The Grey Book Part 21

Comments on the att.i.tude of Church leaders and lower clergy are favourable:

"Monks, regardless of the great dangers or considerations of religion or faith, hid persecuted families and rendered secret but effective help to mult.i.tudes of unfortunate people, who could no longer subsist without employment, and thus had to leave their hiding place and give themselves up to the Germans." [364]

"The heads of the Orthodox Church in Greece defied the n.a.z.i edicts and exhorted their faithful followers to shun anti-Semitic slogans and outrages.

It is reported that in May 1943 alone, six hundred Greek priests were arrested and lodged in concentration camps because they refused to obey a n.a.z.i order to preach anti-Jewish sermons. Much help and Jewish rescue work go to the credit of the Greek Orthodox clergy." [365]

What happened in Salonika enables us to realize that the att.i.tude of Church leaders frequently had a very limited influence on the population, even in Greece.

Dr. Nathan Eck, the editor of the revised edition in Hebrew of the book of Michael Molho and Joseph Nehama, has the following to say about the situation in Salonika:

"... The att.i.tude of the non-Jewish population in Salonica to their Jewish neighbours was not very friendly. <159> Many of them were former residents of Turkey who, in 1922, were transferred to Greece on an exchange basis, and their economic and social status was similar to that of the Jews. As a result of their feelings of hatred and compet.i.tion, it was not easy to find anyone among the non-Jews who would agree to endanger his life and the life of his family in order to hide Jews in his home...

The authors Molho-Nehama are wary of casting aspersions and blame on the general non-Jewish population but remain satisfied with mere hints. Here and there, there is a short remark which outweighs a host of express statements. For example, the following remark: 'It is likely that local factors (in Salonica) were active in the implementation of the deportations in order to get rid of compet.i.tors who proved a burden to them in their commercial life' (Part II, p. 11).

Indeed, as the authors point out, only seventy Jews, most of them married to non-Jews, succeeded in finding hiding places in Salonica..." [366]

Another comment:

"The great bulk of the population, while not indifferent, played the role of an interested if shocked spectator. However, this situation began to change after Archbishop Theophilos Damaskinos, who later became a regent, intervened forcefully on behalf of the Jews threatened with deportation.

The Archbishop's vigorous protest about the action contemplated against the small Jewish population of Greece created a stir throughout the country." [367]

The att.i.tude of the non-Jewish population in Salonika, where most of the Jews were living, was lamentable. Such information should prevent us from accepting stereotypes such as "the Greek - or the Dutch, or the French - population has done everything to save the Jews".

b Athens and Southern Greece

Following the Italian armistice, the Germans took over the administration of Athens and other parts of Southern Greece. General Stroop, the "Conqueror of the Warsaw Ghetto", arrived in Athens on September 10, 1943, and took over the function of Higher SS leader. <160>

On October 3, 1943, the Jews were ordered to register. The seizure of the Jews on the Greek mainland was to be completed in three days, from March 23-25. Jews living on the Greek islands were deported in June and Jule, 1944.

More than sixty thousand Jews out of the 79,950 who had been living in Greece, were deported. [368]

The following is quoted from "The Destruction of Greek Jewry, 1941-1944":

"... On Tuesday, September 21, 1943, Athens' Chief Rabbi, Elia Barzilai, was ordered to submit to the German authorities a list containing the names and addresses of all Jews living in Athens... A delegation led by Rabbi Barzilai paid a visit to the Archbishop who declared that, to his deep regret, he did not see how he could do anything on behalf of the Jews, despite his willingness to help them. The only alternative left was to go into hiding, or disappear, the Archbishop said. When the Rabbi requested permission for the Jews to hide in the churches, the Archbishop replied: 'Willingly, but it is a mistake to think that there you will be safe.

They will not hesitate to seize you. However, I could, with the help of the English, arrange a transfer to the Middle-East for those Jews who are prepared to go...'" [369]

At the instigation of Archbishop Damaskinos, priests preached in the churches that Jews should be aided. He also intervened with the German authorities so that children younger than 14, as well as, persons married to parties of the Greek Orthodox faith, should be exempted from the strict anti-Jewish regulations. [370]

According to Moissis, the fact that more than 10,000 Jews saved themselves was largely due to the efforts of the Orthodox Church under Archbishop Damaskinos. A few days proceeding the German attempt to corral the Jewish population, the Church issued a circular to all priests, parishes and convents, exhorting them to lend succour and safety to the victims of n.a.z.i barbarism. [371] <161>

I have not succeeded in retrieving a copy of this circular, nor was Mr.

Moissis able to give any additional information. He confirmed to me that Archbishop Damaskinos had done much for the rescue of the Jews:

"Archbishop Damaskinos knew my place of refuge, in the neighbourhood of Athens, and sent me provisions every month. He did the same for other Jews ...whose hiding place he knew." [372]

It seems unlikely that a circular letter was issued: a copy might easily have fallen into the hands of the persecutors. In those days one did not put such a message in writing but it was pa.s.sed on orally.

26 DENMARK

a. The Time of Moderation

Germany occupied Denmark on April 9, 1940.

The position of Denmark under the German occupation was unique in many respects: the King had remained; the Danish Government continued to function until August, 1943; the Germans were interested in keeping things as quiet as possible and granted to Denmark a certain independence in internal affairs, and the attempt to deport and exterminate the Jews of Denmark started relatively late: September, 1943.

A total of 7,700 Jews were living in Denmark, a number of them refugees from Germany and elsewhere. <162>

In December 1941, partic.i.p.ants in a conference of Danish pastors [373]

considered the possibility of presenting a pet.i.tion to Parliament demanding that all members of Parliament should vote against any racial legislation.

But the proposal was withdrawn as it was considered undesirable to focus to much public attention on the question. [374]

The same question was discussed at another conference of pastors which met in the provincial town of Askov. One of the partic.i.p.ants wrote to Rabbi Friediger:

"... For us it is not just a question of the Jews and their rights; for the Danes this first of all must be the question of the right of a small nation to exist, particularly as this is also a question of our whole national att.i.tude and the basis of democracy: equality and human dignity." [375]

Frederik Torm, a professor of theology at the University of Copenhagen, brought about a common decision of the theological faculty and of the students, declaring that, should persecution of the Jews begin, they would voice their opposition vigorously and publicly. This internal decision was put into practice, in October, 1943. [376]

The Church Press in Denmark could publicly denounce anti-Semitism at a time when the Press in other countries had long since been completely silenced.

The Rev. Johannes Nordentoft, in one of his articles, called for an active war against the anti-Semitic propaganda of the n.a.z.i press. He pointed out that "those who remain silent or disapprove by merely shrugging their shoulders become accomplices". [377]

An article in the Church gazette of Sonderbourg, edited by Dean Halfdan Hoegsbro, stated: <163>

"Hatred of the Jews is prompted by the demand for a scapegoat...

We will not lend our support to the introduction of anti-Jewish laws; Jew hatred is an infectious disease, to which the innate sense of justice of the Danish people will not permit them to succ.u.mb. It is a disease that we shall cast out from our midst.

Shame upon us if we ever allow ourselves to fall victim to it." [378]

The Skydebjerg-Aavup Church Gazette, comparing the anti-Jewish drive to that of medieval times, wrote:

"Our Danish minds will not let themselves become infected by this disease...

Anti-Jewish legislation is tantamount to lawlessness, and if we forsake justice, then we will be submitted to a degradation worse than war and suppression." [379]

In January, 1943, the Bishop of Copenhagen, Dr. Fuglsang-Damgaard, publicly warned against racial hatred. [380] The pro-n.a.z.i press frequently attacked "the Church's dogged opposition to attempts to initiate anti-Jewish restrictions". [381]

The first occasion on which the Danish Bishops approached the authorities en bloc to protest on behalf of the Church of Denmark, was when they addressed a protest to the Minister of Justice containing the following paragraph:

"... We draw to your attention the feeling of protest which is spreading in the Church of Denmark. This feeling of protest is due, above all, to the way in which justice is administered in these days.

