounded in this battle which caused his retirement for a considerable time from active service. In his report of the battle he paid a high compliment to the men of our company, whom he commended for their rare intelligence and skill.

At the beginning of General Ord's retirement he requested General Grant to reserve Company A as his personal guard but he was gone so long that the company was ordered to report to General Logan, with whom it had been but a short time when Captain Hotaling was appointed Senior Aid upon Logan's staff with the t.i.tle of Major, in which capacity he served with distinction until the close of the war. Our company continued to act as escort for General Logan until after the surrender of Vicksburg.

After the battle at Davis' Bridge I was detailed as hospital a.s.sistant to help in holding sponge and to a.s.sist in amputating legs and arms. It was a grewsome experience and my first of the kind. Between forty and fifty men were brought in in varying conditions and among them General Ord, who was wounded in the leg.

The next morning we moved back to Bolivar where we were the guests of our regiment. It was a joyous reunion and we slept but little that night. Our joy was marred however, by the absence of our beloved Colonel Harvey Hogg, who met his death a few days previous in a heroic charge at the battle of Bolivar. His death was said to have occurred within sight of his mother's house. On the day of the battle, those of the regiment who were detailed to bury the dead, found the Colonel's body stripped of all clothing, and were told by the rebels that "the hogs did it." The statement is proof of its absurdity and of the unbelievable hatred which existed at the time against southerners who fought for the Union. The details of Colonel Hogg's death have been embodied in a separate sketch and need not be enlarged upon here.

Our visit ended in the morning when we marched back to Jackson where we were engaged in picket duty and foraging until the weather began to get chilly. From Jackson we marched by way of Bolivar to Water Valley, Mississippi, about sixty miles south of Holly Springs. The latter place had been chosen as a secondary base of supplies for that portion of the army located south of there. General Grant, in what he regarded as an almost hopeless endeavor to fit his plans to those of Gen. Halleck and the orders resulting from the latter, was compelled to scatter his forces and to guard as best he could, a number of widely separated points in order to maintain railway communication with the North. Under the conditions existing, they could not all be adequately protected.

Colonel R. C. Murphy, of the eighth Wisconsin, with about fifteen hundred men, including companies C, F, G, H, I and K, of the Second Illinois Cavalry, was left to guard the post. The companies mentioned were under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Quincy McNeil.

Believing that the destruction of the munitions and stores acc.u.mulated there would greatly cripple our army, Van Dorn undertook to capture the place. He was especially anxious to secure the horses of our regiment which had the reputation of being one of the best mounted in the service. So, on the 20th of December, with a force of mounted infantry and cavalry outnumbering that of the Union troops more than ten to one, he made a dash to capture the place. Murphy had been notified of his approach but made no preparations to meet him nor did he take the trouble to inform his command. Van Dorn had no difficulty in "surprising" him and less in inducing him to surrender. Before the troops knew of the situation the town was surrounded by several thousand confederates and the post with stories and troops had been formally surrendered by Murphy. The six companies of our regiment were encamped upon the fair-grounds, over all parts of which they were scattered. Lieutenant Colonel McNeil, with Captains Jones and Higgins were upon the east side of the Camp, Captain Marsh upon the north and Majors Mudd and Bush upon the west and south sides respectively. The men were told that the Second had been surrendered with the other troops. "Not by a d.a.m.ned sight," was the reply, "If they want the Second, they must fight for it." At this instant the rebels rushed in upon the east side and immediately began shooting down those who were saddling their horses. McNeil rallied the men nearest to him and advanced to the attack. Captains Jones and Higgins seconded McNeil.

There was no time to form. McNeil was pressed by overwhelming numbers, surrounded and captured. At the same time Marsh was rallying the men at the north and the conflict or series of conflicts, became an indiscriminate struggle to the death. Just then the enemy in still larger numbers poured into the camp and captured the stragglers and convalescents. Captain Jones' horse was shot under him, Lieutenant Garrett was wounded and both were made prisoners. Marsh ordered a saber charge and broke through the line at the north, followed by Captain Higgins and the men who had been with McNeil. Marsh charged west and then south in the hope of supporting Major Bush. Major Mudd, who had been ordered to Oxford by rail and was preparing to go, knew nothing of the situation until he heard of the surrender. He rallied a few men nearest to him and ordered a saber charge. The same order was simultaneously executed by Marsh and Bush, all of whom broke through the lines at different points. The several detachments were separated.

