The German Classics of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries Volume X Part 25

Marshal Bazaine had not thought it advisable to proceed to Verdun now that the Germans were so close on the flank of such a movement. He preferred to a.s.semble his forces at Metz, in a position which he rightly supposed to be almost impregnable.

Such a position was afforded by the range of hills, bordering on the west of the valley of Chatel. That side facing the enemy sloped away like a _glacis_, while the short and steep decline behind offered protection for the reserves. The IId, IIId, IVth and VIth Corps were placed on the ridge of the hills between Roncourt and Rozereuilles, a distance of one mile and a half (German); thus there were eight or ten men to every yard of ground.

A brigade of the Vth Corps stood at Ste.-Ruffine in the valley of the Moselle, the cavalry in the rear of the two wings.

The positions of the IId and IIId Corps were hastily entrenched, batteries and covered ways were established, and the farmhouses in front prepared for defense. To approach this left wing from the west it was necessary to cross the deep valley of the Mance. The VIth Corps on the other hand had no engineering tools; and it is indicative of the general ill-equipment of the French that, merely to convey the wounded to the rear, in spite of the enormous baggage-train, provision wagons had to be unloaded and their contents burnt. This Corps was therefore unable to construct such defenses on the side overlooking the forest of Jaumont as were necessary to strengthen the right wing.

This would undoubtedly have been the place for the Guards, but in his fear of an attack from the south, Marshal Bazaine kept them in reserve at Plappeville.

The King again arrived at Flavigny at six o'clock on the morning of the 18th. All officers in command were ordered to report directly to headquarters, and Staff-officers of Army Headquarters were despatched in all directions to watch the progress of the engagement.

The VIIth army Corps, forming the pivot upon which the intended wheel to the right was to be effected, occupied the Bois de Vaux and Bois des Ognons; the 8th, under the personal command of the King, halted at Rezonville, ready to proceed to the north or east, as might be required. The IXth Corps, on its left, advanced toward the Marcel, while the IIId and Xth formed the second line. The Guards and XIIth Corps moved in a northerly direction.

A serious delay occurred when the XIIth Corps of the Second Army, which was stationed on the right, was commanded to form the left wing, by the crossing of the two on the march. The Saxon troops did not get through Mars-la-Tour until nine o'clock, and till then the Guards could not follow.

The advanced guard of the XIIth Corps had meanwhile reached Jarny, and proceeded as far as Briey without encountering the enemy.

Before this could be known, the authorities at headquarters had been convinced that at least the main forces of the enemy were still at Metz; misapprehension, however, prevailed as to the extension of their lines, and it was thought the French front did not reach beyond Montigny. The general in command of the Second Army was therefore instructed not to proceed further northward, but to join the IXth Corps in attacking the enemy's right wing, and move in the direction of Batilly with the Guards and the XIIth Corps. The First Army was not to attack in the front until the Second was ready to strike.

In obedience to this, Prince Frederick Charles ordered the IXth Corps to march on to Verneville, and, in case the French right wing should be found there, to open battle by bringing a large force of artillery into action. The Guards were to continue their advance _via_ Doncourt to reinforce the IXth as soon as possible. The XIIth was to remain at Jarny for the present.

A little later fresh reports came in which indicated that the IXth Corps, if proceeding in the manner ordered, would come upon the French centre, instead of their right wing. The Prince therefore determined that the Corps should postpone the attack till the Guards had done so at Amanvillers. At the same time the XIIth Corps was pushed on to Ste.-Marie-aux-Chenes.

But, while these orders were being given, the first heavy firing was heard at Verneville. This was at twelve o 'clock.

The two Corps on the left had, of their own accord, taken an easterly direction without waiting for orders, and the IId Corps moved up behind the IXth at the farm of Caulre.

General von Manstein, in command of the IXth, had observed from near Verneville a French encampment at Amanvillers, apparently in a state of quietude. From that point of view the great ma.s.ses of troops on their immediate left at St.-Privat were not visible. Mistaking this camp for the right wing, he determined to act on his first orders and take the foe by surprise. Eight of his batteries at once opened fire.

