The German Classics of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries Volume X Part 34

So they reflected and held their peace. Now, Gentlemen, are you quite sure that a political upheaval will never recur? Are you ready to swear that you have reached the end of historical development? Or are you willing to see your lives and property again at the mercy of a Karbe and a Lindenmuller?

If not, then your thanks are due to the men who have devoted themselves to the work of filling up that gulf which separates scientific thought and scientific speech from the people, and so to raze the barriers that divide the bourgeoisie and the people. Your thanks are due these men, who, at the expense of their utmost intellectual efforts, have undertaken a work whose results will redound to the profit of each and all of you. These men you should entertain at the prytaneum, not put under indictment.

The place in which this address was held, therefore, can also not afford ground for exception as to its scientific character.

I have now shown you conclusively that the production is a scientific work.

But if, contrary to all expectation, this should still be questioned, although I do not for a moment consider it possible that it should be questioned by men as enlightened as you are, Mr. President and Gentlemen of the Court; now, in such a case, I seek refuge in the privilege which is accorded every cobbler and which you can all the less deny me, viz., to submit a question of workmanship in my trade to the award of men expert in the trade.

In the last resort, the question as to the scientific character of a given work is a question for the men of the trade, and therefore a question which may not be decided on a basis of common education and common culture alone, and therefore also not by a court of law. The question at issue does not concern jurisprudence, with which you are necessarily familiar, but it concerns other sciences with which you may well be unfamiliar, although, as a matter of chance, you may, in your private capacity, not your capacity as jurists, also be acquainted with these matters.

It is true, you may answer this question in the affirmative, your competence extends that far. For in very many cases is the scientific character of a given work manifest, even to the commonly instructed intelligence.

But to pa.s.s a negative opinion in the face of the expert testimony to which I provisionally appeal as a subsidiary recourse;[55] to that your competence does not extend, for the nicer question, whether in a given case the most profound researches of science may not, with a view to their readier apprehension, be presented in a facile and popular form, whether this fact of a facile presentation may not itself mark a peculiarly high achievement of scientific endeavor, in which all traces of the struggle, all difficulties and all the refractoriness of the materials handled have been successfully eliminated and the whole has in the outcome been reduced to the simplest and clearest terms; where the result presented is a scientific work of art, which, in the words of Schiller, has risen above the limitations of human infirmity and moves with such ease and freedom as to give the impression that it offers but the free play of the auditor's own unfolding thought; to decide with confidence whether you have to deal with a scientific work of this cla.s.s, and to decide it with that certainty and security that is required in order to pa.s.s a sentence, that is something of which none but men trained in the science are capable.

This question, therefore, I beg that the following gentlemen: Privy Councillor August Bockh, Efficient Privy Councillor Johannes Schultze, formerly Director of the Ministry of Public Worship, Professor Adolf Trendelenburg, Privy Councillor and Chief Librarian Dr. Pertz, Professor Leopold Ranke, Professor Theodor Mommsen, Privy Councillor Professor Hanssen, all members of the Royal Academy of Science, and as specialists capable of judging in the matter, be const.i.tuted a subsidiary tribunal to pa.s.s on the question, whether the address in question is not in the strict sense a scientific production.

But, if such is found to be the case, then, as I have already explained, it has nothing to do with the penal code.

I have permitted myself to go exhaustively into an exposition of this, my first ground of defense, because, for the sake of the country itself and the dignity and liberty of science, and for the sake of establishing once for all a precedent which shall bar out all similar endeavors of the public prosecutor in the future, it is inc.u.mbent on me to adjure you to acquit me under Article 20 of the Const.i.tution.

But it is not that recourse to this article is necessary to protect my person from the penalty of the law.

For, even were it held that the present case comes within the competence of the penal code, the law appealed to has in no wise been violated, and the paragraph cited by the public prosecutor has no application.

Even this one exception, alone would suffice to set the indictment aside; viz., that no objection is taken to any given pa.s.sage in which the specified offense is alleged to occur; so that the prosecution proceeds wholely on an allegation of bias, and in the baldest manner.

The indictment runs against a bias; that is all. But a bias is not actionable.

