The German Classics of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries Volume X Part 17

That no temporary arrangement is contemplated will be perfectly clear, I believe, when I ask you to survey with me the dangers of war which we have met in the past forty years without having become nervously excited at any one time.

In the year 1848, when many dikes and flood gates were broken, which until then had directed the peaceful flow of countless waters, we had to dispose of two questions freighted with the danger of war. They concerned Poland and Schleswig-Holstein. The first shouts after the Martial days were: war with Russia for the rehabilitation of Poland!

Soon thereafter the danger was perilously near of being involved in a great European war on account of Schleswig-Holstein. I need not emphasize how the agreement of Olmutz, in 1850, prevented a great conflagration--a war on a gigantic scale. Then there followed two years of greater quiet out of general ill feeling, at the time when I first was amba.s.sador in Frankfort. In 1853 the earliest symptoms of the Crimean War made themselves felt. This war lasted from 1853 to 1856, and during this whole time we were near the edge of the cliff, I will not say the abyss, whence it was intended to draw us into the war. I remember that I was obliged at that time, from 1853 to 1855 to alternate like a pendulum, so to speak, between Frankfort and Berlin because the late king, thanks to the confidence he had in me, used me as the real advocate of his independent policy whenever the insistence of the western powers that we too should declare war on Russia grew too strong, and the opposition of his cabinet too flabby for his liking. Then the play was staged--I do not know how often--when I was called back here and ordered to write for His Majesty a more pro-Russian dispatch, and Mr. von Manteuffel resigned, and I requested to be instructed by His Majesty to follow Mr. von Manteuffel, after the dispatch was gone, into the country or anywhere else, and to induce him to resume his office. Yet each time Prussia, as it was then const.i.tuted, was hovering on the brink of a great war.

It was exposed to the hostility of the whole of Europe, except Russia, if it refused to join in the policies of the west European powers, and, if it did, it was forced to break with Russia, possibly for a very long while, because the defection of Prussia would probably have been felt very painfully in Russia.

During the Crimean War, therefore, we were in constant danger of war.

The war lasted till 1856, when it was at last concluded by the treaty of Paris, and we found, in the Congress of Paris a sort of Canossa prepared for us, for which I should not have a.s.sumed the responsibility, and against which I vainly counseled at the time. We were not at all obliged to play the part of a greater power than we were, and to sign the treaties made there. But we were dancing attendance with the view of being permitted to sign the treaty. This will not again happen to us.

That was in 1856, and as early as in 1857 the problem of Neuchatel was again threatening us with war. This did not become generally known. In the spring of that year I was sent to Paris by the late king to negotiate with Emperor Napoleon concerning the pa.s.sage of Prussian troops in an attack upon Switzerland. Everyone who hears this from me will know what this would have meant in case of an understanding, and that it could have become a far-reaching danger of war, and might have involved us with France as well as with other powers. Emperor Napoleon was not unwilling to agree. My negotiations in Paris, however, were terminated because his majesty the king in the meanwhile had come to an amicable understanding in the matter with Austria and Switzerland.

But the danger of war, we must agree, was present also during that year.

While I was on this mission in Paris, the Italian War hung in the air.

It broke out a little more than a year later and came very near drawing us into a big general war of Europe. We went so far as to mobilize, and we should undoubtedly have taken the field, if the peace of Villafranca had not been concluded, somewhat prematurely for Austria, but just in time for ourselves, for we should have been obliged to wage this war under unfavorable circ.u.mstances. We should have turned this war, which was an Italian affair, into a Franco-Prussian war, and its cessation, outcome, and treaty of peace would no longer have depended on us, but on the friends and enemies who stood behind us.

Thus we came into the sixties without the clouds of war having cleared from the horizon for even one single year.

Already in 1863 another war threatened hardly less ominously, of which the people at large knew little, and which will only be appreciated when the secret archives of the cabinets will be made public. You may remember the Polish uprising of 1863, and I shall never forget the morning calls which I used to receive at that time from Sir Andrew Buchanan, the English amba.s.sador, and Talleyrand, the French representative, who tried to frighten me out of my wits by attacking the Prussian policy for its inexcusable adherence to Russia, and who used rather a threatening language with me. At noon of the same days I then used to have the pleasure of listening in the Prussian diet to somewhat the same arguments and attacks which the foreign amba.s.sadors had made upon me in the morning. I suffered it quietly, but Emperor Alexander lost his patience, and wished to draw his sword against the plotting of the western powers. You will remember that the French forces were then engaged with American projects and in Mexico, which prevented France from taking a vigorous stand. The Emperor of Russia was no longer willing to stand the Polish intrigues of the other powers, and was ready to face events in our company and to go to war. You will remember that Prussia was struggling at that time with difficult interior problems, and that in Germany the leaven had begun to work in the minds of the people, and the council of the princes in Frankfort was under contemplation. It may be readily granted, therefore, that the temptation for my gracious master was very strong to cut, and thus to heal, his difficult position at home by agreeing to a military undertaking on a colossal scale.

At that time war of Prussia and Russia together against those who were protecting the Polish insurrection against us would undoubtedly have taken place if his majesty had not recoiled from the thought of solving home difficulties, Prussian as well as German, with foreign help. We declined in silence, and without revealing to the other German powers who had hostile projects against us the reasons which had determined our course. The subsequent death of the King of Denmark changed the trend of thought of everybody interested. But all that was needed to bring about the great coalition war in 1863 was a "Yes"

instead of a "No" from His Majesty the King in Gastein. Anybody but a German minister would perhaps have counseled affirmatively, from reasons of utility and opportunism in order to solve thereby our home difficulties. You see neither our own people nor foreigners really have a proper appreciation of the amount of national loyalty and high principles which guides both the sovereign and his ministers in the government of German states.

The year 1864--we just spoke of 1863--brought a new pressing danger of war. From the moment when our troops crossed the Eider, I was ready every week to see the European Council of Elders interfere in this Danish affair, and you will agree with me that this was highly probable. But in those days we could observe that it is not so very easy for Europe to attack Austria and Prussia when they are united; and remember that the German federation which supported these two states at that time had not nearly the same military importance which the identical countries possess today. The difficulty of an attack on Austria and Prussia showed itself even then, but the danger of a war remained the same.

In 1865 it faced about, and the preparations for the war of 1866 were beginning. I only remember a meeting of the Prussian cabinet which took place in Regensburg in 1865 with a view to procuring the necessary money, but which was rendered futile by the agreement of Gastein. In 1866, however, the war broke out in full force, as you know. A circ.u.mspect use of events alone enabled us to ward off the existing danger of turning this duel between Prussia and Austria into a fierce European war of coalition, when our very existence, our life and all we had, would have been at stake.

This was in 1866, and in 1867 the Luxembourg problem arose, when only a somewhat firmer reply was needed to bring about the great French war in that year,--and we might have given it, if we had been so strong that we could have counted on sure success. From then on, during 1868, 1869, and up to 1870 we were living in constant apprehension of war, and of the agreements which in the time of Mr. von Beust were being made in Salzburg and other places between France, Italy, and Austria, and which, we feared, were directed against us. The apprehension of war was so great at that time that I received calls--I was the President of the cabinet--from merchants and manufacturers, who said: "The uncertainty is unbearable. Why don't you strike the first blow?

War is preferable to this continued damper on all business!" We waited quietly until we were struck, and I believe we did well to arrange matters so that we were the nation which was a.s.sailed and were not ourselves the a.s.sailants.

Now, since the great war of 1870 was waged, has there been a year, I ask you, without the danger of war? In the first years of the seventies--the very moment we came home, the question arose: "When will be the next war? When will revenge be given? Within five years at the latest, no doubt?" We were told: "The question whether we shall have to fight and with what success surely rests with Russia now-a-days. Russia alone holds the hilt." It was a representative of the Catholic party who thus remonstrated with me in the Reichstag. I may possibly revert to this subject later. In the meanwhile I wish to complete the picture of the forty years by saying that in 1876 the clouds of war again began to gather in the south. In 1877 the Balkan War was waged, which would have led to a conflagration of the whole of Europe, if this had not been prevented by the Congress gathered in Berlin. After the Congress an entirely new eastern picture presented itself to us, for Russia was offended by our att.i.tude in the Congress.

I may revert to this later, if my strength permits.

Then there followed a period when we felt the results of the intimate relations of the three emperors, which for some time permitted us to face the future with greater placidity. But at the first symptoms of any instability in the relations of the three emperors or of the termination of the agreements which they had made with one another, public opinion was possessed by the same nervous and, I believe, exaggerated excitement with which we have had to contend these last years, and which I consider especially uncalled for today.

From my belief that this excitement is uncalled for I am far from drawing the conclusion that we do not need an increase in our armaments. The very opposite is my view, and this may explain the tableau of forty years which I have just exhibited before you, possibly not for your enjoyment, and I ask your pardon.

[Ill.u.s.tration: THE BISMARCK MONUMENT AT HAMBURG LEDERER]

But if I had omitted even one of those years, which you yourselves have lived through with trembling, you would not have received the impression that the state of apprehension of great wars is permanent with us. Great complications and all kinds of coalitions, which no one can foresee, are constantly possible and we must be prepared for them.

We must be so strong, irrespective of momentary conditions, that we can face any coalition with the a.s.surance of a great nation which is strong enough under circ.u.mstances to take her fate into her own hands.

We must be able to face our fate placidly with that self reliance and confidence in G.o.d which are ours when we are strong and our cause is just. And the Government will see to it that the German cause will be just always.

We must, to put it briefly, be as strong in these times as we possibly can be, and we can be stronger than any other nation of equal numbers in the world. I shall revert to this later--but it would be criminal if we were not to make use of our opportunity. If we do not need our full armed strength, we need not summon it. The only problem is the not very weighty one of money--not very weighty I say in pa.s.sing, because I have no wish to enter upon a discussion of the financial and military figures, and of the fact that France has spent three milliards for the improvement of her armaments these last years, while we have spent scarcely one and one half milliards, including what we are asking of you at this time. But I leave the elucidation of this to the minister of war and the representatives of the treasury department.

When I say that it is our duty to endeavor to be ready at all times and for all emergencies, I imply that we must make greater exertions than other people for the same purpose, because of our geographical position. We are situated in the heart of Europe, and have at least three fronts open to an attack. France has only her eastern, and Russia only her western frontier where they may be attacked. We are also more exposed to the dangers of a coalition than any other nation, as is proved by the whole development of history, by our geographical position, and the lesser degree of cohesiveness, which until now has characterized the German nation in comparison with others. G.o.d has placed us where we are prevented, thanks to our neighbors from growing lazy and dull. He has placed by our side the most warlike and restless of all nations, the French, and He has permitted warlike inclinations to grow strong in Russia, where formerly they existed to a lesser degree. Thus we are given the spur, so to speak, from both sides, and are compelled to exertions which we should perhaps not be making otherwise. The pikes in the European carp-pond are keeping us from being carps by making us feel their teeth on both sides. They also are forcing us to an exertion which without them we might not make, and to a union among us Germans, which is abhorrent to us at heart. By nature we are rather tending away, the one from the other. But the Franco-Russian press within which we are squeezed compels us to hold together, and by pressure our cohesive force is greatly increased.

This will bring us to that state of being inseparable which all other nations possess, while we do not yet enjoy it. But we must respond to the intentions of Providence by making ourselves so strong that the pikes can do nothing but encourage us.

Formerly in the years of the Holy Alliance--I am just thinking of an American song which I learned of my late friend Motley: "In good old colonial times, when we lived under a King"--well those were the good old patriarchal times when we had many posts to guide us, and many dikes to protect us from the wild floods of Europe. There were the German Union, and the real support and consummation of the German Union, the Holy Alliance. We had support in Russia and in Austria, and, above all, the guaranty of our diffidence that we should never express an opinion before the others had spoken.

All this we have lost; we must help ourselves. The Holy Alliance was wrecked in the Crimean War--not through our fault. The German Union has been destroyed by us, because the existence which we were granted within it was unbearable in the long run for ourselves and the German people as well. After the dissolution of the German Union and the war of 1866, Prussia, as it was then, or North Germany, would have become isolated, if we had been obliged to count with the fact that n.o.body would be willing to pardon our new successes--the great successes which we had won. No great power looks with favor on the successes of its neighbors.

Our relations with Russia, however, were not disturbed by the experience of 1866. In that year the memory of Count Buol's policy and of the policy of Austria during the Crimean War was too fresh in Russia to permit the rise of the thought that Russia could a.s.sist the Austrian monarchy against the Prussian attack, or could renew the campaign, which Emperor Nicholas had fought for Austria in 1849--ask your pardon, if I sit down for a moment. I cannot stand so long.

Our most natural support, therefore, still remained with Russia, due very properly to the policy of Emperor Alexander I. in this century--not to speak of the last century at all. In 1813 he might well have turned back at the Polish frontier, and have made peace, and later he might have dropped Prussia. We certainly owed our reestablishment on the old basis at that time to the benevolence of Emperor Alexander I.--or, if you wish to be sceptical, you may say to the Russian policy, which was such as Prussia needed. Grat.i.tude for this dominated the reign of Frederick William III. The credit, however, which Russia had in the Prussian accounts was used up by the friendship, I may even say servility, of Prussia during the entire reign of Emperor Nicholas, and was, I own, wiped out at Olmutz. There Emperor Nicholas did not take the part of Prussia, nor did he keep us from evil experiences or certain humiliations, for Emperor Nicholas really preferred Austria to Prussia. The idea that we owed Russia any thanks during his reign is a historical myth.

We did, nevertheless, not break our traditional relations with Russia while he lived; and in the Crimean War we remained true, as I said before, to our Russian duty, in spite of many threats and great dangers. His Majesty, the late King, had no desire to play a decisive part in the war by a great levy of troops, as I believe we could have done. We had made certain treaties requiring us to put in the field 100,000 men after the lapse of a stated time; and I proposed to His Majesty to levy not 100,000 but 200,000 men, and mounted at that, whom we could use as well toward the right as toward the left, in which case, I said, Your Majesty will be the arbiter of the Crimean War. But the late King did not cherish warlike enterprises, and the people ought to be grateful to him. I was younger then, and less experienced than I am today. At any rate we harbored no resentment for Olmutz during the Crimean War. We came out of this war as the friends of Russia, and I was enabled to enjoy the fruit of this friendship, when as amba.s.sador I was most kindly received in St. Petersburg, both at court and in society at large. Even our espousing the cause of Austria in the Italian War, while not to the liking of the Russian cabinet, showed no harmful effects. Our war of 1866 was regarded in Russia with a certain amount of satisfaction, for the Russians were glad to see Austria suffer. In our French war of 1870 we were fortunate enough to be able to serve the Russian interests in the Black Sea at the same time that we were successful in defending and guarding our own. The contracting parties probably would not have removed their restrictions from the Black Sea, if the victorious German troops had not been standing near Paris. If we had been beaten, the London agreement in the interest of Russia would not have been made so easily, I believe.

Thus also the war of 1870 carried in its train no disagreement between us and Russia. I mention these matters in order to explain to you the origin of our treaty with Austria, which was published a few days ago, and to defend the policy of His Majesty against the reproach of having enlarged the possibilities of war for the German empire, by adding to them the chances which may befall Austria without any fault of her own. I am, therefore, going to describe to you how it happened that our traditional relations with Russia, which I had always and very gladly fostered, became so altered that we were induced to conclude the treaty published day before yesterday.

The first years after the French war pa.s.sed in the best of friendship.

In 1875 there suddenly appeared the inclination of my Russian colleague, Prince Gortschakoff, to work for popularity with France rather than with us, and to make the world believe, by means of certain artificially created events and an interpolated telegram, that we had harbored the idea, however remote, of invading France, and that his intercession alone had saved France from this danger. This occasioned the first estrangement between us, and led to a serious discussion between me and my former friend and later colleague. All this time and subsequently we were still clinging to the task of maintaining peace among the three emperors, and of continuing the relationship begun by the visits of the emperors of Russia and Austria here in Berlin in 1872, and the subsequent return visits. We were succeeding in this, when in 1876, before the Turkish War, pressure was brought to bear upon us to choose between Russia and Austria. This we refused to do. I do not deem it advantageous to discuss the details.

They will be known some time. The result of our refusal was that Russia turned to Vienna directly, and entered into an agreement with Austria--I believe it was in January, 1877--concerning the possibilities of an Oriental crisis, granting her, if The crisis should take place, the occupation of Bosnia, etc. Then the war took place, and we were very glad that the storm raged further south than it had threatened at first. The war was definitely concluded here in Berlin by the Congress, after the preliminaries had been settled by the peace of San Stefano. The peace of San Stefano, I am convinced, was not more risky for the anti-Russian powers nor much more favorable for Russia than the subsequent congressional treaty. The stipulations of San Stefano were realized, one may say, of their own accord later on, when the little state of East Rumelia, with only 800,000 souls I believe, joined Bulgaria and thereby reestablished on its own responsibility the old San Stefano frontier, although not quite exactly. The damage, therefore, which the Congress inflicted on the agreements of San Stefano was not very considerable. Whether these agreements were masterpieces of diplomacy I leave undecided. We had then very little desire to mix in Oriental affairs, just as we have today.

I was seriously ill in Friedrichsruh when I was officially notified of the Russian wish to call a Congress of the great powers in Berlin for the definite settlement of the war. I was at first not favorably inclined, because I was physically incapacitated, and because I did not wish to involve ourselves in these matters to the extent which the presidency of a Congress necessitates. My final compliance was partly due to the German sense of duty, which does anything in the interest of peace, and partly to the grateful memory of the favors of Alexander I., which I have always remembered, and which induced me to grant also this request. I declared my willingness, provided we could secure the acceptance of England and Austria. Russia undertook to secure the consent of England, and I agreed to recommend the plan in Vienna. We were successful, and the Congress took place.

During the Congress, I may well say, I played my part--without hurting the interests of my country or of our friends--just as if I had been the fourth Russian plenipotentiary--I may almost say the third, for I can hardly accept Prince Gortschakoff as a representative of the then Russian policy, which was more truly represented by Count Schuwaloff.

During the whole course of the congressional deliberations I heard of no Russian wish which I did not recommend and push through. Thanks to the confidence which Lord Beaconsfield--unfortunately dead now--reposed in me, I called at his sickbed in the middle of the night during the most difficult and critical moments of the Congress, when disruption seemed near, and obtained his consent. In short my behavior in the Congress was such that I said to myself when it was over: "If the highest Russian decoration set in diamonds had not been bestowed upon me long ago, I should surely receive it now." I had the feeling of having done something for a foreign power which is rarely vouchsafed to a foreign minister to do.

What, then, were my surprise and natural disappointment, when gradually a sort of newspaper campaign began in St. Petersburg, attacking the German policy, and casting suspicion on my personal intentions. These attacks increased in the following year to the strong request, in 1879, for pressure to be exerted by us on Austria in matters where we could not attack the Austrian rights as such. I could not consent, for, if we should have been estranged from Austria, we should necessarily have fallen into a dependence on Russia, unless we were satisfied with standing entirely alone in Europe. Would such a dependence have been bearable? Formerly I had believed it might be, when I had said to myself: "We have no conflicting interests at all.

There is no reason why Russia should ever cancel our friendship." At least I had never contradicted my Russian colleagues when they expounded such theories to me. The Russian behavior concerning the Congress disappointed me and told me that we were not protected from being drawn into a conflict with Russia against our wishes, even if we placed our policy (for a time) completely at her disposal. The disagreement concerning instructions which we had given or had not given to our representatives in the south grew, until threats resulted, threats of war from the most authoritative quarter.

This is the origin of our Austrian Treaty. By these threats we were compelled to choose between our two former friends, a decision which I had avoided through several decades. At that time I negotiated in Gastein and in Vienna the treaty which was published day before yesterday and which is in force between us today.

The publication has been partly misunderstood in the newspapers, as I read yesterday and the day before. People have wanted to see in it an ultimatum, a warning, and a threat. A threat could not possibly be contained in it, since the text of the treaty has been known to Russia for a long while, and not only since November of last year. We considered it due to the sincerity of so loyal a monarch as the Emperor of Russia not to leave a doubt concerning the actual state of affairs.

Personally I see no chance for us _not_ to have concluded this treaty.

If we had not done it, we should have to do it _now_. It possesses the finest quality of an international treaty, in that it is the expression of the lasting interests of both parties, Austria as well as ourselves. No great power can for any length of time cling to the wording of a treaty against the interests of its own people; it will at last be forced to declare openly: "Times have changed; we can no longer do this;" and will have to defend its action as best it can before its own people and the other contracting party. But no power will approve a course which leads its own people to destruction, for the sake of the letter of a treaty signed under different conditions.

Nothing of this kind, however, is contained in these treaties. The treaty concluded with Austria, as well as other similar ones existing between us and other powers, notably some agreements into which we have entered with Italy, are the expression of common interests in mutual aspirations and dangers. Italy, like ourselves, has been obliged to fight against Austria for her right to establish her national union. At present both of us are living in peace with Austria, sharing with her the wish to ward off the dangers which are threatening all alike. Together we wish to preserve the peace, which is as dear to the one as to the other, and to protect our home--developments to which all of us are determined to devote ourselves. It is these aims and the mutual confidence that the treaties will be kept, and that no one will grow more dependent by them than their own interests permit, which make these treaties firm, durable and permanent!

The extent to which our treaty with Austria is the expression of our mutual interests was shown at Nikolsburg, and in 1870. Already during the negotiations of Nikolsburg we were of the opinion that we could not do for any length of time without Austria in Europe--a strong and vigorous Austria. In 1870, when the war between ourselves and France broke out, many sensitive Austrians whom we had hurt were naturally tempted to make use of this opportunity and to take revenge for 1866.

The thoughtful and far seeing diplomats, however, of the Austrian cabinet had to ask themselves: "What will be the result? What will be our position, if today we a.s.sist the French, and help them to beat Prussia, or even Germany?" What would have been the result if France with the help of Austria had been victorious over us? If Austria had followed such a policy, she could have had no other aim than to resume her former position in Germany: for this was really the only thing she had given up in 1866. There had been no other important conditions, and the pecuniary ones had been insignificant. Well then, what would have been the position of Austria as the presiding power in the German Union, if she had to confess that in alliance with France she had taken from Germany the left bank of the Rhine, that she had reduced the south German states to a renewed dependence on France in the shape of a Rhenish Federation, and had condemned Prussia to an irrevocable dependence on Russia, subject in future to Russian policies?

Such a position was unacceptable to all Austrian statesmen not completely blinded by wrath and vengeance. The same is also true with us in Germany. Imagine Austria struck from the map of Europe. Then we and Italy would be isolated on the continent, hemmed in between Russia and France, the two strongest military powers next to Germany, either continually one against two--and this would be most probable--or alternately dependent on one or the other. But this will not be the case. It is impossible to imagine Austria away, for a State like Austria does not disappear. It is estranged if it is jilted, as was proposed in the Villafranca negotiations, and will be inclined to offer the hand to him who, on his part, has been the opponent of an unreliable friend.

In short, if we wish to avoid being isolated, which is especially dangerous for Germany in our a.s.sailable position, we must have a reliable friend. Thanks to the similarities of our interests, and this treaty before you, we have two such friends. It is not love which makes them reliable, for nations may make war one upon the other because they hate, but it has never yet happened that one nation has sacrificed itself for the other for mere love. Nor do they always fight when they hate each other, for, if this were the case, France would have to be fighting incessantly, not only with us, but also with England and Italy. She hates all her neighbors. I also believe that the Russian hatred of us, which has been artificially fanned, will not last. We are united with our allies in love of peace, not only by inclination and friendship, but also by the most cogent interests of a European equilibrium and of our own future.

For these reasons I believe you will approve the Emperor's policy that has concluded the published treaty, although it increases the possibility of war.

There can be no doubt that the pa.s.sage of the pending bill will add much weight to the alliance which we have joined, and that the member which is represented by the German empire will be immeasurably strengthened. The bill gives us an increase of trained troops, a possible increase of troops, which we need not summon, if we do not need them. We can leave the men at home. But, having them in reserve, we shall also have the arms for them, and this is the all-important thing. I remember the old blunderbuses furnished in 1813 for our _Landwehr_ by England, with which I was drilled in the _cha.s.seurs_.

They were no weapons for war--such we cannot furnish at a moment's notice. But, when once we have the proper weapons, this new bill means an increase of the guarantees of peace, and as strong an increase of the league of peace as if a fourth great power had joined it with 700,000 men, which as you know used to be the maximum figure of a national army. This tremendous increase will also have a quieting effect, I believe, on our own people, and will somewhat alleviate the nervousness of our public opinion and of our bankers and editors. I hope you will be relieved when you realize that after this increase, and from the very moment this bill is signed and published, the men will be ready. A scanty supply of arms for them might even now be at hand, but we must secure better ones, for if we form an army of triarians, of the best human material which we have among our people, men over thirty years of age and fathers of families, then we must have for them also the best arms that can be secured. We should not send them into battle with arms which we do not deem good enough for our regular troops. These staunch men, fathers of families, and gigantic figures, as we remember them from the time when they held the bridge of Versailles, should carry on their shoulders the best of guns, and have the most complete armor and necessary clothing to ward off the hardships of the weather and other ills. In such matters we must not be saving.

After listening to the survey of forty years which I have just given it is natural that our fellow-citizens should realize the ever-present danger of a coalition against us and the possibility of a double attack, in which I, to be sure, do not believe. The thought, however, that in such a case we can have one million good soldiers for our defense on either frontier will be most rea.s.suring to them. In addition, we can keep at home reserves of half a million and more, or even a million, sending them to the front as they may be needed. I have been told: "The result will be that the others will also increase their strength." This they cannot do, for they long ago reached their highest figure. We decreased our figures in 1867, because we believed that we could take things easy, with the North German Alliance at our disposal, and could release from service all men over thirty-two years of age. Our neighbors subsequently adopted a longer period of service, many one as long as twenty years. The minister of war will be able to explain this to you more in detail, if he will address you. In figures the others are as strong as we, but in quality they cannot equal us.

Courage is the same with all civilized nations, the Russian or the Frenchman fights as bravely as the German; but our people, our 700,000 men, are experienced, _rompus au metier,_ trained soldiers who have not forgotten anything.

In addition, no nation in the world can equal us in our material of officers and subalterns to direct such a huge army. This means the remarkable degree to which popular education has spread in Germany, and which appears in no other country. The degree of education which is needed to qualify an officer and a subaltern to command according to what the soldiers expect of them, is found with us far more extensively than elsewhere. We have more of the material out of which officers, and more out of which subalterns are made, than any other country, and we have a body of officers which no country in the world can equal.

This, and the excellence of our subalterns, who are the pupils of our officers, const.i.tute our superiority. The other nations cannot equal us in the amount of education which qualifies an officer to fulfil the severe requirements of his station, and of good comradeship to bear all the necessary privations, and at the same time to satisfy the exceedingly difficult social demands which must be met, if the feeling of good fellowship between officers and men, which thank G.o.d exists in our army to a high and often stirring degree, is to be established without detracting from the authority of the officers. The relations existing, especially in war time, between our officers and men are inimitable,--with few evil exceptions which only prove the rule, for on the whole we may say: No German officer forsakes his men under fire; he saves them at the risk of his life, and they do the same; no German soldier forsakes his officer--we have experienced this.

If other nations are obliged to furnish with officers and subalterns equally large troops as we are intending to create by this bill, they may be forced by circ.u.mstances to appoint officers who will not succeed in guiding a company through a narrow gate, and even less in meeting the heavy obligations of the officer who is to retain the esteem and love of his men. The amount of education which is needed for this, and the amount of _camaraderie_ and sense of honor which we find among our officers, can be elicited from no other body of officers anywhere in the world, either by rules or injunctions. In this we are superior to everybody, and that is why they cannot imitate us. I am, therefore, not at all afraid of it.

Then there is another advantage if this bill is pa.s.sed. The very strength at which we are aiming necessarily renders us pacific. This sounds like a paradox, but it is not.