But it did not take the French troops long to move into the position a.s.signed to them. The independent action of a single Corps naturally exposed it not only to the fire of the troops opposite, but to an attack in flank.

To obtain some shelter on the field, the Prussian batteries had taken up a position on the shoulder of the hill below Amanvillers facing the southeast, where they were exposed from the north, on the flank, and even in the rear to the fire of French artillery, as well as to the concentrated fire of their infantry.

To meet this, the battalions nearest at hand were ordered forward.

They took possession of the eastern point of the Bois de la Cusse on the left, and on the right seized the farmhouses of L'Envie and Chantrenne, forcing their way into the Bois des Genivaux. Thus the line of battle of the 18th Division gained a front of 4,000 paces.

Its losses were very great, for the French with their long-range Cha.s.sepot rifles could afford to keep out of range of the needle-gun; the artillery especially suffered severely. One of the batteries had already lost forty-five gunners when it was attacked by French sharpshooters. There was no infantry at hand to retaliate, and two guns were lost. By two o'clock all the batteries were almost _hors-de-combat_, and no relief arrived till the Hessian Division reached Habonville, and brought up five batteries on either side of the railway, thus diverting on themselves the concentrated fire of the enemy. The batteries of the 18th Division, which had suffered most, could now be withdrawn in succession, but even in their retreat they had to defend themselves against their pursuers by grapeshot.

The artillery of the IIId Corps and the Guards were likewise sent to the a.s.sistance of the IXth, and those of the damaged guns which were still fit for service were at once brought into line. Thus a front of 130 guns was drawn up before Verneville as far as St.-Ail, and its fire soon told upon the enemy. Now, when the IIId Corps was approaching Verneville and the 3d Brigade of Guards had reached Habonville, there was no fear that the French would break through the line.

The main force of the Guards had arrived at St.-Ail as early as two o'clock. General von Pape at once saw that by wheeling to the east he would not encounter the right wing of the French, which was to be out-flanked, but would expose his own left wing to the forces occupying Ste.-Marie-aux-Chenes. The first thing to be done was to gain possession of this village--almost a town. It was strongly occupied and well flanked by the main position of the French army; but, in obedience to superior orders, he must await the arrival of a cooperative Saxon contingent.

The advance guard of this Corps had already reached the vicinity of Batilly, but was yet half a mile distant from Ste.-Marie, so its batteries could not be placed in position west of the town until three o'clock. But, as the Guards had sent most of their own artillery to the support of the IXth Corps, this was substantial aid.

Ten batteries now opened fire upon Ste.-Marie, and by the time it was beginning to tell the 47th Brigade of the XIIth Corps came up. At half-past three the Prussian and Saxon battalions stormed the town from the south and west and north, amid vociferous cheers, and without further returning the fire of the enemy. The French were driven from the place, and a few hundred were taken prisoners.

The Saxons tried to follow them up, and a lively infantry engagement ensued, north of Ste.-Marie, which masked the artillery. As soon as the brigade had been ordered to retire, the batteries reopened fire, and the repeated efforts of the French to regain the lost position were frustrated.

Soon afterwards the IXth Corps succeeded in taking and holding the farm of Champenois, but all further attempts, by isolated battalions or companies, to force their way on against the broad and compact centre of the French were, on the face of it, futile. Thus, by about five o'clock, the infantry ceased fire, and the artillery only fired an occasional shot. Fatigue on both sides caused an almost total suspension of hostilities in this part of the field.

The Commander-in-Chief decided that the First Army should not engage in serious a.s.sault until the Second stood close to the enemy; but when the day was half-spent and brisk firing was heard about noon from Vionville, it was to be supposed that the time for action had arrived; still, for the present permission was only given to send forward the artillery in preparation for the fight. Sixteen batteries of the VIIth and VIIIth Corps accordingly drew up to right and left of the highway running through Gravelotte. Their fire was ineffective, as they were too far from the enemy; besides they were suffering from the fire of the French tirailleurs, who had established themselves in the opposite woods. It became necessary to drive them out, so here again there was a sharp skirmish. The French had to abandon the eastern portion of the Mance valley, and the artillery, now increased to twenty batteries, was able to advance to the western ridge and direct its fire against the main position of the enemy.