Those of Marsh and Bush joined upon the south and charged through the town fighting desperately. The enemy swarmed like locusts but, unable to withstand the terrific onset, gave way at every point. Realizing that a considerable number of their comrades must have been captured, Major Bush charged back like a whirlwind, recaptured the camp and released the captives. Those behind seemed to realize that their comrades would return. Some were found crouched upon the ground behind their dead and dying horses which they used for breastworks, still fighting with coolness and desperation. When the rescue came, these men hurriedly mounted behind their comrades or captured loose horses and went on with them. The charge was scarcely halted. Turning to the west, they again broke through the line and escaped to Coldwater, a town about twenty miles distant. Captain Marsh received three severe wounds but kept on through the fight.

In the meantime, Major Mudd, with a small detachment, succeeded in breaking through the western line, but in doing so, lost a number of his men. The fact of escape was not enough to satisfy his soldierly instinct. Seeing a band of rebels in front of him he gave chase, although at the time he was pursued by a much larger number.

Twenty-four prisoners were captured, including one major; but being unable to take care of them, twelve were released. Whether these were a part of the detachment pursued, I have not been able to ascertain.

Major Mudd with his detachment also escaped to Coldwater where he aided in preparations for the defense of that place which was threatened by the enemy.

On the following Sunday, this officer, under orders from Colonel O'Meara, commanding at Coldwater, went back to Holly Springs under a flag of truce, but finding the place deserted and being joined by Lieutenant Stickel with a few men, took possession of the town and held it until the arrival of Colonel Marsh on the same day.

Another detachment of men, numbering about seventy, broke through the rebel lines and escaped towards Memphis. They bivouacked that night several miles away from Holly Springs, without fire, food or shelter and reached Memphis in due time hungry, cold, exhausted and dest.i.tute.

The loss in killed, wounded and missing was about one hundred and fifty; but, aside from prisoners captured, it was believed that the enemy's loss was much greater.

In a general order issued on December 23rd, 1862, General Grant, after severely censuring Murphy and a part of the garrison, said:

"It is gratifying to note in contrast with this, the conduct of a portion of the command; conspicuous among whom was the Second Illinois Cavalry, which gallantly and successfully resisted being taken prisoners. Their loss was heavy but the enemy's was much greater. Such conduct as theirs will always insure success, &c."

The descendants of those men may be proud to read these words; but how about the descendants of Colonel Murphy? Here is their bequest:--

Headquarters, Department of the Tennessee.

Holly Springs, Miss., Jan. 8th, 1863.

General Orders No. 4.

Colonel R. C. Murphy was dismissed from the service, to take effect from the 20th day of December, 1862, the day of his cowardly and disgraceful conduct.

By order of

Major General U.S. Grant.

John A. Rawlins, a.s.sistant Adjutant General.

A large sum of money had been sent to Holly Springs for the army pay-roll. This was captured and diverted to a like use by the confederates.

The men who escaped to Memphis, being without money or rations and having lost their camp equipage, following the motto that "all is fair in love or war," fixed upon a ruse whereby they might recoup in part from the rebel citizens. Good arms at high prices were in active demand throughout the South. A standard revolver was valued at from fifty to seventy-five dollars in "greenbacks." Southern citizens were always ready to buy arms from any of our men who were willing to sell. Knowing this, one of the officers sent out several men to sell their arms and with each was sent a guard to watch. Upon the completion of a sale the guard would arrest the citizen and confiscate his purchase. In this way they collected about one thousand dollars, which was credited against losses at Holly Springs.

At the time our comrades were undergoing the experiences described, Company A was at Water Valley wading in mud and snow in an effort to rebuild the bridges which had been destroyed by the enemy.

The appearance of Forrest upon the line of railroad between Jackson, Tennessee, and Columbus, Kentucky, cut off communication from the North for more than a week. This, in conjunction with the loss of supplies at Holly Springs, compelled the entire army to subsist upon the country.