But I am not to be permitted to dispose of my defense in so easy a manner. The accusation of having endeavored to incite the poor to hatred of the rich is an accusation of such a kind that, apart from all question of punishment, it is likely to injure any citizen's name and fame. This accusation is of such character that, even if it is formally disproven on legal ground, it may still leave the accused an object of suspicion. You will, accordingly, Mr. President and Gentlemen of the Court, take it simply as evidence of the respect I bear you when I now go on to clear my honor in your sight, with the same solicitude as that with which I have defended my freedom. To this end it is necessary for me to present the grounds of fact, as painstakingly as I have presented the grounds of law, on which this accusation is to be quashed, and you will, therefore, I am sure, hear me with the same forbearance if this second part of my defense turns out to be but little briefer than the first.

I am accused of having violated Section 100 of the penal code. This section reads as follows: "Any person who endangers or jeopardizes the public peace by publicly inciting the subjects of the State to hatred or to contempt of one another, is liable to punishment by a fine of not less than 20 and not more than 200 thalers, or by imprisonment of not less than one month and not more than two years."

This section of the law specifies three different conditions, which must be found to concur if it is to be applicable.

I. There must be incitement to hatred or to contempt;

II. This incitement must be directed to the detriment of given cla.s.ses of the subjects of the State, and I am accordingly accused by the public prosecutor of having incited the cla.s.s of the unpropertied against the cla.s.s of the propertied;

III. This incitement must be of such a nature as to endanger the public peace.

These three conditions must concur, must combine, if the section of the law is to apply,--and not one of these conditions occurs.

As to I. There must be incitement to hatred and contempt; there can in the case before you be no question of this point, and for several reasons.

1. The offense specified in Section 100 cannot be committed except there be an intention to incite to hatred and contempt. A contingent incitement to hatred and contempt, an incitement by inadvertence, is in this case not conceivable. If such a contingent incitement, an unintended incitement to hatred and contempt, were conceivable, what would not the consequences be? We have, all of us, for instance, recently read certain speeches delivered in the upper house, which have, we will say, filled me,--and not me alone, Gentlemen, but along with me a very large part of the nation--with hatred and contempt to the point of distraction. Does it follow that the public prosecutor could take action against the speakers in question? He is not competent to do so, even aside from the political prerogative of the speakers, for, although such has been the effect of these speeches, the purpose of these gentlemen was a.s.suredly not to stir up hatred and contempt. But it is equally true that no one can deny that the purpose of my address was to impart knowledge. The most that the public prosecutor can allege is that it was a matter of indifference to me if the knowledge imparted stirred up hatred and contempt,--an allegation without significance, since there is no such thing as an incitement to hatred and contempt by inadvertence.

But, in point of fact, a deliberate incitement of this kind is in the present case absolutely excluded for another reason, which at the same time establishes that the address in question could not even have had the effect of stirring up hatred and contempt. I, therefore, in order to prevent repet.i.tion, beg to present this reason in connection with the second, viz.: that my address could not have the effect of causing hatred and contempt.

I have, therefore, to say, as the second count under this head, that this address cannot possibly have had the effect of stirring up hatred and contempt, and _a fortiori_ cannot have had that intention.

On what grounds alone can hatred and contempt be deserved?

On the ground of viciousness, which in turn is an attribute of voluntary human actions alone. But in this address of mine, I show that the dominance of this principle of the bourgeoisie, against which I am by the public prosecutor accused of inciting to hatred and contempt, is but a stage of economic and ethical development, which is the outcome of historical necessity, and that its nonexistence is an utter impossibility and that it therefore has all the character of natural necessity that belongs to the developmental progress of the earth.

Do we hate Nature because we have to struggle with her? Because we have to strive to guide her processes and improve her products?

But there is the further question: How has the public prosecutor understood my pamphlet?

The fundamental idea of my address is that the dominance of the bourgeoisie has in no wise been produced, consciously and by their own motion, intentionally and in a responsible manner, by the propertied cla.s.s as persons or individuals. On the contrary, the bourgeois are but the unconscious, choiceless, and therefore irresponsible products, not the producers of the situation as it stands and as it has developed under the guidance of quite other laws than the direction of personal choice. Even their reluctance to surrender this their mastery I refer back to the laws of human nature, whose character it is to hold fast to whatever is and to account it necessary. But a doctrine which goes the length of denying the propertied cla.s.s all responsibility for the existing state of things, which makes them a product instead of the producers of this state of things--this doctrine the public prosecutor construes to have incited to hatred and contempt of these persons.