Men are being arrested without the public being given any information about how the arrested persons are treated in prison. Anti-Semitic propaganda is being artificially incited. At the same time pastors receive warnings from the Government that they must not comment on the persecution of the Jews..." [382] <164>

b. The Deportation Attempt; the Protest

In the summer of 1943, disturbances occurred in several provincial towns.

The Germans took reprisals and the people reacted to this by proclaiming strikes. A German ultimatum was rejected by the Danish Government.

Thereupon martial law was proclaimed on August 29, 1943. Dr. Werner Best, the German envoy in Copenhagen, received full powers as Reich pleni- potentiary. The Danish Government had resigned. The day to day affairs of its ministries remained in the hands of the permanent Department directors; the director of the Danish Foreign Ministry, Nils Svenningsen, became the chief spokesman of the administration.

The Germans now planned the deportation of the Jews in one night, October 1-2. On September 28, however, a German in Copenhagen, Duckwitz, revealed this to Danish friends of his, H.C. Hansen and H. Hedtoft, who warned Henriques, the president of the Jewish community. On the morning of September 29, the Jewish congregations which met in their synagogues for the services of the Jewish New Year were warned.

The raids took place as planned. In the night of October 1-2, 202 Jews were captured in Copenhagen and 82 elsewhere in Denmark. About 200 others were arrested later on, most of them caught in flight. The great majority, however, succeeded in hiding themselves.

The Swedish Government had publicly expressed its willingness to admit the Danish Jews into Sweden. 7,220 Jews were secretly moved to the beaches and then ferried by Danish fisherman to safety. [383]

At the end of August, 1943, the Bishop of Copenhagen, Dr. Fuglsang-Damgaard, asked for an interview with the Director of the Foreign Ministry, who declared that the Jewish question had not been raised. n.o.body had been arrested because of race or religion. When the Director had asked Dr. Best about this matter, he had answered: "The question has not been broached at all". [384] <165> Dr. Fuglsang-Damgaard reported this in a letter to the pastors of his diocese, dated September 4, 1943, adding that later developments would be followed attentively. "From our experience with the German habit of breaking promises, it was not thought wise to take Dr. Best's words too seriously.

Unfortunately however, his words perhaps did set our minds too much at rest." [385]

The Churches, however, made necessary preparation in case persecution of the Jews would begin. Bishop Fuglsang-Damgaard convened with pastors belonging to the unofficial Pastors' Organisation P.U.F. [386] and asked them to prepare a draft for a public protest, to be read out from the pulpits. It was ready a short time later. The Bishop suggested some changes but there was hardly time to make them as events developed rapidly.

On September 17, 1943, some Jewish houses in Copenhagen were raided. Bishop Fuglsang-Damgaard thus had another interview with the director of the Foreign Ministry, Svenningsen. In a letter to the Bishops, dated September 23, he informed them that:

"... the raid did not indicate that they (the Germans) would raise the Jewish question, but that it was connected with a suspicion of certain persons. Thereafter I asked the Director of the Department to inform the German authorities that their raising of the Jewish question would be met by a joint protest by the Church and the Bishops. The Director promised to inform the Germans of this..."

Bishop Fuglsang-Damgaard relates:

"The Jewish community was in a very difficult situation. The chief-rabbi, Dr. Friediger was interned in the camp of Horsercad, just as the time of the great feasts of the year was approaching. We did what we could to obtain his release, so that at least he could lead the services during the feasts.

At the beginning of the fateful week (during the night of the first October) I paid a visit to the chairman of the Jewish community organisation, the advocate of the Supreme Court, C.B. Henriques. <166> I shall never forget it. I came to express our heartfelt fellowship with his community and to say that we were remembering the Jews in our prayers, not the least in those days when they celebrated their great feasts, and also in order to a.s.sure him that we would do what we could to help the interned to get their liberty again..." [387]