The battalions of the 29th Brigade followed up this advantage. They pressed forward into the southern part of the Bois des Genivaux on the left, but were unable to effect a connection with the IXth Corps, occupying the north of the forest, as the French could not be driven from the intervening ground. On the right, various detachments took possession of the quarries and gravel-pits near St.-Hubert.

The artillery meanwhile had got the better of the French guns; several of their batteries were silenced, others prevented from getting into position. The French fire was in part directed on the farm of St.-Hubert, on which the 30th Brigade were gradually encroaching. This well-defended structure was stormed at three o'clock, close under the face of the enemy's main position, and in spite of a tremendous fire.

The 31st Brigade had also got across the valley, but an attempt to reach the farms of Moscow and Leipzig, over the open plain enclosed by the enemy on three sides, proved a failure and resulted in great loss.

The 26th Brigade had taken possession of Jussy, on the extreme right, thus maintaining the connection with Metz, but found it impossible to cross the deep valley of Rozerieulles.

The advanced detachments of the French had been repulsed on all sides, the farms in their front were burning, their artillery appeared to be silenced, and, viewing the situation from Gravelotte, there remained nothing but pursuit. General von Steinmetz, therefore, at four o'clock, ordered fresh forces to the front for a renewed attack.

While the VIIth Corps occupied the border of the wood, four batteries, backed by the 1st Cavalry Division, made their way through the narrow ravine extending for about 1,500 paces east of Gravelotte. But as soon as the advanced guard of the long column came in sight, the French redoubled their rifle and artillery fire, which had till now been kept under. One battery had soon lost the men serving four of its guns, and was hardly able to return into the wood; a second never even got into position. The batteries under Hesse and Gnugge, on the other hand, held their own at St.-Hubert in spite of the loss of seventy-five horses and of the firing from the quarries in their rear.

The foremost regiment of cavalry wheeled to the right after leaving the hollow way, and galloped toward Point-du-Jour, but the enemy, being completely under cover, offered no opportunity for an attack.

Evidently this was no field for utilizing the cavalry, so the regiments retired through the Mance valley under a heavy fire from all sides.

This ill-success of the Germans encouraged the French to advance from Point-du-Jour with swarms of tirailleurs, who succeeded in driving the Prussians back from the open ground as far as the skirts of the wood.

The bullets of the Cha.s.sepots even reached the hill where the Commander-in-Chief was watching the battle, and Prince Adalbert's horse was shot under him.

Fresh forces were now at hand and drove the enemy back to his main position. St.-Hubert had remained in the hands of the Germans; and though the survivors there were only sufficient to serve one gun, still every attempt to cross the exposed plateau proved a failure.

Thus hostilities ceased at this point also, at about five o'clock in the afternoon, allowing the weary troops on both sides to take breath and reorganize.

King William and his staff rode over to the hill on the south of Malmaison at about the same hour, but could see nothing of the situation of the left wing, which was more than a mile away. The French artillery had ceased firing along the centre, from La Folie to Point-du-Jour; but to the northward the thunder of artillery was louder than ever. It was six o'clock, the day was nearly at an end, and decided action must at once be taken. The King therefore ordered the First Army to advance once more, and for that purpose placed the IId Corps, just arrived after a long march, under the command of General von Steinmetz.

Those battalions of VII Corps which could still do good service, except five, which were kept in reserve, were again sent up the Mance valley, and the battalions from the Bois de Vaux came to their support toward Point-du-Jour and the quarries. The IId Corps of the French Army thus attacked was now reinforced by Guard Voltigeur Division. All the reserves were brought to the front. The artillery was more rapidly served, and a destructive musketry fire was directed on the advancing enemy. Then the French on their side made an attack. A strong body of riflemen dispersed the smaller parties which were lying in the open, dest.i.tute of commanders, and drove them back to the wood. There, however, their advance was checked, and there was still another Army Corps ready for action.

The IId Corps, the last to come up by rail to the seat of war, had up to this time followed in the wake of the army by forced marches, but had not yet fought in any engagement. It had started from Point-a-Mousson at 2 p.m. and, taking the road by Buxieres and Rezonville, arrived south of Gravelotte in the evening. The Pomeranians were eager to get at the enemy without delay.

It would have been better if the Chief of the Staff, who was personally on the field at the time, had not allowed this movement at so late an hour. A body of troops, still completely intact, might have been of great value the next day; it was not likely this evening to affect the issue.

Rushing out of Gravelotte, the foremost battalions of the IId Corps pushed forward to the quarries, and up to within a few hundred paces of Point-du-Jour; but those following were soon entangled in the turmoil of the troops under fire south of St.-Hubert, and any further advance toward Moscow was arrested. Darkness was falling, and friend became indistinguishable from foe. So the firing was stopped; but not until ten o'clock did it entirely cease.

The advance of the IId Corps resulted in some good, however, for these fresh troops could occupy the fighting-line for the night, while the mixed companies of the VIIth and VIIIth Corps were enabled to re-form in their rear.

The whole course of the engagement had conclusively proved that the position of the French left wing, made almost impregnable by nature and art, could not be shaken even by the most devoted bravery and the greatest sacrifices. Both parties were now facing each other in threatening proximity, and both fully able to reopen battle next morning. The success of the day must depend on events at the other end of the French line.

The Prince of Wurtemburg, standing at Ail, believed that the hour had come for an attack on the French right at about a quarter-past five; but that wing extended much further north than the line of his Guards, further, indeed, than the French Commander-in-Chief himself was aware of. Though the Saxons had partic.i.p.ated in the capture of Ste.-Marie-aux-Chenes, the Crown Prince deemed it necessary to a.s.semble his Corps at the Bois d'Auboue, to attack the enemy in flank.

One of the brigades had to come from Jarny, and one from Ste.-Marie; so, as the Corps was late in getting away from Mars-la-Tour, it was not expected to be on the field for some hours yet.

The 4th Brigade of Foot Guards, in obedience to orders, proceeded in the direction of Jerusalem, immediately south of St.-Privat. As soon as General von Manstein, in command of the IXth Corps, observed this, he ordered the 3d Brigade of Guards, which had been placed at his orders, to advance from Habonville toward Amanvillers.

Between these two brigades marched the Hessians, but it was not till half an hour later that the First Division of Guards joined from Ste.-Marie, marching on St.-Privat, on the left of the Second. This attack was directed against the broad front of the French IVth and VIth Corps. Their fortified positions at St.-Privat and Amanvillers had as yet hardly felt the fire of the German batteries, which had found sufficient employment in replying to the enemy's artillery outside the villages.

Several ranks of riflemen, one above the other, were placed in front of the French main position, on the hedges and fences in a slope up the ridge. At their back towered St.-Privat, castle-like, with its ma.s.sive buildings, which were crowded by soldiers to the very roof.

The open plain in front was thus exposed to an overwhelming shower of projectiles.

The losses of the attacking Guards were, in fact, enormous. In the course of half an hour five battalions lost all, the others the greater part of their officers, especially those of the higher grades.

Thousands of dead and wounded marked the track of the troops, who, in spite of their losses, pressed forward. The ranks, as fast as they were thinned, closed up again, and their compact formation was not broken even under the leadership of young lieutenants and ensigns. As they got nearer to the enemy the needle-gun did good service. The French were driven from all their foremost positions, where, for the most part, they did not await the final struggle. By a quarter-past six the battalions had advanced to within 600 to 800 paces of Amanvillers and St.-Privat. The troops, weary from long combat, halted under the steeper slopes offering some, though small, protection, and in the trenches just abandoned by the enemy. Only four battalions now remained in reserve at Ste.-Marie, behind the German line, which now extended to a length of 4,000 paces. Every charge of the French cavalry and of Cissy's Division had been persistently repelled with the aid of twelve batteries of the Guards which had now put in an appearance; but the German troops, reduced, as they were, by untold losses, had to face two French Corps for thirty minutes longer before reinforcements came to their aid.

It was nearly seven o'clock when, to the left of the Guards, two brigades of the Saxon infantry arrived on the field; the other two were still a.s.sembling in the forest of Auboue; their artillery, however, had for some time kept up a lively fire on Roncourt.