For, be it noted, we have here to do with persons and cla.s.ses of persons, under section 100, not with inst.i.tutions established by the State, as under section 101.

No workingman has got so faulty an understanding of my address as the public prosecutor, and I leave it to him to say whether this is due to his lack of understanding or to his lack of will to understand.

But, more than all this, I go on to show that the dominance of the idea of the bourgeoisie is a great historic move in the liberation of humanity; that it was a most potent moral cultural advance; that in fact it was the historically indispensable prerequisite and transitional stage through development out of which the idea of the working cla.s.s was to emerge.

I therefore must be said to reconcile the working cla.s.s to the dominance of the bourgeoisie as an historical fact by showing the logical necessity of this dominance. I reconcile them to it, for a comprehension of the rationality of what restricts us is the fullest possible reconciliation to it.

And if I proceed, further, to show that the idea of the bourgeoisie is not the highest stage of the historical development, not the perfect flower of advancing improvement, but that beyond it lies yet a higher manifestation of the human spirit, and that this ulterior phase rests on the former as its base--does this mean that I incite to hatred and contempt of the former?

The working cla.s.s might as well hate and despise themselves and all human nature, whether in their own or in their neighbors' persons, because it is the law of human nature to unfold step by step and to proceed to each succeeding stage of development from the indispensable vantage ground of the phase preceding.

If I had any predilection for homiletical discourse, Gentlemen, I should be quite justified in saying that I have exhorted the working cla.s.ses to a filial piety toward the bourgeoisie, in that I have shown that the dominance of the bourgeoisie was the indispensable prerequisite and condition by transition out of which alone the idea of the working cla.s.s could come forth. For even if the son, by grace of a freer and fuller education and a larger endowment of personal force, strives to place himself above the level on which his father stood, still he never forgets the source of his own blood and the author of his own being. How deep in the mud is it the intention to thrust the n.o.blest of all the sciences in bringing this charge of criminal instigation against the doctrine that history is an unfolding evolution of reason and human liberty?

It was for long incomprehensible to me how the public prosecutor could use such words as instigation to hatred and contempt in this connection. In the end I have been able to explain this fact to myself only on this one supposition. The public prosecutor must have endeavored in reading this address, to put himself in the place of a working man and has then come to feel that he would in such a case be moved to hatred.

The public prosecutor, then, is sensible that he would hate.

Now, Gentlemen, I might say that this would be attributable to the peculiarity of his temperament, and that he had no call to generalize and go beyond that. But I will lend a hand to the public prosecutor in this perplexity. I will bring the charge against myself in a more telling form than he has been able to do. I will formulate it as the facts of the case require that it must be formulated if it is to be preferred at all. And in so doing, the more pointedly I may be able to bring to light the essential nature of the charge, the more utterly shall I annihilate it.

This is what the public prosecutor should have said:

It is true this address held by La.s.salle appeals to the intellect of the auditors, not to their practical impulses or their emotions. It is accordingly true also that this address does not come within the sphere of competence of the penal code.

But in a person endowed with the normal complement of human sensibility, cognition, will and emotion are not so many insulated pigeonholes which stand in no relation to one another. Whenever the one compartment is full it flows over into the next. Will and emotion are servants of the intellect and are controlled by it.

La.s.salle, it is true, has not a word to say of hatred and contempt; he is simply occupied with a theoretical exposition of how certain arrangements, for instance, the three-cla.s.s suffrage, is pernicious. I am unable to confute this teaching. But I have this to say with respect to the organic unity of human nature, that if the doctrine is true then it follows that every normally const.i.tuted working man must come to hate and distrust not only these arrangements and inst.i.tutions but also those who profit by them.

Such is the logical framework on which this indictment must proceed.

This is the line of argument which avowedly or not, by logical necessity comes to expression in this indictment.

It is not I, but the public prosecutor speaking from the eminence of his curule chair, who proclaims to the working cla.s.ses the awful doctrine: You must hate and distrust.

It is not for me, it is for the public prosecutor to square himself with the bourgeoisie.

But what is my answer to the public prosecutor and his indictment which charges me with his own offense?

My answer is a four-fold one: